The Fallacy of
Epistemological Idealism

Table
of Contents
The
Common Element in Idealism

The
Fallacy of the Idealist Postulate

The
Ego-Centric Predicament

Modern
philosophy seems to be a maze of contradictory theories which have arisen in a
relatively short period of time. Almost every thinker has his own particular
brand of theory, more or less at variance with that of his fellow-philosophers.
There seems to be hardly a single point on which they all agree, when they
begin to expound the details of their system.

On the
surface, there appears to be nothing but intellectual chaos. Viewed from a
broader standpoint, however, by far the majority of these theories and systems
will be seen to be more or less alike. They reveal a common parentage and show
a common kinship. As such, then, they possess a uniform trait, a fundamental
doctrine identical in them all, which underlies all the variants and forms the
root-idea from which they derive their origin and then develop into different philosophies.
This uniform trait is idealism, and
the root-idea is the idealist postulate.

It
would be an impossibility to submit every form and variant of idealism to a
critical evaluation. Nor is this necessary. If it can
be shown that the fundamental doctrine, the root-idea, of idealism is
essentially fallacious, then idealism itself as a system of thought, no matter
what its individual shade and shape, will also be shown to be essentially
fallacious.

The Common Element
in Idealism

Idealism
arose out of the difficulty of understanding and explaining how the human mind
can transcend itself and know extra-mental reality. The ordinary man sees no
difficulty in this; for him there is no problem. He sees houses; he hears
sounds; he smells odors; he tastes flavors; he touches objects: these are
plain, everyday facts; what more is there to say?

The
epistemologist acknowledges these facts, and he finds his problem precisely in
these facts. Certainly we see and hear and smell and taste and touch; but what
do we perceive in these psychical acts and how do we perceive these
supposedly extra-mental things? The extra-mental objects (if there be such)
cannot very well leave their location, travel through the intervening space,
pierce the body, and enter the mind in their physical being; the house across
the street, for instance, remains across the street, and the red of the rose
remains in the rose out there in the garden. And the mind assuredly does not
leave the body, flit through space, and envelop the star billions of miles away
in its physical being; the mind remains here and the star remains there.

How,
then, can the mind perceive things at a distance, or how can things get into
the mind? It does not seem to solve the difficulty by referring to the stimuli
(lightwaves, airwaves, etc.), which are supposed to
leave the objects and impinge upon the sense-organs; because then we should
perceive these stimuli and not the objects from which they come. That, however,
is not the case: we perceive apparently objects and certainly not stimuli.

The
greatest difficulty lies in the fact of the dissimilarity which exists
between mind and matter. The mind is psychical, while the objects
are physical; the mind is unextended, while the
objects are extended. How can the mind assimilate something so diametrically
opposed to its own nature? And how can physical, extended objects impress
themselves upon a mind which is altogether devoid of all extension? Can the
extended become unextended, or the unextended become extended? Can the physical become
psychical, or the psychical become physical? Is this not a contradiction in
terms?

Since
the mind is psychical, it seems perfectly obvious and logical, that nothing but
what is psychical can affect the mind and nothing can proceed from the mind but
what is psychical. All knowledge, then, since it proceeds from the mind
and takes place in the mind, must be purely mental. Physical objects
are, therefore, absolutely excluded from knowledge: the objects of knowledge
are mental objects, ideas. Consequently, even when we apparently perceive
external and extended objects, what we really perceive are "mental
objects," "ideas," "conscious states,"
"representations," but not physical, extra-mental things themselves.

All we
can perceive is our "ideas" of things; whether anything corresponds
"out there," extra-mentally, to these "ideas," is something
we can never actually know. If such extra-mental objects exist, we simply
cannot know them, because they are physical entities, and the mind is
restricted to the mental, the psychical, the ideal, in all its processes. As
far as the mind is concerned, its objects have "being" only in so far
and so long as they are "perceived": esse
est percipi
("to be is to be perceived").

Such
"being" is then not physical, but ideal; and since it proceeds
from, and resides in, the mind as its
"subject," it is subjective. All objects of our knowledge are,
therefore, ideal and subjective, because they are mental products. This
doctrine, that the mind in its knowing can know only its own "ideas"
or "percepts," is idealism;
and when this doctrine is accepted as an axiom or postulate, it is the idealist postulate.

This
line of reasoning, formulated in many different ways, though seldom cast into
strict logical form, is basic to idealism. It can be worded thus:

Objects, so far as the knowing mind is concerned, exist only
when perceived; but perception ("being perceived") is a conscious
mind-state or "idea"; hence, objects are only conscious mind-states
or "ideas"; consequently their existence or "being" (esse) is nothing but "being perceived" (percipi): esse est percipi.

The
argument originated with the antithetical dualism existing between body and
mind, as postulated by Descartes.

The Fallacy of the
Idealist Postulate

Logic
is not the strong point of modern philosophers. They disdain the strictly
logical formulation of arguments and prefer the loose language of the essayist.
And loose language often hides loose thinking. We can see this clearly in the
argument of George Berkeley, if we cast his thoughts into strict form. A close
analysis will reveal the fallacy underlying his argument. Here are his words:

What are the aforementioned objects [houses, mountains, rivers,
and, in a word, all sensible objects] but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations?
and is it not plainly repugnant that any of these
[ideas or sensations], or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge).

A
casual reading of this argument sounds plausible enough; in fact, it almost
seems self-evident; and to many this line of reasoning has appeared so
transparently and unanswerably obvious, that it has been accepted without
question and become the dogma of idealism. It deserves, therefore, to be
analyzed more in detail.

It
will be evident that the conclusion of the idealist argument will have to be
that objects cannot exist in reality except when they are perceived,
because it is the contention of the idealists that the "being" of
objects is their "being perceived." So far as we are concerned, they
cease to "be" once they cease to "be perceived." Here is
the syllogism:

The
fallacy lies in the minor premise: "Sensible objects (houses, etc.) are
ideas or sensations." The term "sensible objects" can be taken
in two meanings: objects can be called "sensible" in the meaning of
"actually sense=perceived" and in the meaning of "potentially
sense-perceived."

In the
first meaning they are perceived in the act of perception; and in the
second meaning they can be perceived. In the first case we have objects
which are "within" the act of perception, and in the second case we
have objects which are "outside" the act of perception but are
capable of being perceived. In either case such objects would be called
"sensible."

The
difference lies in the fact that in the first case these "sensible"
objects are considered as "perceived," while in the second
case they are merely "perceivable." Berkeley confuses the two meanings: he
identifies the "perception of objects" with the "objects of
perception."

His
argument merely proves that "sensible" objects when perceived, are
"ideas or sensations"; but it says nothing whatever about such
objects when not perceived. All that his argument can prove is that
"objects are perceived when we perceive them"; and that, though true,
is plainly a redundancy and a juggling of words, but no proof that things
"cannot exist unperceived."

If he
contends that the argument also holds in the second meaning, so that there are
no sensible objects outside the act of perception which are unperceived but
perceivable, he begs the whole question by presupposing in his premise
what is supposed to be the burden of the conclusion. Such a contention is an
unwarranted assumption. "Sensible objects are ideas and sensations"
when perceived; but that is no proof that they cannot be objects in and for
themselves without being perceived.

What
idealists prove is merely that "sensible objects cannot be perceived as
existing without being perceived as ideas or sensations"; but this in
no way proves that "sensible objects cannot exist without being
perceived as existing." Because objects, when perceived, have now a
"subjective existence," it does not follow that such objects have a
"subjective existence only." Things could possibly have an
"objective existence" for themselves and then obtain an added
"subjective existence" in the subject when perceived by the subject.
In order to establish their case, idealists would have to disprove this
possibility; but this their argument fails to do.

The
fallacy of the idealist argument will, perhaps, be more clear
if we cast it into the form of a hypothetical syllogism. It could be made to
read in the following manner:

The
major premise contains a true statement: anything that has a purely subjective
existence is mind-dependent, because it is produced by the mind; it has,
therefore, a mental existence.

The
minor premise is also true: when objects are perceived, they are perceived by
the mind and as such exist cognitionally in the mind;
they have, then, a mental existence.

But
the conclusion does not follow logically from these premises. It is the
fallacy of false consequent. The minor premise posits the consequent
instead of the antecedent, and that is not logically permissible.

If we
wish to avoid this inconsistency and make the minor premise posit the
antecedent, the syllogism will read:

But
now the argument does not prove enough. It merely proves that perceived objects
have "a mental existence," and that is something which the realist
admits; the idealist, however, desires to prove that all perceived objects have
nothing but "a purely subjective existence," since it is his
contention that the "esse" of
all perceived objects is their "percipi."
The argument does not reach that far.

Besides,
in the syllogism, as now given, the minor premise states that "perceived
objects have a purely subjective existence." This statement begs the
question in dispute, because here the "esse est percipi" is already
assumed as true, while the truth of this fact is supposed to be found only in
the conclusion.

There
is only one more way in which this argument can be formulated so as to be
logically correct and consistent. It could be made to read as follows:

This
syllogism is consistent, but the conclusion is not true. The major premise, as
it stands, is again a begging of the whole question. The fact in question is
precisely that which is assumed in the major premise; Is
it a fact that, if something has a mental existence, it has a purely
subjective existence? This is the very point which the idealist intends to
prove by the argument; hence, to assume its truth in the premises is an
illegitimate procedure.

It is
thus seen that the fundamental position of the idealist is untenable, because
illogical. He cannot prove that the objects we perceive have only a
subjective existence in the mind; for all he knows, they may have a
mind-independent, objective existence in nature also. And if objects can
exist both in nature and in the mind (and no valid reason has been adduced to
the contrary), then the fundamental idealist postulate is invalid.

D.C.
Macintosh has summarized the essential fallacy of idealism in these concise
words:

The fallacy may appear as one of equivocation -- the common
fallacy of "four terms" -- as in the following syllogism:

Or, if the equivocation be avoided, the fallacy will remain as
that of an "undistributed middle term," as in this syllogism:

Or, more simply, psychological idealism may be said to rest upon
a fallacious conversion. From the obvious truth that all elements which depend
on consciousness for their existence, such as pains, feelings, desires, etc.,
are in the subjective relation, i.e., are objects for a subject, it is
inferred, by the fallacious process of simple conversion, that all that
is in the subjective relation, all that is object for a subject, is dependent
on consciousness and this relation to consciousness for its own existence. (D.C. Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge).

The Ego-Centric
Predicament

Every
form of idealism, whether dualistic or monistic, rests upon the primacy of
consciousness. Things simply cannot be known, perceived, experienced,
except by a conscious mind. Consciousness is thus for them the universal
condition of all knowledge and also of being. Consciousness constitutes
its objects; and if this consciousness maintains its own individuality in the
human mind, we have dualistic idealism, and if it is merged in a universal Ego,
we have monistic idealism.

In
either case the "object known" is identified with the "subject
knowing." We have seen how Berkeley argues for the oneness of the
material reality with the perceiving mind. Bradley argues in a similar fashion
for the oneness of all reality with sense-experience.

Immaterialism,
phenomenalism, absolutism, and every shade of
idealism, ultimately base their doctrine on the fact that reality is somehow
enclosed within the realm of consciousness, for the simple reason that we
cannot perceive objects as existing apart from conscious perception.

This
ultimate fact, which is the heart of idealism, thus rests on what has been so
aptly styled the ego-centric predicament.
Here is Ralph Barton Perry's exposition of the idealist fallacy as based on the
ego-centric predicament:

No thinker to whom one may appeal is able to mention a thing
that is not an idea, for the obvious and simple reason that in mentioning it he
makes it an idea. No one can report on the nature of things without being
on hand himself. It follows that whatever thing he reports does as a matter of
fact stand in relation to him, as an idea, object of knowledge, or
experience...

This predicament arises from the attempt to discover whether the
cognitive relationship is indispensable to the things which enter into it. In
order to discover if possible exactly how a thing is modified by the cognitive
relationship, I look for things out of this relationship, in order that
I may compare them with instances of things in this relationship. But I
can find no such instances, because "finding" is a variety of the
very relationship that I am trying to eliminate. Hence I cannot make the
comparison, nor get an answer to my original question by this means. But I
cannot conclude that there are no such instances; indeed, I now know that I
should not be able to discover them if there were.

Just in so far as I do actually succeed in eliminating every
cognitive relationship, I am unable to observe the result. Thus if I close my
eyes, I cannot see what happens to the object; if I stop thinking, I cannot
think what happens to it; and so with every mode of knowledge. In thus
eliminating all knowledge, I do not experimentally eliminate the thing known,
but only the possibility of knowing whether that thing is eliminated or not.

This, then, is the "ego-centric predicament." But what
does it prove, and how does it serve the purpose of idealism? It should be
evident that it proves nothing at all. It is simply a peculiar methodological
difficulty. It does, it is true, contain the proposition that every
mentioned thing is an idea. But this is virtually a redundant proposition
to the effect that every mentioned thing is mentioned -- to the effect that
every idea, object of knowledge, or experience, is an idea, object of
knowledge, or experience. And a redundant proposition is no proposition at all.
The assertion that an idea is an idea conveys no knowledge even about ideas.
But what the idealist requires is a proposition to the effect that everything
is an idea or that only ideas exist. And to derive this proposition
directly from the redundancy just formulated, is simply to take advantage of
the confusion of mind by which a redundancy is commonly attended.

It may be argued, however, that the ego-centric predicament is
equivalent to an inductive proof of the proposition that all things are ideas.
Every observed case of a thing is a case of a thing observed. Neglecting the
redundancy, which is sufficient of itself to vitiate the assertion, we remark
that the induction proceeds entirely by Mill's
"method of agreement," which is invalid unless supported by "the
method of difference," that is, the observation of negative cases. But the
ego-centric predicament itself prevents the observation of negative cases. It
is impossible to observe cases of unobserved things, even if there be any. In
other words, there is a reason connected with the conditions of observation
why only agreements should be observed. But where this is the case the method
of agreement is worthless; and the use of it is a fallacy. (Ralph Barton Perry, Present
Philosophical Tendencies).

Perry's
criticism of the idealist argument from the ego-centric predicament is
eminently justified. The argument is essentially fallacious. The only way in
which we can become acquainted with things, is to perceive them or have ideas
of them; therefore, if and when and while we know them,
they must be "percepts" or "ideas" in our
consciousness. The very nature of our knowing demands this. But things could
possibly have existence without being perceived and thus be mind-independent in
their being; all that the ego-centric predicament can prove is that
things cannot be perceived without being perceived, which truth, of
course, amounts to a mere tautology.

If we
now turn to Bradley's idealist argument, it will be evident that it is nothing
but a sample of specious reasoning from the ego-centric predicament. He says:

Find any piece of existence, take up anything that anyone could
possibly call a fact, or could in any sense assert to have being, and then
judge if it does not consist in sentient experience....Anything in no sense
felt or perceived becomes to me quite unmeaning. (F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality).

Certainly,
things "in no sense felt or perceive" must be "unmeaning" to
the perceiver or knower; for how could they acquire a meaning for him, if
he did not "feel" or "perceive" them? That would imply
"knowing" them without someone knowing them, and
"perceiving" them without someone perceiving them. The very fact of
cognition always involves the perceiver or knower just as necessarily as the
object itself that is to be known; because an object, to be known, must be
known by someone.

Wherefore,
Bradley's argument only proves that objects can or cannot be for themselves
outside the knowledge relation, and Bradley's conclusion that "experience
is the same as reality" is thus seen to be entirely unwarranted. The
ultimate nature of reality is still an open question.

The
whole attitude of the idealist, of whatever type he may be, rests upon a confusion
of ideas. From the fact that a being, in order to be known, must be
perceived within the consciousness of the perceiver in a mental act, he
concludes that the "reality itself" of the being, and not merely its
"perception," is mental. Reality would thus be immanent in the
knower.

The
confusion is based on the identification of the "reality" and the
"perception" of the object known. It is unquestionably true that the
"perception" of an object is mind-dependent and immanent. To assert
that an object, when known, can remain unperceived,
is a contradiction; and it would also be a contradiction to assert that an
unperceived object, when unperceived, can be known.

But it
is no contradiction to assume that an object, which has a reality of its own,
can remain unperceived by a human mind, either temporarily or forever, either
in part or in whole. We would simply not know of its existence until such time
when it enters our experience. To deny that such an object can exist as an
"unperceived reality" means to confuse the reality of this
object with the perception of its reality. This is precisely what
idealists do, but it is an illogical and dogmatic procedure and therefore
fallacious.

The
foregoing criticism shows that idealism arises out of the ego-centric
predicament and that its arguments involve a faulty logic. This, of course,
does not prove than extra-mental reality actually exists; it merely shows that
idealism has not disproved the existence of extra-mental objects. The question
of the existence of such objects must be solved, not by any a priori,
but by an a posteriori method. Facts alone, together with their proper
interpretation, must settle the issue; that is the only scientific and
philosophic procedure which can lead us with safety to a definite conclusion.