THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

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THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE [Electronic resources] - نسخه متنی

Peter Szor

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  • Acknowledgments

    Contact Information

    Part I. STRATEGIES OF THE ATTACKER

    Chapter 1. Introduction to the Games of Nature

    Section 1.1. Early Models of Self-Replicating Structures

    Section 1.2. Genesis of Computer Viruses

    Section 1.3. Automated Replicating Code: The Theory and Definition of Computer Viruses

    References

    Chapter 2. The Fascination of Malicious Code Analysis

    Section 2.1. Common Patterns of Virus Research

    Section 2.2. Antivirus Defense Development

    Section 2.3. Terminology of Malicious Programs

    Section 2.4. Other Categories

    Section 2.5. Computer Malware Naming Scheme

    Section 2.6. Annotated List of Officially Recognized Platform Names

    References

    Chapter 3. Malicious Code Environments

    Section 3.1. Computer Architecture Dependency

    Section 3.2. CPU Dependency

    Section 3.3. Operating System Dependency

    Section 3.4. Operating System Version Dependency

    Section 3.5. File System Dependency

    Section 3.6. File Format Dependency

    Section 3.7. Interpreted Environment Dependency

    Section 3.8. Vulnerability Dependency

    Section 3.9. Date and Time Dependency

    Section 3.10. JIT Dependency: Microsoft .NET Viruses

    Section 3.11. Archive Format Dependency

    Section 3.12. File Format Dependency Based on Extension

    Section 3.13. Network Protocol Dependency

    Section 3.14. Source Code Dependency

    Section 3.15. Resource Dependency on Mac and Palm Platforms

    Section 3.16. Host Size Dependency

    Section 3.17. Debugger Dependency

    Section 3.18. Compiler and Linker Dependency

    Section 3.19. Device Translator Layer Dependency

    Section 3.20. Embedded Object Insertion Dependency

    Section 3.21. Self-Contained Environment Dependency

    Section 3.22. Multipartite Viruses

    Section 3.23. Conclusion

    References

    Chapter 4. Classification of Infection Strategies

    Section 4.1. Boot Viruses

    Section 4.2. File Infection Techniques

    Section 4.3. An In-Depth Look at Win32 Viruses

    Section 4.4. Conclusion

    References

    Chapter 5. Classification of In-Memory Strategies

    Section 5.1. Direct-Action Viruses

    Section 5.2. Memory-Resident Viruses

    Section 5.3. Temporary Memory-Resident Viruses

    Section 5.4. Swapping Viruses

    Section 5.5. Viruses in Processes (in User Mode)

    Section 5.6. Viruses in Kernel Mode (Windows 9x/Me)

    Section 5.7. Viruses in Kernel Mode (Windows NT/2000/XP)

    Section 5.8. In-Memory Injectors over Networks

    References

    Chapter 6. Basic Self-Protection Strategies

    Section 6.1. Tunneling Viruses

    Section 6.2. Armored Viruses

    Section 6.3. Aggressive Retroviruses

    References

    Chapter 7. Advanced Code Evolution Techniques and Computer Virus Generator Kits

    Section 7.1. Introduction

    Section 7.2. Evolution of Code

    Section 7.3. Encrypted Viruses

    Section 7.4. Oligomorphic Viruses

    Section 7.5. Polymorphic Viruses

    Section 7.6. Metamorphic Viruses

    Section 7.7. Virus Construction Kits

    References

    Chapter 8. Classification According to Payload

    Section 8.1. No-Payload

    Section 8.2. Accidentally Destructive Payload

    Section 8.3. Nondestructive Payload

    Section 8.4. Somewhat Destructive Payload

    Section 8.5. Highly Destructive Payload

    Section 8.6. DoS (Denial of Service) Attacks

    Section 8.7. Data Stealers: Making Money with Viruses

    Section 8.8. Conclusion

    References

    Chapter 9. Strategies of Computer Worms

    Section 9.1. Introduction

    Section 9.2. The Generic Structure of Computer Worms

    Section 9.3. Target Locator

    Section 9.4. Infection Propagators

    Section 9.5. Common Worm Code Transfer and Execution Techniques

    Section 9.6. Update Strategies of Computer Worms

    Section 9.7. Remote Control via Signaling

    Section 9.8. Intentional and Accidental Interactions

    Section 9.9. Wireless Mobile Worms

    References

    Chapter 10. Exploits, Vulnerabilities, and Buffer Overflow Attacks

    Section 10.1. Introduction

    Section 10.2. Background

    Section 10.3. Types of Vulnerabilities

    Section 10.4. Current and Previous Threats

    Section 10.5. Summary

    References

    Part II. STRATEGIES OF THE DEFENDER

    Chapter 11. Antivirus Defense Techniques

    Section 11.1. First-Generation Scanners

    Section 11.2. Second-Generation Scanners

    Section 11.3. Algorithmic Scanning Methods

    Section 11.4. Code Emulation

    Section 11.5. Metamorphic Virus Detection Examples

    Section 11.6. Heuristic Analysis of 32-Bit Windows Viruses

    Section 11.7. Heuristic Analysis Using Neural Networks

    Section 11.8. Regular and Generic Disinfection Methods

    Section 11.9. Inoculation

    Section 11.10. Access Control Systems

    Section 11.11. Integrity Checking

    Section 11.12. Behavior Blocking

    Section 11.13. Sand-Boxing

    Section 11.14. Conclusion

    References

    Chapter 12. Memory Scanning and Disinfection

    Section 12.1. Introduction

    Section 12.2. The Windows NT Virtual Memory System

    Section 12.3. Virtual Address Spaces

    Section 12.4. Memory Scanning in User Mode

    Section 12.5. Memory Scanning and Paging

    Section 12.6. Memory Disinfection

    Section 12.7. Memory Scanning in Kernel Mode

    Section 12.8. Possible Attacks Against Memory Scanning

    Section 12.9. Conclusion and Future Work

    References

    Chapter 13. Worm-Blocking Techniques and Host-Based Intrusion Prevention

    Section 13.1. Introduction

    Section 13.2. Techniques to Block Buffer Overflow Attacks

    Section 13.3. Worm-Blocking Techniques

    Section 13.4. Possible Future Worm Attacks

    Section 13.5. Conclusion

    References

    Chapter 14. Network-Level Defense Strategies

    Section 14.1. Introduction

    Section 14.2. Using Router Access Lists

    Section 14.3. Firewall Protection

    Section 14.4. Network-Intrusion Detection Systems

    Section 14.5. Honeypot Systems

    Section 14.6. Counterattacks

    Section 14.7. Early Warning Systems

    Section 14.8. Worm Behavior Patterns on the Network

    Section 14.9. Conclusion

    References

    Chapter 15. Malicious Code Analysis Techniques

    Section 15.1. Your Personal Virus Analysis Laboratory

    Section 15.2. Information, Information, Information

    Section 15.3. Dedicated Virus Analysis on VMWARE

    Section 15.4. The Process of Computer Virus Analysis

    Section 15.5. Maintaining a Malicious Code Collection

    Section 15.6. Automated Analysis: The Digital Immune System

    References

    Chapter 16. Conclusion

    Further Reading

    Index

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  • 9.9. Wireless Mobile Worms


    The SymbOS/Cabir worm40 indicates a totally new era of computer worms that will slowly become more popular as wireless smart phones replace current mobile phone systems, which have limited programming ability. The Cabir worm appeared in June 2004, and it has a number of unique features. This worm can run on Nokia 60 series phones running the Symbian operating system. The Symbian operating system is based on the EPOC. In fact, Symbian is EPOC version 6, also called EPOC32, but has a new name.

    Interestingly, the Cabir worm spreads using the Bluetooth feature of wireless phones as shown in Figure 9.20.

    Figure 9.20. The attacker phone is on the left, and the recipient is on the right.

    The worm's code is compatible with mobile phones using ARM series processors with Symbian operating system. Normally, by default the Bluetooth communication feature is off on mobile phones. Mobile phone users might exchange some little programs, and in doing so they open up the Bluetooth communication channel to Cabir-like worms as well.

    When executed, Cabir installs itself into several directories of the Symbian OS intending to make sure it will run each time the user boots the phone. Fortunately, this operation is disallowed in newer phone models. However, on older phones, worm components cannot be easily found without using custom file manager applications. Cabir does not enumerate Bluetooth devices; instead, it tries to find only the first such device and communicates with that device. The standard Bluetooth range is about 30 feet, and apparently not all Bluetooth devices like to communicate with each other. (However, researchers such as Mark Rowe are experienced with Bluetooth signal amplification and pointed out that attackers could utilize such technology to extend the Bluetooth range to about 300 feet, reliably.) In addition, researchers such as Ollie Whitehouse of @stake also demonstrated that Bluetooth devices are discoverable even in the so-called "non-discoverable" mode41. Several Bluetooth-related attack tools exist today including the most popular Bluesniff, Btscanner, PSMscan, and Redfang.42, while others can be used to implement phishing attacks on a number of smart phones types43.

    Sure enough, in the future you can expect that worms are going to make phone calls from your mobile phone instead of you. There might be a new era of MMS- (Multimedia Messaging Service) based mass mailer worms as well as SMS- (Short Messages Services) based downloaders, porn dialers, and spammer applications, as well. Who is going to pay the bill?


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