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which moves voluntarily, acts according to inclination and urge. In a mature
human being there is a relation between will and reason on the one hand and between
inclination or appetite and reason on the other. Urge is a passive state. In an
animal or man that acts under urge, the greater the influence of urge the
lesser is the role of thought, consciousness and reason and the action takes an
involuntary form. For example, when man sees food, he feels inclined towards it
and it is as if there were something external that draws him towards itself. On
the contrary, when man acts according to his will, he withdraws from what is
external to his being and his decision arises from his inner being. For
example, if he has feels an inclination for a certain kind of food, he thinks
over its consequences and then decides to take some other food for which he
feels a lesser inclination. He controls himself by his will and it is his will
which enables him to dissociate himself from that which is external to his
being. Hence will is identical with freedom. Reason and will liberate man from
the tyranny of urges and make him rely upon himself. Of course, sometimes both
inclination and will may be present. That is, one may be inclined towards
something which may be the object of
one's will due to the judgement of reason. Q:
Is will totally absent in cases where there is an inclination, or is it only
weak? A:
Will is there, but it is weak. What I want to point out is that will and
inclination are two separate things. To the extent that man is subject to
inclination, his will is proportionately weak. I do not agree with Mulla Sadra (though elsewhere he
has expressed an opposite opinion), Mulla Hadi Sabzawari and Ibn Sina in considering
inclination and will as one thing. Elsewhere they, including even Ibn Sina, have drawn a
distinction between the two. Will is the state of self-possession of the soul,
a state of resolution, where reason is involved and rational calculations are
made and the judgement of reason prevails. Moral
imperatives relate to man as a rational being (in the same way as early Muslim
Philosophers consider them as part of practical reason), not to the soul from a
practical aspect. Moral approval and disapproval are judgements
of practical reason (the contemplative faculty which comprehends universals)
from the aspect of the government of the body. Otherwise moral norms are
irrelevant to animals or to man from the viewpoint of not being subject to the judgements of reason. Metaphorical
ideas are exclusive to man. His thought has reached the point where he can
apply the term for something to another thing. For instance, he sees the moon
and then sees a human being possessing beauty to whom he is drawn. He applies
the term for the former and transfers to the latter his feelings evoked by the
moon. This act signifies man's developed nature and no animal is capable of
such an act. This act is a kind of make up and adornment; i.e. man observes a
kind of beauty in someone and then he adds to it by supplementing accidental
graces, while he knows that these graces do no belong to that person but are
charms borrowed from extraneous colour, water, and
line but which heighten his feelings of attraction towards that person. This is
what happens in metaphorical and poetical expressions. When the poet refers to
something with metaphors, that thing assumes a greater charm in his sight, as
in the case of Rudaki who wrote those verses for the Samanid prince using those metaphors for Bukhara. Bukhara remained what it was but he projected the city in
such charming terms that they moved the prince. These are miracles of the human
mind. Q:
Is this the Pavlovian conditioned reflex? A:
No. Pavlovian conditioned reflex relates to the
materialist approach to perception (not to normative concepts) which tries to
give a materialist interpretation to human thought. Pavlov talks of involuntary
human reflexes. The issue of conditioned reflex or association of ideas is
different from the issue of values and metaphor. In the latter there is no
succession and association. Here one sees something as something else. That is,
he joins it to the other and applies the definition of one thing to another thing.
There is no succession of ideas as in association. In metaphor there is a
simultaneous unification of two things, not a succession of several things.
This is what gives the power of passion and pathos to elegies. Thus
one of the objections against the Allamah's view is
that he generalizes the faculty of normative formulation to all animate beings,
whereas it is exclusive to man and that too to his practical reason. Early Muslim philosophers defined practical wisdom,
which includes ethics, as the science of man's voluntary actions in respect of
how they ought to be and how they can be best and most perfect. This definition
given by early Muslim philosophers is somewhat similar to that of theoretical
wisdom which deals with the most perfect order and the question whether or not
the existing order is the best and most perfect order possible. This question
however relates to whether something exists or not, and in the discussion of
man's voluntary acts the question relates to how something ought to be and how
it can be most perfect. According
to modern philosophers ethics deals with the question, how should one live
one's life, i.e. it does not deal with how men live but with how they should
live. This almost amounts to the same thing with certain added qualifications.
One relates to universality. When the early Muslim philosophers defined ethics
as a science of man's voluntary acts they meant a universal prescription for
all human beings, not for any particular person. The other point that should be
mentioned here is that when modern philosophers hold that ethics deals with how
one should live one's life, a qualification is to added here and they often add it themselves, thus coming
closer to the viewpoint of ancient philosophers - stating that what is meant is
a life imbued with sublimity and sanctity. The meaning of ethics is loaded with
a sense of sublimity and sanctity, or value in contemporary terms. Another point
whose mention here is not without benefit is that when it said that ethics is
the science of how one must live one's life, that includes behaviour
and habit, that is, what kind of conduct and habits one must have to lead a
worthy life. Also
nowadays another point that is mentioned, which is also found in our
philosophy, is that ethics deals only with how man should live and it is
assumed that man's nature is already known, and it is with the knowledge of
this nature that the question of how he must live so that his life possesses
sublimity and sanctity arises. As we know, the existentialists have certain
views about the fundamentally of existence (Mulla Sadra's philosophy is also based on the fundamentally of
existence) and they hold man to be a potential and indeterminate being. That
is, his essence is not predetermined and it is man's acts which form his habits
and these habits constitute man's identity and essence. Man does not have an
essence apart from his habits and they constitute the substantial actuality of
man's existence. It is his habits and traits which make and determine man's
being. More precisely, ethics is not only the science of how one should live
but the science of what one should become. When we talk of ethics as the
science of how one should live, it is assumed that we know what we are and then
go on to discuss how man with his fixed nature and essence, which is the same
in all men, is to live. But
if we hold that habits constitute the essence of man then ethics will take a
new dimension. If man can shape his reality with his morals and habits, then
his inner being and essence will change and accordingly ethics assumes a more
profound meaning. Men
have the same form, but from the spiritual viewpoint their reality depends on
their morals and habits. Hence the definition of man' may apply to some
persons in respect of form while in respect of their inner being the term
animal' may be true of them. With this definition of practical wisdom let us follow
up the foregoing discussion. We said that the issue of moral imperatives
signifies man's relation to a certain act and stems from his feeling. That is
man's nature seeks certain goals and in consonance with those ends certain
feelings emerge in his conscious faculty. He desires what his nature seeks, and
this finally leads him to declare, I like that thing' and It is good.' Bertrand
Russell and others hold - and Allamah Tabatabai's views lead to the same conclusion - that there
can be no objective criterion for ethics. For instance, when I say that
something is good, it means I like it, and my liking it does not mean that
somebody else should also like it. Others may like something else. Those who
lived in the past regarded what they liked as good, while today people regard
something else as good. Here
a question arises: How can ethical issues be demonstrated? How can we argue as
to what is good and what is bad? The Allamah is of
the view that these are not demonstrable, for normative matters cannot be
proven. We can only test them on the basis of utility (futility). That is, the mind's normative formulations are meant to
achieve certain goals and if they do not help one reach them they are invalid. Moral issues cannot be tested except through the test
of utility. They are not objective matters that can be proven by experiment or
reasoning. They can be proven neither by deduction nor by the empirical method.
In deduction the premises are based on self evident-principles, or on empirical
experience, whereas practical wisdom is concerned with the concept of good and
bad and these concepts are derive from ought and ought not, which in their turn
depend upon likes and dislikes, which are not identical in all people and vary
according to their personal situation, interests, pursuits and their
attachments to various creeds, groups, and nations. Therefore, every individual
and groups likes certain things and therefore moral values are inevitably
subjective and relative. Hence moral concepts are not objective issues
susceptible to logical proof or deductive or inductive methods.
Ethical Theories
Bertrand
Russell is one of the thinkers who arrived at the same conclusion through his
philosophy of logical analysis. In his book, A History of Western Philosophy,
while examining Plato's conception of justice and Trasymachus's
famous objection against it, that justice is nothing but the interests of the
powerful, Russell is of the view that this is the basic problem of politics and
ethics: is there any criterion in ethics to distinguish between good and bad
except that which is meant by those who use these terms? If there is no such
criterion then most of Trasymachus's conclusions will
inescapable. But how can one say that such a criterion exists? Elsewhere
Russell says that the difference between Plato and Trasymachus
is very important. Plato thinks that he can prove that his idea of republic is
good. A democrat who accepts the objectivity of ethics may think that he can
prove the Republic to be immoral; but anyone who agrees with Trasymachus will say: There is no question of proving or
disproving; the only question is whether you like or not. If you do, it is good
for you; if you do not it is bad for you. It is like matters of taste; one may
like a certain kind of food and say that this food is good and others may like
another kind and say that, that food is good. There is no absolute good to
compare other goods with. He further says that if you like it, it is good for
you; if you do not, it is bad for you. If some like it and some don't the
matter cannot be decided by reason, but only by force. That which is said that
justice belongs to the powerful, that is because when some people like
something and others don't, those who have greater power impose their wishes on
others by force and that becomes law. The
gist of Russell's statements is that the concepts of good and bad indicate the
relation between man and the thing in question. If this relation is one of
liking it is good and if it is one of dislike then it is bad. If it is neither
liked nor disliked, then it neither good
nor evil. We have written that the answer to Russell is
that first we have to trace the roots of why man likes something and dislikes
something else. Man likes anything that serves the purpose of life even if from
a particular aspect. In other words, nature always moves towards its perfection
and in order to impel man to carry out that which must be accomplished through
his will and choice it has placed desire,
liking and love in him in the same way that it has informed him with the
notions of good and evil. As nature moves towards individual perfection and
expediency, it also moves towards the perfection of the species as well.
Basically the individual's perfection is not separable from the perfection of
his species. The individual's perfection lies in that of the species, and
inevitably a kind of likes equally shared by all individuals take shape equally
in all individuals. These similar, uniform, universal and absolute likes
constitute the universal criterion of morality. Justice and other moral values
are the ends towards which nature moves for the perfection of the kind. In
order to attain such ends through voluntary action it creates a liking for
these ends in all individuals. By virtue of that liking the oughts
and ought nots appear in the form of a series of
universal imperatives in the soul. Accordingly, to have a universal criterion
in ethics it is not necessary to consider good and evil objective entities like
whiteness and blackness, roundness and squareness.
Russell considers the ego in "I like it," as an ego solely concerned
with its material and physical or as an ego
that is concerned with the interests of its kind. Here we will mention two or
three hypotheses and then try to substantiate the above remarks. We have to see
whether or not there actually exists a set of common, universal and permanent
imperatives in man's soul (this minor premise has to be derived through
experience). That is, do there exist in the human conscience any notions
commonly held by all individuals in addition to the temporary, particular, and
individual notions of good and bad? I mean those universal imperatives that are
devoid of personal preferences and tastes in which all that is relevant is
personal interest. Do such imperatives exist according to which man makes judgements occasionally even despite his personal preferences?
One
may say I don't know the analysis of such an issue, but I know this much that I
and all people have certain universal precepts according to which we judge, for
instance, that honesty is good in itself, whatever the basis of this judgement, or that it is good to return kindness for
kindness. This judgement transcends all personal
interests, and one cannot deny if someone says that a kindness returned for
kindness a thousand years ago is praiseworthy or that anyone who ever returned
evil for kindness is blameworthy. Undeniably there are two kinds of acts
involved here; one act is praiseworthy and valuable for man and the other is
worthless or has a negative value. If one were to compare with a free mind two
kinds of characters, such as Abu Dharr and Mu'awiyah, in order to make a judgement
concerning them, he will see that Abu Dharr was a man
to whom Mu'awiyah was ready to give everything to buy
his loyalty and to make him relinquish his higher principles. He did not
surrender to the devices of Mu'awiyah who had made
everything a means of attaining his ambitions. Here
one naturally commends the former and condemns the latter. The same test may be
applied in case of other characters and the result will invariably be the same.
We are not concerned with the opinion that all judgements
concerning goodness and badness derive from likes or dislikes. That may be
true, but firstly we want to see whether or not there exist common and
universal judgements. Secondly, if they do, how can
we justify them? Are they justifiable according to what the Allamah and Russell have said? We said that there are two kinds of ought and ought
not; one kind is particular and individual which we regularly come across in
everyday life. For instance, I ought to eat such food, I ought to wear such a
dress, and so on. The second kind of imperatives, of which examples were cited,
is universal in nature. Now
the question is what is the basis of such universal judgements?
If we do not agree with the theologians in considering goodness and badness as
objective attributes and hold that these notions ultimately pertain to man's
relation to a thing, then how can we justify universal moral judgements? First
Theory There
are three kinds of justification. According to the first, man has certain urges
which serve to fulfill his individual needs. For instance when hungry, he feels
an urge for food. Man has also another kind of urges which are species
oriented. That is, man may desire something which is not for his individual
benefit but for the sake of others. For instance, man does not like others to,
go hungry in the same way that he does not want to remain hungry himself. God
has created man such. If
we accept this justification, then the Allamah's
view becomes implausible for he holds that man's motives are consonant with his
