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Soul
FROM IBN
BAJJAH'S SAYINGS
Chapter 1ON THE
SOUL
In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the
All-Merciful. Allah alone helps and directs
to the right course.
Bodies are either natural or artificial. Artificial bodies,
for example, chair and couch, exist as the result of voluntary action
only. Natural bodies, for example, stone, palm-tree, and horse, all
come to be and pass away. Aristotle has explained in his works about the
things which are common to natural things (i.e. about the general
principles of physics) that all these are composed of form and matter just
like artificial bodies, and that the condensation of gold has the same
relation to pure gold, its matter, as the form of the couch to wood.
Matter, as explained in the first book of Aristotle's Physics
(Fol. 139A), is either formless by itself, and what is generated from it
is a simple body (i.e. an element); and the simple bodies (i.e. the
elements), as explained in other places, are four, namely earth, water,
air and fire; or matter has a form. With the exception of the four
elements matter of this description can only become the matter for any
natural body if another element is mixed with it. For when a simple
being (i.e. element) changes, it changes either in its form, and thus
another simple being (i.e. element), opposite to it, is generated from
it--from water, for example, is generated air and earth--or it can change
in its accidental qualities, but this is transformation, not
generation. Now, when an element is bent upon producing a compound,
it has necessarily to be mixed with more than one. Similarly, some
artificial bodies originate from one existent formed thing, since the
species of art are accidental qualities of natural bodies, although their
substratum receives them from the artisan only. Some artificial
bodies receive the accidental qualities by means that all come from art
exclusively, for example, the chair; for its wood receives form through
art, and the instruments by which it is made are products of art as
well. But there are other artificial bodies in the case of which the
first mover is art, while the instruments are natural bodies, as for
example, glass which is only finished through the heat of fire, fire being
a natural body. This latter kind can be sub-divided: either
all the instruments are things which do not exist as a result of voluntary
action, or the instruments are in part natural, in part artificial.
But how do those things that have natural instruments become artificial?
I answer: The mover is either accidental or
essential, for it may set in motion by itself, or it may set in motion
through the intermediary of one or more other things, and these
intermediaries are instruments or quasi-instruments for the mover.
But the art does not set in motion by itself, but sets motion through
instruments. That which is set in motion in such a way through a
mover has more than one mover and will have a last mover and
this is the one that is in contact with the thing moved, for example, the
axe with the wood, and this is the mover from whom the art derives or who
is the art itself. And as has been shown, the last mover cannot set
in motion without the first, whereas the first can set in motion without
the last, for the motion comes to be at the precise time when the first
mover originates movement. Hence, the first mover is the agent for
the motion and to him it is ascribed, as has been shown in Physics VIII.
Everything moved in which the first mover is nature is natural, and
everything in which the first mover is art is artificial, whatever be its
instruments. As for the fact that the art may change, this is
due to an accident or second intention, this has been explained in Physic
II. ( Fol. 139-B ) Forms, of whatever shape they are, are either
natural or artificial. The forms are, in short, the perfection’s of
the bodies in which they are. They are not mere perfection’s, but
perfection firmly established in the bodies like permanent
acquisitions. When perfection reaches this state it is called an
"entelechy." Forms are then the entelechies of bodies that possess
entelechies potentially. These entelechies are of different
kinds: those that perform their actions in the things to which they
belong without being moved essentially, and those that perform their
actions while being acted upon. Since everything moved as a
mover, the entelechies are moved either by a mover outside them, like most
of the artificial bodies, or by a mover inside themselves. In art
this is like the automatic machines that are set in motion to perform
their actions that remain in them for some time. I have summarized
this in the science of Politics.
As to natural bodies, they have their mover inside the whole body,
and the natural body is composed of mover and moved. Artificial
bodies have their mover outside the thing moved, and the thing moved is
connected with the mover by accident. Natural bodies are, however,
not like this. As to the question whether there is in nature
anything similar to art, this demands an inquiry, although if there is,
this resemblance would seem to be of a different kind. Natural bodies move
to their natural places only when they are in places not natural to them,
for, then there exists in them a capacity according to nature and
therefore they have their movements to their places. They only
change their directions by accident. For their not being in their
natural places is only due to an obstacle that prevents them, but when the
obstacle is removed, they move to their natural places. Hence, it
has been assumed that the mover in natural bodies is the same as the
moved. But this is not so. For in so far as the stone is in
potentially is below and moves in as much as it has weight, the thing
moved in it is its potentiality of moving downwards, and the mover is the
weight. hence, it moves with one kind of movement that is natural
for it.
There is nothing in the thing moved in opposition to the mover, for
the thing moved is only its potentiality. This is not the case with
those bodies that possess souls. For the thing moved possesses a
form for the sake of which it performs a certain action, and either the
mover moves them in opposition to their natural action, or moves them
according to their nature, e.g. raising the hand and jumping, for though
it the body is moved and this is a motion upwards, and therefore the soul
moves through an instrument, i.e. the natural warmth or something like it.
Forms are of two kinds: (I) the entelechy of a natural body in
which the mover and the thing moved are not joined essentially. It
is moved without an instrument but is moved as a whole. The other
(ii), the entelechy of a natural body moved through instruments. The
first is called nature par excellence the second is called soul.
Soul is then the entelechy of a natural organic body.
There (Fol. 104A) is a first and last entelechy. For a geometer,
when actually geometrizing, is called geometer according to the last
perfection. So when he geometrizes he is in his last
perfection. But soul is the first entelechy. Hence, soul is a
first entelechy in a natural body. And, the existence of a body with
soul is life, so every body having a soul is alive.
It is clear that soul is an equivocal word. For our
expression "entelechy" is said in an ambiguous sense, similarly our
expression "body" and "instrument." Soul then is said in similar
ambiguous sense as "weak", "many" and the like. hence, it is
necessary to specify it and so it is said: the nutritive soul is the
entelechy of the nutrient organic body, the sensitive the entelechy of the
sensitive organic body, the imaginative the entelechy of the imaginative
organic body. Soul is, however, predicated of the reasoning soul in
a sense though equivocal but more manifest than all these. All
knowledge, as Aristotle says, is noble and beautiful. But some
knowledge is nobler than others, and I have already enumerated the grades
of sciences in their nobility in many places. The knowledge of the
soul (i.e. psychology) precedes all sciences, physical and mathematical,
with all the kinds of dignity. Again, every science depends upon the
science of the soul, because we cannot apprehend the principles of other
sciences unless we apprehend soul an know what it is by its definition, as
shown in other places. Again, it is a generally admitted fact that
one who is trusted in his knowledge of the state of his own soul is even
less fit to be trusted in his knowledge of others. If then we do not
know the state and the nature of our soul and if it has not become clear
to us whether what has been said about it, has been said correctly or
cannot be relied upon, we are even less fit to rely on what appears to us
in all other things.
The knowledge of the soul precedes all sciences also because,
it gives the inquirer a capacity to grasp those premises without which the
physical science cannot be complete. Moreover, political science
cannot be treated in an orderly fashion before one knows the nature of the
soul. Again, a science is ennobled either by certainty, that is,
when its statements are precise and explicit, or by the nobility and
fascination of its subject-matter, as it is the case with the science of
the movement of stars (i.e. Astronomy). Now, psychology fulfills
both conditions. Psychology is worthy of being the most noble
science with the exception of the science of the First Principle (i.e.
metaphysics). It appears that metaphysics is different, in an other
way< from all other sciences, just different, in an other way, from all
other sciences, just as the existents are different from the First
Principle. Again, the knowledge of the First Principle is impossible
except when it is preceded by the knowledge of the soul and the intellect,
otherwise it would be imperfectly known.
The most perfect method of knowing the First Principle is the
science in which the capacity provided by psychology is used.
Knowledge of a thing has several kinds of relation; the first and
the most deserving of priority is the knowledge of what it is; the second,
the knowledge of its particular essential qualities; and the third (Fol.
104B), the knowledge of its general essential qualities, is knowing only
in metaphorical sense. The knowledge of the quiddity of a thing is either
imperfect, i.e. known through only one of the complete parts of its
definition -- this is of various kinds, and the explanation of its kinds
has been given elsewhere -- or it is perfect, i.e. known through what its
definition indicates.
Definition per prius et posterius is said of meanings all of which
are equivocal in their existence and are equally predicated of an object;
definition, therefore, indicates a particular quality of the thing.
The expression per posterius is used because of the posterity of
everything that is composed of elements which do not constitute the thing,
it has been explained elsewhere that the things which constitute a thing
are its causes. The definition per posterius are not composed of
causes, but are only composed of qualities, either far or near, essential
or not essential. The definition per prius is that which is composed
of causes, and this has also many genera, some of which are composed of
farther, some of nearer causes. This (i.e. the definition per prius)
is a definition in a stricter sense.
Causes, in short, are four, matter, agent (i.e. efficient cause),
form, and end (i.e. final cause). They are sometimes particular,
sometimes general, that is although specified in form yet general.
The most apt to become a definition per prius is a definition that
consists of the particular cause. Similarly, the causes are
sometimes potential and sometimes actual; and the most apt for the
definition per prius is then the one that consists of the actual
particular cause. This type of definition is either self-evident and
thus axiomatic, or derived and found out either by division or by
composition, as shown elsewhere. Definitions like these are in the
same category as axiomatic definitions, or they are found out by absolute
demonstrations, and this is three ways: (I) as the conclusion of a
demonstration, (ii) as the principle of a demonstration, or (iii) a
demonstration with a different arrangement of the terms. This is the
most perfect definition and the most deserving of priority.
Signs provide the parts of the definition by accident, not
essentially. All this is summarized in the Posterior Analytic’s.
Since we are trying to investigate this kind of knowledge concerning the
soul (i.e. its definition), how natural it is that its attainment is
difficult, but although difficult not impossible.
It is clear that the definition of the soul is not an axiomatic
definition, but a derived one. Again, among the kinds of
knowledge that follow, in the first instance, if the knowledge of
what the thing is and they are as it were a supplementation of this, which
is to know whether the thing is one or not one. If one, whether it
consists of parts or not, if it does not consist or parts whether it has
several faculties or only one faculty -- all these needs investigation in
psychology. For all these are views of those who proceeded
(Aristotle). For some of those who proceeded him believed that
"soul" indicates plurality, as analogous words do. Others, like
Democritus and those who believed in atoms (Fol. 141A), held that it had
many parts separately. yet others like Galen, the physician, held
that the soul is one but has many parts in its substrata. This is a
view which Plato had already recorded in the Timaeus.
A similar question is asked about "soul" in particular, and
its solution is so much desired at the very start that it would seem that
psychology is only studied for its sake. Namely, the question
whether the soul is separable or not at all separable. Hence, you
find that Aristotle says at the very beginning of Book One that, if there
exists a particular action of the soul which distinguishes it form the
body, it may be separable. He starts with this topic before
beginning the main investigation, because of the aforementioned
desire. All this adds to the difficulty of this part of natural
science. Since we are determined on this question, we have to ask
whether it belongs to the study of the bodies in which the soul is, or
whether it belongs to the qualities which are ascribed to the body in
which soul is, like health and illness, or to the actions which are
ascribed to the soul, e.g. anger and contentment. Now, if the soul
is not separable at all, all the actions related tot he soul are shared by
the body, although some exist because of the soul and some because of or
through the body.
As has been shown in the Posterior Analytic, no definition can be
formed unless the genus by which it is described is found, for, when we
frame a definition which is not composed of the genus of the thing, its
parts are indicated by derived words. For all the things that can be
predicated of a thing only the genus can be indicated by primary symbol
(i.e. non-derived word); this definition would express the existence of a
thing in a substratum by which it is not explained, so that it would be
incomplete and would indicate an imperfection. Hence, we have first
to investigate the genus which is to be predicated of the soul and by
which it is described, in order to find a way to define the soul.
Now, genus and differentia have different aspects, for, the genus is
potentially the differentia by receiving its form through the
differentia. So potentially it resembles, in a way, the potency
which is predicated in matter. Hence, potentially, genus is a thing
extraneous to it (i.e. the differentia). Now, the differentia is
potentially the definition, just as the whole is said to contain
potentially its parts, and the genus exists within the differentia
potentially in a manner analogous to the existence of the parts in the
whole. This is because when each -- genus and differentia is taken
as designating the concrete whole, then the one is genus in so far as it
is genus and the other is differentia in so far as it is differentia; but
when they are taken in so far as they are definitions, then the genus is
the conclusion of demonstration and the differentia the principle of a
demonstration or they both are something analogous. And, therefore,
in so far as they are parts of the thing defined, each of them is then
potentially the definition but in a different was, as stated (Fol. 141B)
in the metaphysics.
Since, as explained in the Posterior Analytic, there are
three methods for the derivation of the definition: (I) the method of
division, (ii) the method of composition, and (iii) the method in which
syllogism is employed, we must ask which method must be followed to define the
soul. For this method of division will not do, for the genus under which
soul is subsumed us unknown, and if it were self-evident the question whether it
is a body or not would not arise. Nor can we
follow the method in which syllogism is employed, for the representations in
which the soul presents itself are one, and some of them are composed of things
which do not belong essentially together, nor are they necessary deductions from
syllogisms, so that it would be possible for us to consider and use the most
strong of them. In short, there is no way for us to establish a priority
of some to others. Again, when we observe the classes in which the ancient
philosophers divided these representations, we will find them neither
contradicting nor consistent, but would seem clear to him who observes then that
term soul is predicated equivocally. Now, if it is possible to understand
the representations of the soul, and we are asked for a proof that this is so,
if there were any proof, then indeed we find only one among many definitions of
which the soul is predicated, nut not the real notions of which soul is
predicated. For, if soul is predicated equivocally, it is certainly
predicated in an ambiguous way. Therefore, only the method of composition
remains.
Now, it is evident that the method of composition
can only be used for something whose existence is previously known, and the soul
is one of the things whose existence is evident; and ask for an explanation of
its existence is like asking for a proof for the existence of nature. Such
a question can only be asked by someone who does not know the difference between
self-evident knowledge and the knowledge through something else. Since
some know things are self-evident, e.g. "horse and man possess soul," but this
type of thought can only become coherent through considering all that of which
soul is predicated, he (Aristotle), therefore, studies the souls of all the
animals; for, about the forms of plants, there is still scope for investigation.
Now, this kind of study was never undertaken by
those who preceded Aristotle. The only aim of the previous philosophers
was to consider the human soul in particular to the extent that was necessary
for their studying political affairs to which their investigation was at that
time, confined, whereas the various kinds of souls are studied not only for this
purpose alone, but because the science of every soul is a part of natural
science.
We, therefore, say: every species of animal
is a body composed of parts unlike to each other and not connected, but its
parts are separate according to their particular ends, and meet together either
by coalescence or at a joint; and this takes place when one of the two is set in
motion by the other, for, it is common to all animals. Again, it is (Fol.
142A) a well-known fact that every animal is capable of motion, possesses
senses: it perceives through parts that move and perceive. It is,
therefore, composed of the two (i.e. movement and perception). It is evident that the animal is a genus of body and
form, but as to the question in what respect it is said to be composed of body
and form, and whether the soul is body or form, this becomes clear to him who
relies on the study of his own soul. In his book on the soul, Alexander
has discussed about this clearly, so it may be learnt from here.
It is, therefore, established that the soul, as
shown before, is a form of the like of this body; and when we use the method of
division which we have summarized this implication must be accepted -- namely,
that the soul is the entelechy of a natural organic body -- since it includes
every soul and everyone of its faculties, no matter whether it possesses certain
particular faculties or certain others. Since our word "entelechy" is said
ambiguously and our expression "natural organic" is not a synonym, like our
expression about a dog as "barking dog", it is clear that soul is said in an
ambiguous sense, and that it is an equivocal term. It is also clear that there is no one nature which
comprises all souls, for if the soul were homogeneous, its actions would
certainly be homogeneous, whereas no two actions of an animal, like nutrition,
sense-perception, locomotion, imagination and reasoning, are homogeneous so that
the corresponding faculties of all these actions, too, are not homogeneous; but
some actions precede others, e.g. nutrition and sense-perception, and some are
similar to each other, e.g. sense-perception and imagination. Similarly,
the faculties and the soul are in a relation of priority, posterity and
symmetry. hence, it is impossible to include in the definition of the soul
all that is called soul in one and the same way; hence, the method of
demonstration cannot be used in the case of the definition of the soul.
Neglect of this study is one of the reasons due to which
the right treatment of soul escaped the philosophers previous to
Aristotle. For they all agreed that soul is a substance, and, therefore,
they wanted to subsume it under the species of substance, some saying it is
fire, and others blood or air. And, yet another who realized the absurdity
of its being a body made efforts to subsume it under another category. In
short, all of them gave it a place in the ten categories.
Since, it had become clear to Plato that the soul
must be subsumed under substance which is, as explained by him, predicated of
the matter which is body, and of the form, and that it is absurd to assume soul
as a body, he made efforts to define soul in a way to specialize to it.
And, as he postulated, he investigated that which is shared by all of them, and
found that sense-perception is the characteristic of the animal, and motion is
common to all, he, therefore, defined soul by saying: "It is a thing which
moves itself." For the word "thing" indicates here the same as we say
"being." Such was his definition of the soul, because Plato believed that
every mover is moved, since according to him (Fol. 142B) nothing can cause
motion unless it is moved; and this view has been summarized in Physics VII.
Concerning the refutation of the views recorded
about the soul, Aristotle has explained it thoroughly in the first book of the
De Anima, so let us assume his conception in general. Let us now turn to the study of the soul which
Aristotle believed initiates out in the way we shall describe. Since some
souls are per prius by nature, and some are per posterius, and the last of all
in appearance is the imaginative soul. For the sense-perception precedes
them. It is sometimes assumed that some animals have no imagination, e.g.
the worm and the fly, and if they did possess imagination, it is neither
separable from sensation nor is it determinate. The most prior of all faculties of sensation is the
faculty of touch, the faculty of sense-perception being preceded by the faculty
of nutrition which is, hence, the most prior of all the faculties of soul.
The reasoning faculty, though itself soul, is the last to
appear in nature in the same way as the perfect comes after the imperfect in
nature. Aristotle has, therefore, started with the investigation of the
nutritive soul. This kind of the soul has two faculties: (I) one the
faculty of growth, and (ii) the other the faculty of generation. The
nutritive faculty, thus, precedes all and is, then, the most prior of the
faculties of soul.
Chapter II
DISCOURSE ON THE NUTRITIVE FACULTY
We say: The opposite of being is
not-being. Not-being is either impossible, i.e. that which cannot exist,
or possible. What is possible is of two kinds: one, the necessary,
is that whose non-existence is impossible, and the other, that which just
exists, i.e. that which exists at a particular time; so it is clear that that
which just exists was non-existing at another particular time. It is
sometimes assumed that it entails for its non-existence in an infinite
time. But if this is the case, it is not so by accident, as has been
summarized, in Physics VIII. As has been shown there, let it be understood
that the non-existence of this is also absolute non-existence. But the
absolute non-existence necessarily implies possibility, since necessarily it is
a equivocal term. The relation of non-existence to possibility is clear
from what we have explained in Physics I. Not being is the opposite being
in relation to matter in so far as it is essentially an opposite being. By
opposite I mean that of which the two contraries, the affirmative and the
negative, are composed, i.e. whenever the opposite I mean that of which the two
contraries, the affirmative and the negative, are composed, i.e. whenever the
opposite is predicated of one and the same substratum -- I mean one thing and
its contrary the two statements become contraries, and are distinguished
according to being true or false.
When, for instance, we say about Zaid, when he is ill,
that he can never recover or not, the opposite of "he can recover," which makes
up this statement, is not the existence of privation of health which is linked
up with its possibility, but it contains "the privation of health" at the moment
which contains the statement, "he can never recover," no matter whether this
time is determined or not determined. Hence, the relation of "health" to
the substratum -- in respect of that which has a like, like this opposite -- is
the possibility of health. The potentiality, in the relation of health to
matter is the non-existence of health, but not in so far as it has an opposite
in potentiality. It is the relation of the opposite form to the
substratum, but not in so far as it is opposite. Therefore they are
mutually interdependent. The possible and what is
potential are one in the substratum on two in expression. hence, as shown
in Physics VIII, it necessarily follows that potentially precedes actuality in
time, e.g. it is said of the moon, "it can eclipse and it is potentially
eclipsable", but in an equivocal sense; potentiality in the moon is nearer to
the univocal expression than our expression "possible," because "possible" is
equivocally used for both "the moon" and the "ill man," and therefore, "eclipse"
has been enumerated among the necessary things.
As explained in many places, potentiality precedes
actuality, and actuality is divided into ten categories. No potential,
however, does become actual before it reaches a state when change becomes
necessary, as has been shown in Physics VIII. Change takes place in substance,
quantity, quality and space, and it is the faculties of these four through which
the thing moved is set in motion. The faculties by which the thing moved
is set in motion are called passive and changing faculties, the faculties
connected with this process being changing faculties.
There is hardly any category among the remaining
categories that is being acted upon, since the entelechy of their passive
faculties is not change, but it is due to change, and hence, it takes place at
the present time. This relation, however, is not found in the definition
of the three categories. Quantity, for example, is not defined through the
relation of the substance, i.e. the substratum, to it, nor is quantity.
But quantity is the most apt for this, so much so that it has been assumed that
it can be separated from substratum. All the other six categories are
defined through their relation to a substratum. But the categories of
Position and Possession have substance in their definitions, whereas the
remaining four are different, since their substrata can be something different
from substance. All these, however, have this in common that they have
substrata, in the definitions of which this relation is not found. But the categories in which the relation is found in
the definition of one of the two substrata, in so far as they are two
contradictories, are Position, Possession, Space, Time and Passivity.
Those categories in which the relation is not found in the definition of one of
them, are of two kinds: either both of the substrata are together in
actuality, and this is the category of Relation, or one of the two is actual and
the other potential in so far as it is potential, and this is the category of
"Being acted upon."
The problem whether there exist two existents in
actuality that are substrata for a relationship which is found in the definition
of the two and is due to Relation, has been explained elsewhere. Now, it
is obvious that that which acts, in so far as it is that which acts, exists in
actuality, and that which is acted upon exists in potentiality, since from our
word Yafa'l (it acts) it follows essentially and not accidentally that it exists
in actuality as a fully specified particular, and from mayanfa'al (that which is
acted upon) it necessarily follows that it exists in potentiality. That
which acts accompanies in existence that which is acted upon, and it necessarily
follows that it exists in potentiality. That which acts accompanies in
existence that which is acted upon, and it entails that its being is necessary.
The thing moved has either eternal or transitory
movement. The mover of the eternal movement is one and is moving
eternally. hence, the mover of the eternal movement is always one,
existent in actuality, and he is not such as to move at one time and not at
another. That which causes a transitory movement is either one and the
same which is at one time moving and at another not, e.g. the weight in the
stone that moves at one time and does not move at another, or is one after
another. Whatever the case, this kind of mover. It, therefore,
entails, on both (whether the mover is one or more than one) that at a certain
time they do not move, the more explicit being the former case, i.e. the mover
being one that moves at a time and does not move at another, as the weight that
is hindered by an obstacle, similarly, the souls of the animals prevented from
movement, the plant that has not yet started growing, the fire when it finds
nothing to cool down. All these, then, do not move, but are capable of
moving. As has been shown, that which is possible is potential, and that
which can move when it does not actually move is potentiality, and this
potentiality characteristics the active and the moving faculties. Thus it
has been shown what the moving faculties are.
Those faculties that are moved are necessarily in a
body, because everything that is moved is divisible, and they are called
faculties per prius. But the moving faculties are only called faculties
per posterius and relatively. It has been shown and summarized in the
metaphysics how the moving faculties exist sometimes in bodies either as forms
or as accidents, and sometimes do not exist in bodies so their existence can be
shown. As such are enumerated the Active Intellect and the Acquired
Intellect.
