Ontological Arguments [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

the conclusions of these arguments have no religious significance whatsoever they are merely arguments for, e.g., the existence of the physical universe.

(7)Hegelian arguments': Since these are not strictly speaking arguments butmerely unsupported assertions there is nothing to refute.

Evenif the forgoing analyses are correct, it is important to note that no argumenthas been given for the conclusion that no ontological argument can besuccessful. Even if all of the kinds of arguments produced to date are prettyclearly unsuccessful i.e., not such as ought to give non-theists reason toaccept the conclusion that God exists it remains an open question whetherthere is some other kind of hitherto undiscovered ontological argument whichdoes succeed. (Perhaps it is worth adding here that there is fairly widespreadconsensus, even amongst theists, that no known ontological arguments for theexistence of God are persuasive. Most categories of ontological argument havesome actual defenders; but none has a large following.)

Manyother objections to (some) ontological arguments have been proposed. All of thefollowing have been alleged to be the key to the explanation of the failure of(at least some) ontological arguments: (1) existence is not a predicate (see,e.g., Kant, Smart (1955), Alston (1960)); (2) the concept of god ismeaningless/incoherent/ inconsistent (see, e.g., Findlay (1949)); (3)ontological arguments are ruled out by "the missing explanationargument" (see Johnston (1992); (4) ontological arguments all trade onmistaken uses of singular terms (see, e.g., Barnes (1972); (5) existence is nota perfection (see almost any textbook in philosophy of religion); (6)ontological arguments presuppose a Meinongian approach to ontology (see, e.g.,Dummett (1993)); and (7) ontological arguments are question-begging, i.e.,presuppose what they set out to prove (see, e.g., Rowe (1989)). There are manythings to say about these objections: the most important point is that almostall of them require far more controversial assumptions than non-theists requirein order to be able to reject ontological argumentswith good conscience. Trying to support most of these claims merely in order tobeat up on ontological arguments is like using a steamroller to crack a nut (incircumstances in which one is unsure that one can get the steamroller tomove!).

Ofcourse, all of the above discussion is directed merely to the claim thatontological arguments are not dialectically efficacious i.e., they givereasonable non-theists no reason to change their views. It might be wonderedwhether there is some other use which ontological arguments have e.g., asPlantinga claims, in establishing the reasonableness of theism. This seemsunlikely. After all, at best these arguments show that certain sets ofsentences (beliefs, etc.) are incompatible one cannot reject the conclusionsof these arguments while accepting their premises. But the arguments themselvessay nothing about the reasonableness of accepting the premisses. So thearguments themselves say nothing about the (unconditional) reasonableness ofaccepting the conclusions of these arguments. Those who are disposed to think thattheism is irrational need find nothing in ontological arguments to make themchange their minds (and those who are disposed to think that theism is trueshould take no comfort from them either).

5. Parodies of OntologicalArguments

Positive ontological arguments i.e., arguments FOR theexistence of god(s) invariably admit of various kinds of parodies, i.e.,parallel arguments which seem at least equally acceptable to non-theists, butwhich establish absurd or contradictory conclusions. For many positiveontological arguments, there are parodies which purport to establish thenon-existence of god(s); and for many positive ontological arguments there arelots (usually a large infinity!) of similar arguments which purport toestablish the existence of lots (usally a large infinity) of distinct god-likebeings. Here are some modest examples:

(1) Bydefinition, God is a non-existent being who has every (other) perfection. HenceGod does not exist.

(2) Iconceive of a being than which no greater can be conceived except that it onlyever creates N universes. If such a being does not exist, then we can conceiveof a greater being namely, one exactly like it which does exist. But I cannotconceive of a being which is greater in this way. Hence, a being than which nogreater can be conceived except that it only ever creates N universes exists.

(3) Itis possible that God does not exist. God is not a contingent being, i.e.,either it is not possible that God exists, or it is necessary that God exists.Hence it is not possible that God exists. Hence God does not exist.

(4) Itis analytic, necessary, and a priori that the F G is F. Hence, the existentperfect being who creates exactly N universes isexistent. Hence the perfect being who creates exactlyN universes exists.

Thereare many kinds of parodies on Ontological Arguments. The aim is to constructarguments which non-theists can reasonably claim to have no more reason toaccept than the original Ontological Arguments themselves. Of course, theistsmay well be able to hold that the originals are sound, and the parodies not but that is an entirely unrelated issue. (All theists and no non-theists should grant that the following argument is sound, given that the connectivesare to be interpretted classically: "Either 2+2=5, or God exists. Not2+2=5. Hence God exists." It should be completely obvious that thisargument is useless.)

Thereare some very nice parodic discussions of Ontological Arguments in theliterature. A particularly pretty one is due to Raymond Smullyan, in 5000 BCand Other Philosophical Fantasies, in which the argument is attributed to"the unknown Dutch theologian van Dollard". A relatively recentaddition to the genre is described in Grey (2000), though the date of itsconstruction is uncertain. It is the work of Douglas Gasking, one timeProfessor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne (with emendations by WilliamGrey and Denis Robinson):

The creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable. The merit of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality, and (b) the ability of its creator. The greater the disability or handicap of the creator, the more impressive the achievement. The most formidable handicap for a creator would be non-existence. Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater being namely, one who created everything while not existing. An existing God, therefore, would not be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived, because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist. (Hence) God does not exist.

This parody at least in its current state seems to me tobe inferior to other parodies in the literature, including the early parodiesof Gaunilo and Caterus. To mention but one difficulty, while we mightsuppose that it would be a greater achievement to create something if one didnot exist than if one did exist, it doesn't follow from this that anon-existent creator is greater (qua being) than an existent creator.Perhaps it might be replied that this objection fails to take the first premiseinto account: if the creation of the world really is "the most marvellousachievement imaginable", then surely there is some plausibility to theclaim that the creator must have been non-existent (since that would make theachievement more marvellous than it would otherwise have been). But what reasonis there to believe that the creation of the world is "the most marvellousachievement imaginable", in the sense which is required for this argument?Surely it is quite easy to imagine even more marvellous achievements e.g.,the creation of many worlds at least as good as this one! (Of course, one mightalso want to say that, in fact, one cannot conceive of a non-existent being'sactually creating something: that is literally inconceivable. Etc.)

6. Gödel's OntologicalArgument

There is a small, but steadily growing, literature on theontological arguments which Gödel developed in his notebooks, but whichdid not appear in print until well after his death. These arguments have beendiscussed, annotated and amended by various leading logicians: the upshot is afamily of arguments with impeccable logical credentials. (Interested readers are referred to Sobel (1987), Anderson (1990),Adams (1995b), and Hazen (1999) for the history of these arguments, and for thescholarly annotations and emendations.) Here, I shall give a briefpresentation of the version of the argument which is developed by Anderson, and then make some comments onthat version. This discussion follows the presentation and discussion inOppy (1996)(2000).

Definition 1: x is God-like iff x has asessential properties those and only those properties which are positive

Definition2: A is an essence of x iff for every property B, xhas B necessarily iff A entails B

Definition3: x necessarily exists iff every essence of xis necessarily exemplified

Axiom1: If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive.

Axiom2: Any property entailed by i.e., strictly implied by a positive propertyis positive

Axiom3: The property of being God-like is positive

Axiom4: If a property is positive, then it is necessarily positive

Axiom5: Necessary existence is positive

Axiom6: For any property P, if P is positive, then being necessarily Pis positive.

Theorem1: If a property is positive, then it is consistent, i.e., possiblyexemplified.

Corollary1: The property of being God-like is consistent.

Theorem2: If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essenceof that thing.

Theorem3: Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified.

Givena sufficiently generous conception of properties, and granted the acceptabilityof the underlying modal logic, the listed theorems do follow from the axioms.(This point was argued in detail by Dana Scott, in unpublished lecture noteswhich circulated for many years. It is also made by Sobel, Anderson, andAdams.) So, criticisms of the argument are bound to focus on the axioms, or onthe other assumptions which are required in order to construct the proof.

Somephilosophers have denied the acceptability of the underlying modal logic. Andsome philosophers have rejected generous conceptions of properties in favour ofsparse conceptions according to which only some predicates express properties.But suppose that we adopt neither of these avenues of potential criticism ofthe proof. What else might we say against it?

Oneimportant point to note is that no definition of the notion of"positive property" is supplied with the proof. At most, the variousaxioms which involve this concept can be taken to provide a partialimplicit definition. If we suppose that the "positive properties"form a set, then the axioms provide us with the following information aboutthis set:

If a property belongs to the set, then its negation does not belong to the set. The set is closed under entailment. The property of having as essential properties just those properties which are in the set is itself a member of the set. The set has exactly the same members in all possible worlds. The property of necessary existence is in the set. If a property is in the set, then the property of having that property necessarily is also in the set.

OnGödel's theoretical assumptions, we can show that any set whichconforms to (1) - (6) is such that the property of having as essentialproperties just those properties which are in that set is exemplified.Gödel wants us to conclude that there is just one intuitive, theologicallyinteresting set of properties which is such that theproperty of having as essential properties just the properties in that set isexemplified. But, on the one hand, what reason do we have to think that thereis any theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to theGödelian specification? And, on the other hand, what reason do we have todeny that, if there is one set of theologically interesting set of properties which conforms to the Gödelian specification,then there are many theologically threatening sets of properties which alsoconform to that specification?

Inparticular, there is some reason to think that the Gödelian ontologicalargument goes through just as well or just as badly with respect to othersets of properties (and in ways which are damaging to the original argument).Suppose that there is some set of independent properties {I, G1, G2, } which can be used to generate the set ofpositive properties by closure under entailment and "necessitation".("Independence" means: no one of theproperties in the set is entailed by all the rest. "Necessitation"means: if P is in the set, then so is necessarily having P. Iis the property of having as essential properties justthose properties which are in the set. G1, G2, are further properties, of which we require at least two.) Considerany proper subset of the set {G1, G2, } {H1, H2, }, say and define a new generating set {I*, H1,H2, }, which I* is the property of having as essential propertiesjust those properties which are in the newly generated set. A "proof"parallel to that offered by Gödel "establishes" that there is abeing which has as essential properties just those properties in this new set.If there are as few as 7 independent properties in the original generating set,then we shall be able to establish the existence of 720distinct"God-like" creatures by the kind of argument which Gödeloffers. (The creatures are distinct because each has a different set of essentialproperties.)

Evenif the above considerations are sufficient to cast doubt on the credentials ofGödel's "proof", they do not pinpoint where the"proof" goes wrong. If we accept that the role of Axioms 1, 2, 4, and6 is really just to constrain the notion of "positive property" inthe right way or, in other words, if we suppose that Axioms 1, 2, 4, and 6are "analytic truths" about "positive properties" thenthere is good reason for opponents of the "proof" to be scepticalabout Axioms 3 and 5. Kant would not have been happy with Axiom 5; and there isat least some reason to think that whether the property of being God-like is"positive" ought to depend upon whether or not there is a God-likebeing.