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Chapter 8
The Third DiscussionSpiritual
Shi'ism and Political Shi'ism
Here I would like to draw attention to a point whose
clarification I consider to be of the utmost importance. Some investigators try
to distinguish between two aspects of Shi'ism, the first Spiritual Shi'ism and
the second Political Shiism. Spiritual Shi ism is believed to be the earlier
of the two. [156] It is also thought that the religious heads, or imams, of
Imamate Shi'ism (descended from Husayn) had retreated from politics after the
massacre of Karbala', devoting themselves only to guidance and worship, keeping
aloof of worldly affairs.
The reality, though, is that Shi'ism has never at any time
since its birth been a purely spiritual tendency. Rather, it was born in the
midst of Islam as a thesis for the continuation by Imam 'Ali of intellectual,
social and poetical leadership alike after the Prophet, in the manner
illustrated above with respect to the conditions that had given rise to
Shi'ism. Because of those conditions, it is not possible to isolate the
spiritual from the political side in this thesis, certainly no more than it is
to isolate it in Islam itself.
Therefore, Shi'ism cannot be subdivided in this way except
in the event where it no longer implies defending the future of the Call after
the Prophet, a future that is in equal need of intellectual authority as it is
of political leadership over the Islamic experiment. And here there existed a
wide range of allegiances to Imam Ali among the Muslims, inasmuch as he was
considered to be just the person fit to resume the role of governing arrogated
by the three Caliphs.
This is precisely the loyalty that brought him to power
after the Caliph Uthman's murder. [157] But it was neither spiritual nor
political Shi'ism, since Shiites believe Ali to be an alternative to the three
Caliphs, the Prophet's direct successor (khalifah). The allegiance extended by Muslims to
the Imam had a wider range than Shiism proper, taken as a whole. But although
spiritual and political Shiism developed within the broad limits of this
loyalty, it cannot be regarded as an instance of a compartmentalized Shiism.
Imam Ali commanded spiritual and intellectual loyalty from
the most prominent Companions at the time of Abu Bakr and Umar - as
illustrated by Sahnan, Abu Dharr, 'Ammar and others. But this hardly means that
it was a spiritual Shi'ism divorced from the political side. It was an
expression of faith by the Companions in Imam Ali's political as well as
intellectual leadership of the Islamic Mission after the Prophet. On the one
hand, their faith in the intellectual side of his leadership was reflected in
the spiritual fidelity alluded to above; on the other, their faith in the
political was reflected in their struggle with the Caliph Abu Bakr, and against
the attempt to divert power away from Imam Ali toward another figure. [158]
In fact, the compartmental view of spiritual Shi'ism was not
unrelated to the emergence of political Shiism. Nor did it arise in the mind
of Shi'ite man except in resignation to a fait accompli. As a definite
formula for continuing the Islamic leadership in the hope of
building the Ummah - a way
of implementing the great drive for change begun by the Prophet - the
embers of Shiism were all but put out inside and transformed into pure belief
ensconced in the heart of man for solace and hope.
We now come to what is alleged to be the abandonment of
politics and the withdrawal from worldly affairs by the Imams of the Household
descended from Husayn. In the light of the foregoing, we might reiterate that
Shiism made for the continuation of Islamic leadership, and that Islamic
leadership simply meant pursuing that
project of change which the Prophet had begun, in order to complete the
construction of the Ummah on
the basis of Islam. It is not possible, therefore, to imagine the Imams
relinquishing the political aspect without renouncing Shi'ism altogether. What
contributed to the idea that they had abandoned the political aspect of their
leadership was their seeming failure to mount military action to overturn the
prevailing situation, the political aspect of leadership being taken strictly
in its narrow military sense. But there are many explicit utterances by the
Imams which make it plain that an Imam is always ready to take the military
course, provided he found enough assistance and the capacity to realize the
Islamic objectives beyond the military campaign itself. [159] When we trace the
course of the Shi'ite movement, we notice that its leadership, comprised of the
Imams of the Household, believed the transference of power alone to be
insufficient. The realization of change in an Islamic sense is impossible so
long as this power was not shored up by a popular base conscious of the goals
of power, believing in its theory of governance, acting to defend it,
explaining its stances to the larger populace and braving the storms.
Midway through the first century after the Prophet's death,
the Shiite leadership, shunned from power, sought constantly to return to rule
in the ways it deemed proper. It was convinced of the existence of popular
bases of consciousness, or vigilant Muhajirin,
Ansar and all those who
emulated their best actions. However,
half-a-century later, when little remained of these popular bases,
and with indecisive generations [160] newly emerging under the influence of
deviationism, the accession to power by the Shiite movement would never have
achieved the larger goal; the popular bases that reinforced consciousness and
sacrifice no longer existed. In the face of this situation, there were only two
possible avenues for action:
One, action for the sake of rebuilding the popular and
conscious bases that could properly pave the way to a transfer of power.
Two, stirring the Islamic Ummah's conscience and
will; safeguarding some degree of life and stalwartness to fortify the Ummah
against abdicating unconditionally its identity and honour to deviationist
rulers.
The first option was the one chosen by the Imams themselves;
whereas the second was taken by the revolutionary partisans of 'Ali as they
sought through fearless sacrifice to sustain the Islamic conscience and will.
The Imams used to support the more sincere among them. Imam Ali b. Musa al-Rida
once said to Caliph Ma'mun, in reference to Zayd b. Ali al-Shahid, that
he was one of the learned from the House of Muhammad. He was angered for the
sake of God, fought enemies until he was killed in God's way. Abu Mus'a b.
Jafar has related to me that he heard his father Ja'far b. Muhammad say:
"May God have merry on my uncle Zayd. He made summons on behalf of al-Rida,
of the House of Muhammad. Had he triumphed, he would have fulfilled his
promise. Zayd b. Ali did not call what was not in his right to do so. He was
more heedful toward God than that. He simply) said: I summon you to al-Rida,
of the House of Muhammad." [161]
In one account, those of the House of Muhammad who ventured
forth were mentioned before Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, who then answered,
"I and my partisans will always be well so long as there is someone from
the House of Muhammad who ventures forth. How I long for him to venture forth!
And incumbent upon me is the maintenance of his dependents." [162]
In sum, the Imams' abandonment of direct military action
against the deviationist rulers did not imply that they had foresaken the
political aspect of their leadership and devoted themselves solely to worship.
It expressed merely a difference in the form of social action, and was limited
by the actual conditions. It also expressed a profound grasp of the nature of
reform activity and the method by which to achieve it.
[156] See Dr. Shaybi, al-Silah
bayna al-tasawwuf wal-tashayyu I:12; Dr. Abd al-Aziz al
Duri, Muqaddamah fi tar'ikh al-Islam, p. 72.
[157] Cf. Ta'rikh al-Tabari II:696ff See also the description of the situation in Imam Ali's Address,
where he states, "Nothing was more delightful to me than people swarming
around me, as hyenas do, from every side ...and gathered round like a resting
herd of sheep (Nahj al-balaghah, ed.
Dr. Subhi al-Salih, p. 48 ("al-Shaqshaqivyah")
[158]See what Tabarsi relates in his al-Ihtijaj I:75.
[159] Cf. Usul al-Kafi II:190 (Ch. "Fi qillat adad al-mu'minin") (Tehran: al-Matbaah al
Islaamiyyah, 1388 AH).
[160] Consider what Umayyid policy visited upon the Ummah in pastimes, buffoonery, wine drinking,
and brutality and repression against all opponents. On this question, see al-Masudi,
Muruj al-dhahab III:214ff; Ibn
Abd Rabbuh, al-Aqd al farid V:200-02;
Abu al-Faraj al-Asfahani, al-Aghani
First Edition 7:6ff (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1407 AH). Concerning the
Umayyids' frivolous use of wealth, see Sayyid Qutb, al-Adalah al ijtima'iyah fi al-Islam.
[161] A1-Hurr al- Amili, Wasa'il al-Shiah, Fifth Edition, ed. Abd al-Karim al-Shirazi
XII:39 (Tehran: al-Maktabah al-Islamiyah 1401 - Imam. See the
edited version, Mu'assasah Al al-Bayt (Qum) XV:54 ("Kitab al jihad")
[162] Cf Ibn Idris, al-Sara'ir
III:569 (Qum: Mu'assasah al-Nashr al-Islami), for Abd Allah al-Sayyari's
narration of words by someone from the Companions.
