Discourse on Reason [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

in which,
amid some examples worthy of imitation,
there will be found,
perhaps,
as many more which it were advisable not to follow,
I hope it will prove useful to some without being hurtful to any,
and that my openness will find some favor with all.

From my childhood,
I have been familiar with letters;
and as I was given to believe that by their help a clear and certain knowledge of all that is useful in life might be acquired,
I was ardently desirous of instruction.

But as soon as I had finished the entire course of study,
at the close of which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned,
I completely changed my opinion.

For I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors,
that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning,
than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance.

And yet I was studying in one of the most celebrated schools in Europe,
in which I thought there must be learned men,
if such were anywhere to be found.

I had been taught all that others learned there;
and not contented with the sciences actually taught us,
I had,
in addition,
read all the books that had fallen into my hands,
treating of such branches as are esteemed the most curious and rare.

I knew the judgment which others had formed of me;
and I did not find that I was considered inferior to my fellows,
although there were among them some who were already marked out to fill the places of our instructors.

And,
in fine,
our age appeared to me as flourishing,
and as fertile in powerful minds as any preceding one.

I was thus led to take the liberty of judging of all other men by myself,
and of concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a nature as I had previously been given to believe.

I still continued,
however,
to hold in esteem the studies of the schools.

I was aware that the languages taught in them are necessary to the understanding of the writings of the ancients;
that the grace of fable stirs the mind;
that the memorable deeds of history elevate it;
and,
if read with discretion,
aid in forming the judgment;
that the perusal of all excellent books is,
as it were,
to interview with the noblest men of past ages,
who have written them,
and even a studied interview,
in which are discovered to us only their choicest thoughts;
that eloquence has incomparable force and beauty;
that poesy has its ravishing graces and delights;
that in the mathematics there are many refined discoveries eminently suited to gratify the inquisitive,
as well as further all the arts an lessen the labour of man;
that numerous highly useful precepts and exhortations to virtue are contained in treatises on morals;
that theology points out the path to heaven;
that philosophy affords the means of discoursing with an appearance of truth on all matters,
and commands the admiration of the more simple;
that jurisprudence,
medicine,
and the other sciences,
secure for their cultivators honors and riches;
and,
in fine,
that it is useful to bestow some attention upon all,
even upon those abounding the most in superstition and error,
that we may be in a position to determine their real value,
and guard against being deceived.

But I believed that I had already given sufficient time to languages,
and likewise to the reading of the writings of the ancients,
to their histories and fables.

For to hold converse with those of other ages and to travel,
are almost the same thing.

It is useful to know something of the manners of different nations,
that we may be enabled to form a more correct judgment regarding our own,
and be prevented from thinking that everything contrary to our customs is ridiculous and irrational,
a conclusion usually come to by those whose experience has been limited to their own country.

On the other hand,
when too much time is occupied in traveling,
we become strangers to our native country;
and the over curious in the customs of the past are generally ignorant of those of the present.

Besides,
fictitious narratives lead us to imagine the possibility of many events that are impossible;
and even the most faithful histories,
if they do not wholly misrepresent matters,
or exaggerate their importance to render the account of them more worthy of perusal,
omit,
at least,
almost always the meanest and least striking of the attendant circumstances;
hence it happens that the remainder does not represent the truth,
and that such as regulate their conduct by examples drawn from this source,
are apt to fall into the extravagances of the knight-errants of romance,
and to entertain projects that exceed their powers.

I esteemed eloquence highly,
and was in raptures with poesy;
but I thought that both were gifts of nature rather than fruits of study.

Those in whom the faculty of reason is predominant,
and who most skillfully dispose their thoughts with a view to render them clear and intelligible,
are always the best able to persuade others of the truth of what they lay down,
though they should speak only in the language of Lower Brittany,
and be wholly ignorant of the rules of rhetoric;
and those whose minds are stored with the most agreeable fancies,
and who can give expression to them with the greatest embellishment and harmony,
are still the best poets,
though unacquainted with the art of poetry.

I was especially delighted with the mathematics,
on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings;
but I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use;
and thinking that they but contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts,
I was astonished that foundations,
so strong and solid,
should have had no loftier superstructure reared on them.

On the other hand,
I compared the disquisitions of the ancient moralists to very towering and magnificent palaces with no better foundation than sand and mud: they laud the virtues very highly,
and exhibit them as estimable far above anything on earth;
but they give us no adequate criterion of virtue,
and frequently that which they designate with so fine a name is but apathy,
or pride,
or despair,
or parricide.

I revered our theology,
and aspired as much as any one to reach heaven: but being given assuredly to understand that the way is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned,
and that the revealed truths which lead to heaven are above our comprehension,
I did not presume to subject them to the impotency of my reason;
and I thought that in order competently to undertake their examination,
there was need of some special help from heaven,