Chapter 5: Week Three: Benchmarks, Competitive Requirements, and Steering Team Review Number One - Supply Chain Excellence [Electronic resources] : A Handbook for Dramatic Improvement Using the SCOR Model نسخه متنی

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Supply Chain Excellence [Electronic resources] : A Handbook for Dramatic Improvement Using the SCOR Model - نسخه متنی

Peter Bolstorff, Robert Rosenbaum

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Chapter 5: Week Three: Benchmarks, Competitive Requirements, and Steering Team Review Number One



Start to put data to work.


The objectives of the third week are to review the results of the data collected during Week Two, including industry comparisons, metric queries, and other information required for the PMG benchmark survey (Chapter 4). Also on the schedule is steering team review number one, conducted by the project manager and chosen members of the design team.


Data Review


The first agenda item on Day One is to review results of the detailed query data collection (far-right column of the SCORcard metric template, Tables 4-1a-c) assigned during Week Two. The owner of each metric should lead the review of data, making adjustments to the type or form of information being sought, Table 4-3). By now, all actual data, plus large portions of the internal and shareholder benchmark sections of the SCORcard, should be complete. After the data has been reviewed, submitting the completed PMG benchmark survey is the last step in completing the customer-facing and supply chain-specific benchmark data of the SCORcard.

When the Fowlers team reached this point, the corporate controller, the vice president of sales and marketing—food products group, and the vice president of operations—technology products group volunteered to present their findings. (See Table 5-1.)

Table 5-1: Fowlers' industry comparison spreadsheet and raw data.


































































































































Fowlers Industry Comparison


Conglomerate Industry


Revenue


SG&A


Cost of Goods


Cash-to-Cash Cycle Time


Inventory Days of Supply


Asset Turns


Gross Margin


Operating Income


Net Operating Income


Return on Assets


Fowlers—2001


1000.0


7%


86%


197


91


1.52


14%


7%


4%


10.7%


National Service Industries


563.3


32%


62%


48


20


0.63


38%


5%


5%


3.4%


Maxxam Inc.


2448.0


7%


82%


120


82


0.54


18%


11%


1%


6.2%


US Industries


3088.0


23%


66%


119


88


1.24


34%


11%


1%


13.1%


Pacific Dunlop Ltd.


2120.4


30%


66%


132


105


1.59


34%


4%


-3%


4.8%


Sequa Corporation


1773.1


14%


75%


127


102


1.37


25%


11%


1%


11.1%


GenCorp Inc.


1047.0


4%


82%


95


78


1.05


18%


15%


12%


11.5%


Olin Corporation


1549.0


9%


77%


82


66


1.84


23%


14%


5%


19.7%


Federal Signal Corporation


1106.1


20%


67%


103


78


1.49


33%


13%


5%


14.7%


Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd.


8394.8


12%


87%


253


137


1.13


13%


0%


-1%


0.4%


Valhi Inc.


1191.9


17%


63%


144


118


0.70


37%


20%


6%


10.5%


Pentair Inc.


2748.0


17%


71%


106


73


1.39


29%


12%


2%


12.3%


Tomkins PLC


5875.0


7%


81%


88


52


2.01


19%


12%


2%


17.5%


ITT Industries Inc.


4829.4


24%


62%


96


65


1.40


38%


14%


5%


15.1%


Six Continents PLC


5939.0


27%


49%


39


17


0.59


51%


24%


11%


10.7%


TRW Inc.


17321.0


9%


80%


42


23


1.40


20%


10%


3%


11.0%


Textron


13090.0


11%


73%


231


72


1.07


27%


16%


2%


12.7%


Johnson Controls Inc.


18427.0


9%


83%


42


14


2.48


17%


8%


3%


14.9%


Dover Corporation


5400.7


21%


60%


120


89


1.47


40%


19%


10%


21.4%


Ratheon Company


16895.0


10%


76%


123


54


0.84


24%


14%


1%


8.7%


ABB Ltd.


22967.0


19%


75%


170


68


0.99


25%


6%


6%


4.5%


RWE AG


48181.6


27%


68%


95


30


0.87


32%


6%


2%


3.6%


Emerson Electric


15479.6


20%


61%


104


74


1.37


39%


19%


7%


19.9%


Honeywell International


25652.0


12%


71%


111


75


1.36


29%


17%


6%


17.6%


United Technologies


26206.0


17%


69%


108


76


1.38


31%


14%


7%


14.3%


Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV


35658.0


17%


70%


106


73


1.31


30%


14%


25%


13.6%


Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing


16724.0


30%


46%


142


109


1.54


54%


23%


11%


26.8%


Vivendi Universal SA


40138.4


22%


62%


213


45


0.38


38%


16%


5%


4.5%


Siemens AG


86208.0


27%


66%


134


85


1.29


34%


7%


2%


6.6%


Tyco International Ltd,


34036.6


22%


53%


488


102


0.41


47%


25%


12%


7.7%


General Electric Company


129417.0


37%


34%


566


65


0.39


66%


29%


10%


8.7%


Conglomerate Industry


100.0


30%


54%


291


78


0.67


46%


16%


11%


7.8%


Food—Meat Products Industry


100.0


13%


83%


49


52


2.13


17%


4%


3%


6.7%


Media—Movie, Television, & Music Production Services and Products Industries


100.0


55%


46%


83


19


0.67


54%


0%


-4%


-0.1%


Diversified Services—Miscellaneous Business Services


100.0


35%


61%


48


17


1.33


39%


4%


0%


3.8%


Industry Parity


8395


17%


69%


119


74


1.31


31%


14%


5%


11%


Industry Advantage


24267


12%


61%


84


48


1.45


39%


19%


8%


15%


Industry Superior—90th


40138


7%


53%


48


23


1.59


47%


23%


11%


20%


























































































































Fowlers Industry Comparison—Raw Data (in millions)


Revenue $


SG&A $


Cost of Goods $


Inventory $


Receivable $


Total Assets $


Gross Margin $


Operating Income $


Net Operating Income $


Fowlers-2001


1000.0


70


860


215


371


656


140


70.0


35


National Service Industries


563.3


182


351.2


19.2


89


898.4


212.1


30.1


27


Maxxam Inc.


2448.0


167.7


1999.3


451.3


453.9


4504


448.7


280


33.9


US Industries


3088.0


721


2040


494


517


2492


1048


327


36


Pacific Dunlop Ltd.


2120.4


629.5


1405.6


405.2


328.4


1773.2


714.8


85.3


-71.1


Sequa Corporation


1773.1


246.6


1334.7


373.7


266.8


1731.1


438.4


191.8


24


GenCorp Inc.


1047.0


40


855


182


135


1324


192


152


129


Olin Corporation


1549.0


132


1196


216


197


1123


353


221


81


Federal Signal Corporation


1106.1


220.7


739.7


157.6


168


991.1


366.4


145.7


57.6


Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd.


8394.8


1040.9


7318.5


2743.4


3371.7


9875


1076.3


35.4


-81.7


Valhi Inc.


1191.9


201.7


753.3


243


183.9


2256.8


438.6


236.9


76.6


Pentair Inc.


2748.0


469.7


1952.5


392.5


468.1


2644


795.5


325.8


55.9


Tomkins PLC


5875.0


412.4


4780.7


677.6


1060.5


3906.5


1094.3


681.9


95.8


Tomkins PLC


5875.0


412.4


4780.7


677.6


1060.5


3906.5


1094.3


681.9


95.8


ITT Industries Inc.


4829.4


1141


2993.5


531.3


814.9


4611.4


1835.9


694.9


264.5


Six Continents PLC


5939.0


1617


2895


133


850


13399


3044


1427


676


TRW Inc.


17231.0


1557


13869


870


2328


16467


3362


1805


438


Textron


13090.0


1482


9534


1871


6791


16370


3446


2074


218


Johnson Controls Inc.


18427


1642.9


15307.3


577.6


2928.3


9911.5


3119.7


1476.8


478.3


Dover Corporation


5400.7


1124


3230.1


783.2


903.2


4892.1


2170.6


1046.6


519.6


Ratheon Company


16895


1740


12836


1908


4566


26777


4059


2319


141


ABB Ltd.


22967


4360


17222


3192


8328


30962


5745


1385


1443


RWE AG


48181.6


12814


32684


2721


12502


74224.7


15497.6


2683.6


1073.1


Emerson Electric


15479.6


3081.9


9410


1896.8


2551.2


15046.4


6069.6


2987.7


1031.8


Honeywell International


25652


3134


18095


3734


4623


25175


7557


4423


1659


United Technologies


26206


4473


18111


3756


4445


25364


8095


3622


1808


Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV


35658


5894


24837


4972


6122


36298


10821


4927


9043


Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing


16724


5064


7762


2312


2891


14522


8962


3898


1782


Vivendi Universal SA


40138.4


8935.1


24802.5


3032.1


21802.4


141965


15335.9


6400.8


2165.2


Siemens AG


86208


23209


57107


13284


18756


89298


29101


5892


2069


Tyco International Ltd.


34036.6


7324.5


18180


5101.3


38759


111287.3


15856.6


8532.1


3970.6


General Electric Company


129417


47437


44087


7812


188317


437006


85330


37893


12735


Conglomerate Industry


100


30


54.32


11.56


66.67


200


45.68


15.68


11.22


Food—Meat Products Industry


100


13.1


82.74


11.82


7.46


62.5


17.26


4.16


2.93


Media—Movie, Television, & Music Production Services and Products Industries


100


54.57


45.62


2.4


25.64


200


54.38


-0.19


-4.22


Diversified Services—Miscellaneous Business Services


100


35.14


61.02


2.8


16.67


100


39.98


3.84


-0.36


They had assembled company data and industry summary data for conglomerates, but also added summary data for the "food/meat products" industry and "media/movie, television, and music production services and products" industries. These provided meaningful comparisons for the company's food and technology product groups, respectively. They used the most recent actual data and didn't bother with current-year data that was reported as preliminary. The team filled out the appropriate sections in the Fowlers enterprise SCORcard but had little time for analysis. (See Figure 5-1.)































































Source: Copyright 2001 Supply-Chain Council, Inc. Used with permission.





Performance Attribute or Category


Level 1 Performance Metrics


Actual


Parity

Median of statistical sample


Advantage

Midpoint of parity and superior


Superior

90th percentile of population


Parity Gap

Parity—actual


External


Supply Chain Delivery Reliability


Delivery Performance


Line Item Fill Rate


Perfect Order Fulfillment


Supply Chain Responsiveness


Order Fulfillment Lead Time


Supply Chain Flexibility


Supply Chain Response Time


Production Flexibility


Internal


Supply Chain Cost


Cost of Goods


86%


69%


61%


53%


Total Supply Chain Cost


15.5%


SGA Cost


7%


17%


12%


7%


Warranty / Returns Processing Costs


0.7%


Supply Chain Asset Management Efficiency


Cash-to-Cash Cycle Time


197


119.0


84.0


48.0


Inventory Days of Supply


91


74


48


23


Asset Turns


1.5


1.3


1.5


1.6


Shareholder


Profitability


Gross Margin


14%


31%


39%


47%


Operating Income


7%


14%


19%


23%


Net Income


4%


5%


8%


11%


Effectiveness of Return


Return on Assets


10.7%


11%


15%


20%


Figure 5-1: Fowlers' enterprise SCORcard.

Even on the first examination of the data, several things jumped out. First, the wide range of figures for cost of goods and SGA costs made it clear that there is no standard for reporting these numbers from one company to another. Operating income seemed to be a good comparison point for expenses. "But there's still no way to compare supply chain costs using the data we have so far," the coach pointed out. "You can't add cost of goods and SGA and supply chain costs to create a working SCORcard metric. Supply chain costs are activity based, and they borrow from the other two categories, so you'd be double-counting certain costs if you just added them. We'll have to wait for the results of the PMG survey to come back."

Second, the metrics of 197 days for the cash-to-cash cycle and 1.5 asset turns confirmed what many in the finance community seemed to feel about Fowlers: It utilized physical assets well and cash assets poorly.


Third, the 7 percent operating income in the food products group compared well against the food/meat products industry. It was a similar story for technology products. But sales were declining in each business, and profits were nearly half of what they had been the previous year. The strategy of charging a premium price for a premium product wasn't holding, and in fact was causing some customers to go elsewhere.

But as the team looked at the "parity opportunity" portion of the chart, their eyes got wide. As a conglomerate with a $1 billion in revenue, Fowlers' 7 percent operating income ($70 million) was only half the level of the conglomerate industry benchmark. To achieve parity in operating income, they would need to find another $70 million of additional supply chain performance.

Next, the corporate controller, director of logistics, and director of customer service took their turn. In addition to the review of enterprise supply chain and warranty/returns processing costs, they reviewed some data not included on the enterprise SCORcard. They learned that combined food and technology products delivery performance was 22 percent—meaning that just twenty-two orders out of one hundred were delivered on time and complete. Line-item fill rate was 80 percent, perfect order fill rate 5 percent, order fulfillment lead time 4.1 days, supply chain response time was 122 days, and production flexibility was sixty days. By the next week, they said they'd be ready to provide data for each product group SCORcard; enterprise delivery data was out of scope.

By this time, everyone was nearly speechless. Each measure in the customer-facing section was new, and it was the first time that the team had really thought about overall delivery performance through the customer's eyes. Especially disturbing to the team was the big picture about delivery performance.

The ensuing discussion sounded a bit like a classic session with a grief counselor; there was denial, bargaining, anger, and eventually acceptance of the data. Every member of the team wanted to bolt from the room and jump right into fixing the problem—like they had all done so many times before. Fortunately, it was the end of the day. Tomorrow's agenda would focus the team on something else. And a good night's sleep would put this information in perspective: The team had found an opportunity for the kind of improvement it needed to make.

/ 135