THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE [Electronic resources] نسخه متنی

9.3. Target Locator

An efficient target locator module is an extremely important component of computer worms. The easiest mechanism for the attacker is to collect e-mail addresses on the system on which the worm was executed and to send attachments to such targets, but there are many more sophisticated techniques to reach new targets quickly, such as random construction of IP addresses in combination with port scanning.

Modern computer worms also attack the network using several protocols. In this section, I will summarize the most important attacks and network scanning techniques.

9.3.1. E-Mail Address Harvesting

There are many ways in which a computer worm can collect e-mail addresses for attacks. The attacker can enumerate various address books with standard APIs, including COM interfaces¹⁵. An example of this is W32/Serot¹⁶.

Files can be enumerated directly to find e-mail addresses within them. Additionally, sophisticated worms might use the NNTP (network news transfer protocol) to read newsgroups or use search engines such as Google to collect e-mail addresses using techniques similar to those that spam attackers use.

9.3.1.1 Address-Book Worms

All computer environments have some form of address book to store contact information. For example, the Windows Address Book or the Outlook Address Book might contain the e-mail addresses of your friends, colleagues, and clients, or names of e-mail lists in which you participate. If a worm can query the e-mail addresses stored in such locations, it can send itself to all of them and spread with an exponential infection rate. Unfortunately, it is a rather trivial task to query the information in such address books.¹⁷ worm was especially successful with this technique in March 1999. The worm depends on the Microsoft Outlook installation on the system to propagate itself in e-mail by sending an infected Word document as an attachment.

9.3.1.2 File Parsing Attacks on the Disk

Several computer worms such as W32/Magistr¹⁸ simply search for the e-mail client's files or for all files with a WAB extension and parse such files directly for e-mail addresses. This technique became popular after Microsoft introduced security features in Outlook against computer worms that spread via e-mail messages.¹⁹.²⁰ searches for e-mail addresses in Internet Explorer's Cache directory, the user's Personal directory, and the directory that contains the Windows Address Books (referred to by HKCU\Software\Microsoft\WAB\WAB4\Wab File Name in the Registry) in files whose names begins with sho, get, or hot, or whose suffix is HTM or WAB.

9.3.1.3 NNTP-Based E-Mail Collectors

Attackers have long introduced their creations in Internet newsgroups. In 1996 the abuse of the News Net became very intense. As a result, researchers of the Dr. Solomon antivirus team decided to create a service called Virus Patrol²¹ to scan Usenet messages for known and possibly unknown malware that was continuously planted in such messages. Virus Patrol was introduced in December 1996.²² was introduced by the infamous virus writer GriYo of the 29A group in late 1998. Not surprisingly, just like many other GriYo viruses, Parvo also used polymorphism to infect PE files, but it also became the first virus to integrate an SMTP mass-mailing engine. Parvo was years ahead of its time, written in pure Assembly resulting in a 15KB virus body.

W32/Parvo used several newsgroups to collect e-mail addresses, but apparently a minor problem limited its spread. Parvo randomly tried to connect to two possible news servers: talia.ibernet.es or diana.ibernet.es. These servers, however, were not available to everyone at the time. Thus Parvo's newsgroup-based e-mail collector was limited to work "inside the borders" of Spain.

Parvo connects on port 119/TCP (NNTP) to one of the preceding servers and starts to communicate. The attacker prepared three different e-mail messages with content that he expected to be catchy enough for the selected audiences of three different newsgroups.

Parvo's first message targets frequent readers of hacking-related newsgroups, such as alt.bio.hackers, alt.hacker, alt.hackers, alt.hackers.malicious, and so on. The second message is sent to a subset of this newsgroup list. Finally, the third message targeted visitors to erotic newsgroups, such as alt.binaries.erotica, alt.binaries.erotica.pornstar, and so on.

To find e-mail addresses in newsgroups, Parvo uses the group command to join to a group randomly and then uses the head and next commands a random number of times to pick a message randomly. Finally, it extracts the e-mail address from the header of the randomly selected message, sends itself in e-mail to the target, and repeats the process.

9.3.1.4 E-Mail Address Harvesting on the Web

Attackers also can search for e-mail addresses using search engines. This is a relatively simple task that can help the attacker gain quick access to a large number of e-mails. As I was writing this book, the first such worms appeared that utilized popular search engines such as Google, Lycos, Yahoo!, and Altavista to harvest e-mail addresses. For example, the W32/Mydoom.M@mm worm used this technique successfully, and according to Google, it caused minor DoS attacks against its servers.

9.3.1.5 E-Mail Address Harvesting via ICQ

Some computer worms, such as the polymorphic W32/Toal@mm²³, harvests e-mail addresses using ICQ (I Seek You) white pages located on ICQ servers. For example, http://www.icq.com/whitepages/ allows you to make searches for contacts according to various characteristics such as name, nickname, gender, age, and country in any combinations and retrieve contact information, such as e-mail addresses, to people who meet your search criteria. Not surprisingly, computer worms can get an advantage of the information provided.

9.3.1.6 Monitoring User Access to SMTP and Newsgroups on the Fly

Alternatively, a computer worm can capture e-mail addresses from outgoing messages. Even if a particular e-mail address is not saved anywhere on the system, when the user sends a message to a particular address, the worm can send a message to the same address. The Happy99²⁴ worm was the first to use this method. Happy99 sends two messages that look similar to the example shown in Figure 9.3. Note the X-Spanska: Yes in the header. This is a self-tracking method that was used by the worm's author. SMTP servers simply ignore commands that begin with the "X" prefix.

Figure 9.3. The header section of an e-mail sent by Happy99.

Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 09:11:40 +0100 (CET)
From: "XYZ" <xyz@xyz.cz>
To: <samples@datafellows.com>
Subject: VIRUS
X-Spanska: Yes

(Message contains UU-encoded Attachment.)

The original message is shown in Figure 9.4.

Figure 9.4. The message of the user is also sent by Happy99.

From: "XYZ" <xyz@xyz.cz>
To: <samples@datafellows.com>
Subject: VIRUS
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 09:13:51 +0100
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3110.3

The body of the extra mail contains a UU-encoded executable called happy99.exe. When the user executes the attached program, the worm's code is activated.

Happy99 looks for two API names in the WSOCK32.DLL export section. This DLL is the Windows Socket communication library used by many networked applications, including several popular e-mail clients. The worm patches the export address entries of the connect() and send() APIs to point to new entries at the end of the .text section (the slack space) of WSOCK32.DLL.

When the patched DLL is loaded in memory as a client library to a networked application, the worm intercepts the connect() and send() APIs. Whenever the user makes a connection, Happy99 checks the used ports. If the port turns out to be for mail or news access, a new DLL, SKA.DLL, is loaded into the process address space, which contains the worm's complete code previously saved on the disk.

When the intercepted send() API is called, the worm again checks whether this event is related to newsgroups or mail. If so, it copies some part of the original e-mail header, paying attention to MAIL FROM:, TO:, CC, BCC, and NEWSGROUPS: keywords in the header of the e-mail. Finally, it adds the X-Spanska: YES string to the mail header. Several other worms use an approach similar to Happy99's. Some of these worms inject their complete code into the WSOCK32 library.

9.3.1.7 Combined Methods

Of course, there can be many variations of e-mail address harvesting and worm propagation. For example, the Linux/Slapper worm³ is capable of harvesting e-mail addresses and providing them to the attacker based on his request via a remote-control interface. Then another worm might be created by the attacker to use the database of harvested e-mail addresses to propagate to a large number of machines very rapidlywithout requiring a large set of initial infections to harvest an efficient number of e-mail addresses. Even more likely, the attacker can use the collected e-mail addresses to spam targets.

9.3.2. Network Share Enumeration Attacks

Probably the simplest method to find other nodes on the network quickly is to enumerate the network for remote systems. Windows systems are especially vulnerable to such attacks because of their rich support for finding other machines with simple interfaces. Computer viruses such as W32/Funlove used the enumeration principle to infect files on remote targets. These attacks caused major outbreaks at large corporations around the world.

Several computer worms have minor implementation problems and become overly successful at finding networked resources, including shared network printer resources. This happens because not all worms pay attention to the type of resources they enumerate, which can lead to accidental printing on the network printers. Indeed, bogus worms print random-looking binary garbage on the printer, which is in fact the code of the worm. W32/Bugbear and W32/Wangy are examples of computer worms that accidentally target network printers with such an attack.

The success of this kind of worm usually depends on the trusted relationship between systems. However, there are additional contributors:

• Blank passwords:
  Many default installations of systems are vulnerable to attacks because they do not have a default password set for administrative-level access on shared resources.

• Weak passwordsdictionary attacks:
  Weak passwords were a target of computer worms as early as 1988, starting with the Morris worm. However, password dictionary attacks on Windows systems did not become popular until 2003, with the sudden outbreak of worms like BAT/Mumu. Surprisingly, Mumu carried a relatively short password list that includes password, passwd, admin, pass, 123, 1234, 12345, 123456, and a blank password. Most likely, its success is related to the blank passwords on administrator accounts.

• Vulnerabilities related to the handling of passwords:
  The W32/Opaserv worm appeared in September of 2002 and became infamous for its attacks against systems that were otherwise protected with strong passwords, but that shared network resources on vulnerable Windows installations. Specifically, Opaserv exploited the vulnerability described in the MS00-072 security bulletin, which affected Microsoft Windows 95/98 and Me systems. This vulnerability, known as the share-level password vulnerability, allows access to network shares using the first character of the password, no matter how long the password is. The number of systems that share network resources on the Internet without being protected by a personal firewall is overwhelming, which allows Opaserv easy access to writeable shared resources.

• Password-capturing attacks to gain domain administrator-level rights:
  In Windows networks, domain administrators have the right to read and write any files on any Windows machine on the network, unless specifically forbidden. On NT-based systems, domain administrators can also remotely execute programs on the fly and execute commands that require higher privilege levels than those of a regular user on the network.

These features make remote management possible, but at the same time they open up a whole new set of security problems. Gaining domain administrator rights is not trivial. However, a worm could do this easily if given enough time. A worm could spread through traditional channels, constantly sniffing the local network segment with traditional TCP/IP sniffing techniques. After detecting the domain administrator credentials being transferred in the network segment (for example, because the administrator is logging on from a nearby workstation), it logs the domain administrator's username and password hash.²⁵.

In fact, the hashing algorithm of passwords on NT domains splits long passwords to seven character chunks, helping L0phtCrack crack the password more quickly. Nevertheless, computer worms with built-in network sniffing to crack passwords have not been discovered so far. Secure your passwords nowbefore it is too late! (Of course, this advice might not be funded very well when you consider a computer worm with a built-in keylogger to capture user accounts and passwords to attack other systems.)

9.3.3. Network Scanning and Target Fingerprinting

Several computer worms construct random IP addresses to attack other nodes on the network. By analyzing the scanning algorithm of the worm, someone might be able to make predictions about the worm's propagation speed on the network.²⁶. Warhol worms can infect 90% of all vulnerable systems on the entire Internet in less than 15 minutes. (It is expected that IPv6 will force computer worms to switch from traditional scanning methods to "hit list" techniques in the future.)

9.3.3.1 Scanning Using a Predefined Class Table: The Linux/Slapper Worm

Network worms can also scan for remote systems, generating random IP addresses but using a predefined table of network classes. For example, the Linux/Slapper worm uses the classes as defined in Listing 9.1 to attack possibly vulnerable Apache systems running on Linux:

Listing 9.1. The Class Definitions of the Linux/Slapper Worm

unsigned char classes[] = { 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53
, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 80, 81, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134
, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152,
 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170,
 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188,
 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228,
 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239 };

Note

I picked the name for Linux/Slapper worm when we discovered it in September 2002. I chose the name based on Slapper's similarity to the BSD/Scalper worm's code. The Scalper worm attacked Apache systems with the scalp exploit codehence my name selection for this creature, after we had discovered it.

The preceding classes do not have some of the class A-sized, local networks, such as 10, or many other IP address ranges, including invalid classes. The worm builds the base IP address of the target machine as shown in Listing 9.2.

Listing 9.2. The Randomized IP Address Builder Routine of Linux/Slapper

a=classes[rand()%(sizeof classes)];
b=rand();
c=0;
d=0;

The attack will start with an address such as 199.8.0.0, and the worm will scan up the entire range of network nodes. Slapper attempts to connect on port 80 (HTTP) in order to fingerprint the remote system. It does so by sending a bogus HTTP request on port 80 that is missing the Host: header (which is required in HTTP/1.1) as shown in Listing 9.3.

Listing 9.3. The Bogus GET Request of Linux/Slapper

GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\n

The worm expects that Apache Web servers return an error message to this request; Apache returns the message shown in Listing 9.4 to the attacker node:

Listing 9.4. Apache Web Server's Answer

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2004 23:43:42 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.19 (UNIX)  (Red-Hat/Linux) mod_ssl/2.8.1
OpenSSL/0.9.6 DAV/1.0.2 PHP/4.0.4pl1 mod_perl/1.24_01
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: tex184; charset=iso-8859-1

Note the Server: Apache keywords in the error message. The returned data also has information about the actual version number of the Web server, which is 1.3.19 in this example.

The worm checks whether the error message is coming from an Apache server by matching the server information. Then it uses a table filled with architecture and version information numbers (shown in Listing 9.5) to see if the target is compatible with the attack.

Listing 9.5. The Architectural Structure of Slapper

struct archs {
char *os;
char *apache;
int func_addr;
} architectures[] = {
{"Gentoo", ", 0x08086c34},
{"Debian", "1.3.26", 0x080863cc},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.6", 0x080707ec},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.9", 0x0808ccc4},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.12", 0x0808f614},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.12", 0x0809251c},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.19", 0x0809af8c},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.20", 0x080994d4},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.26", 0x08161c14},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.23", 0x0808528c},
{"Red-Hat", "1.3.22", 0x0808400c},
{"SuSE", "1.3.12", 0x0809f54c},
{"SuSE", "1.3.17", 0x08099984},
{"SuSE", "1.3.19", 0x08099ec8},
{"SuSE", "1.3.20", 0x08099da8},
{"SuSE", "1.3.23", 0x08086168},
{"SuSE", "1.3.23", 0x080861c8},
{"Mandrake", "1.3.14", 0x0809d6c4},
{"Mandrake", "1.3.19", 0x0809ea98},
{"Mandrake", "1.3.20", 0x0809e97c},
{"Mandrake", "1.3.23", 0x08086580},
{"Slackware", "1.3.26", 0x083d37fc},
{"Slackware", "1.3.26", 0x080b2100}
};

The attacker knows that the remote system runs Apache on a system that is likely to be compatible with the exploit code of the worm (assuming that the system is not patched yet). The third value is a "magic" address related to the exploit code. The magic number is explained in Chapter 10. In this example, the worm will select the 0x0809af8c address using the Red Hat and 1.3.19 architecture and version information. (See the bold line in the preceding structure.)

9.3.3.2 Randomized Scanning: The W32/Slammer Worm

So far, the Slammer worm has been responsible for the quickest worm outbreak in history. Slammer attacks UDP port 1434 (SQL server) and does not bother to check whether the IP address is valid. It simply generates completely random IP addresses and sends a packet to each target. (See Table 9.2 for an illustration.)

Slammer appears to be one of the quickest possible attacks on the Internet, but researchers predict that some worm types in the future will spread even faster. Slammer's infection was observed almost simultaneously all around the world and does not need to use any fingerprinting. It counts on the "sure shot" against vulnerable targets, which will continue the infection of other nodes as fireworks.

9.3.3.3 Combined Scanning Methods: The W32/Welchia Worm

The Welchia worm uses an IP address generator engine similar to Slapper's; however, it uses a combination of methods:

• Welchia scans class Bsized networks near the host's class-B network. It does so by scanning either the exact class Bsized network or slightly above or below, in hopes that such nearby systems also might be vulnerable to the same exploits.

• The worm uses a hit list for class Asized networks. The attacker expects that these systems will have more vulnerable targets. This method also uses a randomized scanning strategy by attacking 65,536 random IP addresses.

Before Welchia proceeds with its exploits, it checks the availability of the remote system with ICMP echo requests (pings).