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Critique of Marxist Philosophy

Martyr Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's

A Critical Summary of His
Philosophy: Part 2

by Ali Qul' Qara'i

Preface:

Ever since man has attempted to determine his relation
to the external world, the formulation of world view has
been a central problem of philosophic thought. The
author's aim is to present the world view of Islamic
philosophy against the backdrop of other views presented
by modern Western philosophy, especially Marxism.

Two issues are involved in the difference between
world views:

The first one relates to realistic and idealistic
conceptions of the world. Realism believes in the
existence of an objective reality independent of mind,
while for idealism reality can be only mental. The second
issue involves two separate outlooks within realism:
materialism and theological realism. Materialism regards
sensible matter as the common ground of all existence
including mind and consciousness. Theological realism
(hitherto referred to as 'realism')goes beyond matter and
asserts the existence of an eternal and infinite cause as
the primary cause of all phenomena, including the mental
and the material realms.

Correction of Some Errors: Here, it is necessary to
correct the misconceptions n of some modern writers. The
first of these errors is to consider the conflict between
theology and materialism as the one between idealism and
realism, as if theological thought advocated idealism and
materialism was the only representative of realism.

The second is the accusation that the theistic world
view attributes every phenomenon to a supernatural cause
and thus makes science impossible by completely
eliminating causality and law from the realm of nature.
This accusation is false, because theology considers God
as a cause transcending nature, as a power above nature
and matter. This error involves a misunderstanding of the
place of the transcendent cause in the causal chain.

The third error is that of identifying spirituality
with idealism, whereas spirituality can be considered as
an attribute of idealism as well realism; it has a
different meaning in each of these outlooks.

Thus there are three kinds of world views: idealism,
materialism and theological realism. Idealism was studied
in Part 1, while discussing the theory of knowledge.
Materialism and theological realism will be studied in
this part.

A Clarification: At the outset a number of points have
to be clarified. Firstly, what is the basic feature that
distinguishes all the various versions of materialism
from theological realism, making them two conflicting
schools? The answer is that the basic distinguishing
feature of materialism is its denial that there is
anything beyond the scope and realm of experimental
science. Both the theologian and the materialist accept
the findings and formulations of science, but they differ
over the issue that there is an immaterial realm of
existence beyond the realm of experiment and sensible
phenomena. The materialist considers natural causation
revealed by experiments as the sole ground of all
existence, including mind and consciousness. The
theological realist, on the contrary, regards the knowing
subject and its knowledge as being of an immaterial
nature. Further, theological realism asserts that the
developments and movements studied by science are, in the
ultimate analysis, attributable to a cause transcending
nature and the material world. The materialist denies
this and claims that no immaterial or transcendent causes
are revealed in the field of experiment; nature is
dynamic, autonomous, self-sufficient and self-contained.

It is clear that there is no dispute between theology
and materialism with regard to scientific truths. The
theologian admits all scientific truths; he just admits
other truths and asserts the existence of a primary,
non-sensible and immaterial cause of nature's movements
and phenomena.

Secondly, if the conflict between theology and
materialism is that of affirmation and negation, which of
the two schools is responsible for giving evidence in
favour of its position? The theologian must offer reasons
for his affirmation and the materialist for his negation,
for absolute denial like absolute affirmation requires
proof. The materialist, by his absolute denial, in fact
asserts that he has examined the entire realm of being
and not found any immaterial cause in it.

Now a second question arises : What kind of evidence
that can be?

The answer is that the evidence for the affirmation or
for the denial must be based on reason, not on sense
experience. This is contrary to the materialist view,
which considers sense experience as its evidence and
claims that the propositions of metaphysics and theology
cannot in general be verified by sense experience and
that an analysis of experience and nature does not reveal
the existence of immaterial things. Now if materialism is
correct in its claim that sense experience and science do
not constitute a proof for the propositions of theology,
then neither can they be proof for its absolute negation.
Moreover, the truths of science are not the subject of
disputation between theology and materialism. For the
disputation relates rather to the philosophical
interpretation of these truths which asserts the
existence of a cause transcending the limits of sense
experience. It is clear that sense experience cannot be
considered as a proof for the negation of a truth outside
its own limits.

Science does not affirm the materialist view of the
world. All the truths uncovered by science leave room for
the assumption of a cause above matter. Scientific
experimentation cannot prove that matter is not created
by an immaterial cause. Therefore, the proof in support
of materialism cannot be based on scientific truths or
sense experience. Rather, materialism is a philosophic
interpretation of experience and scientific truths, in
the same way as theological realism is; both of them give
different interpretations to the findings of science. The
soundness of these interpretations cannot be established
on the basis of sense experience.

This leads us to a third question: If scientific
experimentation is not sufficient by itself for deciding
the issue, is there any other means available to the
human mind? Al-Sadr's answer is that human reason is
sufficient for studying this issue, in the same way as it
studies all scientific issues in the light of primary
rational knowledge, which is independent of experience.
Thus the method adopted by theological realism in
demonstrating its propositions is ultimately the same
method by which we prove all scientific truths and laws.

Dialectics:

In classical Greek philosophy 'dialectics' meant a
specific method of discussion in which the debate between
the representatives of opposite points of view begins
from preliminaries admitted by both the sides and
proceeds until one of the points of view is affirmed or a
new conclusion is reached by the way of synthesis of
formerly opposite viewpoints.

Dialectic in modem Western philosophy is not a method
of discussion but a method of explaining reality and a
general law of the universe according to which movement
is a continuous development of oppositions and
contradictions, their merging and reconciliation. The
idea is an old one, foreshadowed by Empedocles (who
explained change as a conflict between the world forces
of Love and Strife) and Zoroaster, and embodied in the
'golden mean' of Aristotle, who held that the
knowledge of opposites is one. Hegel was the first
to establish a complete logic (and metaphysics, which in
Hegel is same as logic) on the basis of the notion of
dialectic.

In this logic, which is claimed to govern thought and
existence, the fundamental principle is one of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis, which involves a constant
'taking up' and reconciliation of pairs of
contradictories in higher, more comprehensive and
penetrating ideas, until finally all oppositions are
overcome in the all-inclusive, all-reconciling and
all-explaining Absolute Idea.

Hegel views conception as a hierarchy of syntheses
whose skeleton is constructed of ascending triads in
which seemingly antagonistic concepts are reconciled by
dialectic in higher logical concepts. The most basic
triad involving the concepts of being and non-being as
thesis and antithesis yields the synthetic concept of
becoming. The ideas of becoming and change involve the
concepts of identity and difference which are reconciled
in the concept of essence. The concepts of essence and
existence, whole and part, appearance and reality are
resolved in the concepts of ground and force. The concept
of force suggests those of actuality and potentiality,
whose dichotomy is reconciled in the concept of fact.
Also the notion of fact suggests those of necessity and
freedom, which are resolved in the concept of 'nature of
things' . Now we are confronted with the thesis and
antithesis of substance and its attributes or accidents.
This contradiction is overcome by regarding the substance
as the cause of its attributes. Here cause contains the
effect and so cause and effect become one. Similarly
final and efficient causation are synthesized in the
identity of means and end, which are neither external to
nor distinct from each other, by the concept of process.
The world-process and the Absolute are one; it is its own
cause and its own goal. Hence the actual is the ideal; on
the moral plane, value and fact are identical.

Hegel's stand on the law of contradiction is dubious.
As can be seen, the driving motive behind every Hegelian
synthesis is avoidance of contradiction; i.e. it is
inspired by belief in the impossibility of contradiction.
Moreover, he holds that the nature of Reality can be
deduced from the sole consideration that it must not be
self-contradictory.

On the contrary, according to Hegel, truth and
falsehood are not sharply defined opposites, as is
commonly supposed; nothing is wholly false and nothing
that we can know is wholly true. The truth is the
'whole', and nothing partial is quite true. Whatever the
value of his arbitrary analysis of concepts, it does not
seem correct, on the whole, to hold that Hegel rejects
the principle of contradiction.

Hegel is one of the most confused of philosophers. His
philosophy is difficult because it is difficult to
understand confusion. The Marxist interpretations, or
misinterpretations, of Hegelian dialectics have added to
this difficulty. Therefore, when al-Sadr criticizes
Hegel, he has the

Marxist interpretation of Hegel before him.

Thus when we see al-Sadr charging Hegel with the complete
rejection of the principle of contradiction and with
holding that contradiction is not only the primary
principle of all knowledge but the general law of the
universe, we should understand him as criticizing the
Marxist interpretation of dialectics rather than Hegel.
With these remarks now we turn to al-Sadr's criticism of
Marxist dialectics.

According to the Marxists, the dialectical method is
characterized by four main points: (1) The movement of
development, (2) the contradiction of development, (3)
the leaps of development, and (4) the general linkage.
These are supposed to replace the four laws of thought
recognized by formal logic: the law of identity, the law
of contradiction, the law of conversion, and the law of
demonstration. Al-Sadr then goes by one on to deal with
the four points of the dialectical logic one.

The Movement of
Development:

The dialecticians reproach metaphysics and traditional
logic for considering nature in a static state of
unchanging frozenness and stagnant stability and for
failing to reflect nature in its moving and progressive
reality. According to this claim, the poor metaphysician
is an unperceptive being devoid of consciousness and
awareness who tails to notice change, transformation and
movement in the realm of nature.

Al-Sadr briefly recapitulates the standpoints of Greek
philosophers regarding motion. He refers to the paradoxes
of Zeno (d.c. 430 B.C.) which were arguments put forward
to demonstrate the inconceiv ability of motion and to the
acceptance of motion by the Aristotelian school. The
problem is related to the manner in which motion was
conceived: either as a succession of pauses in instants
of time or as a gradual advance in which there is no
pause or rest.

Islamic philosophy pictures motion as the gradual
actualization of the potentiality of a thing. Development
always consists of something actual and something
potential. Thus motion continues as long as a thing
combines both actuality and potentiality, existence and
possibility. It possibility is exhausted and no capacity
for a new stage remains, motion ceases. Mulla Sadra
(1572-1641) demonstrated that motion does not pertain to
the accidental surface of things but goes on inside their
very substances. Not only that, he also showed clearly
that motion and change is one of the necessary principles
of metaphysics.

The accusation of the dialecticians that metaphysics
views nature as static and frozen is due to their failure
to understand motion in its proper philosophical sense.
The difference between the ways metaphysics and
dialectical materialism view motion consists of these two
points:

Firstly, dialectical materialism views motion as being
based on contradiction and strife among contradictories.
According to the metaphysics of Muslim philosophers
motion is a progression from one stage to an opposite
stage without involving the union of these opposites in
any one of its stages.

Secondly, motion according to Marxism is not confined
to external nature but is also common to intellectual
truths and ideas. On the basis of this, there can be no
absolute truths. According to Muslim philosophers, motion
and development do not intrude into the realm of
knowledge and thought.

In regard to the first point, al-Sadr quotes a passage
of Engels wherein motion is conceived as continuous
succession of contradiction and the temporary
reconciliation of this contradiction. The simplest
mechanical change in place, says Engels,
cannot, in the last analysis, occur except by means
of the presence of a certain body in a certain place at a
certain moment and in another place at the same moment.

In other words its being and non-being are simultaneously
in one place.

This shows that the Marxists have not made much
progress since Zeno in conceiving motion. Fakhr al-Din
al-Razi also raised similar objections against the
gradual emergence of a thing. The Marxists however differ
from the ancient Greek philosophers in that while the
latter negated motion because it involves contradiction,
the former use this conception of motion to justify
contradiction.

The alleged contradiction in motion is only due to the
confusion between potentiality and actuality. At no stage
does motion involve a specific rank in actuality and
another rank in potentiality. In other words, motion is a
gradual actualization of potentiality. The confusion in
the Marxist conception of motion arises due to its
considering the entanglement of actuality and
potentiality, or their union in all the stages of motion
as a union of actual opposites, a continuous
contradiction and a strife among the contradictories.

Now that motion is not the result of an inner cause in
the form of conflicting contradictories, it is also
impossible for motion to be self-sufficient or to be
without an external cause that takes a thing continuously
from potentiality to actuality. Applying this idea to
material nature as a whole, al-Sadr derives a theological
conclusion. The very existence of nature is a gradual
progression and continuous departure from potentiality to
actuality. Since there can be no self-sufficiency in the
form of internal contradiction, the law of causality
forces us to recognize a cause transcending the limits of
nature.

Al-Sadr then takes up the second thesis of dialectical
materialism, that dialectical change and development also
occur in the realm of thought and truth, which could not
portray nature if thought did not grow and develop
dialectically like nature. Reality grows,
states a Marxist citation, and the knowledge that
results from this reality reflects it, grows as it grows,
and becomes an effective element of its growth.
Al-Sadr rejects this dialectical picture of the movement
of thought for the two following reasons:

1. The realm of nature involves fixed laws that
reflect fixed truths in the realms of thought and
knowledge. Scientific knowledge reflects the permanent
underlying the transient in nature.

2. Firstly, concepts and ideas, no matter how accurate,
do not possess the actual properties of the things to
which they pertain (e.g. the idea of radium does not emit
relation). Motion is one of those properties. A true
idea, although it reflects objective reality, need not
possess the actual properties of the reality it
represents. Hence the concepts of changing things do not
change in order to reflect the objective reality of those
things.

Al-Sadr then takes up the second Marxist argument
intended to demonstrate the dialectic development of
thought, that knowledge is a natural phenomenon and
therefore governed by the same laws that rule nature. It
changes and grows dialectically as do all the phenomena
of nature. The laws of the dialectic apply to both matter
and knowledge.

This argument rests on a pure materialistic
explanation of knowledge. Al-Sadr postpones the analysis
of this view to an independent chapter,
knowledge, at the end of the book. Here it
suffices to put a question to the Dialecticians : Is this
materialistic explanation of knowledge reserved for the
thought of the dialecticians or does it extend also to
the thought of others who reject the dialectic? It
becomes contradictory for Marxists to accuse other's
thought of being frozen and static; for if the dialectic
is a natural law common to both thought and nature, then
it must apply to all human thought alike.

Thirdly, al-Sadr examines the Marxist effort to
produce the history of science as an empirical evidence
for the dialectical movement of thought. Although
progress and development in human knowledge is an
undeniable fact of history, this development is not a
kind of motion in the philosophic sense intended by
Marxism. It is no more than an increase in the quantity
of truth and a decrease in . the quantity of errors. When
a theory moves from the level of hypothesis to that of
law, it does not mean that scientific truth has grown and
altered. Al-Sadr gives a few instances from the history
of science to prove his point, He goes on to remark that
Marxism seeks to achieve two ends by applying the
dialectic to truth. First, it seeks to destroy
metaphysics on which theology rests, by holding that
since truth moves and grows there can be no fixed and
absolute truth. Second, by denying absolute falsity it
seeks to make all truth relative.

The Contradictions of
Development:

Here al-Sadr takes up the Marxist rejection of the law
of contradiction and the claim of dialectical materialism
that all change, becoming and development involve
contradiction. He explains the meaning of the law of
contradiction and points out that no logical person can
deny the absolute validity of this law. He points out
that the Marxist denial is based on a misunderstanding of
what is meant by contradiction. He examines one by one
seven instances of contradiction cited by the Marxists,
and argues that none of them involves a union of actual
contradictories. The first example is that of motion,
which according to Engels is in itself contradictory, As
explained previously, there is no contradiction in
motion. The second example is that of the growth of the
living body, which, according to Engels, is at every
moment itself and something other than itself. Other
examples include the contradiction: of the positive and
the negative charges, of action and reaction in
mechanics, attack and defeat, advance and retreat,
victory and defeat in war, etc. Al-Sadr disposes of all
these examples by pointing out that actual opposites are
not logical contradictories and that no logical
contradiction is involved in any of these cases.

Al-Sadr points out that this compulsive urge to see
contradictions in everything has political motives. In
its effort to give a reassuring analysis of the conflict
between the capitalist and the working classes, Marx
builds up a whole social philosophy on the dialectic of
contradictories that promises the ultimate collapse of
capitalism and the victory of communism.

However, the social and political application of the
dialectic would lead to its self-refutation. In the
communist utopia envisioned by Marxism, in which classes
and class-conflict are abolished, social development
would also come to a halt due to the abolishment of
contradiction.

Al-Sadr sarcastically remarks that such a static and
stagnant fate has indeed overtaken the communist states,
wherein the subjugation of all thought to the official
doctrine has led to intellectual repression, stagnation,
and backwardness.

The Leaps of
Development:

This is another idea in the Marxist ideological
arsenal. According to the dialecticians, gradual
quantitative changes reach a point when the accumulated
change produces a sudden qualitative change. Hence
development is not a circular movement but a linear
progression from one qualitative stage to a new one.
Moreover, they assert that this is a general law of
nature. One of the examples offered is that of some
substances, like water, which pass from solid to liquid
state and from liquid to gaseous state at specific
temperatures.

Al-Sadr points out that although instantaneous leaps
do occur in a number of natural phenomena, they are by no
means general and do not hold true in the case of all
phenomena (e.g. biological organisms, language, etc.). In
the example of water, experimentation does not
demonstrate that heating is a result of contradiction,
nor there is any dialectical development involved.
Secondly, neither the heating up of water nor its passage
from one state to another is a linear, irreversible
progression. Thirdly, the leap from solid to liquid state
or from liquid to vapour state does not take place
suddenly for the complete mass of water heated. Why
should, then, the leap in the social sphere be imposed on
society as a whole? Finally, al-Sadr points out, the
change of state of water is as much a matter of
quantitative change from the viewpoint of science as the
change in temperature. Here al-Sadr seems to refer
vaguely to the kinetic theory of heat, according to which
the changes of state are quantitatively related to the
speed of molecular movement and the force of molecular
cohesion.

Al-Sadr goes on to criticize Marx's view of
transformation of Surplus value into capital as an
instance of accumulated quantitative change passing into
qualitative change. Although he is right in pointing out
that money does not undergo any qualitative change by
passing into capital, his insistence that the change
involved is merely verbal amounts to ignoring a
significant economic fact pointed out by Marx.

The General Linkage:

Marxism, following Hegel, insists on considering
nature as a whole in which things and events are linked
together organically and are dependent on one another. No
thing or event makes sense if isolated, as allegedly done
by metaphysics, from other things and events that
surround it. Martyr al-Sadr denies this allegation.
metaphysics considers the world as completely interlinked
in accordance with the law of causality. The novelty
introduced by the Marxist dialectic lies not in the
general linkage itself but in its application to
political aims.

However, two points are noteworthy in regard to the
view of the theory of general linkage held by
metaphysics. First, the linkage of every part of the
universe to the causes, conditions and circumstances
relevant to it does not mean that one cannot notice or
define it in an independent manner. Second, the causal
linkage among the parts of nature cannot be circular.

Here, at the close of al-Sadr's refutation of the
dialectics, which was an attempt, albeit an unsuccessful
one, to understand and interpret historical change and
indeed to bring it about it is essential to point out
that traditional Islamic philosophy as well
historiography have not paid adequate attention to
historical change, which is a kind of 'macro-change' that
reveals itself over extended ages and eras of time.
Western philosophy and science, at least since Hegel and
Darwin, have been keenly cognizant of historical change
and development and have tried to see beyond the
immediate panorama of micro-changes of all sorts:
physical, chemical, biological, social, economic,
political and cultural.

Although al-Sadr insists that traditional metaphysics
has not been blind to change, he himself gives no clear
indication of the recognition which is due to
macro-changes. One of the most significant
characteristics of modem science is its attention to
change that lies behind the veils of permanence in the
universe. This historical awareness is now common to all
the disciplines which have to deal with the past from
astronomy, geology and biology to sociology, history,
anthropology, and the historical study of art,
technology, religion, politics, language and ideas.

The Principle of
Causality:

The law of causality, al-Sadr states, is a necessary
rational principle present in the core of man's nature as
a rational being. It is on the basis of this principle
that (1) the objective reality of sense perception, (2)
the validity of scientific theories and laws based on
experimentation and (3) the validity of all philosophical
and scientific inference, are based.

Al-Sadr explains that although the objective existence
of the world is a necessary primary judgement that
requires no evidence, the objective reality of every
particular sense perception is not known in a necessary
manner. It is on the basis of the principle of causality
that a specific perception, under specific circumstances
and conditions, reveals the existence of its cause as an
external object.

Experimental theories do not acquire a scientific
character unless they are generalized beyond the limits
of particular experiments. And this is not possible
without reliance on general causal laws which are: (1)
the principle that every event has a cause, (2) the
principle that every cause necessarily produces its
effect, and (3) the principle of harmony between causes
and effects.

Without the laws of causality, there would not be any
link between evidence and conclusions and no evidence
would lead to any result.

Even those who attempt to deny this principle by
resorting to a certain evidence would not make this
attempt had they not believed that the evidence on which
they rely is a sufficient cause of the knowledge of the
falsity of this principle. But this is in itself an
application of this principle.

It is wrong to regard the principle of causality as an
inductive law based on experimentation, because such a
view reopens the fundamental question about the validity
of perception and experimentation, to which no answer can
be found. It is a principle which is accepted
independently of the senses and is above experimentation.
From the viewpoint of Islamic philosophers, (1) causality
is not limited to the natural phenomena which figure in
experimentation, but is a general law of existence,
applicable to the material and the immaterial; (2) the
cause whose existence is confirmed by this principle need
not be subject to experimentation, nor it need be of a
material nature; (3) the fact that experimentation does
not disclose a specific cause of a certain phenomenon
does not imply a failure on the part of this principle,
for it does not rest on experimentation. These salient
points differentiate the mechanistic, materialistic
interpretation of the law of causality from its
theological interpretation.

Causality and
Microphysics:

Inevitable uncertainty entered the realm of modern
physics as a result of experimentation with subatomic
particles. If the position of an electron were to be
accurately measured, radiations of very small wavelength
would have to be used for the determination. But such
radiations possess quanta of high energy, and would alter
the momentum and energy of the electron by impact.
Similarly, to measure the momentum of an electron, quanta
of low energy would have to be used.

The wavelengths of such quanta being large, the
position of the electron would be correspondingly
indeterminate. Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty
followed from the wave-particle duality of matter and
radiation, and from the fact that the characteristics of
objects were usually unavoidably altered during the
course of experimentation.

The indeterminacy at the subatomic level meant that
there could be only probabilistic knowledge of subatomic
events. This fact made the physicists and erroneously
according to al-Sadr abandon belief in the universality
of the principle of causality. Not only that, they came
to interpret the causal fixity and regularity of
macroscopic events as a statistical phenomenon, analogous
to the stability of, say, suicide rates.

Al-Sadr points out that the doubts raised by
scientists in microphysics are based on a specific notion
of the principle of causality different from the notion
of it held by Muslim philosophers. According to the
latter notion, the principle is not based on experimental
evidence and stands above experimentation. Moreover, the
limits of experiment prove only our inability to apply it
in some fields, not the invalidity of this principle in
those fields. In addition, microphysical experiments do
not offer any scientific evidence proving the falsity of
the principle of causality in the field of subatomic
physics. The introduction of indeterminacy is a problem
of the observing subject, something which does not
warrant the elimination of causal laws from the universe.

The Meaning of
Causality:

Al-Sadr states that there are four theories
which resulted from attempts to answer the question: Why
do things require causes?

(1) The first theory, adopted by some Marxist
theoreticians, states that an existent requires a cause
for its existence. According to it, causality is a
general law of existence as confirmed by scientific
experiments. To regard the law of causality as an
inductive principle, al-Sadr points out again, is an
error. It is not within the scientific possibilities of
experiment to indicate that the secret of the requirement
for a cause lies at the heart of existence in general.
The principle of causality is a purely philosophical
principle and so also are the issues concerning it and
the theories that treat its limits.

(2) The second theory, which al-Sadr calls the
theory of creation, asserts that things need causes
for coming into existence. Thus if a thing exists
continuously and always and has not come into being after
not having existed, there will be no need in it for a
cause, nor will it enter the realm of causality. While
the first theory goes too far in generalizing causality,
the second theory goes too far in restricting it.

(3) & (4) The other two are the theories of
essential possibility and existential
possibility. These two theories assert that what
makes things need their causes is possibility. They
differ from each other due to their different notions of
possibility, which relate to a difference regarding
quiddity and existence. Since a discussion of this
difference lies outside the scope of the book, al-Sadr
limits himself to the discussion of the theory of
existential possibility, advanced by Mulla Sadra, which
asserts the fundamentality of existence.

According to this theory, causality is a relation
between two existences: the cause and the effect. If, for
example, B is an effect of A, does B have an existence
independent of A? The answer is in the negative.
Causality requires that the effect does not have a
reality prior to its link with its cause; otherwise, it
will not be an effect. Moreover, B is not something that
has a link or relation to the cause; rather it is the
very linkage, in the sense that its being and existence
become a conjunctive being and relational existence. The
discontinuity of its linkage to its cause means
destruction of it and an end of its being, for its being
is represented in that linkage. A relational entity
cannot be detached from the thing to which it is
essentially linked or related. Moreover, all being is not
governed by the principle of causality. Rather, this
principle governs the relational existents, whose reality
embodies linkage and relation.

Here Martyr al-Sadr points out that the Marxists
fluctuate between the dialectical model and causality
while explaining phenomena. That is, while they regard
internal contradiction as a sufficient explanation of
every phenomenon in the universe, they also take recourse
now and then to the cause-effect relation for explaining
some phenomena by external causes. A relevant caw is the
Marxist assertion that the means of production make up
the social infrastructure, whereas all other aspects of
society, including the intellectual and political
conditions, the considered superstructural. This means
that the relation between the superstructure and the
means of production is a cause-effect relation. Here,
there is no contradiction but causality.

Contemporaneity
Between Cause and Effect:

Since the existence of the effect is essentially
linked to the existence of the cause, the cause is
necessary for the effect and the effect must be
contemporaneous with the cause so that its being and
existence the linked to that cause. This is the law of
contemporaneity between the cause and the effect. Two
arguments were forwarded to prove that it is possible for
the effect to continue after its cause ceases to exist.

(1) The first argument, put forward by theologians,
rests on two idea. The first is that things need causes
in order to come into existence; after its coming into
being, a thing has no need for a cause.

However, as pointed out earlier, a thing's need for a
cause is not for its coming into existence, but because
its existence is essentially linked to its specific
cause.

The second notion is that the law of contemporaneity
between the cause and the effect is not consistent with a
certain group of phenomena in the universe. For example,
a building erected by builders continues to exist even
after all of them are gone and are no more alive. Al-Sadr
states that in all such examples, the error lies in
identifying the real causes.

(2) The other theory, suggested by the modem science
of mechanics, assert that in the light of the laws of
motion continuity of motion does not require a cause.
According to the first law of motion, a body continues to
move with a uniform velocity in a straight line, after an
impulse is imparted to it, unless disturbed by an
external force.

According to al-Sadr such an assertion leads to an
immediate cancellation of the principle of causality. If
it were possible for motion to continue without a cause,
then it would also be possible for it to occur without a
cause and for things to begin existing without a cause.

The reason is that continuity of motion always
involves a new coming into existence.

According to al-Sadr, the experiments which suggest the
first law of motion do not actually show that the
external force is cause of motion. It is possible, he
says, that the real cause of ethereal is something that
had existed all along; external causes act the force
within the body and prepare it as cause (Muslim have
believed that all accidental motion, including the
mechanical motion of bodies, is produced by a force
within bodies). As a result, al-Sadr finds the law of
inertia to be incompatible with the law of causality.

It is amazing that the author should consider the
first law of motion as incompatible with the principle of
causality. But that is because he, in the tradition of
Mulla Sadra, considers motion as a continual renewal of
existence, a continual recreation. Mechanics, on the
other hand, considers rest as well as uniform motion in a
straight line as unchanged states. Only acceleration is
considered a change of state that requires an external
cause or force. Also, Mulla Sadra considers circular
motion as the most perfect kind of motion (and, it may be
remarked, such a conception of motion can have
unfortunate consequences for any civilization that adopts
it). There is no reason why simple mechanical motion
should necessarily be considered a continual renewal of
existence and no reason why the first law of motion
should be logically incompatible with the principle of
causality.

One wishes that al-Sadr had treated some concepts of
traditional Muslim philosophy with the same critical
scrutiny with which he treats the dialectics. It is the
view of some historians of science that certain
misconceptions about motion inherited by Muslim
philosophy and science from Aristotle were responsible
for the failure of Muslim scientists to develop the
science of mechanics, which was developed by the West
only after it discarded the misconceptions of Greek
philosophy regarding motion.

On the whole, it may bestated that the arguments
advanced by the author in favour of contemporaneity of
cause and effect are not very convincing. At the end of
the chapter he draws a theological conclusion from the
above discussion. The causal chain which relates
relational entities cannot be infinite or circular; for
in that case all the parts of the chain will be effects.
Hence the world proceeds from a being necessary in
essence, self-sufficient and not requiring a cause. Every
cause except the first cause is a cause-effect, and hence
needs a cause.

The first cause, being a pure cause, does not require
a cause prior to it, for a thing does not require a cause
qua cause but as an effect qua effect.

Matter or God?

The question dealt with in this chapter is whether the
first cause of existence is matter or something
transcending it. This is the ultimate issue in the
conflict between theological philosophy and materialism.

The dialectic is but an unsuccessful attempt of
materialism to unite the efficient cause and the material
cause of the world, in accordance with the laws of
dialectical contradiction.

Al-Sadr briefly recapitulates the development of the
scientific study of matter from Greek thought to the
twentieth-century atomic physics.

Modern physics discovered that energy is the
substratum of the world and matter is a state of energy.
In the light of these discoveries the quality of
materiality itself becomes an accidental quality.

The philosophical conclusion that follows from this is
that it is not possible to regard matter as the first
cause of the world. Moreover, science has established
that there is one kind of matter that underlies all the
various elements, compounds, substances and things. But
how can a single reality be the cause of different and
contradictory manifestations? According to al-Sadr such a
thing is not possible. Hence matter cannot be the
efficient cause of the world, as the world is full of
different and multifarious phenomena.

Furthermore, the properties or qualities that matter
manifests in the various spheres of its existence are
accidental to the primary reality of matter. Further, the
property of materiality itself is also accidental. Hence,
raw matter, which all things share, cannot be an
essential cause of those properties or qualities.

Al-Sadr points out that the method followed by
theology for demonstrating the necessity of an efficient
cause of the world is the same as that followed by
experimental science for explaining empirical phenomena.
He does not fail to point out here that the dialectic
with its theory of contradictions is able to account
neither for the progression of the elements in the atomic
table nor for the formation of chemical compounds.

Matter and
Philosophy.

The above discussion related to the necessity of the
efficient cause of the world in relation to matter as
conceived by science. Thereafter, al-Sadr proposes to
examine the question in the light of the philosophical
conception of matter. By 'philosophical matter' he means
the most primary matter of the world, whether or not
experimental science is able to posit it. Philosophical
matter is matter simpler than scientific matter and has a
form. Its existence can be demonstrated philosophically.

Atomic physics posited Democritean atomism, the theory
that bodies are not continuous and are composed of minute
atoms. But there is a philosophical side to the
Democritean theory which is rejected by philosophy.
Philosophically, according to al-Sadr, the unit of matter
posited by science must be continuous, for it cannot be a
real unit without internal continuity. At the same time,
on account of its continuity, it should be capable of
division and separation. That is, the unit must have a
simple matter which is receptive to division and
separation. Matter, therefore, is that which is receptive
to division and separation, which are destructive of
unity. Philosophically, it is not possible to conceive a
unit without the receptivity to division, regardless of
the ability of scientific tools and methods to affect
such a division. The discovery of the so-called
fundamental particles as the primary units of matter does
not settle the question as to whether or not they are
receptive to division.

When the philosophical conception of matter, as
something composed of matter and form is understood, we
know, according to al-Sadr, that philosophical matter
cannot be the first cause of the world.

Matter and Motion:

Matter is in continuous motion and constant
development. Can the same thing be simultaneously a
subject of motion and a cause of it?

metaphysics insists on the multiplicity of the mover
and the moved, because motion (i.e. growth) is a gradual
development and completion of a deficient thing. A
deficient thing cannot be the cause of its own
completion. In the light of this, the cause of
developmental motion is not matter itself, but a cause
transcending matter that imparts to matter linear motion
and gradual development. Here it should be noted that
al-Sadr does not attempt to distinguish between different
kinds of motion, such as simple mechanical motion and
organic growth.

Dialectical materialism, on the contrary, does not
recognize this duality between the mover and the moved,
and considers matter itself as the cause of its motion
and development. From the viewpoint of theology, there
are no actual contradictions contained in matter. The
internal content of matter is empty of everything except
receptivity and capacity. Motion is a gradual departure
from potentiality to actuality. Matter is not the cause
of motion, for it is devoid of the levels of completion
attained in the various stages of development. It is,
therefore, necessary to search for the cause of the
substantial motion of matter outside its limits. It is
also necessary that this cause be God, the

Exalted, Who encompasses essentially all the ranks of
completion and perfection.

Al-Sadr then calls our attention to the digestive and
circulatory systems which provide proper nutrients to
every one of the billions of cells in the body. In the
same way, he calls attention to the eye and the apparatus
of vision as a proof of the design of a supreme
intelligence.

He points out that experimental biology has failed to
explain the origin of life upon the earth. He asks
whether the astonishing work of the genes, which control
the character of every cell and bestow particular traits
to an organism, could be products of haphazard chance. He
discusses various theories of animal instinct and finds
all of them in- adequate in explaining the wonderful
behaviour of the bee, the shark, the ant, the hen and the
eel. The only adequate explanation is that instinctive
behaviour is the result of a mysterious, divine,
supernatural inspiration. The marvellous order underlying
nature bears testimony to the presence of an omniscient,
omnipotent and omnipresent intelligence.

The Nature of
Knowledge:

The most important issue of epistemology, according to
al-Sadr, is the one concerning the reality of knowledge:
Is knowledge a material or an immaterial phenomenon?
Marxism asserts that knowledge and thought are material,
organic processes of the brain.

Scientific exploration of the processes of sensation
and consciousness has revealed beyond doubt that there
are physical, chemical and physiological events involved
in the functioning of the sense organs and the nervous
system. However, these findings do not prove that
perception, knowledge, thought and consciousness are
material processes and that mind is grounded in matter.
Such an assertion about the reality of the mind lies
outside the scope of experimental science. Similarly,
psychology, either through introspection or objective
observation, studies psychological phenomena; but the
nature of knowledge and the reality of the mind are
questions that have to be dealt by the philosophy of
mind.

Al-Sadr takes up the nature of the perceived image in
visual perception as an example to argue in favour of the
immateriality of the mind.

When we enter a vast garden extending for thousands of
meters, at a glance we perceive its extent together with
most of the trees and objects that are in it. Is the
image of the garden that we grasp a material? It is,
according to materialism. It image existing in a part of
our brain is not, according to the metaphysical view; it
is a metaphysical entity outside the realm of the
material world. It is true that the light rays form an
image on the retina, and this image is transferred in
some form to the brain. Nevertheless, the image
transferred to the brain is other than the mental image.
Al-Sadr offers two reasons for believing so.

Firstly, he states, the mental image does not have the
same geometrical properties as those of the
material image transferred to the brain, because the
former resembles the garden in extent, form and geometric
properties, whereas the brain and its image are small and
the imprinting of a large thing on a small thing is
impossible. Therefore, it must be an immaterial image.

Secondly, the mental image is inclined to stability
and does not change in accordance with the changes of the
image reflected in the nervous system. What al-Sadr means
by the 'stability' of the mental image is this: If, for
example, 1 place a pencil at a distance of one meter from
me it will form an image of a specific size on the
retina. If this distance is doubled, the retinal image
would be reduced in size accordingly. However, al-Sadr
claims, in spite of this reduction in the size of the
retinal image, the mental image we have of the pencil
remains stable in size. This also proves, according to
him, that the mental image is immaterial.

Both of the above arguments offered by al-Sadr appear
to be invalid. In the first argument, the actual size of
the mental image is assumed to be the same as that of the
viewed object (garden, in the example). However, when one
is inside a room, the visual field presents a part of the
room; when viewing a landscape, it covers a much wider
space consisting of near and distant objects. When
viewing the sky at night, the same visual field presents
stars located at astronomical distances. It is not
logical to claim that the mental image assumes the extent
of the room in the first case, the extent of the
landscape in the second, and the extent of the Milky Way
in the third. That the second argument is invalid will be
revealed by a simple visual experiment. Every student of
drawing familiar with the laws of perspective knows that
objects of similar size should be drawn on a scale
proportional to their distance of location. The
'stability' of size, referred to by al-Sadr, is simply an
illusion.

However, the failure of these arguments does not mean
that the philosophical position asserting the
immateriality of the mind is indefensible. An argument
that may be offered in favour of this position is the
following. If we assume the contents of the mind to be
material, then it can be said that the mind should be in
direct contact with the fundamental reality of matter
when perceiving the data of the senses, as well as while
experiencing any of its phenomena, such as thoughts,
dreams, feelings, emotions, and everything else that
enters the consciousness. That is, the fundamental
reality of matter must be the object of the mind's direct
experience if its phenomena are of a material nature.
However, we see that we do not come across any molecules,
atoms or sub-atomic particles, which are what matter is
composed of according to science, in any sphere of our
consciousness. Moreover, it is believed that the reality
of matter is one, while the phenomena that manifest
themselves in consciousness are fundamentally various.
The data of the senses smells, tactual impressions,
impressions of taste, sounds, colours are fundamentally
of a different nature from one another. Further,
perceived impressions of each class are different from
imagined, dreamt, or recalled impressions of that class.
Again, all the impressions of the senses are
fundamentally different from thoughts.

None of them can be imagined as being reducible into
another, nor all of them can be reducible to any single
substratum called matter.

Furthermore, each of the impressions of the senses, and
so also thoughts, are fundamental realities experienced
by the mind. They are signs and images in that they
represent something other than themselves, but in
themselves they are things in that they are what they
are. Material objects are represented by them in that
they are images; but nothing that we know about matter
enters their actual constitution as things.

Now, going back to al-Sadr's discourse, if there are
two sides to a human being, one spiritual or immaterial
and the other material and physical, how do the two sides
constantly affect each other? Plato was unable to bridge
the gulf between the soul and the body. Descartes' theory
of parallelism denied that there was any causal relation
between physical and mental events, and hence admitted an
unbridgeable gulf between the body and the mind. This
failure leads to the crystallization of the inclination
in European philosophy to explain man's being on the
basis of one principle, matter or mind, leading to the
opposite tendencies of materialism and idealism.

In the Islamic world, the explanation of human being
on the basis of two principles, spiritual and material,
found its most convincing formulation in the thought of
Sadr al-Muta'allihin or Mulla Sadra.

According to Mulla Sadra, movement does not occur only
in the accidents, but goes on in the substances and in
the core of the being of things. He called it al-harakat
al-jawhariyyah, substantial movement.

According to his theory, matter in its substantial
movement pursues the completing of its existence until it
assumes an immaterial being, becoming free from all
materiality. Thus, there remains no dividing line between
spirituality and materiality. Rather, they are two levels
of existence. in spite of the fact that the soul is not
material, yet it has material relations, because it is
the highest stage of the completion of matter in its
substantial movement. The difference between materiality
and spirituality is just a matter of degree. However, it
does not mean that the soul is a product of matter and
one of its effects. Rather, it is a product of
substantial movement, which does not proceed from matter
itself. The reason is that every movement is a gradual
emergence of a thing from potentiality to actuality.
Potentiality cannot bring about actuality, and
possibility cannot bring about existence. Therefore,
substantial movement has its cause outside matter. The
soul is a product of this movement, which itself is the
bridge between materiality and spirituality.

Concluded - wa al-hamdu lillah.