Islam and the Modern Age [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

Al-Tawhid

The
Glimpses of Nahj al Balaghah

Part II
- Theology and metaphysics

Murtadha Mutahhari
Transl. from Persian by Ali Quli Qara'i

One of the fundamental issues dealt with in the Nahj al-balaghah
relates to theological and metaphysical problems. In all, there are about
forty places in the sermons, letters, and aphorisms where these matters
are discussed. Some of these pertain to the aphorisms, but more often the
discussion is longer, covering sometimes several pages.

The passages on tawhid (Divine Unity) in the Nahj al-balaghah
can perhaps be considered to be the most wonderful discussions of the book.
Without any exaggeration, when we take into account the conditions in which
they were delivered, they can almost be said to be miraculous.

The discussions on this theme in the Nahj al-balaghah are of
a varied nature. Some of them constitute studies of the scheme of creation
bearing witness to Divine creativity and wisdom. Here, 'Ali speaks about
the whole system of the heaven and the earth, or occasionally discusses
the wonderful features of some specific creature like the bat, the peacock
or the ant, and the role of Divine design and purpose in their creation.
To give an example of this kind of discussion, we may quote a passage regarding
the ant:

Have you observed the tiny creatures that He has created? How He has
made them strong and perfected their constitution and shaped their organs
of hearing and sight, and how He has styled their bones and skin? Observe
the ant with its tiny body and delicate form. It is so small that its features
can hardly be discerned by the eye and so insignificant that it does not
enter our thoughts. See how it roams about upon the ground and arduously
collects its livelihood. It carries the grain to its hole and deposits
it in its store. It collects during the summer for the winter and, when
winter arrives, it foresees the time to reemerge. Its livelihood is guaranteed
and designed according to its built. The Benefactor and the Provider does
not forget or forsake it. He does not deprive it, even though it should
be in hard and dry stones and rocks. You will be amazed at the delicate
intricacy of its wonderful constitution if you investigate the structure
of its alimentary canals, its belly, and its eyes and ears which are in
its head ... (Sermon 185)

However, most of the discussions about tawhid in the Nahj
al-balaghah are rational and philosophical. The rare sublimity of the
Nahj al-balaghah becomes manifest in these discourses. In these
philosophical and rational discourses of the Nahj al-balaghah on
tawhid what constitutes the focus of all arguments is the infinite,
absolute and self-sufficing nature of the Divine Essence. In these passages,
'Ali ('a) attains to the heights of eloquence, and none, neither before
him nor after him, has approached him in this aspect.

Another issue dealt with is that of the absolute simplicity (al-basatatal-mutlaqah)
of the Divine Essence and negation of every kind of multiplicity, divisibility
in the Godhead and refutation of separability of the Divine Attributes
from the Divine Essence. This theme occurs repeatedly in the Nahj al-balaghah.

Also discussed is a series of other profound problems which had never
been touched before him. They are: God being the First while also being
the Last; His being simultaneously the Manifest and the Hidden; His priority
over time and number, i.e. His pre-eternity is not temporal and His Unity
is not numerical; His Supremacy, Authority, and Self-sufficiency; His Creativeness;
that attendance to one affair does not prevent Him from attending to other
affairs; the identity of Divine Word and Act; the limited capacity of human
reason to comprehend His reality; that gnosis (ma'rifah) is a kind
of manifestation (tajalli) of Him upon the intellects, which is
different from conception or cognition by the mind; the negation of such
categories and qualities as corporeality, motion, rest, change, place,
time, similarity, opposition, partnership, possession of organs or instruments,
limitation and number; and a series of other issues which we shall, God
willing, mention later and give examples of every one of these. Even a
thinker well-versed in the beliefs and views of ancient and modern philosophers
would be struck with wonder to see the wide range and scope of the problems
propounded in that wonderful book.

An elaborate discussion of the issues raised and dealt with in the Nahj
al-balaghah would itself require a voluminous book and cannot be covered
in one or two articles. Unavoidably, we shall be brief; but before we commence
our brief survey, we are compelled to mention certain points as an introduction
to our discussion.

A Bitter Fact:

We, the Shi'ah Muslims, must confess that we have been unjust in regard
to our duty with respect to the man whom we, more than others, take pride
in following; or, at the very least, we must admit falling short in our
duty towards him. In substance, any kind of failure in fulfilling our responsibility
is an act of injustice on our part. We did not want to realize the significance
of 'Ali ('a), or we had been unable to. All our energy and labour were
devoted to proclaiming the Prophet's statements about 'Ali and to denouncing
those who ignored them, but we failed to pay attention to the intellectual
side of Imam 'Ali's personality.

Sadi says:
The reality of musk lies in its scent, Not in the perfumer's
advice.

Applying Sa'di's words to our attitude regarding Imam 'Ali's personality,
we did not realize that this musk, recommended by the Divine Perfumer,
itself carried its pleasant aroma, and before everything else we should
have tried to know its scent and become familiar with it. That is, we should
have familiarized ourselves and others with its inner fragrance. The counsel
of the Divine Perfumer was meant to acquaint the people with its pleasant
redolence, not for the purpose that they may believe that it is musk and
then devote all their energies trying to convince others by arguing with
them, without bothering to acquaint themselves with its real fragrance.

Had the Nahj al-balaghah belonged to some other people, would
they have treated it in the way we treated this great book? The country
of Iran is the centre of Shi'ism and the language of its people is Persian.
You have only to examine the translations and commentaries on the Nahj
al-balaghah to make a judgement about what our accomplishment amounts
to.

To take a more general case, the Shi'i sources of hadith (tradition)
and texts of du'a' (prayers) are incomparable to the texts of the
non-Shi'i works in the same field. This is also true of Divine teachings
and other subjects. The problems and issues discussed in works like al-Kulayni's
al-Kafi, or al-Shaykh al-Saduq's al-Tawhid, or al-'Ihtijaj
of al-Tabarsi are nowhere to be found among the works of the non-Shi'is.
It can be said that if occasionally similar issues are dealt with in the
non-Shi'i books, the material is unmistakably spurious, for it is not only
opposed to the prophetic teachings but is also contradictory to the Quranic
fundamentals. There is a strong smell of anthropomorphism which hangs around
them. Recently, Hashim Ma'ruf al-Hasani, in his book Dirasat fi al-Kafi
li al-Kulayni wa al-Sahih li al-Bukhari, which is an original but a
brief comparative study of al-Sahih of al-Bukhari and al-Kulayni's
al-Kafi, has dealt with the traditions related to the problems of
theology.

Shi'i Rationalism:

The discussion of theological problems and their analysis by the Shi'i
Imams, of which the Nahj al-balaghah is the earliest example, was
the main cause of the emergence of rationalistic approach and philosophic
outlook in the Shi'i intellectual world from the earliest days of Islam.
This cannot be labelled as an innovation in Islam; rather, its basis was
laid down by the Quran itself. It was in accordance with the approach of
the Quran and for the purpose of its interpretation that the Imams of the
Ahl al-Bayt ('a) expounded such issues. If anybody can be reproached
in this matter, it is those who did not adopt this method and abandoned
the means to follow it.

History shows that from the earliest Islamic era, the Shiah, more than
any other sect, were interested in these problems. Amongst the Ahl al-Sunnah,
the Mu'tazilites, who were nearer to the Shi'ah, did possess similar inclinations.
But, as we know, the general view predominant among the Ahl al-Sunnah did
not welcome it, and as a result the Mu'tazilite sect became extinct about
the end of the 3rd/9th century .

Ahmad Amin, the Egyptian writer, confirms this view in the first volume
of his Zuhr al-'Islam. After discussing the philosophic movement
in Egypt during the reign of the Fatimids, who were a Shi'ah sect, he writes:

Philosophy is more akin to Shi'ism than it is to the Sunni Islam, and
we witness the truth of this in the era of the Fatimid rule [in Egypt]
and in that of the Buyids [in Iran]. Even during the later ages Iran, which
is a Shi'ite country, has paid more attention to philosophy than any other
Islamic country. In our own times, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al Asadabadi, who
had Shi'ite inclinations and had studied philosophy in Iran, created a
philosophic movement in Egypt when he arrived here.

Curiously, Ahmad Amin in his explanation of why the Shi'ah showed more
inclination towards philosophy, commits an error, willfully or otherwise.
According to him, "the reason for greater inclination on the part of the
Shi'ah towards rational and philosophical discussions is to be found in
their esotericism and their flair for ta'wil. [1]
They were compelled to seek the assistance of philosophy for defence of
their esotericism. That is why the Fatimid Egypt and Buyid Persia, and
Iran during the Safawid and Qajar periods, were more disposed towards philosophy
than the rest of the Islamic world."

This is sheer nonsense on the part of Ahmad Amin. It was the Imams ('a)
of the Shi'ah who for the first time introduced philosophical approach,
and it was they who introduced the most profound and intricate concepts
with regard to theological problems in their arguments, polemics, sermons,
ahadith, and prayers, of which the Nahj al-balaghah is one
example. Even with regard to the prophetic traditions, the Shi'ah sources
are far more sublime and profound than the traditions contained in the
non-Shi'i sources. This characteristic is not confined to philosophy only,
but is also true of kalam, fiqh, and usul al-fiqh,
in which the Shi'ah enjoy a position of distinction. All this owes its
origin to one and same source: stress on rationalism.

Some others have tried to trace the origin of this difference [between
the Shi'i and the Sunni intellects] in the concept of "the Shi'ite nation".
According to them, since the Persians are Shi'ite and the Shi'ah are Persian,
and as the Persians are a people with a philosophical temperament, fond
of the intricacies of speculation and pure thought, with the help of their
rich and strong philosophical tradition, they succeeded in raising the
level of Shi'a thought and gave it an Islamic colour.

Bertrand Russell, in A History of Western Philosophy, expresses a similar
view based on the above-mentioned argument. With his habitual or inherent
impoliteness he puts forth this opinion. However, Russell lacks the capacity
of vindicating his claim, since he was totally unfamiliar with Islamic
philosophy and basically knew nothing about it. He was not qualified to
express any informed opinion about the origins of Shi'ah thought and its
sources.

Our rejoinder to the upholders of this view is: first of all, not all
Shi'ah were Iranian, nor all Iranians were Shi'ah. Were Muhammad ibn Ya'qub
al-Kulayni, Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn al-Husayn ibn Babawayh al- Qummi and
Muhammad ibn Abi Talib al-Mazandarani Persian, but not Muhammad ibn Isma'il
al-Bukhari, Abu Dawud al-Sijistani and Muslim ibn Hajjaj al-Nishaburi?

Was al-Sayyid al-Radi, the compiler of the Nahj al-balaghah,
of Persian origin? Were the Fatimids of Egypt of Persian descent?

Why was philosophic thought revived in Egypt with the inception of Fatimid
rule and why did it decline with their fall? And why was it revived later,
after a long interval, only through the influence of an Iranian Shi'ah?

The truth is that the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt ('a) were the
only real dynamic force behind this mode of thinking and this kind of approach.
All scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah admit that among the Prophet's Companions
only 'Ali ('a) was a man of philosophic wisdom, who had an altogether distinct
rational approach. Abu 'Ali ibn Sina is quoted as having remarked:

'Ali's position among the Companions of Muhammad (S), was that of the
"rational" in the midst of the "corporeal."

Obviously, the intellectual approach of the followers of such an Imam
as 'Ali ('a) should be expected to be radically different from that of
those who followed others. Moreover, Ahmad Amin and others have been susceptible
to another similar misunderstanding. They express doubts with regard to
the authenticity of ascription of such philosophic statements [as exist
in the Nahj al-balaghah ] to 'Ali ('a). They say that the Arabs
were not familiar with such kind of issues and such arguments and elaborate
analyses as are found in the Nahj al-balaghah before their acquaintance
with Greek philosophy, and evidently, according to them, these discourses
should have been composed by some later scholars familiar with Greek philosophy,
and were attributed to Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib ('a).

We also accept that the Arabs were not familiar with such ideas and
notions. Not only the Arabs, the non-Arabs, too, were not acquainted with
them, nor were those notions familiar to the Greeks and Greek philosophy.
Ahmad Amin first brings down 'Ali ('a) to the level of such Arabs like
Abu Jahl and Abu Sufyan and then he postulates his minor and major premises
and bases his conclusion on them: The Arabs were unfamiliar with philosophical
notions; 'Ali was an Arab: therefore 'Ali was also unfamiliar with philosophical
notions. One should ask him whether the Arabs of the Jahiliyyah were familiar
with the ideas and concepts that were propounded in the Quran. Had not
'Ali ('a) been brought up and trained by the Messenger of Allah himself?
Didn't the Prophet (S) introduce 'Ali ('a) to his Companions as the most
learned and knowledgeable amongst them? Why should we deny the high spiritual
status of someone who enriched his inner self by drawing on the bounteous
wealth of Islam in order to protect the prestige of some of the Prophet's
Companions who could never rise above the ordinary level?

Ahmad Amin says that before acquaintance with Greek philosophy the people
of Arabia were not familiar with the ideas and concepts found in the Nahj
al-balaghah. The answer to this is that the Arabs did not become acquainted
with the ideas and notions propounded in the Nahj al-balaghah even
after centuries of familiarity with Greek philosophy. Not only the Arabs,
even the non-Arab Muslims were not acquainted with these ideas, for the
simple reason that there is no trace of them in Greek philosophy itself!
These ideas are exclusively special to Islamic philosophy. The Islamic
philosophers gradually picked these ideas up from the basic Islamic sources
and incorporated them in their thought under the guidance of revelation.

Philosophical Notions Concerning metaphysics

As mentioned before, the Nahj al-balaghah adopts two kinds of
approach to the problems of theology. The first kind of approach calls
attention to the sensible world and its phenomena as a mirror reflecting
the Knowledge and Perfection of the Creator. The second approach involves
purely rationalistic and philosophical reflections. The latter approach
accounts for the greater part of the theological discussions of the Nahj
al-balaghah. Moreover, it is the only approach adopted in regard to
the discussion about the Divine Essence and Attributes.

As we know, the value of such discussions and the legitimacy of such
reflections have been always questioned by those who consider them improper
from the viewpoint of reason or canon, or both. In our own times, a certain
group claims that this kind of analysis and inference does not agree with
the spirit of Islam and that the Muslims were initiated into such kind
of speculations under the influence of Greek philosophy and not as a result
of any inspiration or guidance effused from the Quran. They say that if
the Muslims had adhered closely to the Quranic teachings they would not
have entangled themselves with these tortuous clebates. For the same reason,
they view with suspicion the authenticity of such speculations found in
the Nahj al-balaghah and their ascription to Imam 'Ali ('a).

In the second and third centuries a group of people opposed such kind
of discussions and questioned their legitimacy, raising doctrinal objections.
They insisted that it is obligatory for Muslims to be satisfied with the
literal and commonly understood meaning of the words of the Quran, and
regarded every kind of inquiry into the meaning of the Quran as an innovation
(bid'ah) in religion. For instance, if someone inquired about the
meaning of the Quranic verse "The All-compassionate sat Himself upon
the Throne " [20:5], he was confronted by the displeasure of those
who regarded such questions as not only improper but distasteful. He would
be told: "The exact meaning is unknown and questioning is heresy". [2]

During the 3rd/9th century, this group, which later came to be called
Ash'arites, overwhelmed the Mu'tazilites, who considered such speculations
to be within the bounds of legitimacy. This victory of the Asharites delivered
a severe blow to the intellectual life of Islam. The Akhbaris, who were
a Shi'i school which flourished during the period between the 10th/16th
and the 14th/20th centuries-and particularly during the 10th/16th and 11th/17th
centuries-followed the Asha'irah in their ideas and beliefs. They raised
doctrinal objections against ratiocination. Now we shall proceed to discuss
the objections raised from a rationalist point of view.

As a result of the triumph of the empirical and experimental method
over the deductive approach in Europe, especially in the physical sciences,
the view began to prevail that rational speculation was unreliable not
only in the physical sciences but also in all scientific disciplines and
that the only reliable method was that of empirical philosophy. The result
of it was that tne problems of theology were viewed with doubt and suspicion,
because they lay beyond the domain of experimental and empirical observation.

The past victories of the Ash'arites, on the one hand, and the amazing
triumphs of the empirical method, which followed one another in quick succession,
on the other hand, drove some non-Shi'ite Muslim writers to the extremes
of excitement. The outcome was the eclectic opinion that from the religious
(Shar'i) as well as the rational point of view the use of deductive
method even in problems of theology should be discarded. From the Shar'i
viewpoint, they made the claim that according to the outlook of the Quran
the only approach valid in theology was the empirical and experimental
method and the study of the natural phenomena and the system of creation;
the rest, they declared, is no more than an exercise in futility. They
pointed out that in scores of its verses, the Quran in most unequivocal
terms has invited human beings to study the phenomena of nature; it considers
the keys to the secrets of the origin and workings of the universe to be
concealed within nature itself. In this way they echoed, in their writings
and speeches, the ideas expressed by the European proponents of empirical
philosophy .

Farid al-Wajdi in his book 'Ala atlal al-madhhab al-maddi (On
the Ruins of Materialism), and Sayyid Abu al-Hasan al-Nadawi, in his Madha
khasira al-'alam bi-inhitat al-Muslimin ("What the World Lost Through
the Decline of Muslims") and the writers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood
(Ikhwan al-Muslimin) such as Sayyid Qutb and others, have supported
this view, vehemently attacking the opposite viewpoint.

Al-Nadawi, in his above-mentioned book, says:

The prophets informed men about the existence of God and His Attributes
and informed them about the origin and beginning of the world and the ultimate
destiny of man, putting this free information at his disposal. They relieved
him of the need to understand and discuss these problems the basics of
which lie beyond our reach (because these problems belong to the sphere
of the supra-sensible and our knowledge and experience is limited to the
physical and the sensible). But men did not value this blessing and entangled
themselves in debates and speculations about these problems, and strode
into the dark regions of the hidden and the unknowable. [3]

The same author, in another chapter of the same book, where he discusses
the causes of the decline of Muslims, under the heading "The Neglect
of Useful Sciences," criticizes the muslim 'ulama' in these
words:

The Muslim scholars and thinkers did not give as much importance to
practical and experimental sciences as they gave to debating about metaphysics,
which they had learnt from Greek philosophy. The Greek metaphysics and
theology is nothing more than Greek's polytheistic mythology presented
in a philosophical outfit, and is no more than a series of meaningless
conjectures expressed in an absurd jargon. God has exempted Muslims from
debate, speculation and analysis in these matters, which are not much different
from the analytic pursuits of the Alchemists. But out of ingratitude for
this great blessing, the Muslims wasted their energy and genius in problems
of this sort. [4]

Without doubt, the views of the like of Farid al-Wajd; and al-Nadawi
should be regarded as a kind of return to Ash'arism, though dressed in
contemporary style akin to the language of empirical philosophy.

Here, we cannot enter into a philosophic discussion about the value
of philosophic reflection. In the chapters entitled "The Value of Information"
and "Origin of Multiplicity in Perception" of the book The Principles
and Method of Realism, we have discussed the matter in sufficient detail.
Here, we shall confine ourselves to the Quranic aspect of this problem,
and investigate whether the Holy Quran considers the study of nature to
be the only valid method of inquiry into theological problems, or whether
it allows for another approach besides the above-mentioned.

However, it is essential to point out that the disagreement between
the Ash'arites and the non-Ash'arites is not about the legitimacy of the
use of the Book and the Sunnah as sources in the problems of theology;
rather, the disagreement concerns the manner of their utilization. According
to the Ash'arites, their application should not exceed mute acceptance.
According to them, we assign the various Attributes like Unity, Omniscience,
Omnipotence and the rest to God because they have been ascribed to Him
by the Shar'iah, otherwise we would not know whether God is such
or not, because the basic principles and essentials dealing with God are
beyond our reach. Therefore, according to them, we are forced to accept
God as such, but we cannot know or understand that God is such. The role
of the religious texts is that they prescribe for us the way we ought to
think and believe so that we may follow it in our thought and beliefs.

According to the contestants of this view, these issues are amenable
to human understanding, like any other rational concept or idea. That is,
there exist certain principles and essentials which if known properly enable
man to understand them. The role of the religious texts lies in their capacity
to inspire, motivate, and guide human reason by putting understandable
principles and essentials at its disposal. Basically servitude in intellectual
matters is absurd. It is like ordering one to think in a certain fashion,
and asking him to derive certain prescribed conclusions. It is like ordering
someone to see a thing in a certain fashion and then asking him, "How do
you see it? Is it big or small? black or white?" Servitude in thinking
does not mean anything other than absence of thinking and acceptance without
reflection.

In short, the question is not whether it is possible for man to go beyond
the teachings of the Revelation. God be our refuge, there is nothing that
lies beyond them; because that which has reached us through Revelation
and the Household of the Revelation (i.e. the Ahl al-Bayt [A]) is
the utmost limit of perfection concerning knowledge of the Divine. Here
our debate centres upon the capacity of human thought and reason, whether
it can, when supplied with the basic principles and essentials, undertake
an intellectual journey through the world of theological problems [5]
or not.

As to the invitation of the Quran to study and inquiry about the phenomena
of creation, and its emphasis on nature as a means for attaining the knowledge
of God and the supra-natural, it should be said that it is, indubitably,
a basic principle of the Quranic teachings. It is with extraordinary insistence
that the Quran asks human beings to inquire into the nature of the earth,
the sky, the plants and animals, and man himself, and urges them to study
them scientifically. It is also indubitable that the Muslims did not take
enough worthy steps in this direction. Perhaps the real reason behind it
was Greek philosophy, which was deductive and based on pure speculation,
and they used this approach even in the field of the physical sciences.
Nevertheless, as the history of science bears testimony, the muslim scientists
did not altogether abandon the experimental method in their studies like
the Greeks. The Muslims were the pioneers of the experimental method, not
the Europeans, as is commonly thought, who followed on the tracks first
laid by the Muslims.

The Value of Study of the Natural Phenomena:

Aside from all of this, the question worthy of consideration is whether
the Quran, besides its emphasis on the study of the creatures of earth,
water, and air, allows other ways of approaching the issue, or if it closes
all other doors. The question is whether the Quran, even as it invites
people to study the signs of God (ayat), also welcomes other modes
of intellectual endeavour. Basically, what is the value of inquiry into
the works of creation (an inquiry which the Quran urges us, explicitly
or implicitly, to undertake), from the viewpoint of initiating us into
the awareness and consciousness which this heavenly Book aims to cultivate?

The truth is that the measure of assistance provided by the study of
the works of the creation in understanding the problems explicitly pointed
out by the Holy Quran is quite restricted. The Quran has propounded certain
problems of theology which are by no means understandable through the study
of the created world or nature. The value of study of the system of creation
is limited only to the extent to which it proves that the world is governed
by a Power which knows, designs, plans, and administers it. The world is
a mirror, open to empirical experiment, only to the extent that it points
towards something that lies beyond nature and discloses the existence of
a Mighty Hand which runs nature's cosmic wheels.

But the Quran is not content that man should only know that a Mighty,
Knowing, and Wise Power administers this universe. This may perhaps be
true of other heavenly scriptures, but is by no means true of the Holy
Quran, which is the final and ultimate heavenly message and has a great
deal to say about God and the reality transcending nature.

Purely Rationalistic Problems:

The most basic problem to which the mere study of the world of creation
fails to provide an answer is the necessity of existence and uncreatedness
of the Power which transcends nature. The world is a mirror in the sense
that it indicates the existence of a Mighty Hand and a Wise Power, but
it does not tell us anything more about Its nature. It does not tell us
whether that Power is subservient to something else or not, or if it is
self-subsisting. And if it is subject to something else, what is that?
The objective of the Quran is not only that we should know that a Mighty
Hand administers the world, but that we may know that that Administrator
is "Allah" and that "Allah" is the indefinable: (There is nothing like
Him), whose Essence encompasses all perfection, or in other words, that
"Allah" signifies Absolute Perfection and is the referent of, (His is the
loftiest likeness). How can the study of nature give us an understanding
of such notions and concepts?

The second problem is that of the Unity of God. The Quran has stated
this issue in a logical form and used a syllogistic argument to explain
it. The method of argument it has employed in this regard is what is called
'exclusive syllogism' or 'reductio ad impossible' (burhan al-tamanu').
On occasion it eliminates the possibility of multiplicity in the efficient
cause as in the following verse: [6]

If there had been (multiple) gods in them (i.e. the earth and the
heaven) other than God, they would surely go to ruin ... (21:22)

At other times it argues by eliminating the possibility of multiplicity
in the final cause:

God has not taken to Himself any son, nor is there any god besides
Him; for then each god would have taken off that he created and some of
them would have risen up over others ... (23:91)

The Quran never suggests that the study of the system of creation can
lead us to the knowledge of the Unity of the Godhead so as to imply that
the essential knowledge of the transcendental Creator be considered attainable
from that source. Moreover, such a suggestion would not have been correct.

The Quran alludes to various problems as indicated by the following
examples:

No thing is like Him ... (42:11) And God's is the loftiest
likeness ... (16:60) To Him belong the Names most Beautiful.
(20:8) And His is the loftiest likeness in the heavens and the earth
... (30:27) He is God, there is no god but He. He is the King, the
All-holy, the All-peaceable. the All-faithful, the All-preserver, the All-mighty,
the All-compeller, the All-sublime ... (59:23) And to God belong
the East and the West; whither so ever you turn, there is the Face of God
... (2:115) And He is God in the heavens and the earth; He knows
your secrets, and what you publish ... (6:3) He is the First and
the Last, the Outward and the Inward; He has knowledge of everything.
(57:3) He is the Living, the Everlasting ... (2:255) God, is
the Everlasting, [Who] has not begotten, and has not been begotten and
equal to Him is not any one. (112:2-4)

Why does the Quran raise such issues? Is it for the sake of propounding
mysterious matters incomprehensible to man, who, according to al-Nadawi,
lacks the knowledge of its essential principles, and then asking him to
accept them without comprehending their meaning? Or, the Quran actually
does want him to know God through the attributes and descriptions that
have come in it? And, if this is true, what reliable approach does it recommend?
How is it possible to acquire this knowledge through the study of the natural
phenomena? The study of the creation teaches us that God has knowledge
of the things; that is, the things that He has made were created knowingly
and wisely. But the Quran expects us not only to know this, but also stresses
that:

Indeed God has the knowledge of everything. (2:231) And not
so much as the weight of an atom in earth or heaven escapes from thy Lord,
neither is aught smaller than that, or greater, but in a Manifest Book.
(10:61) Say: "If the sea were ink for the Words of my Lord, the sea
would be spent before the Words of my Lord are spent, though We brought
replenishment the like of it. " (18:109)

This means that God's knowledge is infinite and so is His power. How
and wherefore is it possible through perception and observation of the
world of creation to reach the conclusion that the Creator's Knowledge
and Power are infinite? The Quran, similarly, propounds numerous other
problems of the kind. For instance, it mentions al-lawh al-mahfuz
(the Protected Tablet), lawh al-mahw wa al-'ithbat (The Tablet of
Expunction and Affirmation), jabr and ikhtiyar (determinism
and free will), wahy (revelation) and ilham (intuition),
etc.; none of which are susceptible to inquiry through the empirical study
of the world of creation.

It must be admitted that the Quran, definitely, has raised these problems
in the form of a series of lessons and has emphasized their importance
through advice and exhortation. The following verses of the Quran may be
quoted in this connection:

What, do they not meditate in the Quran? Or is it that there are
locks upon their hearts? .... (47:24) (This is) a Scripture that
We have revealed unto thee, full of blessing, that they may ponder its
revelations, and that men of understanding may reflect. (38:29)

Inevitably, we are forced to accept that the Quran assumes the existence
of a reliable method for understanding the meaning of these truths, which
have not been revealed as a series of obscure incomprehensibles which lie
beyond the reach of the human mind.

The scope of problems propounded by the Quran in the sphere of metaphysics
is far greater than what can be resolved or be answered through the study
of physical creation. This is the reason why the Muslims have pursued these
problems, at times through spiritual and gnostic efforts, and at other
times through speculative and rational approach.

I wonder whether those who claim that the Quran considers the study
of nature as the sole, sufficient means for the solution of metaphysical
problems, can give a satisfying answer in regard to the multifarious problems
propounded by it, a characteristic which is special to this great heavenly
Book.

'Ali's sole source of inspiration in his exposition of the problems
mentioned in the previous chapters is the Holy Quran, and the sole motive
behind his discourses is exegetical. Perhaps, had it not been for 'Ali
('a) the rationalistic and speculative aspects of the Quran would have
forever remained uninterpreted.

After these brief introductory remarks on the value of these issues,
we shall go on to cite some relevant examples from the Nahj al-balaghah.

The Divine Essence and Attributes:

In this section we shall cite some examples of the Nahj al-balaghah's
treatment of the problems of theology related with Divine Essence and Attributes.
Later we shall make a brief comparative study of the issue in various schools
and conclude our discussion on this aspect of the Nahj al-balaghah.

However, before proceeding further, I ask for the reader's pardon that
the discussion in the last three sections became a bit technical and philosophical,
which is not very welcome for those not used to it. But what is the remedy?
Discussion on a book such as the Nahj al-balaghah does entail such
ups and downs. For this reason, we shall limit ourselves to giving only
a few examples from the book on this subject, and refrain from any elaborate
discussion. Because, if we were to comment on every sentence of the Nahj
al-balaghah, the result will be, as is said:
My mathnawi requires seventy maunds of paper.

The Divine Essence:

Does the Nahj al-balaghah have anything to say about the Divine
Essence and how to define it? The answer is, Yes, and a lot. However, much
of the discussion revolves around the point that the Divine Essence is
Absolute and Infinite Being, without a quiddity. His Essence accepts no
limits and boundaries like other beings, static or changeable, which are
limited and finite. A changeable being is one which constantly transcends
its former limits and assumes new ones. But such is not the Divine Essence.
Quiddity, which may qualify and confine Him within limits of finitude,
is not applicable to Him. None of the aspects of being are devoid of His
Presence, and no kind of imperfection is appllicable to Him, except absence
of any imperfection whatsoever: the only thing amiss in Him is absence
of defect or inadequacy of any kind. The sole kind of negation applicable
to Him is the negation of all negations. The only kind of non-being attributable
to Him is the negation of any kind of imperfection in relation to Him.
He is free from all shades of non-being which characterize the creatures
and effects. He is free from finitude, multiplicity, divisibility, and
need. The only territory that He does not enter is that of nothingness
and non-being. He is with every thing, but not in any thing, and nothing
is with Him. He is not within things, though not out of them. He is over
and above every kind of condition, state, similarity, and likeness. For,
these qualities relate to limited and determinate beings characterized
by quiddity:

He is with everything but not in the sense of [physical] nearness. He
is different from every thing but not in the sense of separation. (Sermon
1 )

He is not inside things in the sense of physical [pervasion or] penetration,
and is not outside them in the sense of [physical] exclusion [for exclusion
entails a kind of finitude]. (Sermon 186)

He is distinct from things because He overpowers them, and the things
are distinct from Him because of their subjection to Him. (Sermon
152)

That is, His distinctness from things lies in the fact that He has authority
and control over them. However, His power, authority and sovereignty, unlike
that of the creatures, is not accompanied with simultaneous weakness, subjugation,
and subjection. His distinction and separateness from things lies in the
fact that things are totally subject to His power and authority, and that
which is subject and subordinated can never be like the one who subjugates
and commands control over it. His separateness from things does not lie
in physical separation but is on account of the distinction which lies
between the Provider and the provided, the Perfect and the imperfect, the
Powerful and the weak.

These kind of ideas are replete in 'Ali's discourses. All the problems
which shall be discussed later are based on the principle that Divine Essence
is Absolute and Infinite, and the concepts of limit, form and condition
do not apply to it.

Divine Unity an Ontological, not a Numerical Concept:

Another feature of tawhid (monotheism) as propounded by the Nahj
al-balaghah is that Divine Unity is not numerical, but something else.
Numerical unity means the oneness of something which has possibility of
recurrence. It is always possible to imagine that the quiddity and form
of an existent is realizable in another individual being. In such cases,
the unity of an individual possessing that quiddity is numerical oneness
and stands in opposition to duplicity or multiplicity.

'It is one,' means that there is not another like it, and inevitably
this kind of unity entails the quality of being restricted in number, which
is a defect; because one is lesser in number as compared to two or more
of its kind. But, if a being be such that assumption of recurrence with
regard to it is impossible, since it is infinite and unlimited, and if
we assume another like it to exist, it will follow that it is the same
as the first being or that it is something which is not similar to it and
therefore cannot be called a second instance of it. In such a case, unity
is not numerical. That is, this kind of unity is not one opposed to duplicity
or multiplicity, and when it is said 'It is one,' it does not mean that
'there are not two, three or more of its kind,' but it means that a second
to it is unconceivable.

This notion can further be clarified through an example. We know that
the astronomers and physicists are not in agreement about the dimensions
of the universe, whether it is limited in size or infinite. Some scientists
have favoured the idea of an unlimited and infinite universe; others claim
that the universe is limited in dimensions so that if we travel in any
direction, we shall reach a point beyond which there is no space. The other
issue is whether the universe in which we live is the only universe in
existence, or if there are other universes existing besides it.

Evidently, the assumption of another physical world beyond our own is
a corollary to the assumption that our universe is not infinite. Only in
this case it is possible to assume the existence of, say, two physical
universes each of which is limited and has finite dimensions. But if we
assume that our universe is infinite, it is not possible to entertain the
assumption of another universe existing beyond it. For, whatever we were
to assume would be identical with this universe or a part of it.

The assumption of another being similar to the Being of the One God-like
the assumption of another physical universe besides an infinite material
universe-amounts to assuming the impossible, for the Being of God is absolute:
Absolute Selfhood and Absolute Reality.

The notion that Divine Unity is not a numerical concept, and that qualifying
it by a number is synonymous with imposing limits on the Divine Essence,
is repeatedly discussed by the Nahj al-balaghah:

He is the One, but not in a numerical sense. (Sermon 152)

He is not confined by limits nor counted by numbers. (Sermon
186)

He who points to Him, admits for Him limitations; and he who admits
limitations for Him has numbered Him. (Sermon 1)

He who qualifies Him limits Him. He who limits Him numbers Him. He who
numbers Him denies His pre-eternity. (Sermon 152)

Everything associated with unity is deficient except Him. (Sermon
65)

How beautiful, profound, and full of meaning is the last sentence. It
states that everything except the Divine Essence is limited if it is one.
That is, every thing for which another of its kind is conceivable is a
limited being and an addition of another individual would increase its
number. But this is not true of the Unity of the Divine Essence; for God's
Unity lies in His greatness and infinity, for which a like, a second, an
equal or a match is not conceivable.

This concept that Divine Unity is not a numerical notion is exclusively
an Islamic concept, original and profound, and unprecedented in any other
school of thought. Even the Muslim philosophers only gradually realized
its profundity through contemplating the spirit of the original Islamic
texts and in particular the discourses of 'Ali ('a), and ultimately formally
incorporated it in the Islamic metaphysical philosophy. There is no trace
of this profound concept in the writings of the early Islamic philosophers
like al Farabi and Ibn Sina. Only the later philosophers ushered this concept
into their philosophic thinking calling it "Really True Unity,"
in their terminology.

God, The First and the Last; the Manifest and the Hidden:

Of the many issues discussed by the Nahj al-balaghah is the notion
that God is the First and the Last, the Hidden and the Manifest. Of course
this, too, like other notions, has been deduced from the Holy Quran; though
here we are not going to quote the verses from the Quran. God is the First,
but His precedence is not temporal so as to be in contradiction with His
being the Last. He is the Manifest, but not in the sense of being physically
visible or perceptible to the senses; His Manifestness does not contradict
His Hiddenness. In fact His Firstness is identical with His Lastness and
similarly His Manifestness and Hiddenness are identical; they are not two
different things:

Praise be to Allah, for whom one condition does not precede another,
so that He may he the First before being the Last or may be Manifest before
being Hidden ... (Sermon 65)

Time is not His accomplice, nor does He need the assistance of tools
and agents His Being transcends time. His Existence transcends nothingness
and His pre-eternity transcends all beginning. (Sermon 186)

The Divine Essence's transcendence over time, nothingness, beginning,
and end is one of the most profound concepts of al-hikmah philosophy.
God's pre-eternity does not mean that God has always existed. Certainly
God has always existed but Divine pre-eternity (azaliyyah) is something
greater in meaning than 'existence at all times'; because, 'existing at
all times' assumes existence in time; but God's Being has not only been
at all times, It precedes time itself. This is the meaning of Divine pre-eternity.
This shows that His precedence is something other than temporal precedence.

Praise be to God, whose creation bears testimony to His Existence; temporality
(huduth) of whose creation is the evidence of His preternity the
similarity and likeness amongst whose creation proves that He is unique.
The senses do not perceive Him and nothing can conceal Him. (Sermon
152)

That is, God is both Hidden and Manifest. By Himself He is Manifest
but is Hidden from the human senses. His Hiddenness from the senses is
due to man's own limitations and not on account of Him.

It needs no proof that existence is synonymous with manifestation; the
more powerful the existence of a being, the more manifest it would be.
Conversely, the weaker its being is and the more intermingled it is with
non-being, the less manifest it is to itself and others.

For everything, there are two modes of being: its being-in-itself (wujud
fi nagsih), and its being-for-others. The being of every thing for
us depends upon the structure of our senses and certain special conditions.
Accordingly, the manifestation of a thing is also of two kinds: its manifestation-in-itself
(zuhur fi nafsih) and its manifestation-for-others.

Our senses, on account of their limitations, are able to perceive only
a limited number of finite objects possessing the characteristics of similarity
and opposition. The senses can perceive colours, shapes, sounds, etc.,
which are limited temporally and spacially; that is, their existence is
confined within a particular time and place. Now if there existed a uniform
light, always and everywhere, it would not be perceptible. A continuous
monotonous sound heard always and everywhere would not be audible.

The Being of God, which is absolute being and absolute reality, is not
confined to any particular time and place, and is hidden from our senses.
But God in Himself is absolutely manifest; the perfection of His manifestness,
which follows from the perfection of His Being, is itself the cause of
His hiddenness from our senses. The two aspects of His manifestness and
hiddenness are one and the same in His Essence. He is hidden because He
is perfectly manifest, and this perfect manifestness conceals Him.

Thou, who art hidden on account of Thy perfect brilliance, Thou Art
the Manifest, hidden in Thy manifestness.
The veil on Thy face is also Thy face,
So manifest Thou art,
Thy manifestness conceals Thee from the world's eyes.

An Appraisal

An appraisal however brief of the approach of the Nahj al-balaghah
and its comparison with that of other schools of thought is essential for
discovering the true worth of its views on the problems of theology. We
shall confine ourselves to the brief, though not quite sufficient, examples
quoted in the foregoing pages and proceed to evaluate them.

The subject of the Divine Essence and Attributes is one which has been
discussed a lot by the ancient and modern philosophers, mystics and Sufis
of the East and the West. But in general their method and approach is totally
different from that of the Nahj al-balaghah, whose approach is highly
original and unprecedented. Only in the Holy Quran can be found a precedent
for the Nahj al-balaghah. Apart from the Holy Quran, we do not find
any other source that provides some ground for the discourses of the Nahj
al-balaghah.

As pointed out earlier, some scholars, because of their failure to trace
back to some earlier source the notions elaborated in the Nahj al-balaghah,
have questioned the authenticity of ascription of these discourses to 'Ali
('a). They have supposed that these discourses appeared in a later period,
after the appearance of the Mu'tazilites and assimilation of Greek thought,
heedless of the saying:

The mean earth with the sublime heaven does not compare!

What ignorance to compare the Mu'tazilite and Greek ideas with the teachings
of the Nahj al-balaghah !

The Nahj al-balaghah and the Notions of Kalam:

The Nahj al-balaghah, while it ascribes all the Attributes of
perfection to God, the Exalted, negates any separation of these Attributes
from His Essence and does not consider them as an appendage of Divine Essence.
On the other hand, the Ash'arites, as we know, consider the Divine Attributes
to be additional to Essence and the Mu'tazilites negate all Attributes.
The Ash'arite believes in Separation [of the Attributes from
the Essence]
The Mu'tazilite speaks of subservience [of the Attributes to
the Essence].

This has led some to imagine that the discourses found in the Nahj
al-balaghah on this topic are fabrications of a later period under
the influence of Mu'tazilite views; whereas, anyone with some insight can
readily perceive that the Attributes negated by the Nahj al-balaghah
with respect to Divine Essence are qualities of imperfection and limitation;
for the Divine Essence, being infinite and limitless, necessitates identity
of the Attributes with the Essence, not negation of the Attributes as professed
by the Mu'tazilites. Had the Mu'tazilites reached such a notion they would
never have negated the Divine Attributes considering them subservient to
the Essence.

The same is true of the views on the createdness or temporality (huduth)
of the Quran in the sermon 184. One may, possibly, imagine that
these passages of the Nahj al-balaghah relate to the latter heated
controversies among the Islamic theologians (mutakallimun) regarding
the eternity (qidam) or temporality (huduth) of the Holy
Quran, and which might have been added to the Nahj al-balaghah during
the latter centuries. However, a little reflection will reveal that the
discourses of the Nahj al-balaghah related to this issue have nothing
to do with the debate on the Quran being either created or uncreated, which
was a meaningless controversy, but relates to the creative command (amr
takwini), and Will of the Almighty. 'Ali ('a) says that God's Will
and His command represent Divine Acts and, therefore, are hadith
and posterior to the Essence; for if the command and Will were co-eternal
and identical with His Essence, they will have, necessarily, to be considered
His associates and equals. 'Ali ('a) says:

When He decrees the creation of a thing, He says to it, "Be", and it
assumes existence; but not through an audible voice which strikes the ear
or a cry that can be heard. Indeed the speech of God, glory be to Him,
is but His created Act, which did not exist before [it came into existence].
Had it (Divine speech) been itself eternal, it would be another god besides
Him. (Sermon 186)

In addition, there are other musnad traditions on this subject related
from 'Ali ('a), only some of which have been collected in the Nahj al-balaghah,
and can be traced back to his time. On this basis, there is no room for
doubting their genuineness. If any superficial resemblance is observed
between the statements made by 'Ali ('a) and some views held by the Mu'tazilah,
the probability to be allowed in this connection is that some of his ideas
were adopted by the Mu'tazilah.

The controversies of the Muslim theologians (mutakallimun), both
the Shi'ah and the Sunni, the Asha'irah as well as the Mu'tazilah, generally
revolved around the doctrine of rational basis of ethical judgement concerning
good and evil (al-husn wa al-qubh al-'aqliyyan). This doctrine which
is not other than a practical principle operating in human society, is
considered by the mutakallimun to be also applicable to the Divine
sphere and govern the laws of creation; but we find no trace of it in the
Nahj al-balaghah, similarly there is no sign of it in the Quran.
Had the ideas and beliefs of the mutakallimun found their way into
the Nahj al-balaghah, first of all the traces of this doctrine should
have been found in that book.

The Nahj al-balaghah and Philosophical Concepts:

Some others, on coming across certain words such as 'existence' (wujud),
'non-existence' ('adam), 'temporality' (huduth) and 'pre-eternity'
(qidam), and so on in the Nahj al-balaghah, have been led
to assume that these terms entered the Muslim intellectual world under
the influence of Greek philosophy and were inserted, unintentionally or
intentionally, into the discourses of 'Ali ('a). If those who advocate
this view had gone deeper into the meanings of these words, they would
not have paid heed to such a hypothesis. The method and approach adopted
in the arguments of the Nahj al-balaghah is completely different
from that of the philosophers who lived before al-Sayyid al- Radi or during
his time, or even those born many centuries after the compilation of the
Nahj al-balalghah .

Presently, we shall not discuss the metaphysics of Greek or Alexandrian
(Neo-Platonic) philosophy, but shall confine ourselves to the metaphysical
views propounded by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi.
Undoubtedly Muslim philosophers brought new problems into philosophy under
the influence of Islamic teachings which did not exist before, and in addition
to them, introduced radically original ways of demonstration and inference
to explain and argue their point with regard to some other problems. Nevertheless,
what we learn from the Nahj al-balaghah is obviously different from
this approach. My teacher, 'Allamah Tabataba'i, in the preface to his discourse
on the traditions of Islamic scholarship, writes:

These statements help in resolving a number of problems in the theological
philosophy. Apart from the fact that Muslims were not acquainted with these
notions and they were incomprehensible to the Arabs, basically there is
no trace of them in the writings and statements of pre-Islamic philosophers
whose books were translated into Arabic, and, similarly, they do not appear
in the works of Muslim philosophers, Arab or Persian. These problems remained
obscure and unintelligible, and every commentator discussed them according
to his own conjecture, until the eleventh century of the Hijrah (17th century
A.D.). Only then they were properly understood for the first time- namely,
the problem of the True Unity (al-wahdat al-haqqah) of the Necessary
Being (wajib al-wujud) (a non-numerical unity); the problem that
the proof of the existence of the Necessary Being is identical with the
proof of His Unity (since the Necessary Being is Absolute Existence, Him
Being implies His Unity); the problem that the Necessary Existent is the
known-in-His-Essence (ma'lum bil dhat); that the Necessary Being
is known directly without the need of an intermediary, and that the reality
of every thing else is known through the Necessary Being, not vice versa
... [7]

The arguments of the early Muslim philosophers like al-Farabi, Ibn Sina
and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, such as the discussions on the Divine
Essence and Attributes, such as Unity, Simplicity (basatah), Self-Sufficiency,
Knowledge, Power, Will, Providence, and so on, revolve around the conception
of the necessity of existence (wujub al-wujud), from which all of
them are derived, and the necessity of existence itself is deduced indirectly.
In this fashion it is demonstrated that the existence of all possible existents
(mumkinat) cannot be explained without assuming the existence of
the Necessary Being. Although the argument used for proving the truth of
this cannot be called demonstration per impossible (burhan khulf)
in view of its indirect mode of inference, it resembles burhan khulf and
hence it fails to provide completely satisfactory demonstration, for it
does not explain the necessity of existence of the Necessary Being. Ibn
Sina in his al-'Isharat claims that he has succeeded in discovering
"the Why?" (lima) of it and hence chooses to call his argument "burhan
al-siddiqin" (burhan limmi, i.e. causal proof). However, the
latter philosophers considered his exposition of "the Why?" (lima)
as insufficient.

In the Nahj al-balaghah, necessity of existence is never used
to explain the existence of the possible beings (mumkinat). That
on which this book relies for this purpose is the real criterion of the
necessity of existence, that is, the absolute reality and pure being of
the Divine Essence.

'Allamah Tabataba'i, in the above-mentioned work, while explaining a
hadith of 'Ali ('a) found in al-Tawhid of al-Shaykh al-Saduq,
says:

The basis of our discussion rests upon the principle that Divine Being
is a reality that does not accept any limits or restrictions whatsoever.
Because, God, the Most Exalted, is Absolute Reality from Whom is derived
the existence of all other beings within the ontological limits and characteristics
peculiar to themselves, and their existence depends on that of the Absolute
Being. [8]

In the Nahj al-balaghah the very basis of all discussions on
Divine Essence rests on the position that God is Absolute and Infinite
Being, which transcends all limits and finitude. No point of space or time,
nor any thing is devoid of Him. He is with everything, yet no thing is
with Him. Since He is the Absolute, and the Infinite, He transcends all
time, number, limit and proximity (all kinds of quiddities). That is, time
and space, number and limit are applicable to a lower stage i.e. stage
of Divine Acts and creation. Everything is from Him and returns unto Him.
He is the First of the first and the Last of the last. He precedes everything
and succeeds everything.

This is the idea that forms the axis of all discourses of the Nahj
al-balaghah, and of which there is no trace in the works of al-Farabi,
Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali, and Khwajah Nasir al-Din al-Tusi.

As pointed out by 'Allamah Tabataba'i, these profound discussions of
theology proper (ilahiyyat bil-ma'na al-'akhass) are based on a
series of inter-related problems which have been posited in metaphysics
(al-'umur al-'ammah). [9]
An elaborate discussion of those theological problems and their relevant
issues mentioned above is outside the scope of our present discussion.

There are two reasons for rejecting the claims that the theological
discussions of the Nahj al-balaghah were inventions of later writers
familiar with philosophical notions. Firstly, the kind of problems discussed
in the Nahj al-balaghah were not at all raised by any philosopher
till the time of al-Sayyid al-Radi, the compiler of the Nahj al-balaghah.
That the Unity of the Necessary Being is not of the numerical kind and
that Divine Essence precedes number; that the existence of the Necessary
Being implies Its Unity; the simple reality of the Necessary Being; His
immanence and other such notions were not known to philosophy during or
before al-Sayyid al-Radi's times. Secondly, the axes of arguments presented
in this book are altogether different from the axes of philosophical discussions
which have been prevalent throughout history until the present day.

The Nahj al-balaghah and Western Philosophic Thought:

The Nahj al-balaghah has played a great role in the history of
Eastern Philosophy. Mulla Sadra, who brought a revolution in theological
thought (al-hikmat al-'ilahiyyah), was under profound influence
of 'Ali's discourses. His method of argument with regard to the problems
of tawhid is the method of inferring the Essence from the Essence,
and also deducing the Attributes and Acts from the Essence, and all these
arguments are based on the belief that there exists the Necessary Being
only. These arguments are based on radically different general principles,
which are elaborated in his system of metaphysics.

Eastern theological thought (al-hikmat al-'ilahiyyah) attained
fruition and strength from the sources of Islamic teachings and was firmly
established on unviolable foundations. However, theological philosophy
in the West remained deprived of such source of inspiration. The widespread
philosophical malaise of inclination towards materialism in the West has
many causes whose discussion is outside the scope of our discourse. But
we believe that the major cause of this phenomenon is the weakness and
insufficiency of theological conceptions of Western religious thought. [10]
Anyone interested in making a comparative study of the approaches pointed
out in these chapters, should first study the arguments advanced by Western
philosophers such as Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and others
for proving the existence of God and their discussions about acceptance
or rejection of various arguments, then he should compare them with the
burhan al-siddiqin argument advanced by Mulla Sadra under the inspiration
of 'Ali's words. He would see for himself the wide chasm that separates
the one from the other.

Notes:

[1]
The term ta'wil has been defined variously, but generally when used
in the opposition to tafsir (which is applied to the explanation
of the literal and explicit meanings of the Quranic texts) it is applied
to interpretation of the Quranic verses which goes beyond their literal
meaning. According to Imamiyyah Shi'ah, no one except the Prophet (S) and
the twelve Imams (A) is entitled to draw tawil of the Quranic verses.
To illustrate what is meant by ta'wil consider these examples: (1)
According to Shi'ah hadith, the verse 2:158, Where ever you maybe, God
will bring you all together', pertains to the 313 companions of al Imam
al Mahdi (A) whom God will gather in a certain place from various parts
of the earth in a single night. (2) According to another hadith the verse
67:30, 'Say: What think you? If your water (in wells) should have vanished
into the earth, then who would bring you running water?' pertains to the
ghaybah (occultation) of al Imam al Mahdi (A). Such interpretations,
which obviously go beyond the apparent meaning of the Quranic verses, are
called ta'wil.

[2]
Allamah S.M.H Tabatabai, Usul e falsafah wa rawish e riyalism (The
Principles and Method of Philosophy of Realism), Introduction to vol. I

[3]
Muhammad Sulayman Nadawi, Madha khasara al alam bi inhitat al Muslimin,
vol. IV, p. 97

[4]
Ibid., p. 135

[5]
Allamah Tabatabai, op. Cit

[6]
Ibid, vol. V

[7]
Maktab e tashayyu, No. 2 p. 120

[8]
Ibid, p. 126

[9]
Ibid, p. 157

[10]
See Murtada Mutahhari, Ilal e garayesh beh maddigari (The causes
of inclination towards Materialism), under the chapter: Naresa iha ye
mafahi me falsafiI (The inadequacies of [Western] Philosophical Ideas)