US and the Islamic World [Electronic resources] : US Strategy After 11 September نسخه متنی

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One,Two, Many Vietnams

The
United States' success as a hegemonic power in the postwar period created the
conditions of the nation's hegemonic demise. This process is captured in four
symbols: the war in Vietnam, the revolutions of 1968, the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, and the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Each symbol built
upon the prior one, culminating in the situation in which the United States
currently finds itself-a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader
nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a
global chaos it cannot control.

What
was the Vietnam War? First and foremost, it was the effort of the Vietnamese
people to end colonial rule and establish their own state. The Vietnamese
fought the French, the Japanese, and the Americans, and in the end the
Vietnamese won-quite an achievement, actually. Geopolitically, however, the war
represented a rejection of the Yalta status quo by populations then labeled as
Third World. Vietnam became such a powerful symbol because Washington was
foolish enough to invest its full military might in the struggle, but the
United States still lost. True, the United States didn't deploy nuclear weapons
(a decision certain myopic groups on the right have long reproached), but such
use would have shattered the Yalta accords and might have produced a nuclear
holocaust-an outcome the United States simply could not risk.

But
Vietnam was not merely a military defeat or a blight on US prestige. The war
dealt a major blow to the United States' ability to remain the world's dominant
economic power. The conflict was extremely expensive and more or less used up
the US gold reserves that had been so plentiful since 1945. Moreover, the
United States incurred these costs just as Western Europe and Japan experienced
major economic upswings. These conditions ended US preeminence in the global
economy. Since the late 1960s, members of this triad have been nearly economic
equals, each doing better than the others for certain periods but none moving
far ahead.

When
the revolutions of 1968 broke out around the world, support for the Vietnamese
became a major rhetorical component. "One, two, many Vietnams" and
"Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh" were chanted in many a street, not least in the
United States. But the 1968ers did not merely condemn US hegemony. They
condemned Soviet collusion with the United States, they condemned Yalta, and
they used or adapted the language of the Chinese cultural revolutionaries who
divided the world into two camps-the two superpowers and the rest of the world.

The
denunciation of Soviet collusion led logically to the denunciation of those
national forces closely allied with the Soviet Union, which meant in most cases
the traditional Communist parties. But the 1968 revolutionaries also lashed out
against other components of the Old Left-national liberation movements in the
Third World, social-democratic movements in Western Europe, and New Deal
Democrats in the United States-accusing them, too, of collusion with what the
revolutionaries generically termed "US imperialism."

The
attack on Soviet collusion with Washington plus the attack on the Old Left
further weakened the legitimacy of the Yalta arrangements on which the United
States had fashioned the world order. It also undermined the position of
centrist liberalism as the lone, legitimate global ideology. The direct
political consequences of the world revolutions of 1968 were minimal, but the
geopolitical and intellectual repercussions were enormous and irrevocable.
Centrist liberalism tumbled from the throne it had occupied since the European
revolutions of 1848 and that had enabled it to co-opt conservatives and
radicals alike. These ideologies returned and once again represented a real
gamut of choices. Conservatives would again become conservatives, and radicals,
radicals. The centrist liberals did not disappear, but they were cut down to
size. And in the process, the official US ideological position-antifascist,
anticommunist, anticolonialist-seemed thin and unconvincing to a growing
portion of the world's populations.

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