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Chapter 3
The Second DiscussionThe Affirmative
Path Represented by the Consultative OrderThe second path consists in the hypothesis that the Prophet
had mapped out the future of the Islamic Mission after his death, adopting an
affirmative stance by establishing a custodianship and an experienced
leadership for the Ummah based
on a consultative order, where the first, doctrinally-steeped generation
would bring together both Muhajirin and
Ansar. Representing the Ummah, this is the generation that was to
constitute the base for political authority and the mainstay for the leadership
of the Mission as it expanded.
It should be noted, however, that the situation which
generally prevailed for the Prophet, including the Mission and those who promoted
it, was not conducive to this course. In fact, it tends to contradict such a
hypothesis. That he held the mission's leadership which came immediately after
him to a system of consultation operated by the Ummah's first generation of Muhajiran and Ansar, or ever
opted for such a course, is highly questionable. Here are some points of
clarification.First Issue
Had the Prophet adopted an affirmative position towards the
future of the Mission that envisaged setting up straightaway a system of
consultation to be emulated after his death, with the Mission's command resting
on a leadership emanating directly from such a system, the most obvious thing
would have been for him to take measures to apprise the Ummah and those
actively engaged in its cause of some system of consultation, its limits and
particulars. He would have informed them about its religious and sacred
character, or prepared the community intellectually and spiritually in order
for it to accept such a system, it being a community which originated partly
among clans. For before Islam, the Ummah did not live by political consultation, but rather by an arbitrary
tribal and clan system based on domination through power, wealth and hereditary
relations. [33]
It is obvious that the Prophet did not seek to give advice
on a consultative system, whether in respect of its legal particulars or its
intellectual concepts. Naturally, if this were ever undertaken, it would have
been reflected in the hadiths handed
down from the Prophet. It would certainly have been reflected in the minds of
people - at least the Ummah's
first generation comprised of both Muhajirin
and Ansar whose
responsibility it should have been to apply such a system of consultation. But
we simply do not find any legal notion in the hadiths of the Prophet delimiting any such order. [34] There are no
particular traits within the mentality of the Ummah, or that of the first generation, that specifically reflect such
advice.
Actually, the early generation contained two currents. The
first was the one led by the members of the Prophet's Household; the other
expressed itself at the Saqifah and in the Caliphate that emerged after the passing of the Prophet. Clearly, the former meant belief in Guardianship (wisayah)
and the Imamate [35], along with an emphasis on close kinship to the Prophet;
and none of that reflected any belief in the idea of consultation. [36]
Regarding the second tendency, all the records and the
evidence concerned with the: Prophet's actual practice yield a picture which
leaves little doubt that he did not believe in the system of consultation (as
suggested); nor did he build a practical policy based on it. The same attitude
is found among other groups within that generation of Muslims which witnessed
the death of the Prophet. [37] This is supported by the fact that Abu Bakr, his
physical state worsening, inaugurated Umar b. al-Khattab and ordered
Uthman to record the oath. He wrote:
In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate. That is
what Abu Bakr, Successor of God's Messenger, has obligated the Faithful and the
Muslims with. Peace be with you. To God I give praise before thee. Thereupon, I
place Umar b. al-Khattab at your service. So hearken and obey! [38]
Abd al-Rahman b. Awf then interjected, saying,
"And what becometh of you, O Successor of God's Messenger." To which
he replied, "I am to depart. But you have increased my torment: as you
watch me deposit this trust upon someone from your midst, each of you scowls,
demanding all to himself..." [39] It is clear, from this succession and
the disapproval of the opposition, that the Caliph was not thinking in the
spirit of any system of consultation. He took it as his right to designate a
successor, and to expect compliance with this designation from the Muslims.
This is why he commanded them "to hear and to obey. " [40] It was not
a question of presenting or announcing a candidate, but one of investiture and
obligation.
Umar, in turn, found it within his right to impose a
successor upon the Muslims. He did it through a circle of six persons, to whom
he assigned the task of designation, leaving the rest of the Muslims no role
whatsoever in the selection. [41] But this meant that his method of succession
did not express the spirit of consultation, any more than did that of the first
Caliph. Upon being asked by the populace to appoint a successor, Umar
declared, "If one of two men - Salim Mawla Abi Hudhayfah and Abu
Ubaydah b. al-Jarrah - had come to me, I would have done that with
him, as I trust him; had Sahm been living, I would not have set it up as a
consultation." [42]
On his deathbed, Abu Bakr told Abd al-Rahman b. Awf
in confidence, "I wish I had asked the Messenger of God to whom is the
right. No one then would have challenged it." [43] When the Ansar
had gathered at Saqifah in order to make Sad b. Ibadah the Amir, someone from their midst called
out: "When the Qurayshi Muhajirs refuse,
they or some group in their midst say, We are Muhajirun. We are [the Prophet's] clan and the first to have
embraced Islam.' To which we retort, One Amir
from us, one from you'; less than this we shall never accept."' But in
his address, Abu Bakr answered them: "We are the Muhajir clans of the Muslims and the first to embrace Islam. In
this respect, the populace comes after us. We axe the clan of the Messenger of
God and, of all the Arabs, foremost in kinship [to him]." [45]. When the Ansar,
proposed that the Caliphate alternate between the Muhajirin and the Ansar,
Abu Bakr answered:
When the Messenger of God was sent the Arabs were too self-important
to abandon the religion of their forefathers, so they opposed and distressed
him. But God has marked off those of His people who migrated as being the first
[al-Muhajirin al-awwalin] to have faith in him. In all the earth,
they were the first to worship God; they are his [i.e. the Prophet's] friends
and his kin, the mostt deserving to rule after him. None but the unjust would
contest this... [46]
Encouraging the Ansars rigidity was al-Habbab b. al-Mundhir, who contended,
.Stay your course! People are under your sway, and should anyone insist, then
let there be one Amir from us and
another from them..." [47] 'Umar responded by saying: "As likely as
two swords sheathed together! Who shall' quarrel with us, his Friends and
kinsfolk, about the authority of Muhammad, or what he has bequeathed, but a
deceiver - one given to sin and tangled in failure?" [48]
In sum: the method used by the first and second Caliphs to
appoint a successor; the absence of any disapproval of it by most Muslims; the
spirit that dominated the thinking of the Muhajirin
and the Ansar (the two
rivals of the first generation on the Day of Saqifah); the initial tendency
which clearly set the Muhajirin on
the path to establishing a principle restricting all power to themselves; the Ansar's exclusion
from power; the emphasis on what the Prophet has bequeathed, justified in terms
of the precedence enjoyed by his clan above all others; the readiness of many Ansar
to accept the idea of two Amirs (the one from the Ansar, the other from
the Muhajirin); Abu Bakes expression of regret, upon becoming Caliph, for failing
to ask the Prophet about who was most qualified after him: etc. [49] -
all this makes it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that the thinking adopted
by that segment of the first generation of Muslims to whom power was
transferred after the Prophet's death was not based on consultation. No
definite idea about such a system had existed. How then can one imagine the
Prophet giving legal and intellectual notification of a consultative system, or
preparing a whole generation of Muhajirin
and Ansar for the transfer of leadership within the Mission of Islam
based on such a system? How can it be so if no conscious application of such a
precise system or concept to be found? [50] By the same token, one cannot
imagine that the Messenger, as the leader, could have put this system in place,
given it legal and conceptual definition, and then failed to apprise the
Muslims of it or to educate them in it. [51]
All that only proves that the Prophet never intended to
offer consultation as an alternate system. It is unlikely that it was proposed
in any manner corresponding to its importance, and later to vanish altogether
from every quarter and every political tendency. [52] What makes this truth
quite plain are the following points.
First of all, by its very nature the consultative system was
new for the kind of milieu that had never seen, before the prophethood of
Muhammad, any finished system of governance,' which makes it all the more
necessary that a concentrated effort to inculcate it would have been
undertaken, as indicated above.
Secondly, being a foggy notion, "consultation" is
ill-suited as something having any chance of being implemented, however
much one tries to expound its details, measures and standards of preference in
the event of disagreement; or, indeed, whether these standards depend at all
ran number and quantity, or on quality and experience, etc. - in short,
all the things that might have given the idea its features and suitability for
implementation [54] right after the Prophet's death?
Thirdly, in one forth or another, in fact consultation
enunciated for the Ummah an exercise of authority by way of mutual
consultation and a determination of
political self-determination the responsibility for which attaches to a
great number of people (namely, all those implicated in the consultation).
Therefore, if it were a legally-sanctioned political rule, to be
implemented after the Prophet, it would have been presented to as many of these
people as possible. And they would have had a positive view of consultation,
each bearing his measure of the responsibility. [55]
These points prove that if the Prophet were to adopt the
consultative system as a substitute for what existed during his own lifetime,
he would have been duty-bound to give full scope to preparing for the
idea of consultation, both in terms of depth and in a general psychological
sense. He would have had to fill every
gap, disclose every detail that could make it a practical idea. At that level,
he would need to give it quantity, quality and depth - which was
an impossible thing to do. But all these features then would have had to be
expunged anyways from the Muslims' midst, the
Prophet's own contemporaries. For one would think that the Prophet had to
present the idea of consultation in an appropriate form, on a scale called for
by the situation, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in order to make it
comprehensible to the Muslims; before political impulses were suddenly
awakened, obscuring the truth and forcing the people to suppress whatever they
happened to hear from the Prophet about consultation, its precepts and details.
But this hypothesis, too, is not practicable. Whatever may
be said about these impulses, they did not apply to ordinary Muslims, the
Companions of the Prophet who had no part in political events after his death,
or in raising the pyramid of the Saqifah. Their position was only secondary,
though one that always represents a numerically large portion of every society,
regardless of how much politics may impinge upon it. [56] Had consultation been
proposed by the Prophet in the desired dimensions, the politically-motivated
would not have been the only audience to hear its stipulations. On the
contrary, different people would have heard them. These stipulations would have
been reflected naturally among the common people who had known the Prophet;
just as the Prophetic traditions recorded by the Companions themselves did, in
fact, with respect to the superiority of Imam Ali and his Guardianship (wisayitihi). How, then; can political impulses have failed to prevent hundreds
of hadiths by the Prophet concerning
Imam Ali, his Guardianship and religious authority [57] from reaching us
through the Companions, even though they conflicted with the dominant current
at the time; whereas nothing has come down to us that conveys the least
information about the notion of consultation. [58]
Indeed, those who typified the dominant current frequently
disagreed in their political stances. It was in the interest of one or the
other faction to use consultation as a slogan against the other. Still, we do
not know of any of these factions having employed this slogan as a judgement
actually taken from the Prophet. For example, one might observe Talhah's
rejection of Abu Bakr's designation of Umar, over which he was indignant. [59]
Despite this, he never contemplated playing consultation as a card against this
designation, or to condemn Abu Bakr's stance by claiming that he contradicted
what the Prophet had said about consultation and selection.
Second Issue
The second point is this. If the Prophet had decided to make
the first generation -- one that included both the Muhujirun and the Ansar from
among his Companions - overseers of the Islamic Mission after he was
gone, responsible for continuing the drive for change, this would have obliged
him, as the leader, to enlist their broad intellectual and apostolic commitment
in such a way as to maintain certain theoretical depth; in the light of which
they could consciously seek practical application.
In this way, from the Divine Message itself would issue
solutions to the constant problems faced by the Islamic Mission; especially as
the Prophet, auguring the fall of Khusraw and Caesar, [60] knew that the
Islamic Call would soon see a grand victory. He knew that the Islamic Ummah
would shortly include new peoples in its ranks and extend over great distances.
It would soon be its responsibility to inculcate these peoples in Islam, to
fortify itself against the dangers represented by this expansion, and to apply
the provisions of the Law to the inhabitants of the lands conquered. This was
in spite of the fact that, of all generations, the first that inherited the
Call was the most inculpable, the most prepared to sacrifice. But it was one
that showed no indication of any special preparation to assume the
custodianship of the Mission, let alone a deep or wide-ranging
instruction in its notions. The records that warrant this rejection of this are
too many to be included here.
Indeed, in this connection one might observe that, all
.told, what the Companions have managed to transmit in stipulations from the
Prophet in the area of legislation does not exceed a few hundred hadiths. [61] At the same time, the Companions numbered close to twelve thousand,
as reckoned by the history books. [62] The Prophet used to live among thousands
of them in a single city, with a single place of worship, morning and night.
Therefore, would there not have been in these records some indication of a
special preparation?
Actually, the Companions were known to avoid putting
questions to the Prophet. Instead, awaiting a querying Bedouin arriving from
out of town, they would allow one from their midst to overhear the answer. [63]
They were of the opinion that it was more convenient to abstain from asking
about the legal provisions of decrees that had not yet come to pass. With this
idea in mind, Umar proclaimed from the pulpit, "I forbid anyone to ask about
what does not exist. It is God who discloses that which He brings
forth..." [64] "It is not permissible," he insisted, "for
anyone to ask about what is not. God has given His Decree for what He brings
forth into existence..." [65] One day, a man came to Ibn Umar asking
about something. He replied, "Do not ask about something that is not. I
heard Umar b. al-Khattab denounce the person who asked about what is
not..." [66] A man also queried Ubayy b. Kab concerning a particular
problem; the latter told him: "My son, has what you ask me about come to
pass?" "No." "Then allow me to defer my answer until it
has," Ubayy b. Kab returned." [67]
Umar one day was reciting the Qur'an, and then stopped at
the words: "And (We) produce therein Corn, and grapes and nutritious
plants, olives and dates, enclosed gardens, fruits and abban [fodder']. [68] Then he said, "We know all of these,
but what is the abb'.. By God, this is onerous. You are not
accountable for what you cannot understand. Follow only what appears limpid to
you in the Book, and act accordingly. What you do not know leave to the one who
can master it ..." [69]
In sum, the Companions tended to be averse to all
questioning beyond the limits of current, definable problems. This tendency, of
course, led to the scanty number of legal stipulations transmitted from the
Messenger. But beyond that, it led to the need for sources other than the Book
and the Prophetic Tradition (sunnah) - such as juridical discretion (istihsan), analogy (qiyas) and other types of independent legal
judgement (ij'tihad) in which the personal identity of the
interpreter comes into play. [70] Their aversion thus paved the way for an
infiltration of the legislative process by the human personality through men's
particular tastes and ideas. And such a tendency was furthest removed from the
special apostolic preparation required by this generation. Such a preparation
implies extensive training and instruction in the legal resolution of problems
soon to be faced during its leadership.
Just as the Companions had refrained from querying the
Prophet, so they failed to collect his sayings and traditions (sunnatihi), [71] although these comprised Islam's second (legislative) source.
Collection is the only method of preserving and protecting them from loss or
distortion. Based on Yahya b. Sa'd (who transmitted, in turn, from Abd Allah
b. Dinar), al-Harawi uttered these disparaging words: "Neither [the
Prophet's] Companions nor those who followed used to write the sayings [hadith]. Instead they conveyed them verbally and committed them to
memory." [72] In fact, according to Ibn Sad's Tabaqat, the Second Caliph had been confused as to the best
position to take with respect to the Prophetic Tradition (sunnat al-rasul). This
persisted for a month, after which he announced -a prohibition against
recording any of it." Thus it was that the Messenger's practice, the most
important source for Islam after the Holy Book itself, was given over to fate,
subject to forgetfulness here, to distortion there and, finally, to the passing
away over a course of about 150 years of all those who had it stored in their
memory."
The exception in this regard were those who upheld the
(rights of the) Prophetic Household (ahl
al-bayt). They tirelessly
began recording and collecting from the very first period. There are narratives
relating how the Imams had collected a voluminous book in which are gathered
the words of the Messenger himself in the handwriting of Ali b. Abi Ta1ib's
Does anyone honestly believe that an artless course -
if, indeed, even artlessness is pertinent - such as eschewing all
questioning about an event prior to its occurrence, or of refusing to record
the Prophet's practices once they materialize, can ever make one equal to the
task of heading the new apostleship at the most critical and most difficult
phase of its protracted course? Does one really believe that the Messenger has
left his Tradition (sunnatahu) scattered about without record or
precision, while enjoining adherence to it? [76] Or, would it not have been
necessary to establish the statutes of "consultation" and to fix its
norms (if indeed he were preparing the way for such a system), so as to set it
on a stable and definite path, where idiosyncracies would not come into play. [77]
Is not the only reasonable explanation for this approach by
the Prophet that he prepared Imam Ali as the leading authority and for a
practical leadership after he is gone; indeed, pouring immeasurable knowledge
("a thousand doors") and turning his Tradition entirely over to him. [78]
Events after the Prophet's death have confirmed that the generation of Muhajirin and Ansar could not truly claim to be in
possession of definite instructions for the many significant problems
confronted by the Mission of Islam. So much so that neither the Caliph nor his
circle of supporters had any clear idea of how to govern the prodigious land
area, over which Islam had triumphed, according to the religious rule of law -
whether to distribute it to the soldiery or to make it an endowment for
collective use by the Muslims.' Is it conceivable that the Prophet would assure
the Muslims of their imminent triumph over the "Land of Khusrow and
Caesar," [80] making the Muhajirin and
Ansar custodians over the Mission of Islam to preside over this
conquest, but then fail to inform them how the religious rule of law needed to
be implemented over these great expanses of land that would soon to come into
the fold of Islam?
What is more, the generation contemporary with the Prophet
did not posses any clear, definite idea even of purely religious matters,
although the Prophet performed his acts hundreds of times in his Companions'
full view. One may mention, by way of example, the prayer for the dead. This is
an act of worship that had been openly performed by the Prophet numerous times.
He performed it at public funerals, which were open to all participants and
worshippers. Despite this, the Companions apparently did not consider it
necessary to know the ritual itself so long as the Prophet performed it and so
long as they followed him, step by step. As a result, they disagreed after his
death over how many times to utter exaltations to God during prayers over the
dead. Al-Tahawi related, on the authority of Ibrahim:
God's Messenger died while people were still arguing over
the exaltation of God at funerals. One could hardly wish for less than to hear
a man say, "I heard the Messenger exalt God five times'; and then another
to say, "I heard the Messenger exalt God four times." They disagreed
on this until the death of Abu Bakr. When Umar succeeded him and saw how
people disagreed, he became very troubled. So he communicated to some men from
among the Companions of the Messenger the following: "You are fellows to
the Companions of the Messenger: when you bring disagreement to the people,
they will [continue to] disagree after you. When you bring agreement concerning
a matter, people will agree on it." It was as if he had roused them from
sleep. For they answered, "What an excellent view, O Commander of the
Faithful!" [81]
Hence, the Companions used mostly to rely on the Prophet,
while he lived, sensing no immediate need to understand the legal rulings or
notions so long as they were in his charge. [82]
It might be argued that this depiction of the Companions,
together with whatever the records say about their lack of fitness to lead,
contradict what we generally believe - namely, that the moral education
given them by the Prophet was tremendously successful; since it brought into
being a towering, apostolic generation.
The answer to this is as follows. In the foregoing, we have
tried to establish an actual picture of the entire generation that witnessed
the Prophet's death, without finding anything that might contradict in any
significant way the positive value of the moral education given by the Prophet
during his noble life. The reason is that we believe Prophetic moral education,
at the same time, to be a stupendous instance of Divine (Grace) - indeed
the revival of a messengership quite unique in the lengthy history of
prophethood - we find that neither this belief nor a realistic valuation
of the product of such an education can stand solely on a picture of the final
results, separate from the circumstances and conditions. Nor can it be had by
noting the quantity apart from the quality.
To clarify, let us
consider the following example. Supposing there is a teacher teaching the
English language and its rules to a number of pupils. Now, let us suppose we
would like to evaluate his teaching abilities. We cannot be satisfied with the
teaching of the subject matter alone, nor with what the pupils managed to
assimilate or to grasp of the English language and its rules. Rather, we would
tie this to the time frame he needed to teach. We would also have to determine
the pupil's prior standing; their initial proximity or distance to an English
environment; the amount of difficulty or exceptional toil met with in the
process of teaching hindering its natural course; and, finally, the which the
teacher had in view as he taught his pupils the rules of language. The final
product is as much a function of the teaching process as it is of various other
pedagogical conditions. [83]
Concerning the valuation of the moral education given by the
Prophet, one must take into consideration:
One, the brevity of the period in which the Prophet had been
able to provide moral education; it did not exceed two decades from the oldest
companionship of those few who befriended him at the outset; it does not exceed
one decade relative to the Ansar, and is no more than three or four
years relative to the enormous numbers entering Islam -starting from the
Accord of Hudaybiyyah and onwards to the triumph over Mecca.
The second consideration concerns the (general) situation
prevailing before the Prophet had begun to play his role, the one experienced
intellectually, spiritually, religiously and behaviorally. It includes whatever
people happened to be bound to out of naivety, intellectual idleness and
impetuousness in diverse areas of life. I find no need to elaborate the point
further, it being self-evident that Islam was not a project for
superficial social change, but rather for a change at the roots. It was the
revolutionary construction of a new community. This implies a vast spiritual
parting of ways between, on the one hand, the new situation realized through
the Prophet's efforts to educate the Ummah; and, on the other, the one
that preceded. [84]
The third consideration has to do with the profusion of
events in this period - all kinds of political and military struggles
that took place on numerous fronts. This is a matter that distinguishes the
nature of the relation between the Prophet and his Companions from the type of
relation that existed between a person like Jesus Christ and his disciples. It
was not a relation that was quite that of a teacher or mentor devoted
exclusively to the training of his pupils, but one that corresponded to the
Prophet's position alike of mentor, military leader and head of state. [85]
The fourth concerns what the Muslims collectively faced as a
result of their friction with the People of the Book [86] and various religious
cultures encountered through social and doctrinal struggle. This friction,
along with what those imbued in previous religious cultures had maintained
within this forum, in opposition to the new Call, was a source of constant
agitation and disturbance. It is widely known that it gave shape to an
intellectual current based on Israelite legends, [87] which crept rather
spontaneously or inadvertently into many areas of thought. [88] A careful
perusal of the Qur'an is enough to reveal both the scope of the content of
counter-revolutionary thought and Divine Revelation's concern to guard
against and to contest its ideas. [89]
Fifthly, the goal which the mentor, at that stage, strove to
achieve at a general level was the creation of a healthy popular base that
would permit those presiding over the new Mission - whether in his
lifetime or thereafter - to collaborate with it and to persevere along
the path of experiment. At the time, the short term objective, as such, was not
to raise the Ummah up to the level of the leadership itself, in a way
that required complete understanding of the Message or a comprehensive grasp of
its precepts. It did not demand absolute adherence to its ideas. At that stage,
to define the goal with this in mind is quite logical, and necessary with
respect to the nature of the drive for change. It would be unreasonable to
prescribe a goal that is incompatible with practical possibilities. Practical
possibility in a situation such as the one Islam faced could never exist except
within the limits alluded to here, since the spiritual, intellectual and social
division between the new Mission and the corrupt reality that prevailed at the
time did. not allow people to rise to a level at which they could immediately
lead the Mission. We shall elaborate on this in the next point, [90]
demonstrating its modality -which is that the continuity of guardianship
with respect to the new and revolutionary experience is best embodied in the imamate of the Prophetic Household (ahl al-bayt) and Ali's Succession. It was inevitable, imposed by the logic of
change upon the course of history.
Sixthly, the Prophet left behind a large portion of the Ummah comprised of those who became Muslims
after the Conquest - that is, who entered Islam after Mecca had been won
over [91] and after the new Mission had become politically and militarily
preponderant in the Arabian Peninsula. The Prophet had had scant opportunity to
deal with these Muslims in the brief period that followed the conquest. The
bulk of his dealings with them, in his capacity as sovereign, was strictly a
function of the juncture that the Islamic State was passing through. It was at that
juncture that the idea of "those whose hearts were brought together"
(al-mu'allafah qulubuhum) appeared, one that acquired a place in
the legislation concerning almsgiving (zakat) [92] and other procedures.
But this part of the Ummah was
not isolated from others; it merged with them. It was influential and was, in
turn, influenced.
Viewed within the framework established by these six issues,
Prophetic moral education yielded prodigious results; it achieved a unique
transformation and brought up a righteous generation wellsuited for what the
Prophet was aiming for: to form a sound, popular base that could rally support
around the leadership in this new experiment. But this generation appears then
to have acted as a sound, popular base so long as well-guided leadership
was embodied iii the Prophet. If the leadership had been able to maintain this
Divine course, the base would have played its true role. This in no way implies
that it was ready in practice to assume this leadership, or itself to steer the
Islamic experiment. Such a readiness requires a greater degree of pious and
spiritual merging with the Call, much better comprehension of its precepts,
concepts and various perspectives on life. It required a more thorough
cleansing of its ranks of the "Hypocrites," infiltrators and
"those whose hearts were brought together [93] - who collectively
continued to form a portion of this generation having a certain numerical
importance, [94] and historical factuality. This segment had its negative
effects, as indicated by the sheer bulk of what the Qur'an says about the
Hypocrites, their schemes and postures. It nevertheless had individuals -
such as Salman, Abu Dharr, Ammar and others - whom experience was able
to mold exquisitely for an apostolic purpose and of assimilating in its
crucible. [95]
That these individuals were found among the larger
generation taken as a whole, in my view, hardly proves that the latter ever
collectively attained the kind of level that could justify vesting it with the
tasks of the Islamic experiment simply on the basis of consultation. Even the
majority of these individuals - as lofty of manner, deeply loyal or
sincere as they may have been towards the Call of Islam - did not have in
them anything that justified assuming they were apostolically qualified to
preside, either intellectually or culturally, over this experience. Islam is
not just a human outlook to be intellectually worked out in the course of
practice and application, [96] and its concepts crystallized through faithful experimentation.
It is the very Message of God whose precepts, or concepts, are delimited and
endowed with the general legal provisions demanded by the experience. [97]
Leadership in the Islamic experiment cannot do without a grasp of the details
and limits of the Message; it has to attend to its precepts and concepts. [98]
Otherwise, it will be forced to look to mental precedents and to its own tribal
underpinnings. And that would lead to certain regression for the course of the
experiment; particularly when one notes that Islam constitutes the seal of all
the heavenly messages: it has to stretch over time, transcending the
limitations of era, region and nation. [99] This fact did not permit the
leadership that was to establish the foundation for this temporal span to
engage in trial and error, heaping mistake upon mistake over time until the
resulting hiatus threatened the entire experiment with breakdown and collapse.
[100]
All of the above suggests that the instruction administered
by the Prophet to the Muhajirin and the Ansar, at a general
level, was not such as would be required for the preparation of a leadership
intellectually or politically mindful of the future of the Islamic Call and the
drive for change. It was a kind of instruction, rather, that was conducive to
building a watchful popular base, one which could rally around the Mission's
present and future leadership.
Any hypothesis claiming that the Prophet had been planning
to hand over leadership of the experiment and custodianship after his death
immediately to the Muhajirin and Ansar would
entail, among other things, having to accuse the most sensible and discerning
leader in the entire history of reform, one bearing a Divine Message, of being
incapable of distinguishing between two things: a level of awareness called for
by the popular base of the Mission, and one called for by the Mission's
leadership, intellectual and political guidance.
Third Issue
The Call of Islam is for change and a new way of life. It
aims at building a new Ummah, extirpating
every root and trace of pre-Islam.
Collectively, the Islamic Ummah had hardly been under the aegis of this movement of change for
more than a single decade, at most. In the logic of doctrinal missions -
or any calling for change, for that matter - this short span of time was
insufficient to raise a generation under the tutelage of the Call to some level
of awareness, objectivity and emancipation from the dregs of the past. [101] It
did not allow it to fathom fully what this new Call offered; nor could it help
it, leaderless, to qualify for custodianship, bear full responsibility and
complete the drive for change. The logic of doctrinal missions impels toward
doctrinal tutelage for the Ummah for
a longer period of time, permitting it to adapt to the custodians' higher
level. [102]
This is not something that can simply be inferred. It
describes a truth demonstrated by the events that took place after the
Prophet's death. It manifested itself within half-a-century or less
of practice by the Muhajirin and the Ansar - leading and assuming custody of
the Mission. No sooner had a quarter of a century of custodianship passed than
the "Rightly-Guided Caliphate" and the Islamic experiment led
by the Muhajirin and the Ansar began to -crumble under the heavy
blows delivered by Islam's old enemies [103] - although from within, not from
without.
The latter were able gradually to penetrate the executive
centers and furtively to exploit the leadership, which they then impudently and
fiercely wrenched control of. They compelled the Ummah, its first and foremost generation, to
abdicate its identity and headship. Governing was thus transformed into
hereditary kingship, [104] characterized by a disregard for respectability,
slaying of the innocent, [105] squandering of wealth, [106] suspension of punishments and freezing of legal
rulings, [107] and playing with people's destinies. Land and spoils became the
Quraysh's only requital, as the sons of Bani Umayyah jostled over the Caliphate.
[108] The situation in which the experiment found itself after the Prophet was
gone, along with the consequences that shook it violently a quarter-century
later, support -our reasoning - which is that an immediate transfer
of political and intellectual authority to the Muhajirun and the Ansar after the Prophet's death was a step
too early to take and not at all timely.
Therefore, that the Prophet had ever taken such a step is
simply untenable.
[33] Dr. Abd al-Aziz al-Duri, al Nuzum al-islamiyyah (Baghdad:
Matba'at Najib, 1950), p. 7; Dr. Subhi al-Salih, al Nuzum al-islamiyyah (Dar al--Ilm lil-Malayin,1965),
p. 50.
[34] In his book al-Nazariyyat
al-siyasiyyah al-islamiyyah, Dr. Dia' al-Din al-Rayyis has
acknowledged that the Caliphate in that form upon which rests the consultative
order has no basis in the hadiths. Rather,
it was based on a consensus among the Prophet's Companions, or Sahabah, on the grounds that it was
predominant (p. 106, in a note in response to Arnold). This becomes clearer
upon his response to and debate with Dr. 'Ali Abd al-Razzaq, in al-Islam wa usul al-hukm, as the latter
denies the existence of any contemporaneous legal text which could have
benefited the system of politics and government. However, Dr. al-Rayyis
answers by arguing on the basis of the actual practice of the Righteous Caliphs
(al-khulafa al-rashidin). Their deeds are of decisive legal
value in Islam (p. 148-45). See the reliable and exhaustive discussion on
the text that is alleged to deal with "consultation" in Allamah al-Sayyid
Kazim al-Ha'iri, Asas al-hukumah al-islamiyyah (Beirut: Matbaat al-Nil, 1399 AH), p. 81 ff.
[35] That is, leadership of the Imam.
[36] Imam 'Ali disavowed the idea of consultation and the
recourse to it by those who attended the Conference of Saqifah, where Abu Bakr
had used the pretext of his closeness to the Prophet. See the
"Shaqshaqiyyah Address" and, in particular, Ali words, "What a
consultation!..." (Nahj al-Balaghah.
Sharh al-Imam Muhammad Abduh I:30, 34).
[37] Note the discussions and arguments that took place on
the Day of Saqiqah, as there was no mention, either explicit or implicit, of
"consultation." What did arise was quite different, including the
thesis of "One Amir from us, one from you." Abu Bakr, and after him
Umar b. al-Khattab, rejected this idea, which the latter hastened to lay
to rest by taking Abu Bakr's hand and saying: "Open thy hand that I may
swear thee in..." For texts relating to the Saqfah, see Tarikh al-Tabari (Dar al-Turath)
II:234ff, esp. p. 203; also Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh al-Nahj, ed. Abu al-Fadl
Ibrahim VI:6-9.
[38] Ibn Manzur, Mukhtasar
Tarikh Damashq XV III:310; Tarikh al-Tabari' II:352.
[39] Ta'rirkh
al-Yaqubi II:126 (Tab'at al-Najaf al-Haydariyyah)
-Imam. Cf. Mukhtasar Tarikh Ibn
Asakir XVIII:310; Tarikh al-Tabari, First Edition IV:52 (al-Husayniyyah al-Misriyyah).
[40] In Mukhtasar
Tarikh Ibn Asakir XVIII:312, Qays b. Ab1 Hazim is recorded as
saying: "Umar left us, document in hand and accompanied by Shadid, his
protege, saying. "O People, hearken to the words of the Successor of God's
Messenger, I wish for you Umar, so accept his oath." In another version:
"Hearken and obey what is contained in this paper."
[41] Umar said to Suhayb: "Lead the prayers for three
days. Then admit Ali, Uthman, al-Zubayr, Sad, Abd al-Rahman b.
Awf and Talhah, if he comes forward. Have Abd Allah b. Umar attend, even
though the matter concerns him little. And observe them: if five of them are in
unison over one man and a sixth declines, extirpate the latter or strike off
his head with your sword., If only four agree on someone from their midst and
two decline, then strike both their heads; if three accept one man and three
another, then let Abd Allah b. Umar adjudicate in favour of one side, from
which he is to select one man. Should they disagree with Abd Allah b. Umar's
judgement, take then Abd al-Rahman b. Awf's side and slay the rest if
they are loathe to accept what people have agreed on..." Cf Tarikh al-Tabari II:581; Ibn Athir, al-Kamil
fi al-ta'rikh III:67 (Tabat Dar Sadir). This text has no commentary.
[42] Tabaqat
b. Sad III:343 (Beirut: Tabat Dar Sadir) -
Imam. Cf. Tarikh alTabari II:580 (Dar al-Ilmiyyah). The report here differs from Ibn Sad's.
[43] Ta'rikh
al-Tabari Third Edition II:354 (Beirut: Tabat Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah,
1408 AH) - Imam.
[44] Ibid
II:242.
[45] Ibid. II:235
[46] 'Ibid
II:242. Imam 'Ali responded by arguing something similar to the
following, found in Mukhtasar Ta'rikh Ibn
Sad XVIII 38-9.
If the pursuit of Islam and faith alone could qualify a
human being for the Caliphate, besides a necessary propinquity with the
Prophet, or that he is friend and kin, then Ali has gone the farthest in the
worship of God and faith in the Prophet's Message. Indeed, his worship of God
was not preceded by idolatry - he has never prostrated himself before
idols - unlike all the others. As for his proximity to the Messenger, he
was his closest kin. Strictly speaking, he was his heir [wali], brother and vicar -
the only person to lead in his stead. (Cf. Musnad
al-Imam Ahmad IV:281)
According to this reasoning, he is the most rightful person
to succeed, no other.
[47] Tarikh
al-Tabari II:241 ff, for events in 11 AH.
[48] Ibid
II:243; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh
Nahj al-Balaghah VI:6-9 - Imam.
[49] Ta'rikh
al-Tabari II:354.
[50] This is because, going by the present hypothesis, if
attention had been drawn to such a system, as would invariably be required,
then we would have come across a specific concept in texts pertaining to this
generation, or some specific application. However, nothing of the sort has been
detected, as the Imam Baqir al-Sadr rightly pointed out.
[51] Because instruction normally occurs in his noble
biography and blessed tradition, but bearing on issues of a lesser nature and
importance than this question; it takes place in myriad contexts or situations.
[52] The abiding truth is that all details pertaining to the
idea of consultation have vanished even at a level which might have defined its
most basic features as a system of rule, as it has not been related that any of
the contenders, whether at the conference of Saqifah or afterwards, had come
forward with or clung to a single text in any degree. For the Saqifah texts,
see Ta'rikh al-Tabari II:234ff.
[53] That a system of governance in the Arabian Peninsula
did not exist, before the advent of prophethood and the founding of the Islamic
State at Medina, is something that historians accept, on the one hand, in view
of the undoubted absence of a genuine state; and, on the other, to the Arabs'
diffidence to tribal customs and traditions. Cf. Dr. Salih Ahmad al Ali, Muhadarat
fi ta'rikh al-Arab, Second
Edition (Baghdad); Dr.Abd al-Latif al-Taybawi; Muhadarat fi-ta'rikh al-Arab al-Islam
I:121 (Beirut: Dar al Andalus, 1963); Dr. Jawad Ali; Ta'rikh al-Arab qabl al-Islam.
Al Qism al siyasi (Tabat Dar al-Majma al Ilmi al-Iraqi);
Dr. Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, Ta'rikh al-Islam
al-siyasi, p. 51.
[54] This is in respect of the need for sufficient
clarification to help settle the issue of leadership, now left vacant; thus
averting the dreaded dangers that accompany the absence of precise standards in
this connection.
[55] That is, as is the case with every legal
responsibility, for this will be elaborated on. This was exactly what the
Prophet was wont to hold regarding all legal responsibilities. God says:
"We brought down a remembrance that ye may clarify to the people what has
come down to them" (Qur'an 16:44 "al-Nahl") If
it were legally-sanctioned rule, a duty that had to to be performed by
those qualified, it would have required clarification.
[56] That is, as came to pass in the attempt to expunge the
principle of walayah (or "guardianship") in Ali's case. Despite
this, the relevant texts have not all disappeared Many texts have come down
through recurrent and uninterrupted transmission. Cf. Ibn Manzur, Mukhtasar Ta'rikh Ibn Asakir, XVII:356ff, XVIII:1-50.
If there were any texts or statements on consultation as a system, they have
passed into oblivion.
[57] See the appended study. Cf. Ibn Manzur, Mukhtasar Ta'rikh Ibn Asakir XVII:354, XVIII:I-50; Abu Na'im, Hilyat al-awliya' I:66; Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabaqat al-kubra II:338; al-Qanduzi,
Yanabi al-mawaddah I:62ff; al-Nassa'i, al-Sunan
al-kubra and al Khasais V:128ff.
[58] It is noteworthy that the Muslim writers investigating
the question of political order or the Caliphate, who dismiss the whole idea of
stipulation and designation (illustrated by hundreds of Prophetic traditions),
relying instead on the notion of a consultative system and using the Qur'an
among other sources, have not come across any Prophetic texts in support of
their claims. As a result, they are compelled to rely on the biographies of the
Companions. And yet, they have not been able to give a logical interpretation
for the Companions' rather confused and incongruous situation in the midst of
which a successor was appointed. Cf Dr. al-Rayyis, al-Nazariyyat al siyasiyah al-islamiyyah; Abd al-Fattah
Abd al -Maqsud, al-Saqifah
mal-khilafah.
[59] Cf. Ibn Manzur, Mukhtasar
Ta'rikh Ibn Asakir XVIII:230, on the story concerning al-Sha'bi,
who was with Talhah, al-Zubayr, Said and Abd al-Rahman.
[60] Ta'rikh
al-Tabari, First Edition II:92 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al--Ilmiyyah).
This relates to the Prophetic hadith at
the time when a trench was being dug.
[61] Cf.
Sunan Abi Daud, on account of its specialty in hadiths on legal rulings; Imam Malik's al-Muwatta ; with a total of 1570 hadiths, some of which are mursal.
[62] The four volumes of Ibn Hajar's al-Isabah fi tamyiz al-sahabah count up to 12,267. See Dr. Akram
Diya' al-Umar's Buhuth fi ta'rikh
al-sunnah al-musharaffah, Third edition (Beirut. Mu'assasat al-Risalah,1975)
(the note on p. 71). Cf. Dr. Subhi al-Salih,
Ulum al-hadith wa
mustalahahu, p. 354. It is related on Abu Zar'ah that the Prophet left
behind 114,000 Companions.
[63] Dr. Subhi al-Salih, Nahj al-balaghah, Imam Alis's Sermon No. 210, p. 327. He
said: "Not all of the Messenger's Companions used to question or query
him, so much so that they preferred that a Bedouin or a complete stranger to
ask and they listen. But none of it would go past me without my asking and
retaining..."
[64] Sunan
al-Darimi I:50 (Nashr Dar Ihya' al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah).
[65] Ibid
I:50 - Imam.
[66] Ibid. I:50 - Imam.
[67] Ibid
1:50 - Imam.
[68] Qur'-an 70:27-31, "Abasa'.
[69] Al-Suyuti, al-Itiqan
fi Ulum Qur'an II:4, ed.
Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim.
[70] Shafiite legal interpretation (ijtihad) dismisses the
two theories of "legal or juridical discretion" (istihsan) and
"unbounded interests" (al-masalih
al-mursalah), as religious
law (al-shariah) takes it upon itself to clarify every
legal ruling needed by man, whether through explicit text, allusively or
legally-sanctioned analogy, This is because legal discretion has no
regulative mechanism or scale by which one can weigh the true against the
false. It is reported that Shafi'i had said, "To use legal discretion is
to legislate." See al-Madkhal
al fiqhi al-amm by Dr. Mustafa al-Zarqa I:124-25.
[71] On the question
of the writing of the hadiths, their
prohibition and subsequent endorsement, what was found and recorded by Dr.
Subhi al-Salih, 'Ulum al-hadith
wa mustalihihi (Tab'at Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin), p. 20ff (in
the notes).
[72] Ibid.. See also Sunan
al-Darimi I:119 (Ch. "Who ought to disregard the
written hadihs?" ["man lam
yara kitabat al-hadith"]).
[73] Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabaqat
al-kubra III:287 (Tabat Dar Bayrut,1405 AH).
[74] The first official collection of traditions was written
by Muhammad b. Muslim b. Shahab al-Zuhri (dd.124 Al-1), as ordered
by Umar b. Abd al--Aziz. He is said to have affirmed: "This
knowledge has never been put into a collection before." Cf. Dr. Subhi al-Salih,
Ulum al-hadith wa mustalihatuhu, p. 46.
[75] Usul
al-Kafi I:241-42 (Ch. "Dhikr al-sahifah wal jafr wal jamiah") (Tehran: Nashr Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah,
1388 AH).
[76] As in Hadith al-thaqlayn
("Two Weights': "Verily, I have left among you that by which,
if you adhere to it, you shall never go astray after I am gone...," whose
reliability has been indicated above; see, for example, Sahih Muslim
IV:1874; cf. Muhammad Taqi al-Hakim, al- Usul al-Ammah, his study
on the Sunnah.
[77] In n. 17 above, we alluded to issues concerning the
confused matter of consultation, differences over its proper criteria and features
from one Caliph to the other. Cf. Abd al-Fattah Abd al-Maqsud, al-Saqifah wal-khilafah, p. 264.
[78] Cf Shaykh al-Mufid, al-Irshad, p. 22; al-Qanduzi, Yanabi al-mawaddah I:62. See also this book's appendix,
"The Intellectual and Moral Upbringing of lmam Ali..."
[79] Ibn al-Arabi, Ahkam al-Qur'an IV:1778
("al-Hashr"); cf, al-Baladhuri, Futuh al buldan, p. 268.
[80] On the prophecy
of their conquest, see Tarik al-Tabari II:92
(Beirut: Dar al Kutub al ilmiyyah).
[81] Umdat
al-qari; Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari VIII:137, Ch. "Takbir ala al janazah" (Beirut:
Dar Ihya' al-Turath) - Imam.
[82] Dr. Mustafah Abd al-Razzaq, Tamhid li-Ta'rikh al falsafah, p. 272.
[83] The Imam splendidly draws attention to the precise
criteria for the task of teaching and its final product. These criteria and
observations are relevant to any effort at intellectual or moral training -
and, likewise, to the effort to give a substantial appraisal of a similar case.
[84] On what made Arabian and Hijazi society what it is
before Islam, see Dr. Jawad Ali, Tarikh al-arab qabl Islam
(Sections on "religion" and "society'.)
[85] Indeed, the variety of responsibilities and their
natures, the challenges encountered by the Prophet as leader were so serious
that the he could not find sufficient time to complete his education and
instruction of wide sectors of the Islamic community. Cf. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim,
Ulum al-Qur'an, pp. 96-100.
[86] In its wider sense, the expression "People of the
Book" refers to Jews, Christians and Muslims, but often refers to the
former two when interreligious relations are the subject - Translator.
[87] In reference to legends about people or events of the
Israelite period -Translator.
[88] Cf. Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabi, al-Isra'ilayat
fi tafsir wal-hadith (Damascus: Dar al-Iman, 1985).
[89] Cf "Surat al-Munafiqun" of the
Qur an. One might note here the actions and movements of the Jews, the roles
they played in Islamic history; cf. Muhammad Jawad Mughniyyah, al-Isra'iliyyat
fi al-Qur'an (Beirut).
[90] That is, the following chapter entitled "The Third
Path."
[91] Al-Zamakhshari, Tafsir al-Kashshaf IV: 810 ("Tafsir Surat al-Nasr").
[92] As God says in the Qur an: "Alms are for the poor
and the humble, those who administer it and for those whose hearts have been
reconciled, for those in bondage, in debt and in the way of God; and for the
wayfarer: Thus is it ordained by God..." (Qur an 9:60 "Surat al-Tawbah")
[93] They appear to be numerous so as to constitute a burden
upon the State's financial reserves, whose concellation the second Caliph had
defended on the argument that Islam had become mighty and powerful.
[94] This is readily available in most interpretations of Surat al-Munafiqin.
[95] As the Prophet said, "God hath commanded me to
love four [persons], telling me of His Love of them: Ali, Abu Dharr, al-Miqdad
and Salman" (Sunan Ibn Majjah, I:66). Cf. al-Tajj al jai lil-usul III:405.
[96] Among circles of theorists and thinkers, a common
statement is that theory is enriched through application. That is why the Imam
points out that Islam is not of this sort.
[97] Cf "Nothing have we ommitted from the
Book..." (Qur'an 6:38 "Surat al An'am"...and we sent down
to thee the Book explaining all things..." (Qur'an 16:89 "Surat al
Nahl") ...so take what the Messenger assigns to you, and deny
yourselves..." (Qur an 59:7
"Sural al-Hashr")
[98] See our study appended at the end of this book.
[99] We have not sent thee but [as a Messenger] to all
men..." (Qur an 34:28, "Surat Saba") We have not sent
thee but as Mercy for all..." (Qur'an 21:107, "Surat al Anbiya")
[100] The Prophet Muhammad wanted to spare his Ummah
the bitterness and pains that go with trial and error, along with the suffering
and calamity this may bring upon it He said: "Come! Let me write you a
letter that you may never go astray after I am gone..." Yet the greatest
loss - as expressed by Ibn 'Abbas - was that the Messenger was
prevented from doing so. See the story in Sahih
al-Bukhari VIII:161 (Ch.
"al I'tisam").
[101] Note the cases of defection and apostasy after the
Prophet had died, all the plain inconsistencies and departures from Islam's
clarities and morality committed even by some high-ranking military
chiefs - as in the case of Khalid b. al-Walid who, in the story of
Malik b. Nuwayrah, was accused by the second Caliph Umar of "killing a
Muslim [i.e. Malik b. Nuwayrah] and then coveting his wife." Cf. Tarikh al-Tabari II:280 (Beirut:
Dar al-Turath), the edited printing.
[102] That was the logic of previous missions, as in Da'ud's
(David's) succession by Sulayman (Solomon); similar Musas (Moses succession by
Harun (Aaron): "He said, Be heir of my people and be just..."
Finally, this is necessitated by the logic of things and that of the final
Religious Law (al-Shariah). Cf Appendix.
[103] He means to allude to those who embraced Islam at the
time of the taking of Mecca. Among "those whose hearts were brought
together" was Abu Sufyan and Mu awiyah, Tarikh al-Tabari II:175.
[104] Cf. Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqaddamah
(Tabat Dar al Jil), p. 227 ("The Transformation of the Caliphate into
a Monarchy" Ibn Athir III:199 (Tabat al Halabli) relates that Abd al-Rahman
b. Abi Bakr interrupted Marwan, as the latter was giving sermon from the minbar of Medina, in order to defend
Muawiyah's point of view, shouting at him, "By God! you lie as much as
Mu'awiyah. Neither of you intends anything good for the Ummah. You want to make it Heraclean;
whenever an Heraclius dies another rises in his place." Cf. al-Suyuti,
Tarikh al-khulafa p.
203.
[105] Ibn Athir III:487 relates that Hasan al-Basri,
one of the most prominent of those who succeeded the Companions, had stated,
"Murawiyah has four traits; if he had but one trait, it would be
violation. His leaping upon this Ummah sword in hand to seize power, without any deliberation, while
there were Companions of virtue; bequeathing the throne to his drunkard son
Yazid; making his claims on Ziyad; killing Hajar b. Adi and his confidants.
Woe upon him for Hajar! Woe upon him for Hajar and his confidants!..."
[106] Cf. al-Tajj al jami lil usul V:310; for further
details, see Sayyid Qutb's al-Adalah
al-ijtimaiyyah fi al-Islam, p. 231 ff
[107] See what al-Suyuti relates in his Tarikh, p. 209ff, regarding "What abominable
transgressions were perpetrated by Yazid against the Prophet's grandson,
Husayn; the confinement of the rest of the family; the assault on Mecca,
seizure of Medina, killing of its inhabitants and outrages against loved
ones!"
[108] He means Abu Sufyan's statement to Uthman upon
acceding to power. Cf. al Suyuti, Tarikh al-khulafa; p. 209; al-Maqrizi, al-Naza
wal-takhasum bayna Bani Hashim wa Bani Umayyah, ed. Dr. Mu'nis, p.
56.
