AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

abundantly furnished with the idea of passive power by almost all
sorts of sensible things.

In most of them we cannot avoid observing
their sensible qualities, nay, their very substances, to be in a
continual flux.

And therefore with reason we look on them as liable
still to the same change.

Nor have we of active power (which is the
more proper signification of the word power) fewer instances.

Since
whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere
able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself
to receive it.

But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by
our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active
power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds.

For all power relating to action, and there being but two sorts of
action whereof we have an idea, viz.

thinking and motion, let us
consider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce
these actions.

(1) Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all; it
is only from reflection that we have that.

(2) Neither have we from
body any idea of the beginning of motion.

A body at rest affords us no
idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself,
that motion is rather a passion than an action in it.

For, when the
ball obeys the motion of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the
ball, but bare passion.

Also when by impulse it sets another ball in
motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had
received from another, and loses in itself so much as the other
received: which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of
moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, but not produce
any motion.

For it is but a very obscure idea of power which reaches
not the production of the action, but the continuation of the passion.

For so is motion in a body impelled by another; the continuation of
the alteration made in it from rest to motion being little more an
action, than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the
same blow is an action.

The idea of the beginning of motion we have
only from reflection on what passes in ourselves; where we find by
experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the
mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at
rest.

So that it seems to me, we have, from the observation of the
operation of bodies by our senses, but a very imperfect obscure idea
of active power; since they afford us not any idea in themselves of
the power to begin any action, either motion or thought.

But if,
from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one
thinks he has a clear idea of power, it serves as well to my
purpose; sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by
its ideas: only I thought it worth while to consider here, by the way,
whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer
from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any
external sensation.

5 .Will and understanding two powers in mind or spirit

This, at
least, I think evident,- That we find in ourselves a power to begin or
forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions
of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering,
or as it were commanding, the doing or not doing such or such a
particular action.

This power which the mind has thus to order the
consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to
prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa,
in any particular instance, is that which we call the Will.

The actual
exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its
forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing.

The
forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the
mind, is called voluntary.

And whatsoever action is performed
without such a thought of the mind, is called involuntary.

The power
of perception is that which we call the Understanding.

Perception,
which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts:- 1.

The
perception of ideas in our minds.

2 .The perception of the
signification of signs

3.

The perception of the connexion or
repugnancy, agreement or disagreement, that there is between any of
our ideas.

All these are attributed to the understanding, or
perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that use allows
us to say we understand.

6 .Faculties, not real beings

These powers of the mind, viz.

of
perceiving, and of preferring, are usually called by another name.

And
the ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are
two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used, as all
words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts,
by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real
beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and
volition.

For when we say the will is the commanding and superior
faculty of the soul; that it is or is not free; that it determines the
inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding,
&c.

,- though these and the like expressions, by those that carefully
attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the
evidence of things than the sound of words, may be understood in a
clear and distinct sense- yet I suspect, I say, that this way of
speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so
many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and
authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so
many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling,
obscurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them.

7 .Whence the ideas of liberty and necessity

Every one, I think,
finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end
to several actions in himself.

From the consideration of the extent of
this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which everyone
finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.

8 .Liberty, what

All the actions that we have any idea of
reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz.

thinking and
motion; so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or
not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind,
so far is a man free.

Wherever any performance or forbearance are
not equally in a man's power; wherever doing or not doing will not
equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there
he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary.

So that
the idea of liberty is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or
forbear any particular action, according to the determination or
thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other:
where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced
by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that
agent is under necessity.

So that liberty cannot be where there is
no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there
may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty.

A
little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this
clear.

9 .Supposes understanding and will

A tennis-ball, whether in motion
by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one
taken to be a free agent.

If we inquire into the reason, we shall find
it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently
not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice
versa; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its
both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary, and are so
called.

Likewise a man falling into the water, (a bridge breaking
under him), has not herein liberty, is not a free agent.

For though he
has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the
forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or
cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and
therefore therein he is not free.

So a man striking himself, or his
friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his
power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear,
nobody thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as
acting by necessity and constraint.

10 .Belongs not to volition

Again: suppose a man be carried, whilst
fast asleep, into a room where is a person he longs to see and speak
with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out: he
awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which
he stays willingly in, i.e.

prefers his stay to going away.

I ask,
is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it: and yet,
being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to
stay, he has not freedom to be gone.

So that liberty is not an idea
belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the person having the
power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall
choose or direct.

Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power,
and no farther.

For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or
compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability to act, or to
forbear acting, there liberty, and our notion of it, presently ceases.

11 .Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary

We have
instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies.

A
man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his
power by any thought or volition to stop; and therefore in respect
of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would
follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is
not a free agent.

Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that
though he wills it ever so much, he cannot by any power of his mind
stop their motion, (as in that odd disease called chorea sancti viti),
but he is perpetually dancing; he is not at liberty in this action,