Ijtihad Its Meaning Sources Beginnings and the Practice of Ray [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

(f) The great mujtahid al‑Allamah al‑Hilli
(648‑726/1250‑1325), in his work al Nihayah on usul al‑fiqh, writes: Ijtihad means employment of effort for arriving at presumption
with regard to a hukm of the Shari
ah, in a way that is not blameworthy on account of negligence or omission.

(g) Al‑Allamah al Turayhi
says: Ijtihad is to employ one's
effort and endeavour in pursuit of some difficult task and for arriving at presumption
with regard to a hukm of the
Shariah. [31]

(h) The Usuli mujtahid al‑Amili al‑Jibai
says: Ijtihad is the effort and
endeavour of a faqih in order to arrive at presumption in regard to a hukm of the Shariah. [32]

(i) Al‑Shaykh al‑Baha
i in his Zubdah quotes al‑Hajibi
to the effect that: By ijtihad is meant
the exhaustive efforts of a faqih for arriving at presumption in regard to a hukm of the Shari'ah. Al‑Allamah
al‑Hilli agrees with this definition in his book Tahdhib al‑usul.

(j) Al Allamah Taj al‑Din
al‑Subuki, in his book Jam al
jawami, writes: Ijtihad as a
technical term means the utmost efforts made by a faqih for arriving at
presumption in regard to a hukm (of
the Shari'ah).

Critique of the Above Definitions

The above‑mentioned
definitions of ijtihad do not appear
to be correct; for if these are meant for determining the logical and technical
limits of ijtihad, these definitions
fail to do so. However, if only an explanation and clarification of the term ijtihad is meant, they are not
objectionable. Beyond that purpose, they have no scientific value. Here we
shall briefly point out the defects in the said definitions.

According to the science of
logic, a definition should be inclusive of all the members of the set and
exclude all alien elements; the said definitions are not such. For , if by
presumption' (zann) they mean
something based on the Shari'ah or reason, they are not inclusive of all their
concerned instances. Because, an argument (dalil)
related to a hukm and derived
from the Shari'ah or reason belongs to one of the following three kinds:

1. The argument creates
presumption.

2. The argument creates
certainty.

3. The argument creates neither
presumption nor certainty.

The said definitions deal with
the first kind alone, and leave out the two remaining kinds; whereas a
definition of ijtihad should include
these two as well.

The exclusion of the second kind
in the definitions cited ‑ that is that the argument should create
certainty ‑ is due to the fact that certainty is different from
presumption and the word presumption' does not include it. As to the exclusion
of the third ‑ in which an argument does not produce either presumption
or certainty ‑ the reason is that the argument may not create
presumption. For instance, if the validity (hujjiyyah)
of al‑shuhrat al‑fatwa'iyyah
or khabar al‑wahid or al‑'ijma al‑manqul is
presupposed in such a way that despite not causing presumption they should
still be regarded as hujjah, then,
according to this hypothesis, the derivation of ahkam of the Shari'ah by means of al-shuhrat al‑fatwa'iyyah, khabar al‑wahid and al‑ijma'al‑manqul would not
be ijtihad ‑ since we have
supposed that they do not create presumption ‑ and in the light of the
said definitions ijtihad means attainment
of presumption.

If, in the above‑mentioned
definitions, should presumption' be taken to include both trustworthy and
untrustworthy presumptions ‑ as it obviously does ‑ the definition
will include untrustworthy presumption also, while the attainment of
presumption regarding a hukm of the
Shari'ah by means of untrustworthy presumptions is not considered as ijtihad; because, it is certain that
unreliable presumption cannot be a source of legislation. Accordingly, the
definitions cited fail to exclude alien elements.

In addition they suffer from
another fault ‑ especially those definitions which mention the faqih ‑
as they fail to avoid a vicious circle.

In the definitions cited, the
definition of ijtihad' rests upon
the definition of faqih' and vice
versa, for faqih', in the technical
sense, cannot be imagined without the technical qualification defined as ijtihad', and all scholars and thinkers
unanimously agree on the invalidity of the vicious circle.

Regarding this vicious circle, al‑Muhaqqiq
al‑Qummi writes: The faqih is a scholar who knows the Divine ahkam through the means of reliable (mu'tabar) proofs (adillah) and sources (manabi).
This ability does not materialize without ijtihad, and without it no faqih can exist. Accordingly, the
definition of faqih' rests upon defining ijtihad,
and vice versa.

Regarding the solution of the
problem of the vicious circle, certain Usulis have said: "According to
these definitions, faqih is a person who is acquainted with and is well‑versed
in fiqh; as opposed to one who has no knowledge of fiqh whatsoever. It does not
mean someone who has the knowledge of all the ahkam. It is clear that in this sense the meaning of faqih' does not rest on that of ijtihad; this avoids the vicious
circle, because whereas the definition of ijtihad
is dependent upon that of faqih', the
definition of faqih' is not
dependent upon that of ijtihad ."

But al‑Muhaqqiq. al‑Qummi
objects to this statement and says: Firstly, such a sense imputed to faqih' is figurative', as it literally
means one who knows all the ahkam, not
one who knows only a few of them or some of those things that are related to
the ahkam. Secondly, the effort made
by one who is a faqih' in this sense
does not give rise to the quality of ijtihad;
for, one who knows the outlines of the issues of ijtihad and has read a few books on argumentative fiqh but lacks
the faculty that enables him to revert the furu
to the usul, would not be considered a faqih.

Then, in an effort to remove the
vicious circle, al‑Muhaqqiq al Qummi says: The faqih' is a person possessing such capacity as would lead to the
knowledge of fari ahkam of the
Shari'ah. Thus, the definition of ijtihad
is made dependent on that of the faqih, whereas the vice versa is not
essential. For, the knowledge of the ahkam
of the Shari'ah exists in a faqih as a (potential) capability, and in ijtihad it exists as an actuality.

This view of the Muhaqqiq is
objectionable, since faqih as a term
is applied to one who actually knows the far'i
ahkam of the Shari'ah through a command of its sources, not one who
possesses merely the faculty and capacity of doing so; as mere capacity and
faculty do not qualify one for this appallation, though the appallation of mujtahid' may fit him. Therefore, the
vicious circle still remains; as it is quite clear that the definition of faqih' in the above sense is dependent
upon that of ijtihad', and vice
versa.

Moreover, the apparent meaning of
this definition is unacceptable not only in the Shi'i view of ijtihad but is also incomplete and
objectionable according to the Sunni viewpoint; because legal grounds (adillah Shar'iyyah) are not confined to
presumption and conjecture alone according to Sunnis and include other things
besides.

In any case, the definitions
cited are too restrictive in some respects, and in some others they do not
exclude what is alien to ijtihad. Such
definitions are not sound according to the science of logic, and it may be
concluded that they are unacceptable to both the Muslim sects. Many a time such
incorrect definitions of ijtihad have
been responsible for giving rise to negative views about ijtihad, and made persons like Mirza Muhammad Amin al‑'Astarabadi,
the founder of the Akhbari school, to negate ijtihad outrightly. As a consequence of it ijtihad had been declared as one of the innovations (bidat) and impermissible activities
(this will be discussed in detail while dealing with the Akhbari revolt against
ijtihad).

In fact, if ijtihad means exactly what it has been described to be in the
definitions, its rejection is justified: for, to claim something as a hukm of the Shari'ah on the basis of
presumptive and unreliable grounds (dala'il)
and to act according to them is not permissible in Islamic law. Verses of
the Quran expressly forbid reliance on presumption and conjecture. God
Almighty has stated in the Quran:

O ye who believe, shun much suspicion (al‑zann) .... (49:12)

In another place He says:

Most of them follow naught but conjecture. Assuredly conjecture can by
no means take the place of the truth ....(10:36)

For positing a hukm of the Shari'ah only certainty, or
such argument or methods as have been validated by the Shari'ah, may be relied
upon. Such trustworthy grounds as khabar
al‑wahid and the Practical Principles (al‑'usul al‑amaliyyah) of the Shari'ah (Bara'ah, Ihtiyat, etc), though they do
not lead to certainty as to the real hukm
(al‑hukm al‑waqi'i) ‑ for they may be suspect regarding
their chain of transmission, or meaning, or authenticity of source ‑ but
the certainty of their validity and reliability justifies reliance upon them
and action in accordance with them and provides security from Divine
chastisement.

Anyhow, the Usulis do not
conceive ijtihad in the above sense.
By ijtihad' they mean the
knowledge of the ahkam of the
Shari'ah from sources and grounds whose validity has been affirmed by the
Shari'ah, and it is by using such sources, principles and dicta that the mujtahid is able to meet the needs of
contingent issues and events of life.

Accordingly, the result of ijtihad in the context of deduction of ahkam of the Shari'ah is to refer new
furu to the fundamental usul (which are the general precepts of the Book and
the Sunnah) and to apply the usul to their corresponding instances. It is by
means of ijtihad that sufficient
evidence or hujjah regarding a hukm of the Shari'ah is secured for
answers to emergent and contingent issues. Ijtihad
is not meant for providing presumption or conjecture. It is this sound
meaning of ijtihad that the Usulis
have accepted, and whosoever has faith in Islam and believes in its eternal
and immortal character is bound to accept it in accordance with the precepts of
the Shari'ah and the dictates of reason. Because, it is not possible to posit
the ahkam of the Shariah for issues
for which there is no specific express test without sufficient evidence and
valid grounds, and this is a conception which Muhammad Amin al‑'Astarabadi
also accepts.

It is by means of such ijtihad that valid grounds and basic and
general ahkam are employed for
deriving a hukm of the Shari'ah on a
contingent issue. Such ijtihad is
approved by the Akhbaris too, though they do not call it ijtihad'.

Thus, the incorrect conception of
ijtihad ‑ i.e., the
attainment of presumption on a hukm of
the Shari'ah ‑ which incited the Akhbari opposition, is one which the
Usuli also do not accept and one which they have never approved of. The
presumption' which al‑Allamah al-Hilli, the author of Maalim al‑'asul, and some other
Shii scholars mention in their definitions of ijtihad, is not presumption in its general sense, but one which is trustworthy and supported by some specific dalil..