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Critique of Marxist Philosophy

Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's

A Critical Summary of His Book Our
Philosophy

by

Ali Quli Qara'i

Part 1

OUR PHILOSOPHY: By Muhammad Baqir As-Sadr. Translated
from the Arabic with an introduction and notes by Shams
C. Inati. Foreword by Sayyed Hossein Nasr. The Muhammadi
Trust in association with KPI: London and New York, 1987.
Pp. xvii + 295, ISBN 0-7103 0179-0. Distributed by
Routledge & Kegan Paul, Associated Book Publishers
(UK) Ltd., 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 9 EE.

The present book was intended as first of a series
that remained incomplete due to al-Sadr's martyrdom,
which deprived the Islamic world of one of its most
original and able thinkers. This work, with al-'Usus
al-mantiqiyyah li al-'istiqra' (The Logical
Foundations of Induction), makes up the author's main
contribution to contemporary Muslim philosophic thought.

It consists of an introduction and two parts. The
first part deals with the theory of knowledge and the
second with some problems of metaphysics.

The Introduction:

The Social Problem:

Here the author spells out his main aim for writing
the book. It is not philosophy for philosophy's sake. The
purpose is to present Islam as an alternative system
superior to capitalism and secular democracy on the one
hand and to Marxism and socialism on the other.

Although devoid of an articulate worldview or
ideology, capitalistic democracies are materialistic to
the core. Dissociating themselves from all transcendental
principles, they claim to promote the interests and
rights of the individual and safeguard his economic,
political liberties and freedom of expression and
thought. The interests of the individual are regarded as
primary and are emphasized at the cost of the interests
of society. The assumption is that since all individuals
seek their interests, the provision of individual freedom
leads to the automatic fulfillment of the interests of
society, which are regarded as the sum of individual
interests.

However, due to the dominant materialistic outlook on
life in capitalistic societies, the pursuit of individual
self-interest does not transcend the purview of
materialism. Nearly all moral values, most of which do
not lie within the purview of materialistic self-seeking
of individuals, are neglected, causing deep harm to
society's welfare. The rights of the minority are
neglected. Unlimited economic freedom permits a handful
of capitalists to dominate the majority of people and to
usurp their freedoms and rights. With the immense
economic resources at their disposal, the wealthy
capitalists take control of the mass media, government,
legislature and judiciary. Even foreign countries and
peoples are not secure from their greed for cheap raw
materials, cheap labour, and markets for finished
products. Imperialism, hence, is a direct outcome of
capitalistic democracy.

In this dehumanizing hell of materialism and pursuit
of individual self-interest there is no place for love,
mercy, self-denial or any other higher human value.

Dialectical materialism sees all evils of capitalism
to be rooted in the institution of private property. If
private property is abolished and all property becomes
public, passing from the possession and control of the
individual into those of the community, individual
ambition will die.

All will voluntarily pool the fruits of their labour
for the common benefit. The higher cultural values will
be put within the reach of all alike through community
support and the diffusion of education.

Although communism solved some of the problems of
capitalism at the cost of immense human suffering, the
remedy was only partial.

Dictatorship, repression, deprival of individual
freedoms, constant fear of imprisonment, torture and
execution for the dissidents, loss of economic vigour due
to absence of individual initiative and motivation, the
debasement of man's dignity these are some of the
outcomes of the socialist solution.

In the view of Martyr al-Sadr, the evil of capitalism
lies not in private property but in the neglect of the
spiritual dimensions of man's being. Moreover,
self-seeking is inherent in human nature; it is not a
product of the institution of private property, as
alleged by Marx. The failure of secular democracies lies
in their emphasis on individualism and their inability to
stimulate and promote the higher spiritual aspect of
man's self-seeking nature, whose activation is vital for
arising man's altruistic potentialities so significant
for society's welfare. Marxism makes the mistake of
abolishing private property while keeping intact
capitalism's destructive materialistic world view. As a
result, it ends up substituting a handful of bureaucrats
and party officials for a handful of capitalists who
wield all power and control the society's wealth and
resources.

Both capitalism and communism fail to present a
correct world outlook and to formulate an ideology
capable of solving the diverse problems of human society.
This failure is rooted in their materialist world view
and their inadequate understanding of man's nature.

The Islamic Solution:

There are no more than two alternatives for modern man
to solve the basic problem of society. Either, he should
somehow abandon his self-seeking character and become
altruistic while keeping his materialistic world view;
or, he should abandon his materialistic outlook and
select a different metaphysical criterion and goal.

The communists select the first alternative because
they do not believe that man is self-seeking by nature.
They erroneously regard private property as
infrastructure and man's self-seeking as its
superstructure. This is putting the cart before the
horse.

The second alternative is chosen by Islam. It does not
abolish private property but gives a new meaning to human
existence. It does not consider human nature a mechanical
artifact of social and economic conditions, nor does it
put the society at the mercy of the individual.

The Islamic outlook is based in faith in a
transcendent source of life and existence. This world is
a prelude to another. The highest value and criterion of
all human activities and pursuits is the attainment of
God's good pleasure and His approval. All human history
testifies to the innateness of man's self-seeking
character. Had it not been for this self-seeking and
self-love there would have been no motive for the
satisfaction of human needs. No school of thought or
ideology can offer an ultimate solution to man's problems
without taking into account his nature and without
establishing a harmony between that which is and that
which ought to be.

Offering a transcendental interpretation of life, a
perspective in which this world is a prelude to the
hereafter, Islam seeks to bring about a harmony between
man's self-seeking nature and the good of society, by
putting forward the criterion of the attainment of God's
approval and good pleasure as the ultimate end in itself.
As a result it eliminates the conflict between the good
of the individual and that of society, and the individual
is promised an everlasting reward in his struggle for the
establishment of a prosperous and just society as a means
for the attainment of God's good pleasure:

Upon that day men shall issue in scatterings to
see their works, and whose has done an atom's weight
of good shall see it, and whose has done an atom's
weight of evil shall see it. (99:6-8)

Such a thing is not possible in the framework of a
materialistic world view. The Islamic world view opens up
an infinite vista before man's eye, and compensates his
ephemeral losses with lasting benefits.

Apart from transforming human criteria through a
transcendental world view, Islam offers a specific system
of training for nourishing man's various spiritual, moral
and emotional potentialities which lie latent in his
being. Islam takes into consideration the welfare of both
the individual and society, based as it is on a spiritual
understanding and moral sense of life. Other systems
either sacrifice the individual for society or society
for the individual, and as a result they paralyze man's
nature and expose social life to severe complications and
perils.

Here, at the end of his introduction, the author
spells out his objective, which is a comparative study of
the philosophical viewpoints of Islam and other schools
which confront it. Since the capitalist system lacks any
philosophical basis, he proposes to examine in detail the
philosophical foundations of dialectical materialism.

Part One: The Theory of Knowledge
(Chapter I):

Concepts:

The first chapter in this section is devoted to the
epistemological problem of the source of concepts and
judgements. First the author examines the Platonic
doctrine of Recollection, then the rationalist theory,
and following that the empirical theory.

The Platonic theory is false because soul does not
exist in an abstract form prior to the existence of the
body, being the result of substantial motion in matter.
It is by means of this movement that it acquires an
immaterial existence not characterized by material
qualities and free from the laws of matter.

The rationalist theory that some concepts are innate
or a priori is not refutable if interpreted to mean that
innate ideas exist in the soul potentially, becoming
actual as the soul develops.

The empirical theory, first propounded by John Locke,
holds that there are no innate ideas; all our ideas
without exception are derived from experience. It was
adopted by Marxism. However, the empirical theory as
admitted by Hume fails to explain how we form such
concepts as that of causality; for that which is derived
from the senses is succession, not causality. The
rejection of the principle of causality by empiricists
does not solve the difficulty, because the fact remains
that we do conceive causality, which is not given in
sense perception.

Al-Sadr then goes on to the Abstraction theory (nazariyyat
al-'intiza') favoured by the Islamic philosophers in
general. According to this theory, concepts are of two
kinds: primary and secondary. The primary ones are
products of sense-perception. The secondary ones are
produced from the primary concepts by the mind through
the means of 'abstraction.' The secondary concepts
although derived from the primary ones transcend them and
are the inventions of the mind.

Judgements:

Moving from concepts to judgements, al-Sadr selects
here the rational and empirical theses about the source
of judgements for discussion.

1. According to the rationalists, knowledge (in the
form of judgements or propositions) consists of two
kinds. The first kind is primary, self-evident, and
intuitive. It includes such propositions as the principle
of contradiction, and such statements as 'The whole is
greater than the part', 'One is half of two', 'A thing
cannot have contradictory attributes at the same time',
and so on. The other kind is what the author calls
'theoretical' knowledge, whose truth cannot be
established except in the light of the first kind. Among
the examples given are: 'The earth is spherical', 'Heat
is caused by motion', 'Infinite regress is impossible',
'The angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles'.

The author does not seem to be right here in putting
two different kinds of statements in one class called
'theoretical knowledge'. 'The earth is spherical' is not
the same kind of judgement as 'The angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles'. The former requires
observation and inference for its proof, while the latter
can be established by pure reasoning. The same
distinction applies to the two statements 'Heat is caused
by motion' and 'Infinite regress is impossible'.

All knowledge is based on previous knowledge, which in
turn depends on knowledge preceding it. The a priori or
primary knowledge is that irreducible remainder which
does not arise from any previous knowledge. A part of
primary knowledge, consisting of such general principles
as the law of contradiction, constitutes the basic
condition of all knowledge. Without it no general
proposition can be affirmed.

It is this knowledge independent of experience that
makes metaphysics possible.

The progression of thought is from universal to more
particular propositions. This is true even in the
experimental sciences, which cannot dispense with the
universal principles of causality and uniformity of
nature. Experimentation also, without the application of
necessary rational laws, does not lead to general
scientific truths. The Islamic philosophers, including
al-Sadr, espouse this theory.

2. According to the empiricists sense experience is
the primary source of all knowledge. They do not admit
the existence of any necessary rational knowledge prior
to experience. There can be no knowledge of universal
truths prior to experience. Their position makes
metaphysics and deduction impossible.

The empirical doctrine has to be rejected for the
following four reasons.

First, either the empirical doctrine is prior to
experience or it is not. If it is, it refutes itself. If
it is derived from experience, the validity of experience
as a criterion of knowledge has not yet been established.

Second, empiricism fails to affirm the existence of
matter and the external world, which cannot be affirmed
except by primary rational knowledge. Thus the
metaphysical realities are not the only ones which depend
for their affirmation on the rational method.

Third, experience by itself is not sufficient to
assert the impossibility of anything. All that experience
can affirm is non presence or at the most non-existence.
The notion of impossibility can be accepted only on
rational grounds, not on the basis of experience. If the
notion of impossibility is denied, anything, including
contradiction, becomes possible. The possibility of
contradiction leads to the collapse of all knowledge and
science.

Fourth, the principle of causality cannot be
demonstrated by the means of the empirical doctrine. All
that experience can affirm is succession and contiguity,
not causal necessity.

The author then turns to the effort of Hume to show
how the 'feeling' of necessary connection implicit in the
concept of causality arises from experience: the theory
of association of ideas. According to Hume, the habit of
leaping forward to and expecting the sequent associated
with the antecedent becomes so ingrained by continual
repetition of their conjunction as to make the mind feel
that when the one event occurs the other simply must
follow it. Events so habitually conjoined and associated
as to be accompanied by this feeling of must are called
cause and effect, and the relation of simple sequence is
turned into one of causation.

Al-Sadr offers five reasons for rejecting this
explanation. First, if it were true, no scientist would
be able to confirm a causal relation between two things
in a single experiment, where there is no repetition of
the conjoined events to produce the feeling of necessity.
Similarly, many times, belief in a causal relationship is
not strengthened by further repetition of events
involving a cause and its effect.

Second, when we take the associated ideas of two
events regarded as being in cause-effect relationship, is
the relation between these two ideas that of mere
conjunction or necessity? If it is mere conjunction, the
element of necessity implied in their association is not
explained.

Third, the necessity of the principle of causality is
not a psychological necessity but an objective one.

Fourthly, the mind distinguishes between cause and
effect even when they are completely conjoined (e.g. the
movements of the pen and the hand while writing).

Fifthly, it often happens that two events are
frequently associated without producing the belief that
one of them is the cause of the other (e.g. day and
night). Empiricism cannot provide the basis for the
sciences, which are based on some rational principles
that are not subject to experimentation, viz., the
principle of causality, the principle of harmony between
cause and effect, and the principle of non contradiction.
The scientist, in framing his theories, passes from these
general principles to particular hypothesis through a
process of syllogistic reasoning.

Of course, experience has a high value, but it itself
stands in need of a rational criterion. This criterion is
primary rational knowledge.

The rational theory of knowledge also explains the
quality of necessity and certainty that distinguishes the
propositions of mathematics from the propositions of the
natural sciences. This is because mathematics is entirely
based on primary rational principles. Some empiricists
have tried to explain this difference by stating that
mathematical propositions are analytic (tautological).
Yet even mathematical statements would not be certain had
it not been for their reliance on certain rational
principles, such as the law of contradiction. Moreover,
all mathematical statements are not analytic, such as,
,The diameter is shorter than the circumference'.

How does primary knowledge emerge when it is not
present at birth and in all men at all times? The answer
is that the primary judgements proceed from the innermost
being of the soul after it has formed the necessary
conceptions, directly or indirectly, as a result of
experience. As the soul develops through substantial
movement, the primary knowledge, which exists in it
potentially, becomes actual.

The Marxist Theory of
Knowledge:

Here, the statement of the Marxist position by the
author is, unfortunately, not based either on the
original works of Marx or Engels or their authoritative
interpreters. Perhaps due to the non-availability of
translations, he bases his criticism on the writings of
second-rate interpreters, such as Mao Tse-tung. The
result is that the Marxist position stated is weak,
weakening in turn somewhat the author's criticism of
Marxist epistemology.

According to Marxism, all knowledge begins in
experience. The next step is that of ordering of
information, inference and application.

It does not accept that some knowledge is independent
of sense experience. Denying that there exists some
primary knowledge which enables the mind to move from the
first to the second stage, it fails to explain how the
mind can move from the stage of sense perception to that
of theory and inference.

The conclusion is- drawn that only the rationalist
theory provides an adequate explanation of how the mind
is able to move from the first to the second stage of
knowledge. It is only the knowledge of the general
rational laws that affords the scientist to develop
theories and to draw inferences in his endeavour to
discover the reality that lies beyond empirical
phenomena. The rejection of primary rational knowledge,
which is independent of experience, makes it impossible
to go beyond the stage of sense-perception.

Empiricism and the
Possibility of metaphysics:

Before the birth of empiricism, philosophy was
considered responsible for discovering the general laws
of being. Its tool was syllogistic reasoning and
philosophic thought moved from general to more particular
propositions. Not only metaphysics and ethics but also
such sciences as physics and psychology lay within the
sphere of philosophy. However, the experimental method
and induction took the sciences, each of them devoted to
a specific class of phenomena, out of the purview of
philosophy, which was left to deal with issues which fell
within the purview of pure reason. The empiricists
claimed that there is no field of knowledge beyond the
field of experimentation that the sciences have divided
among themselves, leaving nothing for philosophy. The
only scope that was admitted for philosophy by some
schools was that of discovering the relations and links
among the sciences and to postulate general scientific
theories based on the outcome of experiments in various
scientific fields. Foremost amongst them were the schools
of Marxism and positivism.

The logical positivists were not satisfied with the
empiricist attacks against metaphysics. They did not
limit themselves, for instance, to the assertion that
metaphysics was useless since its propositions could not
be demonstrated by the scientific method. The positivists
went on to assert that the propositions of metaphysics
were meaningless. The criticism of the positivists
against metaphysics can be summarized as follows:

1. metaphysical propositions deal with matters that
lie beyond the sphere of experience and experiment. Hence
they cannot be verified.

2. Their being true or false makes no difference so far
as the world of experience is concerned.

3. metaphysical propositions are meaningless because they
do not give any information about the world.

4. It is inappropriate to ascribe truth or falsity to
them.

The author suggests the following lines for answering
this criticism:

1. If we refute the empirical theory of knowledge and
affirm the existence of a primary knowledge prior to
experience in the core of the human mind, we can
demonstrate that the mind has the capacity to confirm the
veracity or falsity of metaphysical propositions.

2. Although metaphysical propositions have no direct
bearing on the data of experience, these data are not
altogether irrelevant to metaphysical statements. Further
clarification to be given later.

3. The logical positivists describe a proposition as
'meaningful' if its truth or falsity can be affirmed
within the limits of sense experience.

This is equal to saying, The content of
metaphysical propositions lies beyond sense
experience. With this, the positivists assert an
indisputable truth, that the subjects of metaphysics are
not empirical something which the rationalists have
stressed all along.

What would the positivist say about such propositions
as relate to nature but cannot be verified by sense
experience, such as a statement about the existence of
mountains and valleys on the other side of the moon?
Positivism revises its original position to assert that
that which is important here is logical possibility, not
actual possibility. However, the notion of logical
possibility is a metaphysical notion, and thus
positivism, in the last analysis, has to adopt a
metaphysical criterion of 'meaning'. metaphysical
propositions are as meaningful as any other, in that they
relate to realities independent of the mind and the
logical possibility of being true or false holds in their
case.

Marxism and
metaphysics:

The Marxist position regarding metaphysics is
essentially similar to that of positivism. Marxism
rejects a higher philosophy above and over the sciences
and independent of them. Marxist philosophy calls itself
'scientific', yet soon trespasses into other fields to
judge metaphysical issues affirmatively or negatively. In
violating its self-set limits it contradicts itself a
result of the Marxist mistake of basing its theory of
knowledge on sense experience alone.

It is in the light of the rational theory of knowledge
that philosophy and metaphysics rest on firm fundamental
principles. The acceptance of primary rational knowledge
relieves philosophy of bondage to the constantly changing
theories of experimental science.

The link between philosophy and science is strong, for
science furnishes philosophy with new facts that enable
philosophy to obtain new philosophical conclusions. Yet
in spite of this philosophy may at times not need any
sense experience, nor is it necessary for philosophy to
accompany the procession of science in its gradual march.

The Value of Knowledge (Chapter 2):

The Possibility of
Knowledge:

In this chapter Martyr al-Sadr is concerned not with
the 'value' of knowledge but rather with the possibility
of knowledge as such. To what extent does 'knowledge'
(i.e. that which is considered to be knowledge) capture
the essence of reality and the secrets of the external
world?

Marxism believes in the possibility of knowledge of
objective realities and rejects skepticism and sophistry.
The world does not contain anything that cannot be known.
But is it appropriate for Marxism to claim that definite
knowledge is possible? Can it escape skepticism in the
ultimate analysis?

In order to understand the Marxist and Islamic
positions on this issue, the author considers it
essential to review important doctrines formulated by
philosophers, beginning with the Sophists.

Greek Philosophy: In the fifth century B.C. a class of
teachers emerged in Greece that devoted itself to
teaching of rhetoric and giving professional advice to
their clients in matters of law, court procedure and
politics. Protagoras (b.c. 500 B.C.) and Gorgias (fl.c.
427 B.C.), two major skeptics, were the products of this
class. Gorgias, for instance, taught that the Real, about
which the pre-Socratic philosophers had argued, does not
exist. If a world-stuff existed we could never know what
it was like; it is not what it appears, since the senses
lie. Even if Reality could be known, knowledge is
incommunicable; for, language, being mere noise, cannot
convey the knowledge of reality to other minds.

The Sophists rejected the possibility of knowledge and
made truth a purely subjective and relative affair. Hence
metaphysics is idle speculation and its results are
worthless. There is no reality that reason can know
except the ever-changing flux of sensible experience.

Sophistry wished to destroy what philosophy had built
hitherto. They were opposed by Socrates (d.399 B.C.),
Plato (428-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who
tried to maintain reason on its throne. Aristotelian
epistemology validated reason and recognized the value of
experience, and posited the possibility of certain
knowledge.

The skepticism that reemerged after Aristotle was a
compromise in that it did not deny reality but denied the
possibility of certain knowledge. However, skepticism
could not prevail in philosophy, and reason mounted the
throne offered to it by Aristotle, until skepticism
emerged again in the 16th century in an atmosphere of
doubt and rebellion against the authority of reason.
Descartes emerged in this atmosphere and he tried to
bring back certitude to philosophy.

Descartes: Descartes (1596-1650) began his philosophy
with sweeping doubt. Ideas, he reasoned are susceptible
to error and sense perception is often deceptive. The
point of departure for philosophical certitude was the
existence of his thoughts, which leads him to infer his
own existence: 'I think, therefore, I am'. This statement
is true because it is clear and distinct. He therefore
adopts as a general rule the principle that all things
that we conceive very clearly and distinctly are true.

Ideas seem to be of three sorts: (1) those that are
innate, (2) those that are foreign and come from without,
(3) those that are the mind's constructs. Descartes
disposes of skepticism by first proving the existence of
God, whose idea belongs to the first class. Since we as
imperfect beings are not sufficient reason for the idea
of perfection we entertain the idea of God being the idea
of an absolutely perfect being the idea of God must have
been caused by Him. God is thus the first objective
reality posited by Descartes. Now since God is good, the
innate ideas (which include the ideas of external bodies)
which we have such strong inclination to believe must be
true. This is how Descartes posits external reality and
the possibility of science.

Al-Sadr points out that 'I think, therefore, I am',
contains a concealed syllogism: 'I think, every thinker
exists, therefore I exist'.

Moreover as pointed out by Ibn Sina, this argument from
thought to existence is invalid; for the thinking subject
admits his existence in the first phrase 'I think'.

Secondly, Descartes confuses between the idea of a
perfect being and the objective reality it represents. It
is God, not the idea of God, which is more sublime than
human beings.

Descartes bases the whole edifice of existence on the
proposition:

It is impossible for God to deceive. He
confuses between 'deception is impossible', and
'deception is abominable', which is not a metaphysical
(judgement of fact) but an ethical (judgement of value)
proposition.

In any case, the author's purpose is not an elaborate
criticism of Descartes' philosophy but to present his
view regarding the possibility of knowledge. Descartes
accepts the validity of innate rational knowledge.

John Locke:

Locke (1632-1704) is the founder of modern empiricism.
While he claims that all knowledge is derived from
experience there being no innate ideas or principles he
divides knowledge into three types:

(1) by intuition, (2) by rational demonstration, (3) by
sensation. Our knowledge of our own existence is
intuitive, our knowledge of God's existence is
demonstrative, and our knowledge of things present to
sense is sensitive. This division of knowledge into three
groups is inconsistent with his empirical doctrine.

Locke makes a distinction between what he calls
primary and secondary qualities. The primary ones are in
separable from bodies, such as solidity, extension,
figure, motion or rest, and number. The secondary
qualities are only in the percipient, such as colour,
sound, smell, etc.

Since there is no way, according to Locke, of knowing the
primary qualities except through the senses, this
division is also inconsistent with his empirical
doctrine.

The Idealists:

The Platonic theory of Ideas, generally called
'realism', is referred to as 'idealism' by the author.
Whatever we may call it, it did not involve any denial or
doubt about reality. In metaphysics, idealism is the
theory that reality is of the nature of mind or idea. To
al-Sadr, it is an attempt to shake the foundations of
objective reality and to exterminate certainty. In order
to study the role of idealism in the theory of knowledge,
he proposes to examine three tendencies in idealism.
These he calls 'philosophical', 'physical' and
'physiological'.

Philosophical Idealism: Its founder was Berkeley, who
declared, 'To exist is to know or to be known'. He denies
existence to objective realities existing independent of
minds. Mind and its ideas exist. All we know of 'matter'
are the qualities of our sense (the secondary qualities
of Locke). Berkeley's idealism has been interpreted
differently and al-Sadr has selected an interpretation
that he considers best-known. He cites Berkeley's proofs
in support of his doctrines.

The first one is intended to prove that all knowledge
is based on and comes from the senses. The main criticism
against Berkeley is that he takes for granted the law of
contradiction in his proofs while denying that there is
any knowledge not rooted in sense experience. The author
interprets Berkeley as denying the independent existence
of things and offers reasons for rejecting this alleged
denial of Berkeley.

The fact is that Berkeley's position is not understood
clearly by the author. Berkeley does not deny the reality
of external objects. What he denies is that such objects
could exist by themselves and independent of the Divine
mind. That is, existence for him is synonymous with being
the object of consciousness. Things cannot exist except
as ideas inside minds. Why does Berkeley deny what Locke
calls primary qualities? That is because he is reluctant
to recognize such qualities as extension, number, motion,
solidity and figure as being attributes of the Divine
mind, perhaps in accordance with the theological notions
of the scholastics. If external objects are to be
conceived as ideas in the Divine mind, there is no place
for matter and materiality in the external world, matter
being the main obstacle in the way of conceiving external
objects as Divine ideas. Hence he denies the primary
qualities as representing attributes of material bodies,
and thus he annihilates matter. In some ways Berkeley's
thesis that existence is mental is similar to the theory
of God's 'knowledge by presence' ('ilm huduri)
propounded by some Muslim philosophers. In both the
cases; things are conceived as objects of knowledge, not
as things in themselves independent of a perceiving mind.
On the whole, one may say that the reasons behind
Berkeley's denial of matter and corporeality are mainly
theological, because he regards the idea of material
substratum as the base on which the concept of
thing-in-itself rests. Since corporeality cannot be a
quality of Divine ideas, Berkeley will not have any
things-in-themselves. According to him everything that
there is thing- in-consciousness.

The Nature of
Judgement:

However, to return to al-Sadr's criticism of Berkeley,
it is obvious that Berkeley's denial of the objectivity
of thought leads to solipsism. Berkeley's proofs involve
a misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge
has two main divisions according to al-Sadr: conception
and judgement. The forms of objects exist on three levels
in our intellect:

(1) as percepts, on the level of sense perception, (2)
as images, on the level of imagination (and perhaps
memory), and (3) as concepts, on the abstract level of
intellection. Mere concepts, in isolation from one
another, do not ensure the mind's movement from the
subjective to the objective realm. The presence of the
form of an essence in our intellect is one thing, while
the objective presence of that essence in the outside is
something else (it is not clear whether this is true of
sense perception or only of imagination and conception).

Judgement, however, is different from conception. It
is the point of departure for the movement from
conception to objectivity.

1. Judgement does not arise in the mind by way of senses.
It is rather an act of the knowing mind.

2. Most importantly, it is an inherent property of
judgement to reveal a reality beyond the mind. Although
the mind has no direct conjunction with anything except
its knowledge, it is inherent in judgement to be
essentially disclosive (kashfan dhatiyyan) of
something outside knowledge.

Berkeley's argument is based on a confusion between
conception and judgement. The empirical doctrine that all
knowledge arises from perception relates to the stage of
conception. By failing to recognize the difference
between concepts and judgements, it makes it impossible
to move in the direction of objectivity.

Answers to
Objections:

(1) It may be said that if it is inherent in judgement
to essentially disclose reality lying beyond knowledge,
then all judgements must be true, which is not the case.
To solve this difficulty al-Sadr explains the meaning of
'essential disclosure'. It is inherent in judgement to
point towards a reality independent of itself. Whether
true or false, it discloses judgement is not detached
other than itself. Thus essential disclosure of from
judgement itself, even when there is error and ambiguity
(the author uses the word 'knowledge' instead of
judgement in this statement, which does not agree with
the conception that knowledge is something always true).

(2) The second objection is that if judgement may be
erroneous, its property of essential disclosure being
unable to protect it from error, how can we rely upon it?
The answer is that if human thought did not possess a
number of judgements of indubitable certainty, no
judgement would be free of doubt and it would be
impossible for us to know any reality. It is here that
the doctrine of necessary primary knowledge comes to our
rescue. This doctrine asserts that there is a knowledge
whose truth is secure and which is completely free from
error. Error occurs in inferring secondary judgements on
the basis of primary knowledge. Even Berkeley
unconsciously believes in a store of certain knowledge,
for no one can demonstrate anything unless he bases his
demonstration on the fundamentals contained in primary
knowledge such as the law of contradiction and the
principle of causality and necessity.

This discussion of philosophical idealism enables us
to draw two conclusions: (1) the acceptance of the
essentially disclosing nature of judgements, (2) the
acceptance of basic principle of human knowledge whose
truth is necessarily secure. Even Berkeley's belief in
the existence of other minds and his proofs in favour of
idealism assume the acceptance of these two notions.

Realism (which in metaphysics means that reality is
not reducible to mind and thought, and in epistemology
means the doctrine that objects of knowledge and
experience exist independently of their being known or
experienced) bases its arguments on these two principles.

Idealism in Physics
and Psychology:

The nineteenth-century physicist explained nature in
terms of mechanical laws involving material bodies,
particles and waves. The developments in atomic physics
abolished the classical conception of matter. Matter was
no more indestructible; mass and matter became
convertible to energy. As a result of this, the
materialistic conception of the world became inconsistent
with the findings of empirical science.

The discoveries in subatomic particle physics lead to an
idealistic tendency among some physicists. The concepts
and theories of science, they said, were only convenient
ways of discussing reality, whose true nature escaped the
categories of thought and knowledge. This idealism, or
absence of faith in the objective value of knowledge was,
according to Martyr al-Sadr, the result of a
philosophical error. They perceived the debate between
realists and idealists as revolving about the choice of
one of these two alternatives: Either the world is
attributable to mind and consciousness, or to a material
reality existing outside them.

This is a fallacious formulation of the primary issue
involved, that is whether the world has an objective
reality independent of mind and consciousness (which in
the last analysis may not be material).

As a result, when they failed to posit the fundamental
reality of matter, they came to doubt the possibility of
knowledge. However, realism and materialism are not
synonymous. If science is led to discard the
materialistic view of the world, or if any of its
scientific axioms collapse as a result of experiments, it
should not lead us to reject realism and deny the
objective value of knowledge.

The evaporation of matter as a fundamental reality
existing independently of mind was a deadly blow to
materialist philosophies, including Marxism. However, the
Marxist ideologues, such as Lenin, tried to save face by
insisting that the philosophical conception of matter is
different from the matter of science. The only necessary
quality of 'matter', they pleaded, was its existence
independent of mind, not the corporeal qualities
traditionally ascribed to matter.

This is a futile play with words, for it does not conceal
the fact that Marxism has to abandon its philosophical
position. If to exist independently of mind is the only
necessary quality of matter, then theological
metaphysics, according to this new definition of matter,
is a materialistic philosophy!

The tendency towards idealism and agnosticism among
the physicists was the result of a psychological crisis
that came due to the collapse of certain scientific
axioms. Materialism was such an axiom, but realism is
not. Realism is not the result of empirical proof or
experiments; its acceptance is inherent in human nature.

A similar skeptical tendency arose among the
physiologists studying the physiology of perception and
the causal processes related to it.

They suggested that the objects given in sense
perception are symbolic, not representative of the
external objects. This tendency was a complication of the
materialistic notion that knowledge was purely a
physiological act conditioned by the nature of the
nervous system.

Skepticism:

Modern skepticism has its progenitor in the
post-Aristotelian Greek school of skepticism headed by
Pyrrho (b.c. 360 B.C.). It did not confine itself to
showing the contradictions of sense perception but went
on to an analysis of knowledge to assert the
impossibility of certainty. Hume took Locke's and
Berkeley's empiricism to its logical conclusion by
throwing doubt on causality and induction and abolished
the distinction between rational belief and credulity.
Not only God but also the self, other minds and external
reality fell prey to a skepticism based on the denial of
the principle of causality, which was again based on the
empirical theory of knowledge. Hume's explanation of
causality, as pointed out before, is unsuccessful.

Relativism:

Relativism, in the context of metaphysics and
epistemology, is, according to al-Sadr, a doctrine which
asserts the existence of independent reality and the
possibility of knowledge, but a relative knowledge that
is not free from subjective attachments. Hence the author
proposes to discuss certain main relativistic tendencies,
beginning with Kant's philosophy.

Kant's 'Relativism':

Kant believes that propositions are of two kinds:
analytic and synthetic. An analytic proposition is one in
which the predicate is part of the subject; for instance,
'The triangle is three-sided'. The synthetic propositions
are those which are not analytic; they give new
information.

Propositions are also distinguishable into two other
kinds: a priori and empirical. A priori judgements,
though they may be elicited by experience, have a basis
other than experience, unlike empirical judgements which
are rooted in experience. Some a priori judgements are
synthetic. All the propositions of pure mathematics are a
priori in this sense. The propositions of sciences are
synthetic and empirical. Kant believes space and time to
be formal attributes of the perceiving subject which give
a special and temporal structure to all experience. He
agrees with Berkeley that matter is not given in
knowledge and sense experience, but disagrees with him in
holding that external reality cannot exist independently
of mind. Things independent of mind, the
things-in-themselves, do exist. Percepts are caused by
things in themselves and are ordered by our mental
apparatus in space and time. Things-in-them-selves, which
are the causes of sensations, are unknowable; they are
not in space or time, nor are they substances.

In addition to the subjectivity of space and time,
Kant believes in the subjectivity of these twelve
categories divided into four sets of three: (1) of
quantity. unity, plurality, totality, (2) of quality:
reality, negation, limitation, (3) of relation:
substance-and-accident, cause-and-effect, reciprocity,
(4) of modality: possibility, existence, necessity (of
these, al-Sadr mentions only causality). These, like time
and space, are subjective. i.e. our mental constitution
is such that they are applicable to whatever we
experience, but there is no reason to suppose them
applicable to things-in-themselves.

Mathematical propositions are all a priori. These are
the only synthetic judgements which are a priori, because
they rest not upon the variable and contingent content of
experience but upon the unchanging forms of space and
time in which all experience is given.

The statements of natural science, which are empirical
and synthetic, are composed of two elements, one of which
is empirical and the other rational. The empirical aspect
relates to the content or stuff of experience, whereas
the rational element relates to mind and its forms and
categories. The natural sciences, according to Kant, do
not describe the external order of things-in-themselves,
but are valid and trustworthy within the realm of
experience, i.e. the experienced order of 'things-in-us'.

Here al-Sadr does not appear to appreciate the depth
of Kant's skepticism regarding the knowledge of the
external world, which he interprets as a kind of
relativism. Hence these statements of his:
Knowledge (in Kant's philosophy), therefore, is a
mixture of subjectivity and objectivity, and
That is why relativity is imposed on every truth
representing external things in our knowledge, in the
sense that our knowledge indicates to us the thing's
reality in us, and not the thing's reality in
itself. He does not seem to notice that Kant's
extreme subjectivism makes not only metaphysics
impossible but so also natural science, which is reduced
to some kind of phenomenology. Kant's subjectivism makes
his realism altogether ineffectual. The
things-in-themselves are shadows that lurk on the
boundaries of his system, which is idealist and
subjective through and through. His realism is as useless
for science as his rationalism is useless for metaphysics
and theology.

Al-Sadr's criticism, however, is addressed mainly to
Kant's denial of the possibility of metaphysics.
According to Kant, there can be no synthetic judgements
relating to metaphysics. Empirical synthetic judgements,
like that of the sciences, involve mind's formal modes
and categories: space and time and the categories of
quantity, quality, relation and modality. These finite
categories apply to sense-experience and phenomena, not
to things-in-themselves, the noumenal. God, soul, and the
noumenal world lie beyond experience, and hence there can
be no empirical synthetic judgements about them. Also,
since the noumenal world transcends mind's a priori
concepts, a priori synthetic judgements, like that of
logic and mathematics, which are purely formal and empty
of content, cannot pertain to metaphysics. Accordingly
there is no room in metaphysics for anything but analytic
judgements, which do not constitute any real knowledge at
all.

Al-Sadr, it seems, does not notice that Kant has built
the realm of the mind and experience into an almost
autonomous and self-contained world by itself (almost, we
said, allowing for Kant's inconsequential belief in the
unknowable things-in-themselves, which cause sensations).

This is shown by the 'two basic errors' in Kant's
theory that he points out. Firstly, he points out, Kant
considers mathematical science to 'produce' mathematical
truths and principles, which are above error and
contradiction, whereas every realistic philosophy must
recognize that science does not 'produce' or 'create'
truths. Science is revelatory of what transcends the
limits of mind. The propositions of mathematics reflect
an objective reality and are, in this sense, similar to
the laws of natural science. Secondly, Kant
considers the laws that have their foundation in the
human mind as laws of the mind, and not scientific
reflections of the objective laws that govern and
regulate the world as a whole. They are nothing but
relations present in the mind naturally, and used by the
mind to organize its empirical knowledge. Such a
position, al-Sadr says, leads to idealism, for if
the primary knowledge in the mind'.

Is nothing but dependent relations awaiting a subject in
which to appear, then how could we move from conception
to objectivity? Further, how could- we prove the
objective reality of our various sense perceptions that
is, the natural phenomena whose objectivity Kant
admits?

The fact is that Kant's position is already deeply
steeped in idealism. In his system extreme rationalism
leads to an inscrutable subjectivism. Kant, in the
ultimate analysis, is not a relativist but a skeptic, if
not altogether a sophist. Objectivity for him lies within
the inner realm of experience. Knowledge, he would say in
reply to al-Sadr, is indeed revelatory, but revelatory of
that which is within this realm.

Relativism in Philosophy and Sciences:

After discussing Kant, Martyr al-Sadr directs his
attention to other relativistic tendencies in philosophy
and sciences. 'Subjective relativism' is such a tendency
in philosophy (viz. in James, Schiller, Vaihinger), which
asserts that truth is nothing but what is necessitated by
an individual's specific circumstances and conditions of
knowing. It is supported by physiological idealism which
asserts that sense perception is symbolic, not
representative, its quality being determined by the
workings of the nervous system, not external reality.
This kind of outlook makes all knowledge relative without
exception, even mathematics, which was excepted by Kant.
Also, unlike Kant, it makes truth vary with individuals.

In the field of science, there are some theories which
lead to skepticism despite the intention of their
proponents. These are behaviourism, Freudianism and
historical materialism. Behaviourism, which regards
external stimuli and physiological conditioning as
preceding the mind and consciousness and as determinants
of its contents, unavoidably leads to a denial of the
value of knowledge. The author has discussed it
elaborately in Chapter 5 of Part 2 of the present work.

According to Freud, the contents of the conscious mind
are determined by the appetites, urges and instincts
hidden in the unconscious, which rule conduct and the
conscious mind and its ideas. The Freudian view of the
mind as an instrument of the unconscious and its
instincts leads to skepticism by denying its function of
mirroring and reflecting objective reality. The author,
here, promises to deal with Freud's views touching upon
the theory of knowledge in a future book, Our Society,
which he did not succeed in writing.

Historical materialism, which may be regarded here as
a sociological theory, also leads to skepticism by
treating knowledge and ideas as part of social
composition. According to this theory, economic
condition, determined by the means of production, is the
determining basis of society. Knowledge and thought are
thus linked to social structure and the economic forces.
Economic forces occupy the same position here as
unconscious urges in Freud's theory; both lead to loss of
confidence in the possibility of knowledge. The
inevitable links between thought and the economic factor
in historical materialism contradicts with the Marxist
theory of knowledge which asserts confidence in the
possibility of knowledge.

Here the author makes an important
remark : All theories that argue against the objective
value of knowledge involve a contradiction; by
eliminating confidence in knowledge they destroy their
own foundation and condemn themselves. In the light of
this, behaviourism becomes a product of Pavlov's
physiology and stimuli; Freud's theory a product of his
unconscious urges; historical materialism also becomes a
product of the economic conditions in which Marx lived.

Knowledge in Islamic Philosophy:

At this point Martyr al-Sadr again recapitulates the
main points in the theory of knowledge of .Islamic
philosophers. These points are as follows.

1. Human knowledge is of two kinds: Conception and
judgement (or assent). Conception, in its various forms,
has no objective value (not in the sense that concepts
are not derived from perception of reality, but in the
sense that they by themselves are not sufficient to take
hold of objective reality in the sense that judgements
do). Only judgement has the quality of essentially
disclosing reality.

2. All knowledge of judgement type can be attributed
to necessary primary knowledge, whose necessity cannot
(and need not) be proved and whose truth cannot be
demonstrated (on account of its self-evidence). However,
the mind is conscious of the necessity of accepting it.
Examples of such knowledge are the law of contradiction
and the law of causality. It is on these principles that
all other judgements must be based. The objective value
of judgements depends on the degree to which they rest
upon these principles. It is possible in the light of
these principles to acquire knowledge in metaphysics,
mathematics and natural sciences. In the natural sciences
knowledge is acquired by applying the primary principles
through the mediation of experiment, which is not needed
in mathematics and metaphysics. This is the reason why
the conclusions of metaphysics and mathematics are, for
the most part, certain, in contrast to those of the
natural sciences.

Sometimes the drawing of metaphysical conclusions may
depend on experimentation. In that case a philosophical
theory has the same value and rank as a scientific
theory.

The concept we form of an external reality is two
sided. One side is the form of the thing it represents.
In the other respect, it is fundamentally different from
the objective reality of that thing; it enjoys none of
the effectiveness and activity of the thing represented.
This difference between the idea and reality is the
difference between quiddity and existence, as described
in Part 2 of this work.

Knowledge in
Dialectical Materialism:

Dialectical materialism asserts the possibility of
knowledge and rejects idealism and relativism, as well as
skepticism and sophistry. It is here that the author, for
the first time in his book, takes up Marxist epistemology
for a critical study. All that which was said hitherto on
the theory of knowledge, about the views of the Sophists,
Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant was a
preparation for examination of the Marxist viewpoint on
knowledge. Basing as it does its theory of knowledge on
the empirical doctrine, on dialectical movement of
thought and synthesis of contradictions, can it refute
idealism and avoid relativism and skepticism? The
author's purpose is to show that it fails in this
venture.

Marxism and
Refutation of Idealism:

Marxism fails to refute idealism by its stand that all
knowledge is derived from experience. It fails to notice
that in the dispute between idealism and realism sense
experience cannot be a judge, for the idealist claims
that things exist only in sense experience while the
realist asserts that they exist independently of sense
experience. The realist cannot demonstrate the
objectivity of sense experience i.e. of its being
representative of another independent reality by sense
experience itself. So also arguments from science can be
valid only if the objectivity of experience and
experiment has already been posited.

The efforts of Marxist ideologues like Engels, Lenin,
Roger Garaudy and Georges Politzer are naive in that they
try to refute idealism with arguments from science, which
are pointless as long as the objectivity of science has
not been established on philosophical grounds. Yet this
is something that Marxism cannot do, because:

(1) It does not accept necessary rational principles.
According to it, the principle of causality, for example,
is an empirical principle. Therefore, it cannot be
considered a basis for the validity and objectivity of
sense experience.

(2) The dialectic explains external events by
contradictions internal to matter: natural events do not
require an external cause. The idealist can assert the
same thing about phenomena and claim that knowledge and
experience arise out of their inner contradictions
without the need of any external cause in the form of an
independent reality.

The author cites some naive arguments advanced by
Marxists against idealism which are derived from science
or commonsense, but which in fact side step the real
issue or beg the question. Once again al-Sadr concludes
that it is not possible to base a sound realism except on
the basis of the rational theory of knowledge which
asserts the presence of necessary rational principles
independent of sense experience.

Sense Experience and
the Thing-in-Itself:

Al-Sadr here quotes Marxist texts that state that
there is no basic

difference between the thing-in-itself and the
phenomenon, between outward reality and the manner in
which it appears to consciousness. But there is a duality
here, between appearance and reality, for according to
empiricism the senses perceive only the phenomena. Can
Marxism eliminate this duality and prove that external
reality appears to us in our percept s and ideas as it
is?

The answer is, No, because knowledge according to
materialism is purely a physiological act. Unlike
mechanical materialists, the dialectical materialists
claim that the idea of a thing is not its pure mechanical
picture. Since qualitatively different forms of motion
can transform from one to another, the physical motion of
a thing changes into a physiological motion in our
senses. Then the physiological motion changes into the
psychological motion of the idea. To begin with such
changes are not admissible, and even if they be admitted
it means that Marxism does not succeed in revealing the
relation between a thing and its idea except as a
relation between a cause and its effect or at the most
that of a reality and its reflected picture.

But why should we assume that this effect and cause
differ from other effects and causes and are
distinguished from them by a special characteristic,
namely that the effect pictures its cause faithfully? Of
course, there are many physiological events that are
effects of external causes without having the capacity of
picturing their causes. Even if such a thing were
admitted, how do we know that the idea (percept) fully
corresponds to the objective reality?

The Marxists answer this objection by asserting that
thought is a part and product of nature; rather its
highest expression. Our knowledge is nothing other than a
superior product of nature; it cannot but reflect the
laws of the motions of matter. The products of thought,
being the products of nature, are not in contradiction
but in agreement with the rest of material nature.

Yet this is not sufficient for proving the possibility
of knowledge. Aren't idealist thought and theological and
metaphysical thought as much part of nature and products
of it as dialectical materialism?

Truth and Dialectical
Movement of Thought:

Marxism rejected the relativity theory of truth as a
kind of sophistry, but it itself admitted relativity by
asserting that:

(1) there are no absolute truths; truth grows and
develops in a way that reflects the growth and
development of external reality.

(2) truth and falsehood may come together; there is no
absolute incompatibility between truth and falsity as
asserted by formal logic;

(3) all judgements, regardless of how truthful they may
appear, involve contradiction and hence an aspect of
falsity. It is such a contradiction that makes knowledge
and truth grow. Al-Sadr now proceeds to refute each of
these notions.

Truth, according to realism, is an idea that
corresponds to a reality that exists independently of
mind and consciousness. There is a second definition of
'truth' given by subjective relativists, according to
which it is something which is consistent with the mind's
formulations. The third definition of truth, advanced by
the pragmatists and instrumentalists, is that it is some
idea whose benefit or utility is demonstrated by
practical experience. Bergson described truth as a
creation not discovery.

Schiller and Dewey proposed nearly similar definitions
of truth. Pragmatism involves a clear contusion between
the meaning of truth and the motives behind attempts to
attain it. Moreover.

(1) to give truth a pure practical meaning and to
strip it of the quality of disclosing independent reality
is an unrestricted admission of skepticism;

(2) secondly, it is not clear whether the benefit of
individual or that of society is to be the criterion of
truth. It the criterion is the former, it would lead to a
social chaos. It the latter, a long social experience is
required to affirm the validity of any statement. This
would apply to the pragmatic doctrine itself, whose truth
cannot be determined without the test of experience.

(3) That an idea is beneficial is not sufficient for its
acceptance. For instance, a disbeliever cannot accept
religion even it he agrees that it is effective in
rectifying human conduct.

If Marxism is to assert the possibility of knowledge,
it cannot do so without adopting the correspondence
theory of truth on which realism rests. For it is
impossible on the basis of this theory to hold that truth
develops and grows. Marxism understands neither motion
nor truth when it holds that truth is subject to
movement, and motion and becoming involve contradiction.

In the description of a process involving motion,
change or becoming, a statement describing a certain
momentary state is absolutely true at that moment; it
cannot, after that, become contrary to that reality at
that specific stage.

Moreover, Marxism abolishes itself by applying the law
of movement to truth. It movement is a general law
governing truths, then it is impossible to affirm any
absolute truth, including the judgements of logic and
mathematics, to say nothing of the doctrine of
dialectical materialism itself.

Marxism finds fault with formal logic for accepting
absolute opposition between truth and falsity. The
Marxist notion of the union of truth and falsity is based
on two misconceptions. One of them is the notion of the
development and movement of truth and the other is that
motion is nothing but a series of contradictions. The
author postpones the study of the second issue to Part 2
of this work. Nevertheless, it is evident even at this
stage of the argument that application of the laws of the
dialectic to the realm of knowledge undermines the
foundations of all rational knowledge.

Science and Absolute Truth: Al-Sadr cites here an
argument of Engels wherein the latter criticizes the
principle that truth is absolutely incompatible with
falsehood. Engels cites the example of a general
scientific law (Boyle's law) which is not true in certain
cases to assert that if the metaphysicians were correct
in their assertion that truths are absolute and totally
incompatible with falsity, then they would have to reject
every scientific law because it is not true in some
cases. Al-Sadr points out that Engels does not understand
well the phrase 'absolute truth'. He explains that
propositions are of two types: simple (e.g. 'Plato died
before Aristotle') and composite (e.g. 'Bodies expand by
heat'). A simple proposition cannot be true in one
respect and false in another. But since a composite
proposition is really a bundle of numerous simple
propositions, it is true in some cases and false in
other. But this does not mean that truth and falsity
unite. A composite proposition is completely true in the
case that it is true, and completely false in the case
that it is false.

Following conclusions are derived from this study:

1. Truth is absolute and unprogressive, even though the
objective reality develops and changes.

2. Truth is fully incompatible with falsity. A simple
proposition cannot be both true and false.

3. The application of dialectic to truth leads to
complete skepticism.

By regarding truth as in continuous change and
development, the dialectic sentences itself to death.

The Marxist Relapse into Subjectivism: Despite
claiming an objective character for its own relativism,
Marxism relapses into subjective relativism by linking
consciousness with class. Although this is class
subjectivity, and not the individual subjectivity of
subjective relativists, no one can secure in its light
the truth of any philosophical or scientific judgement in
the sense of its correspondence to objective reality. As
long as Marxism upholds the necessity of class character,
it cannot offer a world view of universal validity. (Here
Part 1 ends).

Here at the conclusion of the summary of Part I of Our
Philosophy, some relevant remarks may not be out of
place. It is true that Marx, Freud and the Behaviourists
are wrong in regarding the economic factor or the urges
of the unconscious or the physiological factors as the
exclusive determinant of thought and consciousness but it
would also be wrong to refuse to acknowledge the
influence, no matter how undesirable, of these factors on
consciousness and thought. The history of human thought,
more than being a history of intellectual health, is an
account of monstrous perversions and deviations. Correct,
clear and healthy thinking has been and remains an
exception rather than the rule.

In this regard, the Holy Quran, also, refers to the
role of tradition and desire (ahwa') in deviating
men from the course of true intellection, and considers
ethnic, social, political and economic factors as the
causes behind social conflict, division and diversity. To
recognize the causes which lie behind deviant thought is
as important as the necessity of defending the value of
human knowledge. And perhaps it is only after we have
fully recognized these deviating factors that we can
fully appreciate the possibility of certain knowledge.