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Ancient Greek Skepticism

Although
all skeptics in some way cast doubt on our ability to gain knowledge of the
world, the term ''skeptic'' actually covers a wide range of attitudes and
positions. There are skeptical elements in the views of many Greek philosophers,
but the term ''ancient skeptic'' is generally applied either to a member of
Plato''s Academy during its skeptical period (c. 273 B.C.E to 1st century
B.C.E.) or to a follower of Pyrrho (c. 365 to 270
B.C.E.). Pyrrhonian skepticism flourished from Aenesidemus'' revival (1st century B.C.E.) to Sextus Empiricus, who lived
sometime in the 2nd or 3rd centuries C.E. Thus the two main varieties of
ancient skepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian.

The
term ''skeptic'' derives from a Greek noun, skepsis,
which means examination, inquiry, consideration. What leads most skeptics
to begin to examine and then eventually to be at a loss as to what one should
believe, if anything, is the fact of widespread and seemingly endless
disagreement regarding issues of fundamental importance. Many of the arguments
of the ancient skeptics were developed in response to the positive views of
their contemporaries, especially the Stoics and Epicureans, but these
arguments have been highly influential for subsequent philosophers and will
continue to be of great interest as long as there is widespread disagreement
regarding important philosophical issues.

Nearly
every variety of ancient skepticism includes a thesis about our epistemic
limitations and a thesis about suspending judgment. The two most frequently
made objections to skepticism target these theses. The first is that the
skeptic''s commitment to our epistemic limitations is inconsistent. He cannot
consistently claim to know, for example, that knowledge is not possible;
neither can he consistently claim that we should suspend judgment regarding all
matters insofar as this claim is itself a judgment. Either such claims will
refute themselves, since they fall under their own scope, or the skeptic will
have to make an apparently arbitrary exemption. The second sort of objection is
that the alleged epistemic limitations and/or the suggestion that we should
suspend judgment would make life unlivable. For, the business of day-to-day
life requires that we make choices and this requires making judgments.
Similarly, one might point out that our apparent success in interacting with
the world and each other entails that we must know some things. Some responses
by ancient skeptics to these objections are considered in the following
discussion.

(Hankinson
[1995] is a comprehensive and detailed examination of ancient skeptical views.
See Schmitt [1972] and Popkin [1979] for discussion
of the historical impact of ancient skepticism, beginning with its rediscovery
in the 16th Century, and Fogelin [1994] for an
assessment of Pyrrhonian skepticism in light of
contemporary epistemology. The differences between ancient and modern forms of
skepticism has been a controversial topic in recent years-see especially, Annas [1986], [1996], Burnyeat
[1984], and Bett [1993].)

The Distinction Between Academic and Pyrrhonian Skepticism

The distinction between Academic
and Pyrrhonian skepticism continues to be a
controversial topic. In the Second Century C.E., the Roman author Aulus Gellius already refers to
this as an old question treated by many Greek writers (Attic Nights
11.5.6, see Striker [1981/1996]). The biggest obstacle to correctly making this
distinction is that it is misleading to describe Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism as distinctly unified views in the
first place since different Academics and Pyrrhonists seem to have understood
their skepticisms in different ways. So even though the terms Academic and Pyrrhonian are appropriate insofar as there are clear lines
of transmission and development of skeptical views that unify each, we should
not expect to find a simple account of the distinction between the two.

Academic Skepticism

Arcesilaus

Following Plato''s death in 347
B.C.E., his nephew Speusippus became head of the
Academy. Next in line were Xenocrates, Polemo and Crates. The efforts of the Academics during this
period were largely directed towards developing an orthodox Platonic
metaphysics. When Crates died (c. 272 B.C.E.) Arcesilaus of Pitane (c. 318 to
243 B.C.E.) became the sixth head of the Academy. Another member of the
Academy, Socratides, who was apparently in line for
the position, stepped down in favor of Arcesilaus (DL 4.32); so it seems
he was held in high regard by his predecessors, at least at the time of his
appointment. (See Long [1986] for discussion of the life of Arcesilaus.)

Platonic innovator

According to Diogenes Laertius (=DL), Arcesilaus
was "the first to argue on both sides of a question, and the first to
meddle with the traditional Platonic system [or: discourse, logos] and
by means of question and answer, to make it more of a debating contest"
(4.28, translation after R.D. Hicks).

Diogenes
is certainly wrong about Arcesilaus being the first
to argue on both sides of a question. This was a long standing practice in
Greek rhetoric commonly attributed to the Sophists. But Arcesilaus
was responsible for turning Plato''s Academy to a form of skepticism. This
transition was probably supported by an innovative reading of Plato''s books,
which he possessed and held in high regard (DL 4.31).

Diogenes''
remark that Arcesilaus ''meddled'' with Plato''s system
and made it more of a debating contest indicates a critical attitude towards
his innovations. Diogenes (or his source) apparently thought that Arcesilaus betrayed the spirit of Platonic philosophy by
turning it to skepticism.

Cicero, on the other hand, in an
approving tone, reports that Arcesilaus revived the