It is under the protection of a State that the believers strive for God''s
sake, and the unbelievers derive material benefit from their worldly endeavours,
and men attain the fruits of their labours. It is through the authority
of State that taxes are collected, aggressors are repelled, the security
of highways is maintained, and the weak reclaim their rights (through courts
of law) from the strong. (This process continues) until the good citizens
are happy and secure from the evils of miscreants. (Nahj al-balaghah,
Khutab 40)
''Ali (''a), like other godly men and spiritual leaders, despises temporal
power and political office for being lowly and degrading when an instrument
of gratification of lust for power and political ambition. He looks down
upon it with extreme contempt when it is desired as an end-in-itself and
aspired as an ideal of life. He considers such kind of power to be devoid
of any value and considers it to be more detestable than ''a pig''s bone
in a leper''s hand.'' But the same power and leadership if used as a means
for the establishment and execution of social justice and service to society
is regarded by him as a thing of paramount sanctity, for which he is willing
to fight any opportunist and political adventurer seeking to grab power
and illegitimate wealth. In its defence, he does not hesitate to draw his
sword against plunderers and usurpers.
During the days of ''Ali''s caliphate, ''Abd Allah ibn al-''Abbas once came
to him. He found ''Ali mending his old shoes with his own hand. Turning
to Ibn al-''Abbas, ''Ali asked him, "How much do you think is this shoe worth?"
"Nothing," replied Ibn al-''Abbas. ''Ali said, "But the same shoe is of more
worth to me than authority over you if it were not to me a means for establishing
justice, recovering the rights of the deprived, and wiping out evil practices."
(Khutab 33)
In the sermon 216, we come across a general discussion about human rights
and duties. Here, ''Ali states that every right always involves two parties.
Of the various Divine duties the ones which God has ordained are duties
of people towards people; they are framed in such a way that each right
necessitates a duty towards others; each right which benefits an individual
or a group, holds the individual or group responsible to fulfil some duty
towards others. Every duty becomes binding when the other party also fulfils
his duty. He says further regarding this issue:
But the most important of the reciprocal rights that God has made obligatory
is the right of the ruler over the subjects and the rights of the subjects
over the ruler. It is a mutual and reciprocal obligation decreed by God
for them. He has made it the basis of the strength of their society and
their religion. Consequently, the subjects cannot prosper unless the rulers
are righteous. The rulers cannot be righteous unless the subjects are firm
and steadfast. If the subjects fulfil their duties toward the ruler and
the ruler his duty to them, then righteousness prevails amongst them. Only
then the objectives of the religion are realized, the pillars of justice
become stable and wholesome traditions become established. In this way,
better conditions of life and social environment emerge. The people become
eager to safeguard the integrity of the State, and thus frustrate the plots
of its enemies. (Khutab 126)
Justice, a Supreme Value:
The first consequence of the sacred teachings of Islam was the influence
exercised on the minds and ideas of its adherents. Not only did Islam introduce
new teachings regarding the world, man, and his society, but also changed
the ways of thinking. The importance of the latter achievement is not less
than the former.
Every teacher imparts new knowledge to his pupils and every school of
thought furnishes new information to its adherents. But the teachers and
schools of thought who furnish their followers with a new logic and revolutionize
their ways of thinking altogether, are few.
But how do the ways of thinking change and one logic replaces another?
This requires some elucidation.
Man by virtue of being a rational creature thinks rationally on scientific
and social issues. His arguments, intentionally or unintentionally, are
based on certain principles and axioms. All his conclusions are drawn and
judgements are based on them. The difference in ways of thinking originates
precisely in these first principles or axioms, used as the ground of inferences
and conclusions. Here it is crucial what premises and axioms form the foundation
for inference, and here lies the cause of all disparity in inferences and
conclusions. In every age there is a close similarity between the ways
of thinking of those familiar with the intellectual spirit of the age on
scientific issues. However, the difference is conspicuous between the intellectual
spirits of different ages. But in regard to social problems, such a similarity
and consensus is not found even among persons who are contemporaries. There
is a secret behind this, to expound which would take us outside the scope
of the present discussion.
Man, in his confrontation with social and moral problems, is inevitably
led to adopt some sort of value-orientation. In his estimations he arrives
at a certain hierarchy of values in which he arranges all the issues. This
order or hierarchy of values plays a significant role in the adoption of
the kind of basic premises and axioms he utilizes. It makes him think differently
from others who have differently evaluated the issues and have arrived
at a different hierarchy of values. This is what leads to disparity among
ways of thinking. Take for example the question of feminine chastity, which
is a matter of social significance. Do all people prescribe a similar system
of evaluation with regard to this issue? Certainly not. There is a great
amount of disparity between views. For some its significance is near zero
and it plays no part in their thinking. For some the matter is of utmost
value. Such persons regard life as worthless in an environment where feminine
chastity is regarded as unimportant.
When we say that Islam revolutionized the ways of thinking, what is
meant is that it drastically altered their system and hierarchy of values.
It elevated values like taqwa (God-fearing), which had no value
at all in the past, to a very high status and attached an unprecedented
importance to it. On the other hand, it deflated the value of such factors
as blood, race and the like, which in the pre-Islamic days were of predominant
significance, bringing their worth to zero. Justice is one of the values
revived by Islam and given an extraordinary status. It is true that Islam
recommended justice and stressed its implementation, but what is very significant
is that it elevated its value in society. It is better to leave the elaboration
of this point to ''Ali (''a) himself, and see what the Nahj al-balaghah
says. A man of intelligence and understanding puts the following question
to Amir al-Mu''minin ''Ali (''a):
Which is superior, justice or generosity? (Hikam 437)
Here the question is about two human qualities. Man has always detested
oppression and injustice and has also held in high regard acts of kindliness
and benevolence performed without the hope of reward or return. Apparently
the answer to the above question seems both obvious and easy: generosity
is superior to justice, for what is justice except observance of the rights
of others and avoiding violating them; but a generous man willingly foregoes
his own right in favour of another person. The just man does not transgress
the rights of others or he safeguards their rights from being violated.
But the generous man sacrifices his own right for another''s sake. Therefore,
generosity must be superior to justice.
In truth, the above reasoning appears to be quite valid when we estimate
their worth from the viewpoint of individual morality, and generosity,
more than justice, seems to be the sign of human perfection and the nobleness
of the human soul. But ''Ali''s reply is contrary to the above answer. ''Ali
(''a) gives two reasons for superiority of justice over generosity. Firstly
he says:
Justice puts things in their proper place and generosity diverts them
from their (natural) direction.
For, the meaning of justice is that the natural deservedness of everybody
must be taken into consideration; everyone should be given his due according
to his work, ability and qualifications. Society is comparable to a machine
whose every part has a proper place and function.
It is true that generosity is a quality of great worth from the point
of view that the generous man donates to another what legitimately belongs
to himself, but we must note that it is an unnatural occurrence. It may
be compared to a body one of whose organs is malfunctioning, and its other
healthy organs and members temporarily redirect their activity to the recovery
of the suffering organ. From the point of view of society, it would be
far more preferable if the society did not possess such sick members at
all, so that the healthy organs and members may completely devote their
activities and energies to the general growth and perfection of society,
instead of being absorbed with helping and assisting of some particular
member.
To return to ''Ali''s reply, the other reason he gives for preferring
justice to generosity is this:
Justice is the general caretaker, whereas generosity is a particular
reliever.
That is, justice is like a general law which is applicable to the management
of all the affairs of society. Its benefit is universal and all-embracing;
it is the highway which serves all and everyone. But generosity is something
exceptional and limited, which cannot be always relied upon. Basically,
if generosity were to become a general rule, it would no longer be regarded
as such. Deriving his conclusion, Ali (''a) says:
Consequently, justice is the nobler of the two and possesses the greater
merit. This way of thinking about man and human problems is one based on
a specific value system rooted in the idea of the fundamental importance
of society. In this system of values, social principles and criteria precede
the norms of individual morality. The former is a principle, whereas the
latter is only a ramification. The former is a trunk, while the latter
is a branch of it. The former is the foundation of the structure, whereas
the latter is an embellishment.
From ''Ali''s viewpoint, it is the principle of justice that is of crucial
significance in preserving the balance of society, and winning goodwill
of the public. Its practice can ensure the health of society and bring
peace to its soul. Oppression, injustice and discrimination cannot bring
peace and happiness-even to the tyrant or the one in whose interest the
injustice is perpetrated. Justice is like a public highway which has room
for all and through which everyone may pass without impediment. But injustice
and oppression constitute a blind alley which does not lead even the oppressor
to his desired destination.
As is known, during his caliphate, ''Uthman ibn ''Affan put a portion
of the public property of the Muslims at the disposal of his kinsmen and
friends. After the death of ''Uthman, ''Ali (''a) assumed power. ''Ali (''a)
was advised by some to overlook whatever injustices had occurred in the
past and to do nothing about them, confining his efforts to what would
befall from then on during his own caliphate. But to this his reply was:
A long standing right does not become invalid!
Then he exclaimed: "By God, even if I find that by such misappropriated
money women have been married or slave-maids have been bought, I would
reclaim it and have it returned to the public treasury, because:
There is a wide scope and room in the dispensation of justice. [Justice
is vast enough to include and envelop everyone;] he who [being of a diseased
temperament] finds restriction and hardship in justic should know that
the path of injustice and oppression is harder and even more restricted.
(Khutab 15)
Justice, according to this conception, is a barrier and limit to be
observed, respected, and believed in by every person. All should be content
to remain within its limits. But if its limits are broken and violated,
and the belief in it and respect for it are lost, human greed and lust,
being insatiable by nature, would not stop at any limit; the further man
advances on this interminable journey of greed and lust, the greater becomes
his dissatisfaction.
Indifference to Injustice
''Ali (''a) regards justice to be a duty and a Divine trust; rather, to
him it is a Divine sanctity. He does not expect a Muslim who is aware and
informed about the teachings of Islam to be an idle spectator at the scenes
of injustice and discrimination.
In the sermon called ''al-Shiqshiqiyyah'', after relating the pathetic
political episodes of the past, ''Ali (''a) proceeds to advance his reasons
for accepting the caliphate. He mentions how, after the assassination of
''Uthman, the people thronged around him urging him to accept the leadership
of Muslims. But ''Ali (''a), after the unfortunate events of the past and
being aware of the extent of deterioration in the prevailing situation,
was not disposed to accept that grave responsibility. Neverthe less, he
saw that should he reject the caliphate, the face of truth would become
still more clouded, and it might be alleged that he was not interested
in this matter from the very beginning, and that he gave no importance
to such affairs. Moreover, in view of the fact that Islam does not consider
it permissible for anyone to remain an idle spectator in a society divided
into two classes of the oppressed and the oppressor, one suffering the
pangs of hunger and the other well-fed and uneasy with the discomforts
of over-eating, there was no alternative for ''Ali (''a) but to shoulder
this heavy responsibility. He himself explains this in the aforementioned
sermon:
(By Him who split the grain and created living things,) had it not been
for the presence of the pressing crowd, were it not for the establishment
of (God''s) testimony upon me through the existence of supporters, and had
it not been for the pledge of God with the learned, to the effect that
they should not connive with the gluttony of the oppressor and the hunger
of the oppressed, I would have cast the reins of [the camel of] the caliphate
on its own shoulders and would have made the last one drink from the same
cup that I made the first one to drink (i.e. I would have taken the same
stance towards the caliphate as at the time of the first caliph). (Then
you would have seen that in my view the world of yours is not worth more
than a goat''s sneeze.) (Khutab 3)
Justice Should not be Compromised:
Favouritism, nepotism, partiality and shutting up of mouths by big morsels,
have always been the essential tools of politicians. Now a man had assumed
power and captained the ship of the caliphate who profoundly detested these
things. In fact his main objective was to struggle and fight against this
kind of politics. Naturally, with the very inception of ''Ali''s reign, the
politicians with their hopes and expectations were disappointed. Their
disappointment soon grew into subversive conspiracies against ''Ali''s government,
creating for him many a headache. Well-meaning friends, with sincere goodwill,
advised ''Ali (''a) to adopt greater flexibility in his policies for the
sake of higher interests. Their advice was: "Extricate yourself from the
ruses of these demagogues, as is said, ''sewing the dog''s mouth with a big
morsel''. These are influential persons, some of whom are from the elite
of the early days of Islam. Presently, your real enemy is Mu''awiyah, who
is in control of a rich and fertile province like Syria. The wisdom lies
in setting aside, for the time being, the matter of equality and justice.
What harm there is in it?"
''Ali (''a) replied to them:
Do you ask me to seek support through injustice [to my subjects and
to saerifice justiee for the sake of political advantage]? By God! I will
not do it as long as the world lasts and one star follows another in the
sky [i.e. I will not do it as long as the order of the universe exists].
Even if it were my own property I would distribute it with justice, and
why not when it is the property of God and when I am His trustee? (Khutab
126)
This is an example of how highly ''Ali valued justice and what status
it held in his opinion.
The Rights of the People:
The needs of a human being are not summarized in the phrase ''food, clothing,
and housing.'' It may be possible to keep an animal happy by satisfying
all its bodily needs; but in the case of man, spiritual and psychological
factors are as important as the physical ones. Different governments following
a similar course in providing for the material welfare of the public might
achieve differing results, because one of them fulfils the psychological
needs of society while the other doesn''t.
One of the pivotal factors which contribute to the securing of the goodwill
of the masses is the way a government views them, if it regards them as
its slaves or as its masters and guardians, if it considers the people
as possessing legitimate rights and itself only as their trustee, agent,
and representative. In the first case, whatever service a government may
perform for the people is not more than a kind of the master''s care of
his beast. In the second case, every service performed is equivalent to
discharging of duty by a right trustee. A State''s acknowledgement of the
authentic rights of the people and avoidance of any kind of action that
implies negation of their right of sovereignty, are the primary conditions
for securing their confidence and goodwill.
The Church and the Right of Sovereignty:
At the dawn of the modern age there was a movement against religion
in Europe, which also affected more or less other regions outside the Christendom.
This movement was inclined towards materialism. When we examine the causes
and roots of this movement, we discover that one of them was the inadequacy
of the teachings of the Church from the viewpoint of political rights.The
Church authorities, and some European philosophers, developed an artificial
relationship and association between belief in God on the one hand and
stripping the people of their political rights by despotic regimes on the
other.
Naturally, this led to the assumption of some necessary relation between
democracy on the one hand and atheism on the other. It came to be believed
that either we should choose the belief in God and accept the right of
sovereignty bestowed by Him upon certain individuals who have otherwise
no superiority over others, or deny the existence of God so as to establish
our right as masters of our own political destinies. From the point of
view of religious psychology, one of the causes of the decline of the influence
of religion was the contradiction between religion and a natural social
need, contrived by religious authorities, especially at a time when that
need expressed itself strongly at the level of public consciousness. Right
at a time when despotism and repression had reached their peak in European
political life and the people were thirstily cherishing the ideas of liberty
and people''s sovereignty, the Church and its supporters made an assertion
that the people had only duties and responsibilities towards the State
and had no rights. This was sufficient to turn the lovers of liberty and
democracy against religion and God in general and the Church in particular.
This mode of thought, in the West as well as in the East, was deeply
rooted from ancient times. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in The Social Contract,
writes:
We are told by Philo, the Emperor Caligula argued, concluding, reasonably
enough on this same analogy, that kings were gods or alternately that the
people were animals.
During the Middle Ages,this out look was revived again; since it assumed
the status of religious faith, it induced a revolt against religion itself.
Rousseau, in the same book, writes:
Grotius denies that all human government is established for the benefit
of the governed, and he cites the example of slavery. His characteristic
method of reasoning is always to offer fact as a proof of right. It is
possible to imagine a more logical method, but not one more favourable
to tyrants. According to Grotius, therefore, it is doubtful whether humanity
belongs to a hundred men, or whether these hundred men belong to humanity,
though he seems throughout his book to lean to the first of these views,
which is also that of Hobbes. These authors show us the human race divided
into herds of cattle, each with a master who presents it only in order
to devour its members.
Rousseau, who calls such a right ''the right of might'' (right=force),
replies to this logic in this fashion:
''Obey those in power.'' If this means ''yield to force'' the precept is
sound, but superfluous; it has never, I suggest, been violated. All power
comes from God, I agree; but so does every disease, and no one forbids
us to summon a physician. If I am held up by a robber at the edge of a
wood, force compels me to hand over my purse. But if I could somehow contrive
to keep the purse from him, would I still be obliged in conscience to surrender
it? After all, the pistol in the robber''s hand is undoubtedly a power.
Hobbes, whose views have been referred to above, although he does not
incline to God in his totalitarian logic, the basis of his philosophic
position regarding political rights is that the sovereign represents and
personifies the will of the people and he actually translates the will
of the people itself into his actions. However, when we closely examine
his reasoning, we find that he has been influenced by the ideas of the
Church. Hobbes claims that individual liberty is not contrary to unlimited
power of the sovereign. He writes:
Nevertheless we are not to understand that by such liberty the sovereign
power of life and death is either abolished or limited. For it has been
already shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject,
on what pretence soever, can properly be called injustice or injury, because
every subject is the author of every act the sovereign does, so that he
never wants right to anything otherwise than as he himself is the subject
of God and bound thereby to obscene the laws of nature. And therefore it
may and does often happen in commonwealths that a subject may be put to
death by the command of the sovereign power and yet neither do the other
wrong-as when Jephtha caused his daughter to be sacrificed; in which, and
the like cases, he that so dies, had the liberty to do the action for which
he is nevertheless without injury put to death. And the same hold also
in a sovereign prince that puts to death an innocent subject. For though
the action be against the law of nature as being contrary to equity, as
was the killing of Uriah by David, yet it was not an injury to Uriah but
to God.
As can be noticed, in this philosophy the responsibility to God is assumed
to negate the responsibility toward the people. Acknowledgement of duty
to God is considered sufficient in order that the people may have no rights.
Justice, here, is what the sovereign does and oppression and injustice
have no meaning. In other words, duty to (God is assumed to annul the duty
to man, and the right of God to override the rights of men. Indubitably,
Hobbes, though apparently a free thinker independent of the ideology of
the Church, had ecclesiastical ideas not penetrated into his mind, would
not have developed such a theory. Precisely that which is totally absent
from such philosophies is the idea that faith and belief in God should
be considered conducive to establishment of justice and realization of
human rights. The truth is that, firstly, the belief in God is the foundation
of the idea of justice and inalienable human rights; it is only through
acceptance of the existence of God that it is possible to affirm innate
human rights and uphold true justice as two realities independent of any
premise and convention; secondly, it is the best guarantee for their execution
in practice.
The approach of the Nahj al-balaghah:
The approach of the Nahj al-balaghah to justice and human rights
rests on the above-mentioned foundations. In sermon 216, from which we
have quoted before, ''Ali (''a) says:
Allah has, by encharging me with your affairs, given me a right over
you and awarded you a similar right over me. The issue of rights, as a
subject of discourse, is inexhaustible, but is the most restricted of things
when it comes to practice. A right does not accrue in favour of any person
unless it accrues against him also, and it does not accrue against him
unless that it also accrues in his favour.
As can be noticed from the above passage, God is central to ''Ali''s statement
about justice, rights, and duties. But ''Ali''s stand is opposed to the aforementioned
view according to which God has bestowed rights on only a handful of individuals
solely responsible to Him, and has deprived the rest of people of these
rights, making them responsible not only to Him but also to those who have
been granted by Him the unlimited privilege to rule others. As a result,
the ideas of justice and injustice in regard to the relationship between
the ruler and the ruled become meaningless.
In the same sermon ''Ali (''a) says:
No individual, however eminent and high his station in religion, is
not above needing cooperation of the people in discharging his obligations
and the responsibilities placed upon him by God. Again, no man, however
humble and insignificant in the eyes of others, is not too low to be ignored
for the purpose of his cooperation and providing assistance.
In the same sermon, ''Ali (''a) asks the people not to address him in
the way despots are addressed:
Do not address me in the manner despots are addressed [i.e. Do not address
me by titles that are used to flatter despots and tyrants]. In your attitude
towards me do not entertain the kind of considerations that are adopted
in the presence of unpredictable tyrants. Do not treat me with affected
and obsequious manners. Do not imagine that your candour would displease
me or that I expect you to treat me with veneration. One who finds it disagreeable
to face truth and just criticism, would find it more detestable to act
upon them. Therefore, do not deny me a word of truth or a just advice.
The Rulers are the People''s Trustees Not Their Lords:
In the last chapter, we said that a dangerous and misleading view became
current in the thought of some modern European thinkers interlinking in
an unnatural fashion the belief in God on the one hand and negation of
peoples rights on the other. This correlation played a significant role
in inducing a group to incline towards materialism. Duty and responsibility
to God was assumed to necessarily negate the duty and responsibility to
the people. Divine obligations completely displaced human obligations.
The belief and faith in God (Who, according to the Islamic teachings, created
the universe on the principles of truth and justice) was considered to
conflict with and contradict the belief in innate and natural human rights,
instead of being regarded as their basis. Naturally, belief in the right
of people''s sovereignty was equated with atheism.
From Islamic point of view the case is actually the reverse. In the
Nahj al-balaghah, which is the subject of our discussion, the main
topics are tawhid and ''irfan; throughout the talk is about
God, whose Name occurs repeatedly everywhere in its pages. Nevertheless,
it not only does not neglect to discuss the rights of the people and their
privileges vis-a-vis the ruler, in fact regarding the ruler as the trustee
and protector of their rights, but also lays great emphasis on this point.
According to the logic of this noble book, the imam and the ruler is the
protector and trustee of the rights of the people and responsible to them.
If one is asked as to which of them exists for the other, it is the ruler''
who exists for the people and not vice versa. Sa''di has a similar idea
in his mind when he says:
It''s not the sheep who are to serve the shepherd, But it is the shepherd
who is for their service.
The word ra''iyyah (lit. herd), despite that it gradually acquired
an abominable meaning in the Persian language, has an original meaning
which is essentially good and humanitarian. The word ra''i for the
ruler and ra''iyyah for the masses first appears in the speech of
the Prophet (''s) and is literally used thereafter by ''Ali (''a).
This word is derived from the root ra''a, which carries the sense
of ''protection'' and ''safeguarding''. The word ra''iyyah is applied
to the people for the reason that the ruler is responsible for protecting
their lives, property, rights, and liberties.
A tradition related from the Holy Prophet (''s) throws full light on
the meaning of this word:
Truly, everyone of you is a raii responsible for his rai''yyah.
The ruler is the ra''i of his people and responsible for them; the
woman is the ra''i of her husband''s house and responsible for it;
the slave is the ra''i of his master''s property and responsible for
it; indeed all of you are ra''i and responsible [for those under
your charge].
In the preceding pages we cited some examples from the Nahj al-balaghah
which illustrated ''Ali''s outlook regarding the rights of the people. Here
we shall give sample quotes from other sources, beginning with the following
verse of the Holy Quran:
God commands you to deliver trusts back to their owners; and that
when you judge between the people, judge with justice ... (4:58)
Al-Tabarsi, in his exegesis Majma'' al-bayan, commenting upon
this verse, remarks:
There are several opinions regarding the meaning of this verse; firstly,
that it is about trusts in general, including the Divine and the non Divine,
the material and the non-material trusts; secondly, that it is addressed
to the rulers, and that God, by making the returning of the trusts an obligation,
is commanding them to observe the rights of the people.
Then he further adds:
This is corroborated by the verse immediately following it: O believers,
obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you ...
(4:59)
According to this verse the people are bound to obey the commands of
God, His Messenger and those in authority (wulat al-''amr). While
the preceding verse mentions the rights of the people, this one reiterates
the complementary rights of those in authority. It has been related from
the Imams (''a) that ''one of these two verses is ours (i.e. it establishes
our rights in relation to you), and the other is yours (i.e. it outlines
your rights in relation to us)'' ... Al-Imam al-Baqir (''a) said that the
performanee of salat, zakat, sawm, and Hajj are some of the
trusts (mentioned in 4:58). One of the trusts (amanat) is that the
wulat al-''amr have been commanded to justly distribute the ghana''im,
sadaqat, and whatever is a part of the rights of the people, among
them.
In the exegesis al-Mizan, in the part of the commentary upon
this verse which deals with tradition, the author relates a tradition from
al-Durr al-manthur from ''Ali (''a) that he said:
It is incumbent on the imam to rule according to the decrees revealed
by God, and to discharge the trusts that he has been charged with. When
he does that, it is incumbent upon the people to pay attention to the Divine
command (about obeying the wali al-''amr), to obey him and respond
to his call.
As noticed earlier, the Holy Quran considers the ruler and the head
of the State as a trustee and a guardian; it regards just government as
a fulfillment of a trust entrusted to the ruler. The approach of the Imams(''a),
in particular that of Amir al-Mu''minin ''Ali (''a), corresponds with the
view which can be inferred from the Holy Quran.
Now that we know the Quran''s view of this matter, we may go on to examine
the statements of the Nahj al-balaghah on this issue. More than
anything else, we must study ''Ali''s letters to his governors, especially
those which were meant to be official circulars. It is in these letters
that we would find glimpses of the teachings of Islam regarding the functions
of the ruler and his duties towards the people as well as their rights.
Ali (''a), in his letter to the governor of Adharba''ijan, reminds him of
his duties towards the people in these words:
Beware lest you consider this assignment as a bait [for acquiring personal
gain]; rather, it is a trust lying on your neck. You have been charged
with caretaking [of the people] by your superior. It is not for you to
betray your duties with respect to the people (ra''iyyah). (Kutub
5)
In another letter written as a circular to tax collectors, after a few
words of advice and admonition, ''Ali (''a) says:
Fulfill the demands of justice in your relationship with the people
and be patient in matters regarding their needs; because you are treasurers
of the people (ra''iyyah), representatives of the community (Ummah),
and envoys of your imams. Kutub 51
In the famous epistle to Malik al-''Ashtar, which contains elaborate
instructions about various aspects of government, he writes:
Awaken your heart to kindness and mercy for the people (ra''iyyah)
and love and tenderness for them. Never, never act with them like a predatory
beast which seeks to be satiated by devouring them, for the people fall
into two categories: they are either your brethren in faith or your kindred
in creation ... Do not ever say, ''I have been given authority'' or ''My command
should be obeyed.'' Because it corrupts the heart, consumes one''s faith,
and invites calamities.
In another letter sent as a circular to army commanders, he says:
It is an obligation that an official should not behave differently with
the people (ra''iyyah) on account of a distinction he receives or
material advantage that he may achieve. Instead these favours from Allah
should bring him nearer to God''s creatures and increase his compassion
towards his brethren. Kutub 50
''Ali (''a) shows an amazing sensitivity to justice and compassion towards
the people and a great respect for them and their rights, which, as reflected
in his letters, is an exemplary and unique attitude towards this issue.
There is another letter in the Nahj al-balaghah consisting of
instructions to the collectors of zakat, and is entitled: ''To the
officials assigned to the job of collecting zakat''. The title indicates
that it was not addressed to any particular official but sent either as
a general instruction in writing or delivered as a routine oral instruction.
Al-Sayyid al-Radi has included it in the section of kutub, or letters,
with the clarification that he is placing this letter here to show to what
extent ''Ali was meticulous in matters pertaining to justice and rights
of the people, being attentive not only to main points but also to minute
details. Here are ''Ali''s instructions:
Set out with the fear of God, Who is One and has no partner. Do not
intimidate any Muslim. Do not tresspass upon his land so as to displease
him. Do not take from him more than Allah''s share in his property. When
you approach a tribe, at first come down at their watering place, stay
there instead of entering their houses. Approach them with calm dignity
and salute them when you stand amongst them, grudge not a proper greeting
to them. Then say to them "O servants of God, the Wali and Khalifah
of God has sent me to you to collect from you Allah''s share in your property.
Is there anything of His share in your property? If there is, return it
to His Wali. " If someone says ''No'', then do not repeat the demand.
If someone answers in the affirmative, then go with him without frightening,
threatening, or compelling him. Take whatever gold and silver he gives
you. If he has cattle or camels, do not approach them save with his permission,
because the major part belongs to him. When you arrive (into the cattle
enclosure), do not enter upon them in a bossy and rude manner ... Kutub
25, also see 26, 27 and 46
The passages quoted above are sufficient to throw light on ''Ali''s attitude
as a ruler toward the people under his rule.
Notes:
That is, in the absence of a righteous government, an unjust government,
at least preserves law and order in society, which is, of course, better
than chaos and rule of jungle.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (trns. by Maurice Granston
Penguin Books, 1978, p. 51
(Ibid p. 53)
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, The Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1958,
p. 173
Bukhari, Kitab al Nikah, vol. VIII