Asrari Khudi [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

INTRODUCTION

THE Asrar-i-Khudi
was first published at Lahore in 1915. I read it soon afterwards and thought so highly of
it that I wrote to Iqbal, whom I had the pleasure of meeting at Cambridge some fifteen
years ago, asking leave to prepare an English translation. My proposal was cordially
accepted, but in the meantime I found other work to do, which caused the translation to be
laid aside until last year. Before submitting it to the reader, a few remarks are
necessary concerning the poem and its author-"
Iqbal is an Indian Muslim. During
his stay in the West he studied modem philosophy, in which subjects he holds degrees from
the Universities of Cambridge and Munich. His dissertation on the development of
metaphysics in Persia-an illuminating sketch-appeared as a book in 1908. Since then he has
developed a philosophy of his own, on which I am able to give some extremely interesting
notes communicated by himself. Of this, however, the Asrar-i-Khudi gives no
systematic account, though it puts his ideas in a popular and attractive form. While the
Hind a philosophers, in explaining the doctrine of the unity of being, addressed
themselves to the head, Iqbal, like the Persian poets who teach the same doctrine, takes a
more dangerous course and aims at the heart. He is no mean poet, and his verse can rouse
or persuade even if his logic fail to convince. His message is not for the Mohammedans of
India alone, but for Muslims everywhere: accordingly he writes in Persian instead of
Hindustani a happy choice, for amongst educated Muslims there are many familiar with
Persian literature, while the Persian language is singularly well-adapted to express
philosophical ideas in a style at once elevated and charming.
Iqbal comes forward as an
apostle, if not to his own age, then to posterity
"I have no need of the ear
of To-day.

I am the voice of the poet of To-morrow"
and after Persian fashion he
invokes the Saki to fill his cup with wine and pour moonbeams into the dark night of his
thought.
That I may lead home the
wanderer.

And imbue the idle looker-on with restless impatience.

And advance hotly on a new quest.

And become known as the champion of a new spirit."
Let us begin at the end. What is
the far-off goal on which his eyes are fixed? The answer to that question will discover
his true character, and we shall be less likely to stumble on the way if we see whither we
are going. Iqbal has drunk deep of European literature, his philosophy owes much to
Nietzsche and Bergson, and his poetry; often remians us of Shelly ; yet he thinks and
feels as a Muslim, and just for this reason his influence may be great. He is a religious
enthusiast, inspired by the vision of a New Mecca, a world-wide, theocratic, Utopian state
in which all Muslims, no longer divided by the barriers of race and country, shall be one.
He will have nothing to do with nationalism and imperialism. -These, he says, "rob us
of Paradise": they make us strangers to each Other, destroy feelings of brotherhood,
and sow the bitter seed of war. He dreams of a world ruled by religion, not by politics,
and condemns Machiavelli, that "worshipper of false goods," who has blinded so
many. It must be observed that when he speaks of religion he always means Islam.
Non-Muslims are simply unbelievers, and (in theory, at any rate) the Jihad is
justifiable, provided that it is waged "for God's sake alone." A free and
independent Muslim fraternity, having the Ka'ba as its centre and knit together by love of
Allah and devotion to the Prophet-such is lqbal's ideal. In the Asrar-i-Khudi and
the' Ramuz-i-Bekhudi lie preaches it with a burning sincerity which we cannot but
admire, and at the same time points out how it may be attained. The former poem deals with
the life of the individual Muslim, the latter with the life of the Islamic community.
The cry "Back to the Koran!
Back to Mohammad!" has been heard before, and the responses have hitherto been
somewhat discouraging. But on this occasion it is allied with the revolutionary force of
Western philosophy, which Iqbal hopes and believes will vitalise the movement and ensure
its triumph. He sees that Hindu intellectualism and Islamic pantheism have destroyed the
capacity for action, based on scientific observation and interpretation of phenomena,
which distinguishes the Western peoples "and especially the English." Now; this
capacity depends ultimately on the conviction that Khudi (selfhood, individuality,
personality) is real and is not merely an illusion of the mind. Iqbal, therefore, throws
himself with all his might against idealistic philosophers and pseudo-mystical poets, the
authors, in his opinion, of the decay prevailing in Islam, and argues that only by self
affirmation, self-expression, and self development can the Muslims once more become strong
and -free. He appeals from the alluring raptures of Hafiz to the moral fervour of Jalalu'd
din Rumi, from an Islam sunk in Platonic contemplation to the fresh and vigorous
monotheism which inspired Mohammed and brought Islam into existence-² Here,
perhaps, I should guard against a possible misunderstanding Iqbal's philosophy is
religious, but the does not treat philosophy as the handmaid of religion. Holding that the
full development of the individual presupposes a society, he finds the ideal society in
what he considers to be the Prophet's conception of Islam. Every Muslim, in striving to
make himself a more perfect individual, is helping to establish the-Islamic kingdom of God
upon earth.³
The Asrar-i-Khudi is
composed in the metre and modelled on the style of the famous Masnavi. In the
prologue lqbal relates how Jalalu'd din Rumi, who is to him almost what Virgil was to
Dante, appeared in a vision and bade him arise and sing. Much as be dislikes the type of
Sufism exhibited by Hafiz, he pays homage to the pure and profound genius of Jalalu'ddin,
though he rejects the doctrine of self-abandonment taught by the great Persian mystic and
does not accompany him in his pan theistic Rights.
To European readers the Asrar-i Khudi
presents certain obscurities which no translation can entirely remove. These lie partly in
the form and would not be felt, as a rule, by any one conversant with Persian poetry.
Often, however, the ideas themselves, being associated with peculiarly Oriental ways of
thinking, are hard for our minds to follow. I am not sure that I have always grasped the
meaning or rendered it correctly; but I hope that such errors are few, thanks to the
assistance so kindly given me by my friend Muhammad Shafi, now Professor of Arabic at
Lahore, with whom I read the poem and discussed many points of difficulty. Other questions
of a more fundamental character have been solved for me by the author himself. At my
request he drew up a statement of his philosophical- views on the problem touched and
suggested in the book. I will give it in his own words as nearly as possible. It is not,
of course, a complete statement, and was written, as he says, "in a great
hurry," but apart from its power and originality it elucidates the poetical argument
for better than any explanation that could have been offered by me.
1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE
ASRAR-I-KHUDI
"'The experience should take
place in finite centres and should wear the form of finite this-ness is in the end
inexplicable.' These are the words of Prof. Bradley. But starting- with these inexplicable
centres of experience, he ends in a unity which -he calls Absolute and in which the finite
centres lose their finiteness and distinctness. According to him, therefore, the finite
centre is only an appearance. The test of reality, in his opinion is all-inclusiveness;
and since all finiteness is 'infected with relativity, it follows that the latter is a
mere illusion. To my mind, this inexplicable finite centre of experience is the
fundamental fact of the universe. All life is individual; there is no such thing as
universal life. God himself is an individual: He is the most unique individual.⁴
The universe, as Dr. McTaggart says, is an -association of individual ; but we must add
that the orderliness and adjustment which we find in this association is not eternally
achieved and complete in itself. it is the result of instinctive or conscious effort. We
are gradually travelling from chaos to cosmos and are helpers in this achievement. Nor are
the members of the association fixed; new members are ever coming to birth to co-operate
in the great task. Thus the universe is not a completed act: it is still in the course of
formation. There can be no complete truth about the universe, for the universe has not yet
become 'whole.' The process of creation is still going on, and man too takes his share in
it, inasmuch as he helps to bring order into at least a portion or the chaos. The Koran
indicates the possibility of other creators than God.⁵
"Obviously this view of man
and the universe is opposed to that of the English Neo-Hegelians as well as to all forms
of pantheistic Sufiism which regard absorption in a universal life or soul as the final
aim and salvation of man.⁶ The moral and religious ideal of man is not
self-negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more
individual, more and more unique. The Prophet said, 'Takhallaqu bi-akhlaq Allah,'
'Create in yourselves the attributes of God.' Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and
more like the most unique Individual. What then is life? It is individual : its highest
form, so far, is the Ego (Khudi) in which the individual becomes a self contained
exclusive centre. Physically as well as spiritually man is a self-contained centre, but he
is not yet a complete individual. The greater his distance from God, the less his
individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. Nor that he is
finally absorbed in God. On the contrary, he absorbs God into himself.⁷ The
true person not only absorbs the world of matter; by mastering it he absorbs God Himself
into his Ego. Life is a forward assimilative movement. It removes all obstructions in its
march by assimilating them. Its essence is the continual creation of desires and ideals,
and for the purpose of it its preservation and expansion it has invented or developed out
of itself certain instruments, ,e.g., senses, intellect, etc., which help in to assimilate
obstructions.⁸ The greatest obstacle in the way of life is matter. Nature ; yet
Nature is not evil, since it enables the inner powers of life to unfold themselves.
"The Ego attains to freedom
by the removal of all observations in its way. It is partly free, partly determined⁹,
and reaches fuller freedom by approaching the Individual. who is most free-God. In one
word, life is an endeavour for freedom.
2. THE EGO AND CONTINUATION OF
PERSONALITY
"In man the centre of life
becomes an Ego or Person. Personality is a state of tension and can continue only if that
state is maintained. If the state of tension is not maintained,, relaxation will ensue.
Since personality, or the state of tension, is the most valuable achievement of man, he
should see that he does not revert to a state of relaxation. That which tends to maintain
the state of tension tends to make us immortal. Thus the idea of personality gives us a
standard of value : it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies
personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art,¹⁰ religion, and ethics¹¹
must be judged from the stand-point of personality. My criticism of Plato¹² is
directed against those philosophical systems which hold up death rather than life as their
ideal-systems which ignore the greatest obstruction to life, namely, matter, and teach us
to run away from it instead of absorbing it. "As in connexion with the question of
the freedom of the Ego we have to face the problem of matter, similarly in connexion with
its immortality we have to face the problem of time.¹³ Bergson has taught us
that time is not an infinite line (in the spatial sense of the word 'line') through which
we must pass whether we wish it or not. This idea of time is adulterated. Pure time has no
length. Personal immorality is an aspiration: you can have it if you make an effort to
achieve it. It depends on our adopting, in this life modes of thought and activity which
tend to maintain the state of tension. Buddhism, Persian Sufism and allied forms of ethics
will not serve our purpose. But they are not wholly useless, because after periods of
great activity we need opiates, narcotics, for some time. They forms of thought and action
are like, nights in the days of life. Thus, if our activity is directed towards the
maintenance of a state of tension, the shock of death is not likely to affect it. After
death there may be an interval of relaxation, as the Koran speaks of a barzakh, or
intermediate state, which lasts until the Day of Resurrection¹⁴. Only those
Egos will survive this state of relaxation who have taken good care during the present
life. Although life abhors repetition in its evolution, yet on Bergson's principles the
resurrection of the body too, as Wildon Carr says, is quite possible. By breaking up time
into moments we spatialise it and then find difficulty in getting over it. The true nature
of time is reached when we look into our deepar self.¹⁵ Real time is life
itself which can preserve itself by maintaining that. particular state of tension
(personality) which it has so far achieved. We are subject to time so long as we look upon
time as something spatial.. Spatialised time is a fetter which life has forged for itself
in order to assimilate the present environment. In reality we are timeless, and it is
possible to realise our timelessness even in this life. This revelation, however, can be
momentary only.
3. THE EDUCATION OF THE EGO
"The Ego is fortified by
love (Ishq)¹⁶. This word is used in a very wide sense and means the
desire to assimilate, to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and
the endeavour to realise them. Love individualises the lover as well as the beloved. The
effort to realise the most unique individuality individualises the seeker and implies the
individuality of the sought, for nothing else would satisfy the nature of the seeker. As
love fortifies the Ego, asking (sua'l) weakens it." All that is achieved
without personal effort comes under sua'l. The son of a rich man who inherits his
father's wealth is an 'asker' (beggar); so is every one who thinks the thoughts of others.
Thus, in order to fortify the Ego we should cultivate love, i.e. the power of assimilative
action, and avoid all forms of 'asking, ie. inaction. The lesson of assimilative action is
given by the life of the Prophet, at least to a Muhammadan.¹⁷
"In another part of the poem¹⁸
I have hinted at the general principles of Muslim ethics and have tried to reveal their
meaning in connexion with the idea of personality. The Ego in its movement towards
uniqueness has to pass through three stages :
(a) Obedience to the Law.

(b) Self-control, which is the highest form of self-consciousness or Ego-hood!¹⁹

(c) Divine vicegerency.²⁰
"This (divine vicegerency,
niyabat-e-Alahi) is the third and last stage of human development on earth. The na'ib
(vicegerent) is the vicegerent of God on earth. He is the completest Ego, the goal of
humanity²¹, the acume of life both in mind and body; in him the -discord of our
mental life becomes a harmony. This highest power is united in him with the highest
knowledge. In this life thought and action, instinct and reason become one. He is the last
fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trial of a painful evolution are justified
because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the
kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of life
on others, and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The more we advance in
evolution,, the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are raising ourselves in the
scale of life. The development of humanity both in mind and body is a condition precedent
to his birth. For the present he is a mere ideal ; but the evolution of humanity is
tending towards the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who
will become his fitting parents. Thus the Kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of
more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on
this earth. Nietzsche had a glimpse of this ideal race, but his atheism and aristocratic
prejudices marred his whole conception."²²
Every one, I suppose, will
acknowledge that the substance of the Asrar i-Khudi is striking enough to command
attention. In the -poem, naturally, this philosophy presents itself under a different
aspect. Its audacity of thought and phrase is less apparent, its logical brilliancy
dissolves in the glow of feeling and imagination, and it wins the heart before taking
possession of the mind. The artistic quality of the poem is remarkable when we consider
that its language is not the author's own I have done my best to preserve as much of this
as a literal prose translation would allow. Many passages of the original are poetry of
the kind that, once read, is not easily forgotten, e.g. the description of the Ideal Man
as a deliverer for whom the word is waiting, and the noble invocation which brings the
book to an end. Like Jalal'uddin Rumi, Iqbal is found of introducing fables and apologues
to relieve the argument and illustrate his meaning with more force and point than would be
possible otherwise.
On its first appearance the
Asrar-i Khudi took by storm the younger generation of Indian Muslim. ',Iqbal,"
wrote one of them, "has come amongst us as a Messiah and has stirred the dead with
life." It remains to be seen in what direction the awakened one will march. Will they
-be satisfied with a glorious but distant vision or the City of God, or will they adapt
the new doctrine to other ends than those which its author has in view ? Notwithstanding
that he explicitly denounces the idea of nationalism, his admirers are already protesting
that he does not mean what he says.
How far the influence of his work
may ultimately go I will not attempt to prophesy. It has been said of him that "he is
a man of his age and a man in advance of his age; he is also a man in disagreement with
his age." We cannot regard his ideas as typical of any section of his
co-religionists. They involve a radical change-in the Muslim mind, and their real
importance is not to be measured by the fact that such a change is unlikely to occur
within a calculable time.