transform from one to another, the physical motion of a thing changes into a physiological motion in our senses. Then the physiological motion changes into the psychological motion of the idea. To begin with such changes are not admissible, and even if they be admitted it means that Marxism does not succeed in revealing the relation between a thing and its idea except as a relation between a cause and its effect or at the most that of a reality and its reflected picture.
But why should we assume that this effect and cause differ from other effects and causes and are distinguished from them by a special characteristic, namely that the effect pictures its cause faithfully? Of course, there are many physiological events that are effects of external causes without having the capacity of picturing their causes. Even if such a thing were admitted, how do we know that the idea (percept) fully corresponds to the objective reality?
The Marxists answer this objection by asserting that thought is a part and product of nature; rather its highest expression. Our knowledge is nothing other than a superior product of nature; it cannot but reflect the laws of the motions of matter. The products of thought, being the products of nature, are not in contradiction but in agreement with the rest of material nature.
Yet this is not sufficient for proving the possibility of knowledge. Aren't idealist thought and theological and metaphysical thought as much part of nature and products of it as dialectical materialism?
Marxism rejected the relativity theory of truth as a kind of sophistry, but it itself admitted relativity by asserting that:
(1) there are no absolute truths; truth grows and develops in a way that reflects the growth and development of external reality.
(2) truth and falsehood may come together; there is no absolute incompatibility between truth and falsity as asserted by formal logic;
(3) all judgements, regardless of how truthful they may appear, involve contradiction and hence an aspect of falsity. It is such a contradiction that makes knowledge and truth grow. Al-Sadr now proceeds to refute each of these notions.
Truth, according to realism, is an idea that corresponds to a reality that exists independently of mind and consciousness. There is a second definition of 'truth' given by subjective relativists, according to which it is something which is consistent with the mind's formulations. The third definition of truth, advanced by the pragmatists and instrumentalists, is that it is some idea whose benefit or utility is demonstrated by practical experience. Bergson described truth as a creation not discovery.
Schiller and Dewey proposed nearly similar definitions of truth. Pragmatism involves a clear contusion between the meaning of truth and the motives behind attempts to attain it. Moreover.
(1) to give truth a pure practical meaning and to strip it of the quality of disclosing independent reality is an unrestricted admission of skepticism;
(2) secondly, it is not clear whether the benefit of individual or that of society is to be the criterion of truth. It the criterion is the former, it would lead to a social chaos. It the latter, a long social experience is required to affirm the validity of any statement. This would apply to the pragmatic doctrine itself, whose truth cannot be determined without the test of experience.
(3) That an idea is beneficial is not sufficient for its acceptance. For instance, a disbeliever cannot accept religion even it he agrees that it is effective in rectifying human conduct.
If Marxism is to assert the possibility of knowledge, it cannot do so without adopting the correspondence theory of truth on which realism rests. For it is impossible on the basis of this theory to hold that truth develops and grows. Marxism understands neither motion nor truth when it holds that truth is subject to movement, and motion and becoming involve contradiction.
In the description of a process involving motion, change or becoming, a statement describing a certain momentary state is absolutely true at that moment; it cannot, after that, become contrary to that reality at that specific stage.
Moreover, Marxism abolishes itself by applying the law of movement to truth. It movement is a general law governing truths, then it is impossible to affirm any absolute truth, including the judgements of logic and mathematics, to say nothing of the doctrine of dialectical materialism itself.
Marxism finds fault with formal logic for accepting absolute opposition between truth and falsity. The Marxist notion of the union of truth and falsity is based on two misconceptions. One of them is the notion of the development and movement of truth and the other is that motion is nothing but a series of contradictions. The author postpones the study of the second issue to Part 2 of this work. Nevertheless, it is evident even at this stage of the argument that application of the laws of the dialectic to the realm of knowledge undermines the foundations of all rational knowledge.
Science and Absolute Truth: Al-Sadr cites here an argument of Engels wherein the latter criticizes the principle that truth is absolutely incompatible with falsehood. Engels cites the example of a general scientific law (Boyle's law) which is not true in certain cases to assert that if the metaphysicians were correct in their assertion that truths are absolute and totally incompatible with falsity, then they would have to reject every scientific law because it is not true in some cases. Al-Sadr points out that Engels does not understand well the phrase 'absolute truth'. He explains that propositions are of two types: simple (e.g. 'Plato died before Aristotle') and composite (e.g. 'Bodies expand by heat'). A simple proposition cannot be true in one respect and false in another. But since a composite proposition is really a bundle of numerous simple propositions, it is true in some cases and false in other. But this does not mean that truth and falsity unite. A composite proposition is completely true in the case that it is true, and completely false in the case that it is false.
Following conclusions are derived from this study:
1. Truth is absolute and unprogressive, even though the objective reality develops and changes.
2. Truth is fully incompatible with falsity. A simple proposition cannot be both true and false.
3. The application of dialectic to truth leads to complete skepticism.
By regarding truth as in continuous change and development, the dialectic sentences itself to death.
The Marxist Relapse into Subjectivism: Despite claiming an objective character for its own relativism, Marxism relapses into subjective relativism by linking consciousness with class. Although this is class subjectivity, and not the individual subjectivity of subjective relativists, no one can secure in its light the truth of any philosophical or scientific judgement in the sense of its correspondence to objective reality. As long as Marxism upholds the necessity of class character, it cannot offer a world view of universal validity. (Here Part 1 ends).
Here at the conclusion of the summary of Part I of Our Philosophy, some relevant remarks may not be out of place. It is true that Marx, Freud and the Behaviourists are wrong in regarding the economic factor or the urges of the unconscious or the physiological factors as the exclusive determinant of thought and consciousness but it would also be wrong to refuse to acknowledge the influence, no matter how undesirable, of these factors on consciousness and thought. The history of human thought, more than being a history of intellectual health, is an account of monstrous perversions and deviations. Correct, clear and healthy thinking has been and remains an exception rather than the rule.
In this regard, the Holy Quran, also, refers to the role of tradition and desire (ahwa') in deviating men from the course of true intellection, and considers ethnic, social, political and economic factors as the causes behind social conflict, division and diversity. To recognize the causes which lie behind deviant thought is as important as the necessity of defending the value of human knowledge. And perhaps it is only after we have fully recognized these deviating factors that we can fully appreciate the possibility of certain knowledge.