Discourse on Reason [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

as that,
in the event of my falling into error,
I might be at less distance from the truth than if,
having chosen one of the extremes,
it should turn out to be the other which I ought to have adopted.

And I placed in the class of extremes especially all promises by which somewhat of our freedom is abridged;
not that I disapproved of the laws which,
to provide against the instability of men of feeble resolution,
when what is sought to be accomplished is some good,
permit engagements by vows and contracts binding the parties to persevere in it,
or even,
for the security of commerce,
sanction similar engagements where the purpose sought to be realized is indifferent: but because I did not find anything on earth which was wholly superior to change,
and because,
for myself in particular,
I hoped gradually to perfect my judgments,
and not to suffer them to deteriorate,
I would have deemed it a grave sin against good sense,
if,
for the reason that I approved of something at a particular time,
I therefore bound myself to hold it for good at a subsequent time,
when perhaps it had ceased to be so,
or I had ceased to esteem it such.

My second maxim was to be as firm and resolute in my actions as I was able,
and not to adhere less steadfastly to the most doubtful opinions,
when once adopted,
than if they had been highly certain;
imitating in this the example of travelers who,
when they have lost their way in a forest,
ought not to wander from side to side,
far less remain in one place,
but proceed constantly towards the same side in as straight a line as possible,
without changing their direction for slight reasons,
although perhaps it might be chance alone which at first determined the selection;
for in this way,
if they do not exactly reach the point they desire,
they will come at least in the end to some place that will probably be preferable to the middle of a forest.

In the same way,
since in action it frequently happens that no delay is permissible,
it is very certain that,
when it is not in our power to determine what is true,
we ought to act according to what is most probable;
and even although we should not remark a greater probability in one opinion than in another,
we ought notwithstanding to choose one or the other,
and afterwards consider it,
in so far as it relates to practice,
as no longer dubious,
but manifestly true and certain,
since the reason by which our choice has been determined is itself possessed of these qualities.

This principle was sufficient thenceforward to rid me of all those repentings and pangs of remorse that usually disturb the consciences of such feeble and uncertain minds as,
destitute of any clear and determinate principle of choice,
allow themselves one day to adopt a course of action as the best,
which they abandon the next,
as the opposite.

My third maxim was to endeavor always to conquer myself rather than fortune,
and change my desires rather than the order of the world,
and in general,
accustom myself to the persuasion that,
except our own thoughts,
there is nothing absolutely in our power;
so that when we have done our best in things external to us,
all wherein we fail of success is to be held,
as regards us,
absolutely impossible: and this single principle seemed to me sufficient to prevent me from desiring for the future anything which I could not obtain,
and thus render me contented;
for since our will naturally seeks those objects alone which the understanding represents as in some way possible of attainment,
it is plain,
that if we consider all external goods as equally beyond our power,
we shall no more regret the absence of such goods as seem due to our birth,
when deprived of them without any fault of ours,
than our not possessing the kingdoms of China or Mexico,
and thus making,
so to speak,
a virtue of necessity,
we shall no more desire health in disease,
or freedom in imprisonment,
than we now do bodies incorruptible as diamonds,
or the wings of birds to fly with.

But I confess there is need of prolonged discipline and frequently repeated meditation to accustom the mind to view all objects in this light;
and I believe that in this chiefly consisted the secret of the power of such philosophers as in former times were enabled to rise superior to the influence of fortune,
and,
amid suffering and poverty,
enjoy a happiness which their gods might have envied.

For,
occupied incessantly with the consideration of the limits prescribed to their power by nature,
they became so entirely convinced that nothing was at their disposal except their own thoughts,
that this conviction was of itself sufficient to prevent their entertaining any desire of other objects;
and over their thoughts they acquired a sway so absolute,
that they had some ground on this account for esteeming themselves more rich and more powerful,
more free and more happy,
than other men who,
whatever be the favors heaped on them by nature and fortune,
if destitute of this philosophy,
can never command the realization of all their desires.

In fine,
to conclude this code of morals,
I thought of reviewing the different occupations of men in this life,
with the view of making choice of the best.

And,
without wishing to offer any remarks on the employments of others,
I may state that it was my conviction that I could not do better than continue in that in which I was engaged,
viz.

,
in devoting my whole life to the culture of my reason,
and in making the greatest progress I was able in the knowledge of truth,
on the principles of the method which I had prescribed to myself.

This method,
from the time I had begun to apply it,
had been to me the source of satisfaction so intense as to lead me to,
believe that more perfect or more innocent could not be enjoyed in this life;
and as by its means I daily discovered truths that appeared to me of some importance,