Therefore, it does not include
such presumption as is not supported by a dalil;
for such presumption has been forbidden by verses of the Quran and ahadith. Hence, it cannot be said that
the presumption' mentioned in the definitions includes this (untrustworthy)
kind of presumption. Accordingly, the ijtihad
approved by the Usulis means procurement of sufficient evidence (hujjah) regarding a hukm of the Shari'ah ‑ a
conception which the Akhbaris also do not reject.
On this basis, it can be said
that the dispute between the Usulis and the Akhbaris is merely a verbal one,
not one which is essential or substantial, for both of them approve of securing
sufficient evidence for a hukm shar'i, with the difference that
the Usulis call it ijtihad whereas
the Akhbaris do not name it so.
In reality, the only objection
that theAkhbaris raise regarding ijtihad relates
to the definition of ijtihad and not
to the Usulis or the mujtahidun as
such; for the Akhbaris themselves never act on presumption unless it is
validated by a reliable Shar'i proof (dalil).
Thus, if the word presumption' (zann) is replaced with the term hujjah (evidence) in the said definition
and it is said: "Ijtihad means
employment of one's powers to secure sufficient evidence (hujjah) in regard to a hukm of
the Shari'ah", there is no doubt that this controversy can be completely
avoided and a synthesis of the views of the Akhbaris and the Usulis can be
achieved.
Second Definition of Ijtihad
Another group of scholars defines
ijtihad as effort on the part of a faqih
for deriving the ahkam of the
Shari'ah. Here we shall cite the views of some of them.
(a) The great scholar Abu Hamid
Muhammad al‑Ghazali al‑Shafii says: "Ijtihad is the effort (on the part of the mujtahid) and employment of one's
utmost powers to extract a command (hukm).
This term is not used unless when it involves hardship and strain. Hence it
is said He exerted himself to carry the millstone'.
But it will not be said that: ,'He exerted himself to carry a grain of
mustard seed.' But in common usage this word is specifically used for the
effort made by the mujtahid in the
way of acquiring the knowledge of the ahkam
of the Shari'ah." [33] Al‑Ghazali further remarks: "Ijtihad in its complete sense is to make
utmost effort in achieving a goal so that it is not possible for one to do
anything more." [34]
(b) Muhammad Khidri Bek writes: Ijtihad is the effort made by a faqih
for acquiring the knowledge of the ahkam of
the Shari'ah. [35] He adds: Ijtihad in
its complete sense is the utmost effort that a faqih undertakes for extracting
a hukm (of the Shari'ah) in such a
manner that he feels that he has exhausted his capacity. [36]
Critique of the Second Type of
Definitions
The above‑mentioned
definitions also are incomplete and defective in spite of their being closer to
a technical definition and freedom from the defects of the former ones. They
are still imperfect because the word waza'if'
(lit. duties) needs to be added; because, besides having to deduce the ahkam of the Shariah, a mujtahid is supposed to procure the
Practical (al usul al‑'amaliyyah) and
the Rational Rules (al‑'ahkam al‑aqliyyah)
‑ such as Bara'ah, takhyir and
Ihtiyat. Thus the field of operation
of the mujtahid includes the ahkam of the Shari'ah as well as the
Practical and the Rational Rules, whereas the above‑mentioned definitions
focus merely on the former alone. In this sense, it is not a comprehensive
definition.
Third Definition of Ijtihad
A third group of scholars of usul
defines ijtihad as: Deduction of the ahkam of the Shari'ah from the usul, the
adillah, and their sources in the
sacred Shari'ah. It would be appropriate to quote some of these related views.
(a) Ahmad Mustafa al‑Zarqa',
the author of the valuable work al
Madkhal al‑faqhi al‑'amm, says: Ijtihad means deduction of the ahkam
of the Shari'ah from their elaborate adillah
found in the Shari'ah. [37]
(b) Al‑Allamah Abu Abd
Allah Shah Wali al‑Faruqi al‑Dihlawi al‑Hanafi, in his book Kitab al‑'insaf fi sabab al‑ Ikhtilaf, writes: Ijtihad means employment of effort and endeavour for the
comprehension of the fari ahkam of
the Shari'ah from their elaborate adillah,
which comprise the Book, the Sunnah, ijma
and qiyas.
(c) Muhammad Amin has also
defined ijtihad in his book Taysir al‑tahrir in similar terms.
(d) Dr. Subhi al‑Mahmasani
says: Ijtihad means exertion and
effort for discovering the ahkam and
laws of the Shari'ah from their legal sources.
Critique of the Third Type of
Definitions
These definitions are also not
free from the defects of the earlier ones, because, like the previous
definitions, they need the word waza'if in
order to include the Practical and the Rational Rules with the ahkam of the Shari'ah. Another objection
against the definition given by al-Dihlawi is that he has considered qiyas one of the sources of the ahkam, a viewpoint which is rejected by
the Shi'ah (this will be dealt in detail while discussing the sources of ijtihad).
Fourth Definition of Ijtihad
The great thinker and scholar of
the Islamic world Muhammad ibn al‑Hasan ibn Abd al‑Samad,
popularly known as al‑Shaykh al‑Bahai, in his book Zubdat al‑'usul, writes: Ijtihad is a capacity (malakah) by means of which one obtains
the power of deducing the ahkam of
the Shari'ah.
Some other scholars have also
defined ijtihad in different words
that are close in meaning to this definition. Here we shall quote two of them
as specimen.
(a) Ijtihad is the manifestation of the capacity for discovering the hujaj (pl. of hujjah) and adillah for
deriving the ahkam of the Shari'ah
and the Practical Obligations (al‑waza'if
al‑amaliyyah), whether posited by the Shari'ah or affirmed by
reason.
(b) Ijtihad is a capacity by means of which a faqih becomes able to
relate the minor premises with the major premises and thereby obtains a hukm of the Shari'ah or an answer to a
Practical Obligation.
Critique of the Fourth Type of
Definitions
These definitions, also, are
controvertible like the previous ones, because firstly, they do not convey the
real meaning of ijtihad, for ijtihad per se is not a capacity; for
had ijtihad been a capacity, its addition
would have served an explanatory purpose, and such is not the case here.
Secondly, the titles that have
been mentioned in traditions, like 'faqih,
arif, () nazir, ()
rawi, ()as
in the widely accepted tradition narrated by Umar ibn Hanzalah, and other such
titles which are mentioned in other riwayahs
‑ are not applicable to one who merely possesses the capacity, but
apply only to those in whom the capacity has reached the stage of
actualization. Capacity (malakah) is
a potential ability; it may or may not reach the point of actualization. It is
for this very reason that the phrasehas
to follow the words above definitions.
Thirdly, the jurisprudential
authorities (maraji taqlid) have set
forth three courses by way of al‑wajib
al‑takhyiri in their handbooks of rulings (rasa'il 'amaliyyah) and works of fiqh for the mukallaf (adult person liable to perform religious duties); they are:
ijtihad, taqlid (imitation) and ihtiyat (caution).
If ijtihad be a capacity, it is not correct to put it by the side of taqlid and ihtiyat; for taqlid and ihtiyat are concerned with actual
practice, while capacity is an inner psychic state. Accordingly, there is no
doubt that in the above statement about a mukallaf's
duty ijtihad is the de facto knowledge of the ahkam of the Shari'ah and the Practical
Rules derived from the sources of the Shari'ah.
Further Clarification
It is evident that the actual ahkam issued by the Sacred Lawgiver
(like obligatory duties and impermissible acts, etc.) are known to apply to all
the mukallafun. This essential
knowledge with the possibility of chastisement is before every mukallaf. And since every sane person
essentially knows that God Almighty has prescribed certain duties for him, his
rational faculty enjoins him to comply with the dictates of reason in
comprehending his duties, and to obtain the certainty of their fulfilment; and ‑
as is said in ilm al‑'usul ‑ the certainty of execution
brings the certainty of fulfilment.
Anyone who is in quest of the
certainty of fulfilment (of his duties) and wants to tread the path which can
assure him that he has performed all the Shari'i duties assigned by the Supreme
Lawgiver, will have to perform one of these three things:
1. He should himself perform ijtihad and comprehend his duties,
according to the criteria, from the sources of the Shari'ah.
2. He should follow the rulings
of an all‑round (jami al‑shara'it)
mujtahid.
3. He should choose the path of ihtiyat (i.e., among other things,
refrain from every act that is not known for certain to be permissible).
In any case, it is essential to
take one of the paths; for if one does not act or abstain from performing a
certain act in accordance with one of these courses, he faces the possibility
of Divine chastisement. The rational faculty of every mukallaf individual considers it essential to avoid every possible
harm and punishment; and to avoid such a danger is not possible except by
following either the path of ijtihad, or taqlid or ihtiyat.
Thus, we see that ijtihad, as one of the choices, is de facto comprehension of one's duties
from the sources of the Shari'ah that results in avoiding possible
chastisement; mere possession of the capacity to comprehend one's duties cannot
be regarded as ijtihad; rather, it
means: the identification of the ahkam, their
deduction, and acting according to them.
Accordingly, a rnujtahid' who possesses the capacity of
ijtihad alone, but does not employ
the usul and principles for deriving the ahkam
is not different from a non‑mujtahid; for, in the same way as a non-mujtahid faces the possibility of
chastisement in performing of acts and abstaining from them, a mujtahid who does not use his capacity
of ijtihdd is equally exposed
to such a danger.