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the example of Indians who consider killing of animals as immoral. If
one were to scan philosophical works one would not find a single instance,
where the notions of good and evil have been employed to decide a theoretical
issue. On the contrary the mutakallimin always
base their arguments on the notions of moral and immoral. For instance, they
hold that the rule of Divine grace is good and that such and such a thing is
unseemly for God and that such and such a thing is obligatory for Him, and the
like. The
philosophers consider these as normative issues which cannot form the basis of
rational argument. Like Allamah Tabataba'i,
they also consider good and evil as normative notions. Another
point which gives further importance to his statements is that others like
Bertrand Russell, who claim to have originated a new approach in contemporary
philosophy, also have a similar viewpoint. Undoubtedly Allamah
Tabataba'i was unaware of their views, and I myself,
while writing explanatory notes on the Allamah's book Usul-e falsafeh wa rewish-a
realism, did not notice that his view of the practical sciences and ethics
is something new and identical with the latest views about ethics. Perhaps the
development of such an idea in the Allamah's mind
(about forty years ago in Najaf) was contemporaneous
with the development of this view in European thought. In any case the Allamah was definitely unaware of their views. Among
modern European philosophers, Bertrand Russell has elaborated this issue
seriously. In his book A History of Western Philosophy, Russell states
his viewpoint while discussing Plato's philosophy. Plato
has sublime ideas on the topic of ethics. In his view theoretical wisdom and
practical wisdom are of the same kind and he looks at them from the same point
of view. Regarding the concept of good in ethics he holds that morality means
that man should seek what is good, and the good is a cognizable reality
independent of the soul. That is, the object of human quest is the same in
ethics and objective sciences, as in mathematics or medicine, which are
concerned with external objects independent of the human mind. According to Plato moral values
are realities independent of man, so man should try to know them as he tries to
know any other reality. Here
it becomes clear that early Muslim philosophers had selective approach in
relation to the views of the ancient philosophers. They accepted some of their
views and discarded their incorrect views without indicating what they were
accepting and what they were discarding. So far as ethics is concerned, they
accepted many of Plato's views but they rejected this idea of Plato, and with
justification. While
discussing Plato's views, Bertrand Russell expresses his own viewpoint. He says
that we have to analyze the issue of ethics and see where it leads to. How did
Plato think when he said that the good exists independent of us. Then he
proceeds to analyze in a way very similar to the Allama's analysis.
Russell
holds that good and evil are relative terms whose meaning is determined by
man's relation to objects. When we wish to achieve a goal, we say of a means
that helps us attain that goal that It is good.' Now, what is meant by saying
of a certain thing that It is good'? It means that in order to achieve that
goal we ought to use this means. The very
ought to use' is equal to saying it is good'. Hence it is wrong to hold that the good is an
objective quality inherent in a thing. Plato thinks that goodness is inherent
in things, like whiteness or roundness etc., while it is not so. For example,
when we say Honesty is good,' it is because of a goal which we have chosen. In
other words, it is good for us for achieving our goal and therefore we
ought to employ it. Yet, it does not mean that it is good for everyone. It is
good only for those who have such a goal. Otherwise if one had an opposite goal
it would not be good for him. Bertrand
Russell and other philosophers applied their logical analysis to ethics. They come
to the conclusion that good' or evil' are normative in nature. The mistake of
the philosophers down to the present day is that they have thought ethical
issues to be like those of mathematics or science. Their approaches to ethics
has been similar to their approach to mathematics and physics. For example, as
in physics one studies the nature of the
magnet to discover its properties, in ethics as well they thought that good and
evil are discoverable properties of things. Q: Ethical issues are like scientific issues with the
difference that they belong to different realms; otherwise the criterion is the
same in both cases. A:
There is no difference between this domain or that. For example, when man
speaks, his speaking is a concrete fact no matter whether what he says is true
or false. Does this speech have an external and objective property called
good' or evil'? No. Truth or falsehood do not have any objective quality
called good or evil. Basically, the meaning of good and evil are determined in term
of goals. Truth helps one to achieve one's goal, therefore, one must be
truthful. Here the property of goodness is attributed to truthfulness. Lying,
owning to its effects, prevent individuals and society from achieving their
goal. Therefore, one must not lie and lying is bad. Here one does not have
anything except "one ought to say" and "one ought not to
say". Good and evil are abstracted
from ought' and ought not.' Of
course, it does not mean that ethics is devoid of reality. Later on we will
explain it. The
Europeans thought that they had discovered a very new idea and even today it is
a live issue in European philosophy and enjoys wide acceptance. In their view,
the ethical theories of Plato, Aristotle, Kant and the like are outdated. They
have finally reached this viewpoint. As I said, the early Muslim philosophers
also have dealt with this issue and a shortcoming of Allamah Tabatabai' s work is that he does not relate it to their
ideas. According
to Mr. Ha'iri, one of the questions he was asked to
answer in a test (in the West) was concerning the relation between theoretical
and practical sciences. As the theoretical sciences are related to the
practical sciences, they are not isolated from one another. In modern terms,
theoretical science constitutes world view whereas practical science
constitutes ideology, as in the case of dialectical logic and materialist
philosophy which constitute the Marxist world view and their ideology is also
based on their world view. Now
the question is how can we derive a prescriptive and normative judgement from factual premises? If the premises are
descriptive, no problems arises if the conclusion is also a descriptive
statement. For example, we may say A is equal to B, and B is equal to C;
therefore, A is equal to C. However, in the other case the reasoning will have
this form: A is equal to B, and B is equal to C; therefore, it ought to be
that How can we drive a normative judgement from a
descriptive proposition? Is there any syllogism whose premises are factual and
its conclusion is normative and prescriptive? I am not saying that there isn't.
But if it exists, how should it be analyzed? The
point is that this topic is a live issue in the West. Russell and his
like-minded philosophers are of the view that eternity of moral values is
meaningless. Until
here my purpose was to clarify this point that good and evil are not objective
and concrete properties of things that can be discovered, as is the case in
theoretical sciences. That is, it will be wrong to investigate ethical
principles by such a method, for it confuses between normative and factual
propositions. However, it may be asked whether there are two types of norms,
one mutable and the other immutable. This is another point of contention which
we have with them (European thinkers). Incidentally Allamah
Tabataba'i is also of the view that norms are of two
types, immutable and mutable. He has not discussed immutable norms - and the
entire issue in general - in any great detail, but he bases his theory on two
types of norms. For immutable norms he has given the examples of justice and injustice, stating that the goodness of justice
and the evil of injustice are immutable, and there are many mutable norms as
well.
From
this point onwards we shall take up the discussion about the issue of
ought.' No doubt some 'oughts' are particular and related to individuals. For
instance, one person may need a certain kind of training, and he might say,
"I should take this subject," while another who does not need it
would say, "I should not take that subject." Basically, when two
persons fight each other, each of them fights for the sake of a certain ought.
There is no doubt that individual and particular 'oughts'
are relative. For example, when I say that this food is good for me, this
statement has a theoretical and a practical aspect. My conclusion concerning
the benefit of the food constitutes its theoretical aspect and I ought to eat that food' constitutes the
practical aspect. In short, these kinds of oughts are
particular and changeable. An
important question in ethics is, are there any universal and absolute 'oughts' shared by all human beings? In case there are such oughts, how can such universal oughts
be explained on the basis that every ought' is directed towards some goal?
Incidentally, we reach some fine conclusions at this point. Concerning
the difference between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom it is not
sufficient to say that the formers deals with is' and the latter with ought.'
This is not a sufficient explanation for practical wisdom. After all practical
wisdom is wisdom and wisdom deals with universal issues. Hence practical wisdom
should be defined as dealing with universal 'oughts,'
otherwise there are also certain 'oughts' in
geometry, industry etc., but they have nothing to do with practical wisdom.
What is to be noted here is that there are universal 'oughts'
which are familiar to every mind. Therefore, such 'oughts'
must be directed towards goals which are not particular and individual. If we
could prove such 'oughts,' we will have to accept
that they are rooted in the soul and that man is not confined to physical
nature only. This will be one of the proofs of the immaterial nature of soul. Kant
also reached the immortality of the soul through moral issues, Man's physical nature has some needs which
are limited and relative. The needs of one person differ from those of another
person. The 'oughts' for meeting such needs are also
different and often contradict one another. There are many 'oughts'
which are opposed to other ougths' and so such 'oughts' are not of an ethical nature. But man, by virtue of
his soul, enjoys a station which - like man's physical nature, to which his
outward will and thought are subject - draws him towards its own goals. Man's
physical nature draws him towards its goals in order to attain its own
perfection. It needs food, and we say we ought
to eat food. According to Schopenhauer, we are made to feel pleasure and
to be on look out for pleasure in the world of ideas, while we are unaware of
the fact that within our inner being it is nature which seeks to achieve its
ends. It is nature that moves towards its end, but it provides pleasure for us
in order to make us serve its own purposes. While in the world of ideas we are
drawn towards pleasure, in reality we move to fulfill the goals of nature. For
example, when the baby cries, it is nature which seeks to bring him up. When
the baby cries due to the feeling of pain, it is nature which declares its
need, having subjected the baby's feeling and mind. Man
enjoys a certain spiritual perfection and sublimity which is rooted in his
God-given nobility and dignity (some 'oughts' are
meant to achieve that spiritual perfection). When someone says, I ought to do
such and such a thing,' it means I must attain to that excellence,' although
such a goal may not be reflected in his outer consciousness. Those excellence
are common to all men, and, therefore, in this respect all men feel the same kind
of imperative. The second justification for universal
imperatives is the issue of social spirit. It is said that man is a social
creature and he has certain oughts, to meet not his
individual but his social needs. In the same way that man is impelled to seek
the satisfaction of his individual needs he is impelled to seek the
satisfaction of his social needs. Had there been no relations between man and
his fellow men, such oughts would not have arisen.
For instance, if I had no relations with anyone I would not make any efforts to
feed other people. Such imperatives are related to a higher self, be it an
individual higher self or a higher social self. That higher self seeks to
achieve its goals. That self causes man to perform moral acts. Those acts which
are performed for the sake of the higher individual self or the social self
have permanent principles, which are, firstly, universal and same for all
individuals and, secondly, are permanent and not temporary. The
other point which has been raised concerns
the philosophy of being and the philosophy of becoming. According to the
philosophy of being moral values are permanent and therefore ethical principles
are eternally true. However, according to the philosophy of becoming moral
values are relative and transitory; that is, they are valid during a certain
time and invalid in other times. This
is a very important issue, for apart from ethics it touches other judgements as well. According to the philosophy of becoming
no truth is permanent. Reality is transient and therefore prescriptions are
also transitory, for the difference between truth and morality is that the
former is descriptive and the latter is prescriptive, one is theoretical and
the other is practical. Inevitably this question also arises in the case of all
religious precepts and is not confined to what we mean by the term ethics' (akhlaq). What they (i.e. Westerners) imply by ethics'
is a more general sense which includes all prescriptions and the notions of
good and evil. At
the outset an objection may be raised here, that the philosophy of becoming
does not necessarily imply that truth is changeable. For as we have said the
philosophy of becoming relates to external reality, and even if one were to
admit that there is nothing except becoming, it does not imply that truth
(which is related to the mind) is subject to change. Of course, we accept the
implication that should facts, which include human thought, be subject to
change, consequently truth as human thought will also be subject to change. But
they do not make such an assertion. We believe that truth, which is the content
of thought, is inseparable from external and mental existence except in
conception. For
example, the statement "Zayd was standing on
Friday" is always true. This statement itself, apart from external or
mental existence, is not something that may be said to be neither in the mind
nor in external reality, a proposition that is eternally true. This proposition
has either external existence or mental existence. But when man thinks about
it, he first abstracts it from mental existence, and after abstracting its
meaning declares it to be eternally true. We believe that if thought itself
were changeable, its content will also be changeable, and the statement "Zayd was standing on Friday" will not be conceived
today in the mind as it was conceived yesterday. It will change into something
else. This
was in relation to the permanence of truth. The same objection can be raised in
relation to moral values. Suppose we believe in a philosophy of becoming, and
it implies that truth is changeable. But morals and precepts are a set of
prescriptions and these are normative in nature. The changeability of truth
does not necessitate the changeability of norms. In an article, "Khatm-e Nubuwwat,"
("The Ultimacy of the Prophethood"),
I have pointed out that if anybody claims that all things are subject to
change, then the ultimate prophecy and everlasting laws become meaningless. Our
position is that if truth be mutable it does not imply that prescriptions
should also be mutable. For prescriptions derive from convention and the law of
change of facts does not apply to prescriptions. Thus, it is wrong to assert
that a philosophy of becoming will imply
mutability of moral values. However, there is another argument that may be
offered to support this view. This other argument is that every prescription,
ethical or non-ethical, is based on certain expediencies. This view coincides
with the view of the theologians, and jurisprudence following them, who
maintain that "religious obligations are subtle instances of rational
obligations," or, in the words of Na'ini,
