The Emergence of Shiism and the Shiites [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

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The Emergence of Shiism and the Shiites [Electronic resources] - نسخه متنی

Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Translated from the Arabic by: Asaad F. Shaker

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Chapter 2



The First DiscussionDenial:
Neglecting the Question of Succession [14]Based on such an attitude, the Prophet would have assumed a
stance of denial with respect to the Mission of Islam, being content to pursue
his own leadership role and to direct the Mission only while he lived. He would
thus have abandoned it to circumstance and chance. But such a position of
denial cannot be assumed for the Prophet, because it would have to arise from
one of two issues that fail to apply to him.First Issue
This consists of the belief denial and neglect cannot affect
the fate of the Mission, and that the Ummah that would soon inherit the Call of Islam was capable enough to
assume the responsibility of protecting it and ensuring against its distortion.
In fact, this belief has absolutely no basis. Rather, the
pattern of events was such as to point to something else. This is because the
Call - being from the outset a mission for revolutionary change aimed at
constructing an Ummah and at
eradicating every root of pre-Islam from it - would become exposed
to the worst dangers if the stage were suddenly voided of its leader, or
abandoned by him without any prearrangements.
Firstly, there are the inherent dangers engendered by trying
to confront this vacuum without any advance planning, and by the urgent need to
take a makeshift position while still under the massive shock of having lost
the Prophet. If the Messenger had abandoned the stage without planning the
course of the Islamic Mission, the Ummah would for the first time have faced the responsibility of managing
the most serious problems of its mission without a leader but brandishing not
the slightest prescription. The situation called for immediate and swift
application - despite the gravity of the underlying problem -
because a vacuum cannot persist. [15] Indeed, a hasty measure was taken at a
moment of shock for the Ummah, reeling
as it was from the loss of its leader. This was the shock which, by its very
nature, was to upset the course of thinking in Islam, leaving it in such
disarray that its effects induced a well-known Companion to announce that
the Prophet neither has nor will die. [16] But such a measure could not but
entail danger, with the most undesirable consequences.
Second are the dangers emanating from a message that is not
consummated at a level that could allow the Prophet to be certain of
anticipating the actual procedures soon to be taken, and to keep within the
fold of the Islamic Call. That would not have enabled him to prevail over
latent dissensions that continued to survive in crevices deep inside the hearts
of the Muslims, which dissensions were based on the divisions between the Muhajirun (those who migrated to the
City of Medina) and the Ansar (native
Medinans); the Quraysh and the rest of the Arab tribes; Mecca and Medina. [17]
Third, there axe dangers arising from that segment of
society which passes under the cover of Islam; but against which it used to
conspire during the Prophet's lifetime. This is the group that the Qur'an
collectively calls the "Hypocrites. " [18]
If we add to them a good number of those who embraced Islam
after the taking of Mecca, who were more resigned to the new order of things
than open to truth as such, we can then assess the threat posed as all these
elements seized their opportunity for a broad initiative, doing so just when -
the stage being cleared of the leader as the custodian - a large vacuum
had existed. [19] Hence, the gravity of the situation after his departure was
not something that could have been hidden from any leader seasoned in doctrinal
matters, let alone the Seal of the Prophets. [20]
It might well be true that Abu Bakr, moreover, had no
intention of leaving the scene without a positive intervention ensuring the
future of political authority, on the argument that there was need of
precaution under the circumstances. [21] It may also be true that people rushed
to Umar, when he was wounded, imploring him: "O Commander of the
Faithful, if you would only nominate someone." [22] This was done out of fear of the vacuum that the Caliph
would soon leave behind, notwithstanding the political and social solidity
which the Islamic Mission had attained a decade after the passing away of the
Prophet. Also, Umar may well have named six persons [23] in his will in
deference to the latter's presentiment of danger. He must have seen the depth
of this perilous situation on the Day of the Saqifah and what Abu Bakr's
Caliphate would bring in its train, in view of its doubly improvized
appearance, since he declared that "Abu Bakr's oath-taking was an
oversight from whose evil God has shielded us." [24] Abu Bakr himself
regretted his hasty acceptance to become the sovereign as he bore the heavy
responsibility that went with it, in that he became aware of the seriousness of
the situation and the need to venture some quick solution. When he was censured
for accepting to be sovereign, his words were: "God's Messenger has died,
and the people only recently were in a state of faithless ignorance. I took
alarm that they might be beguiled, but my companions charged me with the
task." [25]
If all of the above is valid, [26] at any rate, it stands to
reason that the Prophet and exemplar of the Call to Islam would have been the
most aware of the danger of denial, [27] most perceptive and farsighted in his
understanding of the nature of the situation and the exigencies of the change
he pursued in an Ummah newly emerging from faithless ignorance, in the
words of Abu Bakr. [28]Second Issue
The second issue which could explain why the leader would
have disavowed the fate of the Mission, or its progress, after his death goes
as follows. Despite his awareness of the danger of the situation, he did not
attempt to fortify the Mission of Islam against this danger, supposedly because
he was mindful of the advantages. And so, his only concern was to protect the
Mission while he lived in order to benefit from it and to enjoy the gains,
caring little to secure its fate beyond his own lifetime.
This explanation cannot hold true for the Prophet, even if
we should refuse to describe him as a Prophet dedicated to God through
everything connected to the Message, making him out instead to be a leader with
a message no different from any other. Yet, in the entire history of message-bearing
leaders no one matches Muhammad in his earnestness toward the Call or, to his
last breath, in his devoted sacrifice for its furtherance. His whole life proves
it. Even as he lay on his deathbed, his illness worsening, he was concerned
about a battle he had earlier planned. Preparing to deploy Usamah's forces, he
repeated: "Make ready the army of Usamah, send it forth, send off
Usamah!" as he fainted now and then. [29]
If the Prophet's attentiveness toward a single problem of
military interest relating to the Call could go to that length, as he slowly
expired on his deathbed; if knowing that he will die before plucking the fruit
of victory did not prevent him from tending to the battle; in short, if he
could maintain active interest while drawing his last few breaths of life -
how, then, could one possibly think that the Prophet did not lived through
moments of anxiety over the fate of the Call? How could he not have planned for
its welfare in the face of anticipated dangers?
Finally, there is one record in the Prophet's life, during
his last illness, which is sufficient to refute the entire case for the
"first path." It shows that nothing was more remote for such an
outstanding leader as our Prophet Muhammad than to assume the position of
denial with respect to the future of the Call, simply because of a lack of
sensitivity to the dangers or to a disinterest in its nature. This record, upon
whose line of transmission all fair-minded Muslims - whether Sunni or
Shi'i -without exception agree upon, is as follows. With certain men
present in the house where he was about to face death, including Umar b. al Khattab,
the Prophet made a request: "Bring me the inkwell and tablet [30] that I
may write you an epistle. After this you shall never stray." [31] This
attempt by the leader - the soundness and authoritative transmission of
whose account, once again, is roundly accepted - points unequivocally to
the fact that he did reflect on the future. He saw clearly the necessity to
provide a plan by which the Ummah can be fortified against deviation and
the Mission of Islam protected from dissolution or ruin.
Hence, it is not possible to presuppose a position of denial
[32] for the Prophet.




[14] The titles given to the three discussions in both the
first and the second chapters were construed from Imam Sadr's own statements,
but are not part of the original text.


[15] It is well recognized that a head of state's empty seat
engendered countless perils and dangers, particularly in the absence of clearly
stipulated constitutional provisions for quickly filling the vacancy. See Dr.
al-Rayyis, al Nazarijyat al-siyasiyyah
al-islamiyyah, p. 134.


[16] See al-Shahrastani, al-Milal wal-nihal I:15, where he states:
Umar b. al-Khattab: 'Whosever says that Muhammad has died I shall slay
with this mine own sword. He has ascended to Heaven."' Cf. Muhammad b.
Jarir al-Tabari, Ta'rikh al-Tabari II:233: "He said that Muhammad indeed
did not die and that he would go over to the one spread rumour of his death and
cut off his hands and smite him at the neck..."


[17] On this state
of affairs, there is no lack of evidence. For example, al-Bukhari, Muslim
and al-Tirmidhi (in Kitab al-tafsir) recount, on the authority of Jabir
b.Abdullah: "We were on an expedition, when a Muhajir struck someone from the Ansar.
The Ansari called out, O Ansar [help me]!' while the Muhajirun called out, O Muhajirin [help me]!' The Prophet heard
all this and said What pagan cry is this?' Ibn Sallul was also heard saying.
They have done it. By God if we return to Medina the stronger will drive out
the weaker"' (al-Shaykh al-Nasif, al Tajj -al jami li1-usul 1V:263).


[18] During the Prophet's lifetime, the
"Hypocrites" as a group sought to play a menacing role through plots
against Islam, the Messenger of God himself and the Muslims. See the previous
note, for instance, for the statement by Ibn Sallul, who headed the
"Hypocrites." They happened to stir up all manner of falsehoods and
to disseminate disruptive rumours, as in the Battles of Uhud and Ahzab.
Consequently, God revealed the "Surah
of the Hypocrites" in the Qur'an, in which He exposed this malicious
group, informing His Messenger of their designs and whatever they sought to
hide. See, for example, al-Fakhr al-Razi's Tafsi'r First ed.VIII:157 (Cairo: al Khayriyyah,1308 AH); al-Zamakhshari
al-Kahshaf IV:811


[19] In relation to those who embraced Islam after Mecca was
gained over, a large number would be expected to commit religious apostasy.
Jabir b. Abd Allah al-Ansari relates: "I heard the Messenger
of God say: People have entered in throngs and they shall leave in
throngs..."' Note also that the movement of apostasy occurred after the
passing away of the Prophet, despite his many warnings about such a, prospect (al Kashshaf IV:811; Ta'rikh al-Tabari II:245). See the famous hadith of
the Basin, where the Prophet says: "I will be there at the Basin before
you. And men known to me shall come forth, to whom I shall be denied access. I
call out to them, "My Companions!" They will answer, Little do you
know what they have concocted after you!' I reply, "Away with all those
who changed after me!" (Sahih al-Bukhari) VIII:86 ("Kitab al fitan").


[20] Ibid.


[21] Regarding the story of Abu Bakr's appointment of Umar
b. al-Khattab as his successor, there are the following words uttered by
Abu Bakr: "If you have accepted my command while I live, it would be
unbecoming that you should differ after me..." (Mukhtasar Ta'rikh Ibn Asakir XVIII:308-09); Ta'rikh al-Tabari II:245, 280.


[22] Ta'rikh
al-Tabari II:580 - Imam. Ibn Manzur, Mukhtasar Tarikh Ibn Asakir XVIII:312.


[23] Tarikh al-Tabari
II:581 - Imam


[24] Tarikh
al-Tabari, ed Muhammad Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim II:205; ibid, II:581.


[25] Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-balaghah, ed. Abu al-Fadl Ibrahirn II:42 -
Imam. Tarikh al-Tabari II:353. Abu Bakr said: "Would that I had not accepted it..."


[26] Umar wished the deliberations would have ended and a
Caliph selected before his wounding, so that he might die a tranquil death
knowing that Islam would progress after him..." (Dr. Muhammad Husayn
Haykal, al-Faruq Umar II:313-314).


[27] The Prophet Muhammad, during his blessed calling,
earnestly desired for the unity of the Ummah and the progress of Islam, no doubtless more intensely than any of
his Companions. For God has declared: "...a beloved friend taking to heart
that ye should suffer adversity, ardently concerned for you, and to the,
faithful most kind, compassionate" (Qur'aan, 9:128 "al-Tawbah").
What is important is that his concern for the Ummah, his teaching of the Companions the
necessary avoidance of discord, and his practical experience in this hardly
need proof, especially as the Qur'an is replete with tens of ayat calling for
the repudiation of all dissension, its causes and motives. How can one then
imagine that this compassionate Prophet could have passed over the chief cause
of strife (namely, the question of leadership) without setting up what is
likely to obstruct and to bar its baleful effects; the more so that this same
perception impelled the first and second Caliphs themselves to appoint
successors, as is clear. Cf. Tarikh al-Tabari
II:580.


[28] Ibid.


[29] Ibn al-Athir, Ta'rikh
al-Kamil II:318 - Imam. See also Ibn Sad, al-Tabaqat al kubra II:249.


[30] Literally, a "shoulder blade," on which
important documents used to be written. It must be recalled that this was the
period just before the Muslims had introduced a new paper substance as a mass
commodity, for the first time in history - Translator.


[31] Sahih
al-Bukhari I:37; Kitab al-ilm 8:161; Kitab al-i'tisam. See also Sahih Muslim V:76 (Ch. "al-Wasiyyah")
(Cairo: Matbaat Muhammad 'Ali Sabih); Musnad
al-Imam Ahmad I:355; cf Ibn
Sa'd, al-Tabaqat al-kubra II:242-44 - Imam.


[32] Every Muslim believes in the preeminence of the
Messenger's personality as a leader, let alone as a Prophet-Messenger,
which discounts unconditionally the presupposition stated above. Indeed, the
Muslim usually holds such a presupposition to be illegitimate with respect to
the Prophet for at least two reasons. One, it would be contrary to the
Prophet's familiar life-conduct unanimously acknowledged by the entire
community. His noble life abounds with goodly works and continuous struggle for
change, construction and salvation of the Ummah. Second, the presupposition runs contrary both to those hadiths which have numerous,
uninterrupted lines of transmission and to what he taught the Ummah with respect to diligence -
indeed, to the point of declaring: "Whosever wakes without a care for the
affairs of the Muslims is not one of them" (Usul al-kafi II:131). His disinterest
in the fate of the Call and of the Ummah would have actually make him derelict in his obligations and
trustworthiness.




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