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practice of Socrates, which he takes to be the same as Plato's. "[Socrates]
was in the habit of drawing forth the opinions of those with whom he was
arguing, in order to state his own view as a response to their answers. This
practice was not kept up by his successors; but Arcesilaus
revived it and prescribed that those who wanted to listen to him should not ask
him questions but state their own opinions. When they had done so, he argued
against them. But his listeners, so far as they could, would defend their own
opinion" (de Finibus 2.2, translated by
Long and Sedley, 68J, see also de Natura
Deorum 1.11). Arcesilaus had (selectively) derived the
lesson from Plato's dialogues that nothing can be known with certainty, either
by the senses or by the mind (de Oratore 3.67,
on the topic of Plato and Socrates as proto-skeptics, see Annas
[1992], Shields [1994] and Woodruff [1986]). He even refused to accept this
conclusion; thus he did not claim to know that nothing could be known (Academica 45).
In
general, the Stoics
were the ideal target for the skeptics; for, their confidence in the areas of
metaphysics, ethics and epistemology was supported by an elaborate and
sophisticated set of arguments. And, the stronger the justification of some
theory, the more impressive is its skeptical refutation. They were also an
attractive target due to their prominence in the Hellenistic world. Arcesilaus especially targeted the founder of Stoicism, Zeno, for
refutation. Zeno confidently claimed not only that knowledge is possible but
that he had a correct account of what knowledge is, and he was willing to teach
this to others. The foundation of this account is the notion of katalpsis: a mental grasping of a sense
impression that guarantees the truth of what is grasped. If one assents to the
proposition associated with a kataleptic impression,
i.e. if one experiences katalepsis, then the
associated proposition cannot fail to be true. The Stoic sage, as the
perfection and fulfillment of human nature, is the one who assents only to kataleptic impressions and thus is infallible. Arcesilaus argued against the possibility
of there being any sense-impressions which we could not be mistaken about. In
doing so, he paved the way for future Academic attacks on Stoicism. To
summarize the attack: for any sense-impression S, received by some observer A,
of some existing object O, and which is a precise representation of O, we can
imagine circumstances in which there is another sense-impression S', which
comes either (i) from something other than O, or (ii)
from something non-existent, and which is such that S' is indistinguishable
from S to A. The first possibility (i) is illustrated
by cases of indistinguishable twins, eggs, statues or imprints in wax made by
the same ring (Lucullus 84-87). The
second possibility (ii) is illustrated by the illusions of dreams and madness (Lucullus 88-91). On the strength of these
examples, Arcesilaus apparently concluded that we
may, in principle, be deceived about any sense-impression, and consequently
that the Stoic
account of empirical knowledge fails. For the Stoics were
thorough-going empiricists and believed that sense-impressions lie at the
foundation of all of our knowledge. So if we could not be certain of ever
having grasped any sense-impression, then we cannot be certain of any of the
more complex impressions of the world, including what strikes us as valuable.
Thus, along with the failure to establish the possibility of katalepsis goes the failure to establish the possibility of
Stoic wisdom (see
Hankinson [1995], Annas [1990] and Frede [1983/1987] for detailed discussions of this
epistemological debate).
judgment In response to this lack of
knowledge (whether limited to the Stoic
variety or knowledge in general), Arcesilaus claimed
that we should suspend judgment. By arguing for and against every position that
came up in discussion he presented equally weighty reasons on both sides of the
issue and made it easier to accept neither side (Academica
45). Diogenes counts the suspension of judgment as another of Arcesilaus' innovations (DL4.28) and refers to
this as the reason he never wrote any books (4.32). Sextus
Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism
[generally referred to by the initials of the title in Greek, PH] 1.232) and
Plutarch (Adversus Colotes
1120C) also attribute the suspension of judgment about everything to him. Determining
precisely what cognitive attitude Arcesilaus intended
by "suspending judgment" is difficult, primarily because we only have
second and third hand reports of his views (if indeed he endorsed any views,
see Dialectical Interpretation below). To suspend judgment seems to mean not to
accept a proposition as true, i.e. not to believe it. It follows that if one
suspends judgment regarding p, then he should neither believe that p nor should he believe that not-p (for this will commit him
to the truth of not-p). But if believing p just means believing that p is true,
then suspending judgment regarding everything is the same as not believing
anything. If Arcesilaus endorsed this, then he could
not consistently believe either that nothing can be known or that one should
consequently suspend judgment.
Interpretation One way around this problem is
to adopt the dialectical interpretation (advanced by Couissin
[1929]). According to this interpretation, Arcesilaus
merely showed the Stoics that they didn't
have an adequate account of knowledge, not that knowledge in general is
impossible. In other words, knowledge will only turn out to be impossible if we
define it as the Stoics
do. Furthermore, he did not show that everyone should suspend judgment, but
rather only those who accept certain Stoic premises. In
particular, he argued that if we accept the Stoic view that the
Sage never errs, and since katalepsis is not
possible, then the Sage (and the rest of us insofar as we emulate the Sage)
should never give our assent to anything. Thus the only way to achieve sagehood, i.e. to consistently avoid error, is to suspend
judgment regarding everything and never risk being wrong (Lucullus
66-67, 76-78, see also Sextus Empiricus,
Against the Logicians [generally referred to by the initial M, for the
name of the larger work from which it comes, Adversus
Mathematikos] 7.150-57). But the dialectical Arcesilaus himself neither agrees nor disagrees with this.
Criterion: to eulogon The biggest obstacle to the
dialectical interpretation is Arcesilaus' practical
criterion, to eulogon. Arcesilaus
presented this criterion in response to the Stoic objection that
if we were to suspend judgment regarding everything, then we would not be able
to continue to engage in day to day activities. For, the Stoics thought, any
deliberate action presupposes some assent, which is to say that belief is
necessary for action. Thus if we eliminate belief we will eliminate action
(Plutarch, Adversus Colotes
1122A-F, LS 69A). Sextus remarks that "inasmuch as it was necessary . . . to investigate also
the conduct of life, which cannot, naturally, be directed without a criterion,
upon which happiness-that is, the end of life-depends for its assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgment about
everything will regulate his inclinations and aversion and his actions in
general by the rule of 'the reasonable [to eulogon],'
and by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for
happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom consists in right actions,
and the right action is that which, when performed, possesses a reasonable
justification. He, therefore, who attends to 'the reasonable' will act rightly
and be happy" (M 7.158, translated by Bury). There
is a good deal of Stoic
technical terminology in this passage, including the term eulogon
itself, and this may seem to support the dialectical interpretation. On
this view, Arcesilaus is simply showing the Stoics both that
their account of knowledge is not necessary for virtue, and that they
nonetheless already have a perfectly acceptable epistemic substitute, to eulogon (see Striker [1980/1996]). But this raises the
question, why would Arcesilaus make such a gift to
his Stoic
adversaries? It would be as if, Maconi's words,
"Arcesilaus first knocked his opponent to the
ground and then gave him a hand up again" (1988: 248). Such generosity
would seem to be incompatible with the purely dialectical purpose of
refutation. Similarly, if he had been arguing dialectically all along, there
seems to be no good reason for him to respond to Stoic objections, for
he was not presenting his own views in the first place. On the other hand, the
proponent of the dialectical view could maintain that Arcesilaus
has not done any favors to the Stoics by giving them
the gift of to eulogon; rather, this 'gift'
may still be seen as a refutation of the Stoic view that a
robust knowledge is necessary for virtue. An
alternative to the dialectical view is to interpret to eulogon
as Arcesilaus' own considered opinion regarding
how one may live well in the absence of certainty. This view then encounters
the earlier difficulty of explaining how it is consistent for Arcesilaus to endorse suspending judgment on all matters
while at the same time believing that one may attain wisdom and happiness by
adhering to his practical criterion.
was succeeded by Lacydes (c. 243 B.C.E.), and then Evander and Hegesinus in turn
took over as heads of the Academy. Following Hegesinus,
Carneades of Cyrene (c. 213
to 129 B.C.E.), perhaps the most illustrious of the skeptical Academics, took
charge. Rather than merely responding to the dogmatic positions that were
currently held as Arcesilaus did, Carneades
developed a wider array of skeptical arguments against any possible dogmatic
position, including some that were not being defended. He also elaborated a
more detailed practical criterion, to pithanon. As
was the case with Arcesilaus, he left nothing in
writing, except for a few letters, which are no longer extant (DL 4.65).
Carneades
employed the same dialectical strategies as Arcesilaus
(Academica 45, Lucullus
16), and similarly found his inspiration and model in Plato's Socrates. The
Socratic practice which Carneades employed, according
to Cicero,
was to try to conceal his own private opinion, relieve others from deception
and in every discussion to look for the most probable solution (Tusculan Disputations 5.11, see also de Natura Deorum 1.11). In 155 B.C.E., nearly one
hundred years after Arcesilaus' death in 243, Carneades is reported to have gone as an Athenian
ambassador to Rome.
There he presented arguments one day in favor of justice and the next he
presented arguments against it. He did this not because he thought that justice
should be disparaged but rather to show its defenders that they had no conclusive
support for their view (Lactantius, LS 68M).
Similarly, we find Carneades arguing against the Stoic conception of
the gods, not in order to show that they do not exist, but rather to show that
the Stoics had not
firmly established anything regarding the divine (de Natura
Deorum 3.43-44, see also 1.4). It seems then that
Carneades was motivated primarily by the Socratic
goal of relieving others of the false pretense to knowledge or wisdom and that
he pursued this goal dialectically by arguing both for and against
philosophical positions.
But whereas Arcesilaus
seemed to limit his targets to positions actually held by his interlocutors, Carneades generalized his skeptical attack, at least in
ethics and epistemology. The main task of Hellenistic ethics was to determine
the summum bonum,
the goal at which all of our actions must aim if we are to live good, happy
lives. Carneades listed all of the defensible
candidates, including some that had not actually been defended, in order to
argue for and against each one and show that no one in fact knows what the summum bonum is, if indeed
there is one (de Finibus 5.16-21). He may have
even intended the stronger conclusion that it is not possible to acquire
knowledge of the summum bonum,
assuming his list was exhaustive of all the serious candidates.
with Arcesilaus, Carneades
also focused much of his skeptical energy on the Stoics, particularly
the views of the scholarch Chrysippus
(DL 4.62). The Stoics had developed
a detailed view of wisdom as life in accordance with nature. The Stoic sage never
errs, he never incorrectly values the goods of fortune, he never suffers from
pathological emotions, and he always remains tranquil. His happiness is
completely inviolable since everything he does and everything he experiences is
precisely as it should be; and crucially, he knows this to be true. Even though
the Stoics were
extremely reluctant to admit that anyone had so far achieved this extraordinary
virtue, they nonetheless insisted that it was a real possibility (Luc. 145,
Tusc. 2.51, Seneca Ep. 42.1, M 9.133, DL
7.91). As a
dialectician, Carneades carefully examined this
conception of the sage. Sometimes he argued, contrary to the Stoic view, that the
sage would in fact assent to non-kataleptic
impressions and thus that he was liable to error (Luc. 67); for he might form
opinions even in the absence of katalepsis (Luc. 78).
But he also apparently argued against the view that the sage will hold mere
opinions in the absence of katalepsis (Luc. 112).
Presumably he didn't himself endorse either position since the issue that had
to be decided first was whether katalepsis was even
possible. In other words, if certainty is possible, then of course the
sage should not settle for mere opinion. But if it is not possible, then
perhaps he will be entitled to hold mere opinions, provided they are thoroughly
examined and considered.
Just as Carneades
generalized his skeptical attack on ethical theories, he also argued against
all of his predecessors' epistemological theories (M 7.159). The main
task of Hellenistic epistemology was to determine the criterion (standard,
measure or test) of truth. If the criterion of truth is taken to be a sort of
sense-impression, as in the Stoic
theory, then we will not be able to discover any such impression that could not
in principle appear true to the most expertly trained and sensitive perceiver
and yet still be false (M 7.161-65, see Arcesilaus'
'Attack
on the Stoics' above). But if we can discover no criterial
sense-impression, then neither will the faculty of
