AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

by

DAVID HUME

SECTION I

OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature,
may be treated after two different manners; each
of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute
to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of man-
kind.

The one considers man chiefly as born for action;
and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment;
pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to
the value which these objects seem to possess, and accord-
ing to the light in which they present themselves.

As vir-
tue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this
species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable
colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and
treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and
such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage
the affections.

They select the most striking observations
and instances from common life; place opposite characters
in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue
by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in
these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious
examples.

They make us feel the difference between vice
and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and
so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and
true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the
end of all their labours.

The other species of philosophers consider man in the
light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and
endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate
his manners.

They regard human nature as a subject of
speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in
order to find those principles, which regulate our under-
standing, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or
blame any particular object, action, or behaviour.

They
think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should
not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of
morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk
of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and de-
formity, without being able to determine the source of
these distinctions.

While they attempt this arduous task,
they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from
particular instances to general principles, they still push on
their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not
satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by
which, in every science, all human curiosity must be
bounded.

Though their speculations seem abstract, and
even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the
approbation of the learned and the wise; and think them-
selves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole
lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may
contribute to the instruction of posterity.

It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will
always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference
above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be
recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful
than the other.

It enters more into common life; moulds
the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles
which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them
nearer to that model of perfection which it describes.

On
the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a
turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action,
vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes
into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any in-
fluence over our conduct and behaviour.

The feelings of
our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of
our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the
profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

This also must be confessed, that the most durable,
as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy
philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to
have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice
or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able
to support their renown with more equitable posterity.

It
is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake
in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary
parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences,
and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by
its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular
opinion.

But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent
the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more
engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no
farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the
natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path,
and secures himself from any dangerous illusions.

The
fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle
is utterly decayed.

La Bruyere passes the seas, and still
maintains his reputation: but the glory of Malebranche
is confined to his own nation, and to his own age.

And
Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke
shall be entirely forgotten.

The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly
but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to
contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure
of society; while he lives remote from communication with
mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally
remote from their comprehension.

On the other hand,
the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing
deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and
nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely
destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments.

The
most perfect character is supposed to lie between those
extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books,
company, and business; preserving in conversation that
discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters;
and in business, that probity and accuracy which are
the natural result of a just philosophy.

In order to diffuse
and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be
more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner,
which draw not too much from life, require no deep appli-
cation or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the
student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise
precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life.

By
means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable,
science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement en-
tertaining.

Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from
science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow
are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfac-
tion can be hoped for in this particular, either from the
extent of security or his acquisitions.

Man is a sociable, no
less than a reasonable being: but neither can he always
enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the
proper relish for them.

Man is also an active being; and
from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities
of human life, must submit to business and occupation:
but the mind requires some relaxation, and cannot always
support its bent to care and industry.

It seems, then, that
nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable
to the human race, and secretly admonished them to allow
none of these biases to draw too much, so as to incapacitate
them for other occupations and entertainments.

Indulge
your passion for science, says she, but let your science be
human, and such as may have a direct reference to action
and society.

Abstruse thought and profound researches I
prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive melancholy
which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which
they involve you, and by the cold reception which your