Corporate Internet Module in Small Networks
The Corporate Internet module provides internal users connectivity to Internet services and provides Internet users access to information on the corporate public servers. This module also provides remote access for remote locations and telecommuters through the use of VPN connectivity.Several key devices make up the Corporate Internet module. These devices are described in Table 13-2.
Device | Description |
---|---|
Mail server | Acts as a relay between the Internet and the intranet mail servers and scans for mail-based attacks |
DNS server | Serves as the authoritative external DNS server and relays internal requests to the Internet |
Web/file server | Provides public information about the organization |
Firewall or Cisco IOS Firewall router | Provides network-level protection of resources, stateful filtering of traffic, and VPN termination for remote sites and users |
Layer 2 switch | Ensures that data from managed devices can only cross directly to the Cisco IOS Firewall and provides private VLAN support |
Figure 13-2. Small Network Corporate Internet Module

Mitigating Threats in the Corporate Internet Module
The most likely point of attack within the Corporate Internet module is on the public services segment. Positioned on this segment are the publicly addressed servers. Table 13-3 shows the anticipated threats and mitigation actions expected on this segment.
Threat | Threat Mitigation |
---|---|
Application layer attacks | Mitigated through host-based IPSs on the public servers |
DoS | Limited through the use of CAR[*] at ISP edge and TCP setup controls at firewall |
IP spoofing | Mitigated through RFC 2827 and RFC 1918 filtering at ISP edge and local firewall |
Network reconnaissance | Mitigated through host-based IPS detecting reconnaissance and by the use of protocol filtering to limit visibility |
Packet sniffers | Mitigated through use of a switched infrastructure and host-based IPS to limit exposure |
Password attacks | Mitigated by limiting the services available to brute force; operating system and IDS can detect the threat |
Port redirection | Mitigated through restrictive filtering and host-based IPS to limit attack |
Trust exploitation | Mitigated through restrictive trust model and private VLANs to limit trust-based attacks |
Unauthorized access | Mitigated through filtering at the firewall |
Virus and Trojan-horse attacks | Mitigated through virus scanning at the host level |
[*] CAR = committed access rate
Figure 13-3 displays the threat-mitigation roles of each of the devices found within the Corporate Internet module.
Figure 13-3. Small Network Corporate Internet Module Threat-Mitigation Roles
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Design Guidelines for the Corporate Internet Module
The small network model represents a scaled-down security-centric network design with all the security and VPN functionality that is found within a single device. As described earlier and shown in Figure 13-2, two options are available within this design model:
- Cisco IOS router
Firewall
The first option uses a Cisco IOS router with firewall and VPN functionality. This option provides the greatest flexibility within the small network design because the router is capable of supporting not only the firewall and VPN functionality but also the advanced features now offered to Cisco IOS routers, such as QoS and multiprotocol support.The second option available in the small network design is to use a dedicated firewall, but because most firewalls are Ethernet-only devices, deployment issues might arise if a WAN termination is required for the ISP circuit. If WAN connectivity is required, a router must be used in the design. However, using a dedicated firewall does have the advantage of easier configuration of security services, and a dedicated firewall can provide improved performance when performing firewall functions.Whichever option is finally chosen, stateful firewall inspection is used to examine traffic in all directions, to ensure that only legitimate traffic crosses the firewall.
Filtering and Access Control
Even before any traffic reaches the firewall, it is ideal to implement some form of security filtering on the perimeter traffic flow. Table 13-4 shows the filter parameters that can be applied to perimeter traffic flow.
Filter Location | Flow | Filter Description | Mitigation |
---|---|---|---|
ISP router | Egress | ISP rate limits nonessential traffic that exceeds a predefined threshold | DDoS |
ISP router | Egress | RFC 1918 and RFC 2827 filtering | IP spoofing |
Router or firewall | Ingress | RFC 1918 and RFC 2827 filtering | IP spoofingverifies ISP filtering |
Router or firewall | Ingress | VPN- and firewall-specific traffic | Unauthorized access |
Intrusion Detection
Every server on the public services segment should be configured with host-based IPS software, which allows for the monitoring of rogue activity at the operating system level. host-based IPS can also be configured to monitor certain common server applications. Additionally, all public service applications, such as the web, mail, and DNS services, should be hardened as much as possible so that unnecessary responses cannot be used to assist an intruder in network reconnaissance.The advanced software features found in Cisco PIX Firewalls and Cisco IOS Firewall routers provide some limited NIDS functionality. They can normally drop many types of attacks without the use of an IDS management station, but obviously dropped events are not reported. However, because these devices are not specifically designed for intrusion detection, it is possible that a degradation in performance of the device might occur. If performance degradation does occur, the drop in performance is normally acceptable when compared to the benefits gained from an increase in attack visibility.
VPN Connectivity
The firewall or Cisco IOS Firewall router provides VPN connectivity for the small network design. Authentication of remote sites and remote users can be accomplished by using preshared keys or the use of an access control server located in the Campus module.
Design Alternatives for the Corporate Internet Module
Usual deviations from these design guidelines normally include the breaking out of the functional components in the network from a single device to individual, specific devices or an increase in network capacity. When these functions are broken out, the design begins to take on the look of the medium-sized network design, which is discussed in Chapter 16, "Implementing Medium-Sized SAFE Networks." Before you decide that you have to adopt the complete design for a medium-sized network, however, it may be worth considering the placement of a Cisco VPN 3000 Series Concentrator or router on the DMZ to offload processing of VPN traffic. The addition of this device also increases the manageability of VPN connectivity.