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The Sunni Theory of Government
Those Muslims who claim that they follow the
traditions (the statements and practices) of Muhammad Mustafa, the Prophe of Islam, and of
his companions, are called Ahl-es-Sunnat wal-Jama'at or Sunni. They also call themselves
"orthodox" Muslims, and they make up the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in
the world. The Sunni Muslims believe that the Prophet of Islam
did not designate anyone as his successor, and he (probably) assumed that after his death,
the Muslims would find a leader for themselves. They further say that the Prophet did not
even tell his followers how they ought to select their future leaders or what
qualifications those leaders should have. Thus, lacking both precedent and guidance in the
matter of finding their leaders, the companions had no choice but to take recourse to
improvisation. But improvisation is not policy, and inevitably, it
turned out to be a rather erratic manner of finding leaders of the Muslim umma
(community). In one case the companions found a leader through what was supposed to be an
election. In another case, the first incumbent (who was elected), nominated and appointed
his own successor. In the third instance, the second incumbent (who was nominated),
appointed a committee of six men and charged them with the duty of selecting one out of
themselves as the future leader of the Muslim community. The third leader, so selected, was killed in the
midst of anarchy and chaos, and the umma was left without a head. The companions then
turned to the family of their Prophet, and appealed to one of its members to take charge
of the government of the Muslims, and thereby to save it from breakdown and dissolution. The fourth incumbent was still ruling the Muslims
when a new candidate for leadership arose in Syria. He brushed aside the hoax of election,
challenged the lawful sovereign of the Muslims by invoking the principle of brute force,
and succeeded in capturing the government. His action brought the number of the
"principles" for finding leaders of the Muslim umma to four, viz. 1. Election: Abu Bakr was elected khalifa (successor of the
Prophet) by a majority vote in Saqifa.(Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth incumbent, was also
elected khalifa by a majority of the Muhajireen and Ansar who were present in Medina at
the death of the third khalifa). 2. Nomination: Umar was appointed by Abu Bakr as his successor. 3. Selection by plutocrats: Uthman was selected khalifa by a committee of six
men appointed by Umar. 4. Seizure of the government by naked force: Muawiya bin Abu Sufyan seized the government of the
Muslims by military action. The Sunni Muslims consider all these four
"principles" as lawful and valid. In this manner, four different
"constitutional" modes of finding a leader for the Muslim umma came into being. Here it should be pointed out that though the Sunni
Muslims have given to each of these four different modes of finding leaders for the umma,
the "status" of a "principle," none of them was derived from the Book
of God (Qur’an) or from the Book of the Prophet (Hadith). All of them were derived
from the events which took place after the death of the Prophet of Islam. In the history of any country, constitution-making
is the first step toward nation-building. The constitution is the organic law of the land.
It is the basic framework of public authority. It determines and defines the
responsibilities, duties and powers of the government. All major decisions affecting the
interests of the nation, are taken in the light of its principles. Whatever is in
agreement with it, is held legal and valid; whatever is not, is discarded as
unconstitutional. H.A.R. Gibb The law precedes the state, both logically and in
terms of time; and the state exists for the sole purpose of maintaining and enforcing the
law." (Law in the Middle East) But the Sunni theory of government suffers from a
built-in anomaly. As a rule, policies and actions of the political leaders ought to follow
the principles of the constitution; but they do not. Instead, it is the constitution that
follows the events resulting from the decisions and actions of the political leaders. In
other words, it is not the constitution that runs the government; it is, instead, the
government, i.e., the political leaders heading the government who "run" the
constitution. Actually, there is no such thing as a Sunni theory
of government. Whenever a new event took place, the Sunni jurists invoked a new
"theory" or a new "principle" to rationalize it. In this manner they
invested their theory of government with a protean character and a flexibility which is
truly remarkable. The Sunni theory and practice of government have
been studied and analyzed by many students of Islamic political development, both ancient
and modern, Muslim and non-Muslim. The author of Sharh-Mawaqif, a classical Arab writer,
believes that the only requirement in a candidate for leadership, is his ability to seize
and to hold power. He says: "When an Imam dies and a person possessing the
necessary qualifications claims that office (without the oath of allegiance, i.e., Bay'a,
having been taken for him, and without his having been nominated to succeed), his claim to
caliphate will be recognized, provided his power subdues the people; and apparently the
same will be the case when the new caliph happens to be ignorant or immoral. And similarly
when a caliph has thus established himself by superior force and is afterwards subdued by
another person, the overpowered caliph will be deposed and the conqueror will be
recognized as Imam or Caliph." Another analyst of classical times, Taftazani, is of
the opinion that a leader may be a tyrant or he may be immoral; he is nevertheless a
lawful ruler of the Muslims. He writes in his book, Sharh-Aqa'id-Nasafi: "An Imam is not liable to be deposed on the
grounds of his being oppressive or impious." Stewart Robinson has quoted Imam Ghazzali, in his
book, The Traditional Near East, as saying: "An evil-doing and barbarous sultan must be
obeyed." Some modern analysts of the Islamic political
thought have also noted the inconsistencies in the Sunni theory of government. Following
is the testimony of a few of them: H.A.R. Gibb Sunni political theory was, in fact, only the
rationalization of the history of the community. Without precedents, no theory, and all
the imposing fabric of interpretation of the sources, is merely the post eventum
justification of the precedents which have been ratified by ijma. (Studies on the
Civilization of Islam, 1962) Bernard Lewis The first four caliphs, sanctified by Muslim
tradition as the righteous rulers, did indeed emerge from the Muslim elite on a
non-hereditary basis, by processes which might be described as electoral in the Sunni
legal sense; but three of the four reigns were ended by murder, the last two amid civil
war. Thereafter, the Caliphate in effect became hereditary in two successive dynasties,
the Umayyads and the Abbasids, whose system and style of government owed rather more to
the autocratic empires of antiquity than to the patriarchal community of Medina. The
subject's duty of obedience remained, and was indeed reinforced; the Caliph's obligation
to meet the requirements of eligibility and fulfill the conditions of incumbency was
emptied of most of its content. This disparity between theory and practice –
between the noble precepts of the law and the brutal facts of government - has led some
scholars to dismiss the whole political and constitutional system of the classical Muslim
jurists as an abstract and artificial construction, as little related to reality as the
civil liberties enshrined in the constitutions of modern dictatorships. The comparison is
exaggerated and unjust. The great jurists of medieval Islam were neither stupid nor
corrupt – neither ignorant of reality, nor suborned to defend it. On the contrary,
they were moved by a profound religious concern, arising precisely from their awareness of
the gap between the ideals of Islam and the practice of Muslim states. The problem of the
juristic writers on Muslim government was deeper than that posed by the conduct of one or
another individual ruler. It concerned the direction taken by Muslim society as a whole
since the days of the Prophet – a direction that had led it very far from the ethical
and political ideas of prophetic Islam. Yet to impugn the validity of the system of
government under which the Muslims lived was to impugn the orthodoxy of the Islamic umma,
a position unacceptable to the Sunni ulema, whose very definition of orthodoxy rested on
the precedent and practice of the community. The jurist was thus obliged, in some measure,
to justify the existing order, so as to vindicate the Sunni faith and system against the
charge that they had gone astray and had led the Muslims into a state of sin. (The chapter
on Politics and War published in the volume, Legacy of Islam, 1974) G. E. Von Grunebaum In the presentation of the role of the caliph, one
senses the uneasy efforts of the author to harmonize the ideal task and the humble facts
of his period. The law has laid down unalterable principles, never envisaging the
increasing incapacity of the prince of the Believers to exercise even his more modest
duties. So theory is compelled to compromise, to stretch the concept of election to
include election by one qualified voter - in other words, to sanction the actual situation
in which the caliph is appointed by his predecessor or the military leader who happens to
be in control. Even the possibility of a plurality of leaders of the community has to be
admitted. As in other ages and other civilizations, the theory of power comes to be a
weapon in the fight for power. (Islam, London, 1969) John Alden Williams A representative statement of how Muslim legalists
of the later medieval period viewed the problems of power and Islamic leadership is shown
by a Syrian contemporary of Ibn Taymiya (and with whom the Hanbali naturally disagreed).
Ibn Jama'a (d. 1333) who was one of the highest officials of the Mamluke religious
establishment, and twice Chief Qadi of Cairo. Although he was a Shaf'i, like al-Mawardi,
it is Ibn Jama'a's view which conforms to that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in the creedal
statement found in the dogma: the Imam in power is to be obeyed regardless of how he came
there. In a conflict between unity and justice, the unity of the umma must have
precedence. By extension, whoever wields effective power in any area must be recognized by
the Imam, if he has no means of removing him. In short, rulers must be treated as if they
were perfect whether they are or not: the need of the Community guarded from error require
it. It is a logical view but Ibn Taymiya felt that it was morally bankrupt. (From Imam and
Legality. From Emancipated Judgment in the Governance of Muslims. By Ibn Jama'a (d. 1333
A.D.), Al-Ahkam fi Tadbir Ahl al-Islam). ‘The Imamate is of two sorts: that by election,
and that by usurpation. The elected Imamate is confirmed by two methods, and the usurped
Imamate by a third method. The first method in the elected Imamate is by an oath of those
with power to loose and bind. The second method is for the Imam to be chosen as successor
by the one before him. ‘As for the third method, by which the
acclamation of a usurper is made valid, it is effected by overcoming the wielder of
effective power, and if there is no Imam at the time, and one sets himself up who is
otherwise not qualified for the office, and overcomes people by his power and by his
troops without any election or appointment to the succession, then his acclamation is
valid and one is bound to obey him, so that the unity of the Muslims be assured and they
speak with one voice. It makes no difference if he is ignorant or unjust, according to the
most correct opinion, and then another rises and overcomes the first by his power and
troops, and the first is deposed, then the second becomes the Imam, for the sake, as we
have said, of the welfare of the Muslims and their unity of expression. For this reason,
Umar's son said at the Battle of Harra: "We are with the one who wins" (page
91). In effect, the Umma entrusted its affairs to a
Caliph, and asked him to be a perfect absolute ruler. Apart from the question of whether
this is not usually a contradiction in terms, there was no sure apparatus for choosing him
or ensuring a peaceful transmission of his power, and often or even usually men came to
power by violent means. Once they were there, there was no mechanism for removing them
except more violence, which was forbidden by law. It was a melancholy fact that in most
states, except those few like the Ottoman and Mughal empires who succeeded in establishing
the principle of hereditary succession, "nothing so well suited a man for power as
criminal instincts.". (Themes of Islamic Civilization, 1971, University of California
Press, Berkeley) The Sunni jurists and theorists were capable of
making endless adjustments and compromises. They were willing to acknowledge as lawful
rulers, not only the Muslim tyrants and usurpers but also the non-Muslim ones. Bernard Lewis Much has been written about the influence of the
Crusades on Europe. Rather less has been written about the effects of these and related
struggles on the lands of Islam. For the first time since the beginning, the Muslims had
been compelled by military defeat to cede vast areas of old Islamic territory to Christian
rulers, and to leave large Muslim populations under Christian rule. Both facts were
accepted with remarkable equanimity. In both West and East, Muslim rulers were willing to
have dealings with their new neighbors, and even on occasion to make alliances with them
against brother Muslims - as an obligation of the Holy Law - of submitting to tyrants, had
little difficulty in extending the argument to include unbelievers. ‘Whose power
prevails must be obeyed,' provided only that he allows Muslims to practice their religion
and obey the Holy Law. The realm of such a sovereign may even, according to some jurists,
be considered as part of the House of Islam. (Politics and War, published in the book,
Legacy of Islam). The sum and substance of the foregoing analysis is
that the Sunni theory of government admits of only one principle, viz., brute force.
Almost all Sunni jurists and theorists have given their blessings to this
"principle." As a principle, brute force has been the only constant of the Sunni
theory of government ever since Muawiya seized the caliphate in A.D. 661. It means that if
a man can revive, in the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth, as elsewhere, the ancient law known
as "Might is Right," he is the lawful ruler of the Muslim umma. The government
has no theory or structure or instrumentality beyond arbitrary force. The commandments of
God enshrined in Al-Qur’an al-Majid, the wishes, the precedents and the commandments
of His Messenger, and the code of ethics, all are, irrelevant. Not so surprisingly perhaps, this attitude of the
Sunni jurists persists into modern times. The Congress of the Caliphate meeting in Cairo,
Egypt, in 1926, laid it down that a Muslim can legitimately become a caliph if he
establishes his claim by conquest, even if he does not fulfill any of the other conditions
required by the jurists. In his analysis given above, Dr. Williams has quoted
Abdullah the son of Umar bin al-Khattab (the second khalifa) as stating that he (Abdullah)
is with the winner whoever he may be. This Abdullah was noted for his piety and religious
zeal and knowledge. He spent or tried to spend as much time in the company of the Prophet
as he could, and if he (Abdullah) said anything, it was (and still is) considered
something most authoritative in the entire Sunni establishment. It's amazing that he
didn't think that in any conflict between two individuals or two groups, the question of
right and wrong had any relevance. The only important thing was winning. According to him,
whoever wins, is right. If a gangster succeeds in liquidating all his competitors and
becomes the unquestioned winner in a struggle for power, then the logic of success would
make him the ideal material for the most important executive office in the Muslim world.
All he has to do to prove that he is the most highly qualified candidate for the throne of
caliphate, is to demonstrate that he can seize it by brute force, and if he does, it will
be his - no credentials in Islam like brute force! The Sunni jurists, theorists and political analysts
have shown astonishing consistency, in all their expositions, in upholding the principle
that obedience must be given to whoever has power in his hands. This probably is the
reason why passive obedience to the ruler has been, in the words of Elie Kedourie,
"the dominant political tradition in Islam," and why the excessive respect of
the Muslims for the fait accompli has given "its unmistakable character to Muslim
history." The Shia Muslims discount the Sunni theory of
government for its lack of moral consensus and its lack of consistency. They say that a
principle must either be right or it must be wrong, and the only touchstone to test if it
is right or wrong, is Al-Qur’an al-Majid. Muslims of the whole world may unanimously
enact a law but if it is repugnant to Qur’an, it cannot be Islamic. The source of
moral consensus in Islam is Qur’an, and not the "majority." The Shia Muslims also say that there must be
consistency in the application of a law or a principle. But if there is not, and a new
"law" or a new "principle" has to be invoked to fit each new
situation, then it will have to be called not policy but expediency. As noted above, the
only consistency in the Sunni theory of government is to be found in the unqualified
acceptance, by Sunni jurists and scholars, of the "principle" that power is the
arbiter of this world, and Muslims, therefore, must kowtow to it. Even Imam Ghazali says
that this "principle" must be upheld because it is a commandment to the Muslims
of Al-Qur’an al-Majid itself. Imam Ghazali is one of the most prestigious figures
in the Muslim world. He is generally considered the greatest theologian of Sunni Islam.
Some Sunni scholars have gone so far as to claim that if any man could be a Prophet after
Muhammad Mustafa, he would be Imam Ghazali. And yet, he advised Muslims to acquiesce in
the abuse of autocratic power by a dictator or a military leader because (he said that)
their obligation to obey the established authority rested upon the text of Qur’an
itself: "Obey God, His Apostle and those at the head of the affairs." It is
amazing that a man like Imam Ghazali could do nothing more than endorse a most
stereotypical interpretation of this verse. Al-Qur’an al-Majid, incidentally, is a stranger
to all the theories of government and principles of political organization discovered,
articulated and codified by the majority of the Muslims, and this for a very simple
reason, viz., it has its own theory of government and its own political philosophy. It
does not have, therefore, any interest in any alien theory or philosophy of
government. Qur’an's political philosophy has been dealt
with in another chapter in this book.
