The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

The Principle of Movement
in the

Structure of Islam
As a cultural movement Islam
rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional
system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects
blood-relationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earth-rootedness. The
search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the
perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.¹ Such a perception
is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it
possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally
appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.²
Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian³ to return to the
old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern
historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the
time when Islam appeared on the stage of History:
It seemed then that the great
civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of
disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where
every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The old
tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer
operate. The new sanctions created by Christianity were working division and destruction
instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a
gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the
golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer
alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the
storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might
snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather
mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a
new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the
same kind would be the work of centuries.’⁴
The writer then proceeds to tell
us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the
throne, and the systems of unification which were based on blood-relationship. It is
amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when
it was most needed. There is, however, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life
intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is
what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that
Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of
the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet
together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of
Tauhd.’⁵ Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this
principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands
loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life,
loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The
ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself
in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in
its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to
regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of
perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all
possibilities of change which, according to the Qur’n, is one of the greatest
‘signs’ of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature. The
failure of the Europe in political and social sciences illustrates the former principle,
the immobility of Islam during the last five hundred years illustrates the latter. What
then is the principle of movement in the structure of Islam? This is known as Ijtihd.
The word literally means to
exert. In the terminology of Islamic law it means to exert with a view to form an
independent judgement on a legal question. The idea, I believe, has its origin in a
well-known verse of the Qur’n - ‘And to those who exert We show Our
path’.⁶ We find it more definitely adumbrated in a tradition of the Holy
Prophet. When Mu‘dh was appointed ruler of Yemen, the Prophet is reported to have
asked him as to how he would decide matters coming up before him. ‘I will judge
matters according to the Book of God,’ said Mu‘dh. ‘But if the Book of
God contains nothing to guide you?’ ‘Then I will act on the precedents of the
Prophet of God.’ ‘But if the precedents fail?’ ‘Then I will exert to
form my own judgement.’⁷ The student of the history of Islam, however, is
well aware that with the political expansion of Islam systematic legal thought became an
absolute necessity, and our early doctors of law, both of Arabian and non-Arabian descent,
worked ceaselessly until all the accumulated wealth of legal thought found a final
expression in our recognized schools of Law. These schools of Law recognize three degrees
of Ijtihd: (1) complete authority in legislation which is practically confined to
be founders of the schools, (2) relative authority which is to be exercised within the
limits of a particular school, and (3) special authority which relates to the determining
of the law applicable to a particular case left undetermined by the founders.⁸
In this paper I am concerned with the first degree of Ijtihd only, i.e. complete
authority in legislation. The theoretical possibility of this degree of Ijtihd is
admitted by the Sunni`s, but in practice it has always been denied ever since the
establishment of the schools, inasmuch as the idea of complete Ijtihd is hedged
round by conditions which are well-nigh impossible of realization in a single individual.
Such an attitude seems exceedingly strange in a system of law based mainly on the
groundwork provided by the Qur’n which embodies an essentially dynamic outlook on
life. It is, therefore, necessary, before we proceed farther, to discover the cause of
this intellectual attitude which has reduced the Law of Islam practically to a state of
immobility. Some European writers think that the stationary character of the Law of Islam
is due to the influence of the Turks. This is an entirely superficial view, for the legal
schools of Islam had been finally established long before the Turkish influence began to
work in the history of Islam. The real causes are, in my opinion, as follows:
1. We are all familiar with the
Rationalist movement which appeared in the church of Islam during the early days of the
Abbasids and the bitter controversies which it raised. Take for instance the one important
point of controversy between the two camps - the conservative dogma of the eternity of the
Qur’n. The Rationalists denied it because they thought that this was only another
form of the Christian dogma of the eternity of the word; on the other hand, the
conservative thinkers whom the later Abbasids, fearing the political implications of
Rationalism, gave their full support, thought that by denying the eternity of the
Qur’n the Rationalists were undermining the very foundations of Muslim society.⁹
Nam, for instance, practically rejected the traditions, and openly declared Ab
Hurairah to be an untrustworthy reporter.¹⁰ Thus, partly owing to a
misunderstanding of the ultimate motives of Rationalism, and partly owing to the
unrestrained thought of particular Rationalists, conservative thinkers regarded this
movement as a force of disintegration, and considered it a danger to the stability of
Islam as a social polity.¹¹ Their main purpose, therefore, was to preserve the
social integrity of Islam, and to realize this the only course open to them was to utilize
the binding force of Shar‘ah, and to make the structure of their legal system as
rigorous as possible.
2. The rise and growth of ascetic
Sufism, which gradually developed under influences of a non-Islamic character, a purely
speculative side, is to a large extent responsible for this attitude. On its purely
religious side Sufism fostered a kind of revolt against the verbal quibbles of our early
doctors. The case of Sufyn Thaur is an instance in point. He was one of the acutest
legal minds of his time, and was nearly the founder of a school of law,¹² but
being also intensely spiritual, the dry-as-dust subtleties of contemporary legists drove
him to ascetic Sufism. On its speculative side which developed later, Sufism is a form of
freethought and in alliance with Rationalism. The emphasis that it laid on the distinction
of hir and bin (Appearance and Reality) created an attitude of
indifference to all that applies to Appearance and not to Reality.¹³
This spirit of total
other-wordliness in later Sufism obscured men’s vision of a very important aspect of
Islam as a social polity, and, offering the prospect of unrestrained thought on its
speculative side, it attracted and finally absorbed the best minds in Islam. The Muslim
state was thus left generally in the hands of intellectual mediocrities, and the
unthinking masses of Islam, having no personalities of a higher calibre to guide them,
found their security only in blindly following the schools.
3. On the top of all this came
the destruction of Baghdad - the centre of Muslim intellectual life - in the middle of the
thirteenth century. This was indeed a great blow, and all the contemporary historians of
the invasion of Tartars describe the havoc of Baghdad with a half-suppressed pessimism
about the future of Islam. For fear of further disintegration, which is only natural in
such a period of political decay, the conservative thinkers of Islam focused all their
efforts on the one point of preserving a uniform social life for the people by a jealous
exclusion of all innovations in the law of Shar‘ah as expounded by the early
doctors of Islam. Their leading idea was social order, and there is no doubt that they
were partly right, because organization does to a certain extent counteract the forces of
decay. But they did not see, and our modern ‘Ulem do not see, that the ultimate
fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of
individual men. In an over-organized society the individual is altogether crushed out of
existence. He gains the whole wealth of social thought around him and loses his own soul.
Thus a false reverence for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no
remedy for a people’s decay. ‘The verdict of history’, as a modern writer
has happily put it, ‘is that worn-out ideas have never risen to power among a people
who have worn them out.’ The only effective power, therefore, that counteracts the
forces of decay in a people is the rearing of self-concentrated individuals. Such
individuals alone reveal the depth of life. They disclose new standards in the light of
which we begin to see that our environment is not wholly inviolable and requires revision.
The tendency to over-organization by a false reverence of the past, as manifested in the
legists of Islam in the thirteenth century and later, was contrary to the inner impulse of
Islam, and consequently invoked the powerful reaction of Ibn Taimyyah, one of the most
indefatigable writers and preachers of Islam, who was born in 1263, five years after the
destruction of Baghdad.
Ibn Taimyyah was brought up in
Hanbalite tradition. Claiming freedom of Ijtihd for himself he rose in revolt
against the finality of the schools, and went back to first principles in order to make a
fresh start. Like Ibn azm - the founder of ?hirschool of law¹⁴ - he
rejected the Hanafite principle of reasoning by analogy and Ijm’ as
understood by older legists;¹⁵ for he thought agreement was the basis of all
superstition.¹⁶ And there is no doubt that, considering the moral and
intellectual decrepitude of his times, he was right in doing so. In the sixteenth century
Suyt claimed the same privilege of Ijtihd to which he added the idea of a
renovator at the beginning of each century.¹⁷ But the spirit of Ibn
Taimyyah’s teaching found a fuller expression in a movement of immense
potentialities which arose in the eighteenth century, from the sands of Nejd, described by
Macdonald as the ‘cleanest spot in the decadent world of Islam’. It is really
the first throb of life in modern Islam. To the inspiration of this movement are
traceable, directly or indirectly, nearly all the great modern movements of Muslim Asia
and Africa, e.g. the Sans movement, the Pan-Islamic movement,¹⁸ and the
Bb movement, which is only a Persian reflex of Arabian Protestantism. The great
puritan reformer, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhh, who was born in 1700,¹⁹
studied in Medina, travelled in Persia, and finally succeeded in spreading the fire of his
restless soul throughout the whole world of Islam. He was similar in spirit to
Ghazzl’s disciple, Muhammad Ibn Tmart²⁰ - the Berber puritan
reformer of Islam who appeared amidst the decay of Muslim Spain, and gave her a fresh
inspiration. We are, however, not concerned with the political career of this movement
which was terminated by the armies of Muhammad ‘Al Psh. The essential thing to
note is the spirit of freedom manifested in it, though inwardly this movement, too, is
conservative in its own fashion. While it rises in revolt against the finality of the
schools, and vigorously asserts the right of private judgement, its vision of the past is
wholly uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly falls back on the traditions of the
Prophet.
Passing on to Turkey, we find
that the idea of Ijtihd, reinforced and broadened by modern philosophical ideas,
has long been working in the religious and political thought of the Turkish nation. This
is clear from alim Sbit’s new theory of Muhammadan Law, grounded on modern
sociological concepts. If the renaissance of Islam is a fact, and I believe it is a fact,
we too one day, like the Turks, will have to re-evaluate our intellectual inheritance. And
if we cannot make any original contribution to the general thought of Islam, we may, by
healthy conservative criticism, serve at least as a check on the rapid movement of
liberalism in the world of Islam.
I now proceed to give you some
idea of religio-political thought in Turkey which will indicate to you how the power of Ijtihd
is manifested in recent thought and activity in that country. There were, a short time
ago, two main lines of thought in Turkey represented by the Nationalist Party and the
Party of Religious Reform. The point of supreme interest with the Nationalist Party is
above all the State and not Religion. With these thinkers religion as such has no
independent function. The state is the essential factor in national life which determines
the character and function of all other factors. They, therefore, reject old ideas about
the function of State and Religion, and accentuate the separation of Church and State. Now
the structure of Islam as a religio-political system, no doubt, does permit such a view,
though personally I think it is a mistake to suppose that the idea of state is more
dominant and rules all other ideas embodied in the system of Islam. In Islam the spiritual
and the temporal are not two distinct domains, and the nature of an act, however secular
in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is
the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character.²¹
An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite
complexity of life behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity. In
Islam it is the same reality which appears as Church looked at from one point of view and
State from another. It is not true to say that Church and State are two sides or facets of
the same thing. Islam is a single unanalysable reality which is one or the other as your
point of view varies. The point is extremely far-reaching and a full elucidation of it
will involve us in a highly philosophical discussion. Suffice it to say that this ancient
mistake arose out of the bifurcation of the unity of man into two distinct and separate
realities which somehow have a point of contact, but which are in essence opposed to each
other. The truth, however, is that matter is spirit in space-time reference. The unity
called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the external
world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and
ideal of such acting. The essence of Tauhd, as a working idea, is equality, solidarity,
and freedom. The state, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform these
ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human
organization. It is in this sense alone that the state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the
sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his
despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. The critics of Islam have lost sight of
this important consideration. The Ultimate Reality, according to the Qur’n, is
spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its
opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is,
therefore, sacred in the roots of its being. The greatest service that modern thought has
rendered to Islam, and as a matter of fact to all religion, consists in its criticism of
what we call material or natural - a criticism which discloses that the merely material
has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as a
profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization
of spirit. All is holy ground. As the Prophet so beautifully puts it: ‘The whole of
this earth is a mosque.’²² The state, according to Islam, is only an
effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization. But in this sense all state, not
based on mere domination and aiming at the realization of ideal principles, is theocratic.
The truth is that the Turkish
Nationalists assimilated the idea of the separation of Church and State from the history
of European political ideas. Primitive Christianity was founded, not as a political or
civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil
affairs, and obeying the Roman authority practically in all matters. The result of this
was that when the State became Christian, State and Church confronted each other as
distinct powers with interminable boundary disputes between them. Such a thing could never
happen in Islam; for Islam was from the very beginning a civil society, having received
from the Qur’n a set of simple legal principles which, like the twelve tables of
the Romans, carried, as experience subsequently proved, great potentialities of expansion
and development by interpretation. The Nationalist theory of state, therefore, is
misleading inasmuch as it suggests a dualism which does not exist in Islam.
The Religious Reform Party, on
the other hand, led by Sa‘d alm Psh, insisted on the fundamental fact that
Islam is a harmony of idealism and positivism; and, as a unity of the eternal verities of
freedom, equality, and solidarity, has no fatherland. ‘As there is no English
Mathematics, German Astronomy or French Chemistry,’ says the Grand Vizier, ‘so
there is no Turkish, Arabian, Persian or Indian Islam. Just as the universal character of
scientific truths engenders varieties of scientific national cultures which in their
totality represent human knowledge, much in the same way the universal character of
Islamic verities creates varieties of national, moral and social ideals.’ Modern
culture based as it is on national egoism is, according to this keen-sighted writer, only
another form of barbarism. It is the result of an over-developed industrialism through
which men satisfy their primitive instincts and inclinations. He, however, deplores that
during the course of history the moral and social ideals of Islam have been gradually
deislamized through the influence of local character, and pre-Islamic superstitions of
Muslim nations. These ideals today are more Iranian, Turkish, or Arabian than Islamic. The
pure brow of the principle of Tauhd has received more or less an impress of heathenism,
and the universal and impersonal character of the ethical ideals of Islam has been lost
through a process of localization. The only alternative open to us, then, is to tear off
from Islam the hard crust which has immobilized an essentially dynamic outlook on life,
and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity with a view
to rebuild our moral, social, and political ideals out of their original simplicity and
universality. Such are the views of the Grand Vizier of Turkey. You will see that
following a line of thought more in tune with the spirit of Islam, he reaches practically
the same conclusion as the Nationalist Party, that is to say, the freedom of Ijtihd
with a view to rebuild the laws of Shar‘ah in the light of modern thought and
experience.
Let us now see how the Grand
National Assembly has exercised this power of Ijtihd in regard to the institution
of Khilfat. According to Sunni Law, the appointment of an Imam or Khalfah is
absolutely indispensable. The first question that arises in this connexion is this -
Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? Turkey’s Ijtihd is that
according to the spirit of Islam the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of
persons, or an elected Assembly. The religious doctors of Islam in Egypt and India, as far
as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on this point. Personally, I believe the
Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to argue this point. The
republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam,
but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world
of Islam.
In order to understand the
Turkish view let us seek the guidance of Ibn Khaldn - the first philosophical historian
of Islam. Ibn Khaldn, in his famous ‘Prolegomena’, mentions three distinct
views of the idea of Universal Caliphate in Islam²³: (1) That Universal Imamate
is a Divine institution, and is consequently indispensable. (2) That it is merely a matter
of expediency. (3) That there is no need of such an institution. The last view was taken
by the Khawrij.²⁴ It seems that modern Turkey has shifted from the first to
the second view, i.e. to the view of the Mu’tazilah who regarded Universal Imamate as
a matter of expediency only. The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be
guided by our past political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the
idea of Universal Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire
of Islam was intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have
arisen. The idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the
organization of modern Islam. Far from serving any useful purpose it has really stood in
the way of a reunion of independent Muslim States. Persia has stood aloof from the Turks
in view of her doctrinal differences regarding the Khilfat; Morocco has always looked
askance at them, and Arabia has cherished private ambition. And all these ruptures in
Islam for the sake of a mere symbol of a power which departed long ago. Why should we not,
they can further argue, learn from experience in our political thinking? Did not Qd
Ab Bakr Bqiln drop the condition of Qarshyat in the Khalfah in view of
the facts of experience, i.e. the political fall of the Quraish and their consequent
inability to rule the world of Islam? Centuries ago Ibn Khaldn, who personally believed
in the condition of Qarshyat in the Khali`fah, argued much in the same way. Since
the power of the Quraish, he says, has gone, there is no alternative but to accept the
most powerful man as Ima`m in the country where he happens to be powerful. Thus Ibn
Khaldn, realizing the hard logic of facts, suggests a view which may be regarded as the
first dim vision of an International Islam fairly in sight today. Such is the attitude of
the modern Turk, inspired as he is by the realities of experience, and not by the
scholastic reasoning of jurists who lived and thought under different conditions of life.
To my mind these arguments, if
rightly appreciated, indicate the birth of an International ideal which, though forming
the very essence of Islam, has been hitherto over-shadowed or rather displaced by Arabian
Imperialism of the earlier centuries of Islam. This new ideal is clearly reflected in the
work of the great nationalist poet iy whose songs, inspired by the philosophy of
Auguste Comte, have done a great deal in shaping the present thought of Turkey. I
reproduce the substance of one of his poems from Professor Fischer’s German
translation:
In order to create a really
effective political unity of Islam, all Muslim countries must first become independent:
and then in their totality they should range themselves under one Caliph. Is such a thing
possible at the present moment? If not today, one must wait. In the meantime the Caliph
must reduce his own house to order and lay the foundations of a workable modern State.
‘In the International world
the weak find no sympathy; power alone deserves respect.’²⁵
These lines clearly indicate the
trend of modern Islam. For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper
self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to
form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist
thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is
truly manifested in a multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rivalries are
adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. It seems to
me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor
Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial
distinctions for facility of reference only,²⁶ and not for restricting the
social horizon of its members.
From the same poet the following
passage from a poem called ‘Religion and Science’ will throw some further light
on the general religious outlook which is being gradually shaped in the world of Islam
today:
"Who were the first
spiritual leaders of mankind? Without doubt the prophets and holy men. In every period
religion has led philosophy; From it alone morality and art receive light. But then
religion grows weak, and loses her original ardour! Holy men disappear, and spiritual
leadership becomes, in name, the heritage of the Doctors of Law! The leading star of the
Doctors of Law is tradition; They drag religion with force on this track; but philosophy
says: ‘My leading star is reason: you go right, I go left."
‘Both religion and
philosophy claim the soul of man and draw it on either side!’
‘When this struggle is going
on pregnant experience delivers up positive science, and this young leader of thought
says, "Tradition is history and Reason is the method of history! Both interpret and
desire to reach the same indefinable something!"
‘But what is this
something?’

‘Is it a spiritualized heart?’
‘If so, then take my last
word - Religion is positive science, the purpose of which is to spiritualize the heart of
man!’²⁷
It is clear from these lines how
beautifully the poet has adopted the Comtian idea of the three stages of man’s
intellectual development, i.e. theological, metaphysical and scientific - to the religious
outlook of Islam. And the view of religion embodied in these lines determines the
poet’s attitude towards the position of Arabic in the educational system of Turkey.
He says:
‘The land where the call to
prayer resounds in Turkish; where those who pray understand the meaning of their religion;
the land where the Qur’n is learnt in Turkish; where every man, big or small, knows
full well the command of God; O! Son of Turkey! that land is thy fatherland!’²⁸
If the aim of religion is the
spiritualization of the heart, then it must penetrate the soul of man, and it can best
penetrate the inner man, according to the poet, only if its spiritualizing ideas are
clothed in his mother tongue. Most people in India will condemn this displacement of
Arabic by Turkish. For reasons which will appear later the poet’s Ijtihd is
open to grave objections, but it must be admitted that the reform suggested by him is not
without a parallel in the past history of Islam. We find that when Muhammad Ibn Tmart -
the Mahdi of Muslim Spain - who was Berber by nationality, came to power, and established
the pontifical rule of the Muwaidn, he ordered for the sake of the illiterate
Berbers, that the Qur’n should be translated and read in the Berber language; that
the call to prayer should be given in Berber;²⁹ and that all the functionaries
of the Church must know the Berber language.
In another passage the poet gives
his ideal of womanhood. In his zeal for the equality of man and woman he wishes to see
radical changes in the family law of Islam as it is understood and practised today:
‘There is the woman, my
mother, my sister, or my daughter; it is she who calls up the most sacred emotions from
the depths of my life! There is my beloved, my sun, my moon and my star; it is she who
makes me understand the poetry of life! How could the Holy Law of God regard these
beautiful creatures as despicable beings? Surely there is an error in the interpretation
of the Qur’n by the learned?³⁰

‘The foundation of the
nation and the state is the family!’

‘As long as the full worth of the woman is not realized, national life remains
incomplete.’

‘The upbringing of the family must correspond with justice;’

‘Therefore equality is necessary in three things - in divorce, in separation, and in
inheritance.’

‘As long as the woman is counted half the man as regards inheritance and one-fourth
of man in matrimony, neither the family nor the country will be elevated. For other rights
we have opened national courts of justice;’

‘he family, on the other hand, we have left in the hands of schools.’

I do not know why we have left the woman in the lurch?

Does she not work for the land? Or, will she turn her needle into a sharp bayonet to tear
off her rights from our hands through a revolution?³¹

The truth is that among the
Muslim nations of today, Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained to
self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her right of intellectual freedom; she alone has
passed from the ideal to the real - a transition which entails keen intellectual and moral
struggle. To her the growing complexities of a mobile and broadening life are sure to
bring new situations suggesting new points of view, and necessitating fresh
interpretations of principles which are only of an academic interest to a people who have
never experienced the joy of spiritual expansion. It is, I think, the English thinker
Hobbes who makes this acute observation that to have a succession of identical thoughts
and feelings is to have no thoughts and feelings at all. Such is the lot of most Muslim
countries today. They are mechanically repeating old values, whereas the Turk is on the
way to creating new values. He has passed through great experiences which have revealed
his deeper self to him. In him life has begun to move, change, and amplify, giving birth
to new desires, bringing new difficulties and suggesting new interpretations. The question
which confronts him today, and which is likely to confront other Muslim countries in the
near future is whether the Law of Islam is capable of evolution - a question which will
require great intellectual effort, and is sure to be answered in the affirmative, provided
the world of Islam approaches it in the spirit of ‘Umar - the first critical and
independent mind in Islam who, at the last moments of the Prophet, had the moral courage
to utter these remarkable words: ‘The Book of God is sufficient for us.’³²
We heartily welcome the liberal
movement in modern Islam, but it must also be admitted that the appearance of liberal
ideas in Islam constitutes also the most critical moment in the history of Islam.
Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration, and the race-idea which
appears to be working in modern Islam with greater force than ever may ultimately wipe off
the broad human outlook which Muslim people have imbibed from their religion. Further, our
religious and political reformers in their zeal for liberalism may overstep the proper
limits of reform in the absence of check on their youthful fervour. We are today passing
through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in Europe, and the lesson
which the rise and outcome of Luther’s movement teaches should not be lost on us. A
careful reading of history shows that the Reformation was essentially a political
movement, and the net result of it in Europe was a gradual displacement of the universal
ethics of Christianity by systems of national ethics.³³ The result of this
tendency we have seen with our own eyes in the Great European War which, far from bringing
any workable synthesis of the two opposing systems of ethics, has made the European
situation still more intolerable. It is the duty of the leaders of the world of Islam
today to understand the real meaning of what has happened in Europe, and then to move
forward with self-control and a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social
polity.
I have given you some idea of the
history and working of Ijtihd in modern Islam. I now proceed to see whether the
history and structure of the Law of Islam indicate the possibility of any fresh
interpretation of its principles. In other words, the question that I want to raise is -
Is the Law of Islam capable of evolution? Horten, Professor of Semitic Philology at the
University of Bonn, raises the same question in connexion with the Philosophy and Theology
of Islam. Reviewing the work of Muslim thinkers in the sphere of purely religious thought
he points out that the history of Islam may aptly be described as a gradual interaction,
harmony, and mutual deepening of two distinct forces, i.e. the element of Aryan culture
and knowledge on the one hand, and a Semitic religion on the other. The Muslim has always
adjusted his religious outlook to the elements of culture which he assimilated from the
peoples that surrounded him. From 800 to 1100, says Horten, not less than one hundred
systems of theology appeared in Islam, a fact which bears ample testimony to the
elasticity of Islamic thought as well as to the ceaseless activity of our early thinkers.
Thus, in view of the revelations of a deeper study of Muslim literature and thought, this
living European Orientalist has been driven to the following conclusion:
The spirit of Islam is so broad
that it is practically boundless. With the exception of atheistic ideas alone it has
assimilated all the attainable ideas of surrounding peoples, and given them its own
peculiar direction of development.’
The assimilative spirit of Islam
is even more manifest in the sphere of law. Says Professor Hurgronje - the Dutch critic of
Islam:
When we read the history of the
development of Mohammadan Law we find that, on the one hand, the doctors of every age, on
the slightest stimulus, condemn one another to the point of mutual accusations of heresy;
and, on the other hand, the very same people, with greater and greater unity of purpose,
try to reconcile the similar quarrels of their predecessors.’
These views of modern European
critics of Islam make it perfectly clear that, with the return of new life, the inner
catholicity of the spirit of Islam is bound to work itself out in spite of the rigorous
conservatism of our doctors. And I have no doubt that a deeper study of the enormous legal
literature of Islam is sure to rid the modern critic of the superficial opinion that the
Law of Islam is stationary and incapable of development. Unfortunately, the conservative
Muslim public of this country is not yet quite ready for a critical discussion of Fiqh,
which, if undertaken, is likely to displease most people, and raise sectarian
controversies; yet I venture to offer a few remarks on the point before us.
1. In the first place, we should
bear in mind that from the earliest times practically up to the rise of the Abbasids,
there was no written law of Islam apart from the Qur’n.
2. Secondly, it is worthy of note
that from about the middle of the first century up to the beginning of the fourth not less
than nineteen schools of law and legal opinion appeared in Islam.³⁴ This fact
alone is sufficient to show how incessantly our early doctors of law worked in order to
meet the necessities of a growing civilization. With the expansion of conquest and the
consequent widening of the outlook of Islam these early legists had to take a wider view
of things, and to study local conditions of life and habits of new peoples that came
within the fold of Islam. A careful study of the various schools of legal opinion, in the
light of contemporary social and political history, reveals that they gradually passed
from the deductive to the inductive attitude in their efforts at interpretation.³⁵
3. Thirdly, when we study the
four accepted sources of Muhammadan Law and the controversies which they invoked, the
supposed rigidity of our recognized schools evaporates and the possibility of a further
evolution becomes perfectly clear. Let us briefly discuss these sources.
(a) The Qur’n. The primary
source of the Law of Islam is the Qur’n. The Qur’n, however, is not a legal
code. Its main purpose, as I have said before, is to awaken in man the higher
consciousness of his relation with God and the universe.³⁶ No doubt, the
Qur’n does lay down a few general principles and rules of a legal nature,
especially relating to the family³⁷ - the ultimate basis of social life. But
why are these rules made part of a revelation the ultimate aim of which is man’s
higher life? The answer to this question is furnished by the history of Christianity which
appeared as a powerful reaction against the spirit of legality manifested in Judaism. By
setting up an ideal of otherworldliness it no doubt did succeed in spiritualizing life,
but its individualism could see no spiritual value in the complexity of human social
relations. ‘Primitive Christianity’, says Naumann in his Briefe ber
Religion, ‘attached no value to the preservation of the State, law, organization,
production. It simply does not reflect on the conditions of human society.’ And
Naumann concludes: ‘Hence we either dare to aim at being without a state, and thus
throwing ourselves deliberately into the arms of anarchy, or we decide to possess,
alongside of our religious creed, a political creed as well.’³⁸ Thus the
Qur’n considers it necessary to unite religion and state, ethics and politics in a
single revelation much in the same way as Plato does in his Republic.
The important point to note in
this connexion, however, is the dynamic outlook of the Qur’n. I have fully
discussed its origin and history. It is obvious that with such an outlook the Holy Book of
Islam cannot be inimical to the idea of evolution. Only we should not forget that life is
not change, pure and simple. It has within it elements of conservation also. While
enjoying his creative activity, and always focusing his energies of the discovery of new
vistas of life, man has a feeling of uneasiness in the presence of his own unfoldment. In
his forward movement he cannot help looking back to his past, and faces his own inward
expansion with a certain amount of fear. The spirit of man in its forward movement is
restrained by forces which seem to be working in the opposite direction. This is only
another way of saying that life moves with the weight of its own past on its back, and
that in any view of social change the value and function of the forces of conservatism
cannot be lost sight of. It is with this organic insight into the essential teaching of
the Qur’n that to approach our existing institutions. No people can afford to
reject their past entirely, for it is their past that has made their personal identity.
And in a society like Islam the problem of a revision of old institutions becomes still
more delicate, and the responsibility of the reformer assumes a far more serious aspect.
Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final
combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent
races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a
self-consciousness of their own. This was not an easy task to accomplish. Yet Islam, by
means of its well-conceived institutions, has succeeded to a very great extent in creating
something like a collective will and conscience in this heterogeneous mass. In the
evolution of such a society even the immutability of socially harmless rules relating to
eating and drinking, purity or impurity, has a life-value of its own, inasmuch as it tends
to give such society a specific inwardness, and further secures that external and internal
uniformity which counteracts the forces of heterogeneity always latent in a society of a
composite character. The critic of these institutions must, therefore, try to secure,
before he undertakes to handle them, a clear insight into the ultimate significance of the
social experiment embodied in Islam. He must look at their structure, not from the
standpoint of social advantage or disadvantage to this or that country, but from the point
of view of the larger purpose which is being gradually worked out in the life of mankind
as a whole.
Turning now to the groundwork of
legal principles in the Qur’n, it is perfectly clear that far from leaving no scope
for human thought and legislative activity the intensive breadth of these principles
virtually acts as an awakener of human thought. Our early doctors of law taking their clue
mainly from this groundwork evolved a number of legal systems; and the student of
Muhammadan history knows very well that nearly half the triumphs of Islam as a social and
political power were due to the legal acuteness of these doctors. ‘Next to the
Romans’, says von Kremer, ‘there is no other nation besides the Arabs which
could call its own a system of law so carefully worked out.’ But with all their
comprehensiveness these systems are after all individual interpretations, and as such
cannot claim any finality. I know the ‘Ulem of Islam claim finality for the
popular schools of Muhammadan Law, though they never found it possible to deny the
theoretical possibility of a complete Ijtihd. I have tried to explain the causes
which, in my opinion, determined this attitude of the ‘Ulem; but since
things have changed and the world of Islam is confronted and affected today by new forces
set free by the extraordinary development of human thought in all its directions, I see no
reason why this attitude should be maintained any longer. Did the founders of our schools
ever claim finality for their reasonings and interpretations? Never. The claim of the
present generation of Muslim liberals to reinterpret the foundational legal principles, in
the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life is, in my
opinion, perfectly justified. The teaching of the Qur’n that life is a process of
progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work
of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems.
You will, I think, remind me here
of the Turkish poet iy whom I quoted a moment ago, and ask whether the equality of man
and woman demanded by him, equality, that is to say, in point of divorce, separation, and
inheritance, is possible according to Muhammadan Law. I do not know whether the awakening
of women in Turkey has created demands which cannot be met with without a fresh
interpretation of foundational principles. In the Punjab, as everybody knows, there have
been cases in which Muslim women wishing to get rid of undesirable husbands have been
driven to apostasy.³⁹ Nothing could be more distant from the aims of a
missionary religion. The Law of Islam, says the great Spanish jurist Imm Shtibin his
al-Muwafiqt, aims at protecting five things - Dn, Nafs, ‘Aql, Ml,
and Nasl.⁴⁰ Applying this test I venture to ask: ‘Does the working
of the rule relating to apostasy, as laid down in the Hedyah tend to protect the
interests of the Faith in this country?’⁴¹ In view of the intense
conservatism of the Muslims of India, Indian judges cannot but stick to what are called
standard works. The result is that while the peoples are moving the law remains
stationary.
With regard to the Turkish
poet’s demand, I am afraid he does not seem to know much about the family law of
Islam. Nor does he seem to understand the economic significance of the Quranic rule of
inheritance.⁴² Marriage, according to Muhammadan Law, is a civil contract.⁴³
The wife at the time of marriage is at liberty to get the husband’s power of divorce
delegated to her on stated conditions, and thus secure equality of divorce with her
husband. The reform suggested by the poet relating to the rule of inheritance is based on
a misunderstanding. From the inequality of their legal shares it must not be supposed that
the rule assumes the superiority of males over females. Such an assumption would be
contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Qur’n says:
And for women are rights over men
similar to those for men over women’ (2:228).
The share of the daughter is
determined not by any inferiority inherent in her, but in view of her economic
opportunities, and the place she occupies in the social structure of which she is a part
and parcel. Further, according to the poet’s own theory of society, the rule of
inheritance must be regarded not as an isolated factor in the distribution of wealth, but
as one factor among others working together for the same end. While the daughter,
according to Muhammadan Law, is held to be full owner of the property given to her by both
the father and the husband at the time of her marriage; while, further, she absolutely
owns her dower-money which may be prompt or deferred according to her own choice, and in
lieu of which she can hold possession of the whole of her husband’s property till
payment, the responsibility of maintaining her throughout her life is wholly thrown on the
husband. If you judge the working of the rule of inheritance from this point of view, you
will find that there is no material difference between the economic position of sons and
daughters, and it is really by this apparent inequality of their legal shares that the law
secures the equality demanded by the Turkish poet. The truth is that the principles
underlying the Quranic law of inheritance - this supremely original branch of Muhammadan
Law as von Kremer describes it - have not yet received from Muslim lawyers the attention
they deserve.⁴⁴ Modern society with its bitter class-struggles ought to set us
thinking; and if we study our laws in reference to the impending revolution in modern
economic life, we are likely to discover, in the foundational principles, hitherto
unrevealed aspects which we can work out with a renewed faith in the wisdom of these
principles.
(b) The adth. The second
great source of Muhammadan Law is the traditions of the Holy Prophet. These have been the
subject of great discussion both in ancient and modern times. Among their modern critics
Professor Goldziher has subjected them to a searching examination in the light of modern
canons of historical criticism, and arrives at the conclusion that they are, on the whole,
untrustworthy.⁴⁵ Another European writer, after examining the Muslim methods of
determining the genuineness of a tradition, and pointing out the theoretical possibilities
of error, arrives at the following conclusion:
‘It must be said in
conclusion that the preceding considerations represent only theoretical possibilities and
that the question whether and how far these possibilities have become actualities is
largely a matter of how far the actual circumstances offered inducements for making use of
the possibilities. Doubtless, the latter, relatively speaking, were few and affected only
a small proportion of the entire Sunnah. It may therefore be said that . . . for the most
part the collections of Sunnah considered by the Moslems as canonical are genuine records
of the rise and early growth of Islam’ (Mohammedan Theories of Finance).⁴⁶
For our present purposes,
however, we must distinguish traditions of a purely legal import from those which are of a
non-legal character. With regard to the former, there arises a very important question as
to how far they embody the pre-Islamic usages of Arabia which were in some cases left
intact, and in others modified by the Prophet. It is difficult to make this discovery, for
our early writers do not always refer to pre-Islamic usages. Nor is it possible to
discover that usages, left intact by express or tacit approval of the Prophet, were
intended to be universal in their application. Shh WalAllh has a very illuminating
discussion on the point. I reproduce here the substance of his view. The prophetic method
of teaching, according to Shh WalAllh, is that, generally speaking, the law revealed
by a prophet takes especial notice of the habits, ways, and peculiarities of the people to
whom he is specifically sent. The prophet who aims at all-embracing principles, however,
can neither reveal different principles for different peoples, nor leaves them to work out
their own rules of conduct. His method is to train one particular people, and to use them
as a nucleus for the building up of a universal Shar‘ah. In doing so he accentuates
the principles underlying the social life of all mankind, and applies them to concrete
cases in the light of the specific habits of the people immediately before him. The
Shar‘ah values (Akm) resulting from this application (e.g. rules relating to
penalties for crimes) are in a sense specific to that people; and since their observance
is not an end in itself they cannot be strictly enforced in the case of future
generations.⁴⁷ It was perhaps in view of this that Ab anfah, who had, a
keen insight into the universal character of Islam, made practically no use of these
traditions. The fact that he introduced the principle of Istisn, i.e. juristic
preference, which necessitates a careful study of actual conditions in legal thinking,
throws further light on the motives which determined his attitude towards this source of
Muhammadan Law. It is said that Ab anfah made no use of traditions because there
were no regular collections in his day. In the first place, it is not true to say that
there were no collections in his day, as the collections of ‘Abd al-Mlik and Zuhr
were made not less than thirty years before the death of Ab anfah. But even if we
suppose that these collections never reached him, or that they did not contain traditions
of a legal import, Ab anfah, like Mlik and Amad Ibn anbal after him, could
have easily made his own collection if he had deemed such a thing necessary. On the whole,
then, the attitude of Ab anfah towards the traditions of a purely legal import is to
my mind perfectly sound; and if modern Liberalism considers it safer not to make any
indiscriminate use of them as a source of law, it will be only following one of the
greatest exponents of Muhammadan Law in Sunni Islam. It is, however, impossible to deny
the fact that the traditionists, by insisting on the value of the concrete case as against
the tendency to abstract thinking in law, have done the greatest service to the Law of
Islam. And a further intelligent study of the literature of traditions, if used as
indicative of the spirit in which the Prophet himself interpreted his Revelation, may
still be of great help in understanding the life-value of the legal principles enunciated
in the Qur’n. A complete grasp of their life-value alone can equip us in our
endeavour to reinterpret the foundational principles.
(c) The Ijm`’. The
third source of Muhammadan Law is Ijm’ which is, in my opinion, perhaps the
most important legal notion in Islam. It is, however, strange that this important notion,
while invoking great academic discussions in early Islam, remained practically a mere
idea, and rarely assumed the form of a permanent institution in any Muhammadan country.
Possibly its transformation into a permanent legislative institution was contrary to the
political interests of the kind of absolute monarchy that grew up in Islam immediately
after the fourth Caliph. It was, I think, favourable to the interest of the Umayyad and
the Abbasid Caliphs to leave the power of Ijtihd to individual Mujtahids
rather than encourage the formation of a permanent assembly which might become too
powerful for them. It is, however, extremely satisfactory to note that the pressure of new
world-forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind
of modern Islam the value and possibilities of the idea of Ijm’. The growth
of republican spirit and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands
constitute a great step in advance. The transfer of the power of Ijtihd from
individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of
the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form Ijm’ can take in
modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happen to
possess a keen insight into affairs. In this way alone can we stir into activity the
dormant spirit of life in our legal system, and give it an evolutionary outlook. In India,
however, difficulties are likely to arise for it is doubtful whether a non-Muslim
legislative assembly can exercise the power of Ijtihd.
But there are one or two
questions which must be raised and answered in regard to the Ijm’. Can the Ijm’
repeal the Qur’n? It is unnecessary to raise this question before a Muslim
audience, but I consider it necessary to do so in view of a very misleading statement by a
European critic in a book called Mohammedan Theories of Finance - published by the
Columbia University. The author of this book says, without citing any authority, that
according to some Hanaf and Mu‘tazilah writers the Ijm’ can repeal
the Qur’n.⁴⁸ There is not the slightest justification for such a
statement in the legal literature of Islam. Not even a tradition of the Prophet can have
any such effect. It seems to me that the author is misled by the word Naskh in the
writings of our early doctors to whom, as Imm Shib points out in al-Muwaffiqt,
vol. iii, p. 65, this word, when used in discussions relating to the Ijm’ of
the companions, meant only the power to extend or limit the application of a Quranic rule
of law, and not the power to repeal or supersede it by another rule of law. And even in
the exercise of this power the legal theory, as ‘Amd- a Shfi‘ doctor of
law who died about the middle of the seventh century, and whose work is recently published
in Egypt - tells us, is that the companions must have been in possession of a
Shar‘ah value (ukm) entitling them to such a limitation or extension.⁴⁹
But supposing the companions have
unanimously decided a certain point, the further question is whether later generations are
bound by their decision. Shaukn has fully discussed this point, and cited the views
held by writers belonging to different schools.⁵⁰ I think it is necessary in
this connexion to discriminate between a decision relating to a question of fact and the
one relating to a question of law. In the former case, as for instance, when the question
arose whether the two small Srahs known as Mu‘awwidhatn ⁵¹
formed part of the Qur’n or not, and the companions unanimously decided that they
did, we are bound by their decision, obviously because the companions alone were in a
position to know the fact. In the latter case the question is one of interpretation only,
and I venture to think, on the authority of Karkh, that later generations are not bound
by the decision of the companions. Says Karkh: ‘The Sunnah of the companions is
binding in matters which cannot be cleared up by Qiys, but it is not so in matters which
can be established by Qiys.’⁵²
One more question may be asked as
to the legislative activity of a modern Muslim assembly which must consist, at least for
the present, mostly of men possessing no knowledge of the subtleties of Muhammadan Law.
Such an assembly may make grave mistakes in their interpretation of law. How can we
exclude or at least reduce the possibilities of erroneous interpretation? The Persian
constitution of 1906 provided a separate ecclesiastical committee of ‘Ulem -
‘conversant with the affairs of the world’ - having power to supervise the
legislative activity of the Mejlis. This, in my opinion, dangerous arrangement is
probably necessary in view of the Persian constitutional theory. According to that theory,
I believe, the king is a mere custodian of the realm which really belongs to the Absent Imm.
The ‘Ulem, as representatives of the Imm, consider themselves
entitled to supervise the whole life of the community, though I fail to understand how, in
the absence of an apostolic succession, they establish their claim to represent the Imm.
But whatever may be the Persian constitutional theory, the arrangement is not free from
danger, and may be tried, if at all, only as a temporary measure in Sunn countries.⁵³
The ‘Ulem should form a vital part of a Muslim legislative assembly helping
and guiding free discussion on questions relating to law. The only effective remedy for
the possibilities of erroneous interpretations is to reform the present system of legal
education in Muhammadan countries, to extend its sphere, and to combine it with an
intelligent study of modern jurisprudence.⁵⁴
(d) The Qiys. The fourth
basis of Fiqh is Qiys, i.e. the use of analogical reasoning in
legislation. In view of different social and agricultural conditions prevailing in the
countries conquered by Islam, the school of Ab anfah seem to have found, on the
whole, little or no guidance from the precedents recorded in the literature of traditions.
The only alternative open to them was to resort to speculative reason in their
interpretations. The application of Aristotelian logic, however, though suggested by the
discovery of new conditions in Iraq, was likely to prove exceedingly harmful in the
preliminary stages of legal development. The intricate behaviour of life cannot be
subjected to hard and fast rules logically deducible from certain general notions. Yet,
looked at through the spectacles of Aristotle’s logic, it appears to be a mechanism
pure and simple with no internal principle of movement. Thus, the school of Ab anfah
tended to ignore the creative freedom and arbitrariness of life, and hoped to build a
logically perfect legal system on the lines of pure reason. The legists of ijz,
however, true to the practical genius of their race, raised strong protests against the
scholastic subtleties of the legalists of Iraq, and their tendency to imagine unreal cases
which they rightly thought would turn the Law of Islam into a kind of lifeless mechanism.
These bitter controversies among the early doctors of Islam led to a critical definition
of the limitations, conditions, and correctives of Qiys which, though originally
appeared as a mere disguise for Mujtahid’s personal opinion, eventually became
a source of life and movement in the Law of Islam. The spirit of the acute criticism of
Mlik and Shfi‘ on Ab anfah’s principle of Qiys, as a source
of law, constitutes really an effective Semitic restraint on the Aryan tendency to seize
the abstract in preference to the concrete, to enjoy the idea rather than the event. This
was really a controversy between the advocates of deductive and inductive methods in legal
research. The legists of Iraq originally emphasized the eternal aspect of the
‘notion’, while those of ijz laid stress on its temporal aspect. The latter,
however, did not see the full significance of their own position, and their instinctive
partiality to the legal tradition of ijz narrowed their vision to the
‘precedents’ that had actually happened in the days of the Prophet and his
companions. No doubt they recognized the value of the concrete, but at the same time they
eternalized it, rarely resorting to Qiys based on the study of the concrete as
such. Their criticism of Ab anfah and his school, however, emancipated the concrete
as it were, and brought out the necessity of observing the actual movement and variety of
life in the interpretation of juristic principles. Thus the school of Ab anfah which
fully assimilated the results of this controversy is absolutely free in its essential
principle and possesses much greater power of creative adaptation than any other school of
Muhammadan Law. But, contrary to the spirit of his own school, the modern Hanaf legist
has eternalized the interpretations of the founder or his immediate followers much in the
same way as the early critics of Ab anfah eternalized the decisions given on
concrete cases. Properly understood and applied, the essential principle of this school,
i.e. Qiys, as Shfi‘ rightly says, is only another name for Ijtihd
⁵⁵ which, within the limits of the revealed texts, is absolutely free; and its
importance as a principle can be seen from the fact that, according to most of the
doctors, as Qd Shaukn tells us, it was permitted even in the lifetime of the Holy
Prophet.⁵⁶ The closing of the door of Ijtihd is pure fiction suggested
partly by the crystallization of legal thought in Islam, and partly by that intellectual
laziness which, especially in the period of spiritual decay, turns great thinkers into
idols. If some of the later doctors have upheld this fiction, modern Islam is not bound by
this voluntary surrender of intellectual independence. Zarkash writing in the eighth
century of the Hijrah rightly observes:
‘If the upholders of this
fiction mean that the previous writers had more facilities, while the later writers had
more difficulties, in their way, it is, nonsense; for it does not require much
understanding to see that Ijtihd for later doctors is easier than for the earlier
doctors. Indeed the commentaries on the Korn and sunnah have been compiled and
multiplied to such an extent that the mujtahid of today has more material for
interpretation than he needs’. ⁵⁷
This brief discussion, I hope,
will make it clear to you that neither in the foundational principles nor in the structure
of our systems, as we find them today, is there anything to justify the present attitude.
Equipped with penetrative thought and fresh experience the world of Islam should
courageously proceed to the work of reconstruction before them. This work of
reconstruction, however, has a far more serious aspect than mere adjustment to modern
conditions of life. The Great European War bringing in its wake the awakening on Turkey -
the element of stability in the world of Islam - as a French writer has recently described
her, and the new economic experiment tried in the neighbourhood of Muslim Asia, must open
our eyes to the inner meaning and destiny of Islam.⁵⁸ Humanity needs three
things today - a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the
individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human
society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe has, no doubt, built idealistic systems on
these lines, but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of
bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring. This is
the reason why pure thought has so little influenced men, while religion has always
elevated individuals, and transformed whole societies. The idealism of Europe never became
a living factor in her life, and the result is a perverted ego seeking itself through
mutually intolerant democracies whose sole function is to exploit the poor in the interest
of the rich. Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man’s
ethical advancement. The Muslim, on the other hand, is in possession of these ultimate
ideas of the basis of a revelation, which, speaking from the inmost depths of life,
internalizes its own apparent externality. With him the spiritual basis of life is a
matter of conviction for which even the least enlightened man among us can easily lay down
his life; and in view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation
binding on man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated peoples on earth.
Early Muslims emerging out of the spiritual slavery of pre-Islamic Asia were not in a
position to realize the true significance of this basic idea. Let the Muslim of today
appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles,
and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual
democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam.⁵⁹