THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

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THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE [Electronic resources] - نسخه متنی

Peter Szor

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  • 8.6. DoS (Denial of Service) Attacks


    In the past, researchers commonly believed that targeted attacks against selected computers or organizations were not possible using computer viruses. But modern operating systems in the networked world give attackers with political motivations the potential to carry out successful attacks against targeted businesses, such as financial institutions.8.9. Eventually, the east coast experienced power loss, including the area of New York City.

    In the end, Blaster worm infections happened so rapidly that vulnerable systems could not be connected to the compromised networks (unless they were protected by a personal firewall) to download the security patches because the worm hit the compromised machine almost immediately. Blaster attempted to attack the Windows Update Web site; however, the attacker failed to pick the right target, so the attack was not successful against the real site. Evidently, a successful attack against the Windows Update site would make it even harder to patch vulnerable systems because the updates would be more difficult to download. Someone could argue, however, that it was hard enough to download the update because vulnerable systems could easily get infected before the patches could be downloaded and installed on them.

    On July 16, 2001, the Chinese W32/CodeRed worm attempted to execute a targeted DoS attack against www.whitehouse.gov (with the IP address 198.137.240.91) by connecting continuously to the site. In response to the attack, the IP address was quickly changed. However, the worm carried another payload that targeted systems using U.S. English codepage (0x409).

    In such a case, the worm installed a hook routine on the TcpSockSend() function of the INFOCOMM.DLL module of Microsoft IIS. The worm's hook routine did not let an infected system access an189 content. Instead, the worm displayed the page shown in Figure 8.7 for all Web access.

    Figure 8.7. The activation routine of the CodeRed worm.

    Chapters 9 and 10, "Exploits, Vulnerabilities, and Buffer Overflow Attacks".) For the sake of completeness, though, it is interesting to mention here that Slapper was designed to build a peer-to-peer network of compromised systems to execute DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks. This allowed the attacker to connect to one infected node and control all infected "zombie" systems connected to that node from a single location by sending commands to all at the same time. Each copy of the worm carried a command interface that the attacker could use to execute various types of DoS attacks, including several flooding techniques. Although a few unconnected attack networks were found, the largest network consisted of nearly 20,000 zombie systems waiting for the attacker's commands.Chapter 3, "Malicious Code Environments"), on Microsoft WebTV systems, was an example of such an attack. The worm simply reconfigured the WebTV system to call 911 instead of the default ISP phone number.


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